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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the construction of the 2008 economic crisis in American media 
through a comparative analysis of three case studies, each involving a different medium and each 
involving a distinct implied public.  I have approached this subject from a rhetorically-inclined 
hermeneutical and phenomenological perspective that conceptualizes texts as manifestations of 
symbolic practices which reflect social reality as well as construct it, and I explore how the texts 
of each case study simultaneously reflect and conjure both the 2008 crisis and their imagined 
publics. 
 In order to explore the some of the various ways the 2008 crisis has been constructed in 
American media, this research deploys three primary lines of investigation: the examination of 
radio broadcasts of speeches by American presidents during the crisis, the analysis of a selection 
of documentary and fictional films on or related to the crisis, and the evaluation of periodical 
articles from The New Yorker and The New York Review of Books.  
 The findings of the research reveal that the three case studies examined offer particularly 
distinct and elastic depictions of the 2008 crisis.  The presidential radio addresses depicted the 
crisis in a predominantly metaphorical manner as a painful event experienced by a national 
public through their rhetorical invocation of a particular and patriotic mytho-ideological 
imaginary of America and its history.  The films portrayed the crisis primarily as the dramatic 
unfolding of a traumatic narrative, emphasizing the character-driven nature of this dramatic 
unfolding and frequently highlighting the moral ambiguity of agents and characters.  The 
periodical articles largely constructed the crisis as principally related to matters of governance, 
finance and economics in both its precipitation and in its assuagement or resolution, 
conspicuously paying scant attention to the affective dimensions of its impact.  Collectively, the 
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case studies evidence that the multiform and dynamic character of the depictions of the 2008 
crisis in American media are significantly shaped by the combinative overlap of the particularity 
of the crisis as a complex and ambiguous phenomena, the dominant modes of address and 
distinct properties of each media type, and the particular implied publics to which each body of 
texts corresponded. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 
The difficulty lies not so much in developing new ideas as in escaping from old ones. 
(John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 1936) 
 
As tsunami.  As earthquake.  As cardiac arrest.  As greed.  As suffering.  As avoidable.  
As inevitable.  Boarded-up houses.  Gleaming office towers.  Stock-ticker lines plunging.  
Complex financial products.  Homeless families and jobless workers.  As yet another crisis.  The 
depiction in American media of what would eventually be referred to as the 2008 crisis has been 
impressive in the plurality of its expression and the richness of its expressive forms.  The crisis 
was sometimes depicted as a natural disaster, sometimes as a morality tale of the greed and lack 
of judgment of those who bought what they could not afford.  On other occasions, it was 
constructed as a villainous tale of the greed of financial firms that knew not any boundaries in 
their pursuit of ludicrous amounts of profit nor cared for what disaster that pursuit would bring to 
so many.  On yet other occasions, it was presented as the story of the collapse of a giant Ponzi 
scheme that had taken shape over an extended period, emanating out a fundamentally corrupted 
system propagating great inequality.  Framed from the level of the personal right up to the level 
of the civilizational, these constructions of the crisis have exhibited a phenomenal richness of 
variety which in itself speaks to the power of discourses to render events. 
 Indeed, the dynamism of the American media’s constructions of the crisis were evidenced in 
how they changed as it developed: the often panicked and dread-filled depictions of the darkest 
days of late 2008 and early 2009, frequently laden with themes of shock, speed, and collapse 
gradually gave way to descriptions of living in uneasy and tense times, of having entered a new 
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era of sorts where living under economic hardship or the threat of it became a new normal of 
sorts.  After what had happened, this new era appeared to be an age in which nothing was 
guaranteed anymore; post-Cold War triumphalism had been humbled, and prospects for the 
future appeared bleak.  Media both new and old played a leading role in the telling of this story, 
and of stories about this story.  The airwaves were filled with voices speaking out on what had 
happened and what was to be done about it.  Film screens featured stories of greed and opulence 
in both the real world and the real world imagined.  Newspapers and magazines produced 
volumes of ink and digital characters bearing the wisdom of leading experts, the vitriol of those 
outraged at the scale of what had happened and how it could have been let to happen, and the 
stories of those whose fortunes had been laid low. 
 The sequence of events which followed the September 15
th
, 2008 failure of U.S. investment 
bank Lehman Brothers, a storied financial firm with a record of more than a century and a half of 
business success, were registered worldwide with a degree of rapidity unseen beforehand.  The 
news that the titanic edifice of the American economy was on shaky ground and teetering spread 
fear and panic across countries on different continents.  Panicked investors rushed to evacuate 
their funds from firms and holdings that had so very recently been considered rock solid.  
Government officials and transnational bodies hastily convened to draw up plans to try and stop 
the financial bleeding as credit markets rapidly froze over and liquidity dried up.  Many people 
struggled to make sense of it all and wondered how it would affect their ability to retain 
ownership of their homes, feed their families, keep their jobs, and plan for the future.  That 
everything seemingly now hung in the balance came as a general shock.  To be sure, there had 
been rumblings the previous fall, and there had been some ominous signs throughout the summer 
as home foreclosures had ticked upward and signs of the economy slowing were discerned, but, 
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apart from the few naysayers who were mostly dismissed as wolf-criers, only a very small 
minority really, truly believed in the possibility of where the trajectory of events then in process 
might lead – that the potential of a full-blown generalized crisis was coming nigh. 
 Once the scale and scope of what was transpiring in mid-September 2008 became evident, 
both the public’s reaction to the crisis and the media’s coverage of it drew on and was shaped by 
the collective cultural memory of previous economic crises in America.  This collective cultural 
memory, which crucially was preserved substantially via media, referred to the history of 
precedents of economic crises that had been experienced in the United States and was harnessed 
to make sense both of what had happened and what was happening.  Economic busts of varying 
degrees of severity were certainly events that the people of the United States had been through 
on a number of occasions in the country’s history, though in the fall of 2008 it would probably 
not have been an exaggeration to say that, in the living memory of most Americans at the time, 
these tended to be relatively specific and localized rather than generalized and widespread.  The 
dot-com crash of the early 2000s and the short-lived but substantial negative economic impact of 
the September 11
th
 2001 attacks were still for example recent memories in 2008.  Although 
further removed in time, the 1990-1991 recession was still less than twenty years in the past 
though it had on the whole been too mild to leave much of a lasting impression, and the savings 
& loan crisis of the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s could still be referred to as an example of shady 
or outright fraudulent financial practices wiping out great amounts of wealth and precipitating 
government intervention.  However these episodes of significant economic downturn, although 
quite notable in several respects and not of negligible impact, were certainly not generalized 
economic crises.  Perhaps more representative of major economic trouble on a systemic scale 
was the oil crisis of the 1970s and the stagflation that occurred during that decade.  To be sure, 
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the term ‘oil shock’ does carry connotations that bear a certain degree of similarity to many of 
the popular descriptions of the 2008 crisis, descriptions which tended to emphasize speed, 
disorientation and trauma.  However, the nominal connection of the oil crisis to events far away 
in the Middle East and the corresponding impression that it was in many ways external to the 
financial markets and the wider U.S. economy, inflicted upon them from without so to speak, 
distinguishes the major crisis of the 1970s from that which followed in the wake of Lehman’s 
collapse.  In point of fact, the collective cultural memory of kindred experiences of what seemed 
to be happening in late 2008 and early 2009 to the United States’ economy were to be found in 
the main quite further back in American history, in a chapter that had long since been written. 
 The sudden seizing up of the financial machinery of the United States when the markets 
plummeted in the aftermath of Lehman’s failure and then hurtled downward again even more 
steeply after the subsequent rejection in the House of Representatives of Treasury Secretary 
Henry Paulson’s first bailout plan resulted in a widespread sense of panic.  That this massive 
failure to function seemed to originate from within the financial system itself as opposed to being 
externally inflicted on it inevitably brought comparisons of what was happening at the time to 
events that had taken place at the dawn of the Great Depression.  Figures as varied as Federal 
Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, Nobel Prize winning economist Paul Krugman and billionaire 
investor George Soros all issued dire warnings of what could happen if urgent action was not 
taken, and the haunting image of the Great Depression, that ‘big one’ of economic crises, loomed 
large in their visions of what the worst could be like.  This perspective was certainly not 
restricted to renowned experts in economics and finance.  Popular, media-borne narratives 
evoking the possibility of economic catastrophe on a scale reminiscent of the Great Depression 
abounded.  The plunging stock market, the growing number of home foreclosures, the rising 
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unemployment rate, and most notably the freezing of credit – President George W. Bush himself 
was memorably quoted as having said of the U.S. economy “if money isn't loosened up, this 
sucker could go down”1 – seemed to point in the general direction of 1929.  That the ghosts of 
the mass unemployment, widespread impoverishment, and the social and political unrest that had 
become indelibly associated with the severe economic contraction that had started in October of 
1929 and which ultimately had given the decade that was then about to open the lasting 
nickname of ‘the dirty thirties’ were being conjured in the year 2008 in the United States seemed 
incredible. 
It had been a long time since the return to such times of economic hardship had been thought 
of as a distinct possibility in America.  Since the end of the Great Depression, the United States’ 
economy had in many respects advanced by leaps and bounds.  It had cruised through numerous 
major armed conflicts emerging relatively unscathed or even stronger, propelled the United 
States to a decisive victory in an over 40-year long cold war with its Soviet nemesis, and 
ultimately installed America in a position of global hegemony with only periodic episodes of 
engine failure.  And then suddenly, almost unbelievably, in the fall of 2008 it stood at the brink, 
as the world’s foremost economic power stared into a dark chasm which led towards memories 
of cardboard-filled shoes and groups of the hungry and destitute huddled around makeshift fires, 
memories whose basis in actuality was located almost eighty years in the past.  That this could be 
happening just nineteen years after Francis Fukuyama had declared that man’s socioeconomic 
trajectory had reached “the end of history”2 and a mere year-and-a-half after Gordon Brown, on 
the other side of the Atlantic, had declared in words he would live to regret having spoken that 
Britain under his Labour Party would “never return to the old boom and bust”3 made it all the 
more shocking.  History appeared to be quite alive and well despite Fukuyama’s assertion that it 
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had ended as such with the post-Cold War triumph of Western liberal democracy as 
representative of the terminus of mankind’s ideological evolution, and the capitalist cycles of 
boom and bust that Brown so dearly (if naively) had hoped could be tamed and ultimately 
vanquished had also showed themselves to have been anything but relegated to the dustbin of the 
past.  This was the shock and truth that both the global capitalist system and its leading nation 
had encountered so unexpectedly, so soon along the path of their supposed post-victory marches.  
The remarkable feast of wealth that had been enjoyed by the wealthy nations of the capitalist 
West since 1991 ended decisively in 2008 with the appearance of an old spectre: the spectre of a 
generalized crisis of capitalism.
4
  The time of feasting had come to an abrupt halt, and that of the 
haunting questioning of the continued economic power and hegemony of the West had begun.  
 
Economic Crises: Calamitas Distinctivus 
There is something very particular about the phenomena of economic crises that make them 
exceptional amongst calamitous events.  It has been for example pointed out that economic crises 
can be distinguished from natural disasters in that they tend to have a wider range of potentially 
adverse impacts.
5
  However, what stands out foremost as distinct about economic crises as 
disastrous phenomena are their peculiar spatial, temporal, and agentive or causational 
characteristics.  Geographically, the effects of economic crises are widespread but typically 
unevenly distributed.  This characteristic of economic crises make them distinct from the 
generally more concentrated impacts of catastrophes such as natural disasters or armed conflicts 
in which damage tends to be proximate to the physical boundaries of the affecting phenomena.  
Along with their particularly complex and ambiguous spatial characteristics, economic crises 
also exhibit temporal complexity and ambiguity that render them distinct from other disastrous 
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events.  Quite unlike an earthquake or an armed invasion, when an economic crisis has been 
deemed to have started and concluded is often an item of debate and contestation, as the criteria 
and logic by which such judgments or assessments are passed or made is complicated by both the 
particularly fuzzy temporal character of economic crises and a lack of consensus amongst those 
judging or assessing their beginning and end points.  Furthermore and perhaps most crucially 
underscoring the particularity of economic crises amongst crisis or catastrophic phenomena is 
their nebulous causational or agentive character.  Given that economic crises emanate out of the 
complex and ambiguous opacities of the regimes of economic valuation, attributing agency or 
causation to the particular parties, systems and contexts from which they originate and develop is 
no simple exercise and is often subject to disagreement amongst both experts and non-experts, 
thus making them very unlike particular catastrophes or disasters that have relatively clear-cut 
agentive or causal origins.  These three distinctive characteristics of economic crises will now be 
elaborated upon with specific reference to the 2008 crisis. 
As was mentioned above, different geographic areas of polities or amongst polities are often 
affected in divergent ways and to uneven degrees by economic crises.  This geographic 
unevenness of the impact of economic crises is not strictly a characteristic of economic crises but 
rather is inherent to the functioning of capitalist systems themselves.
6
  However, while the 
inherently uneven geographic character of capital is at the root of both uneven economic 
development and the uneven geographic impact of economic crises of capitalist systems, it is 
particularly during economic crises that this unevenness is apparent.
7
  Some areas, regions or 
polities are particularly hard hit or left relatively unscathed based on a complex and particular 
combination of factors including but not limited to the character and diversity of their economic 
bases, the nature of the proximate causes or triggers of a given crisis, their existing fiscal 
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situations at the time of the advent of a crisis, demographic factors such as population growth or 
decline, and the extent of penetration and the specific configuration of the economic or financial 
systems in and of those areas, regions or polities.  The 2008 crisis is a case in point of the wide 
and uneven distribution of economic pain or damage.  In the United States, some states and 
regions bore the brunt of the economic damage based on indicators such as the rise in their 
unemployment rates and in the numbers of home foreclosures while others went relatively 
unscathed and ultimately emerged economically stronger.  For example, many of the Sun Belt 
states such as Nevada, Arizona and Florida suffered disproportionately in the crisis and displayed 
lingering signs of economic damage for many years afterwards whereas the Energy Belt and 
some urban areas, such as San Francisco, New York City, and Washington D.C., were less 
harmed by the deleterious effects of the crisis and eventually came out of it in vibrant economic 
condition.
8
   Suffice to say, the geographic impact of the 2008 crisis in the United States was 
indeed widely dispersed but unevenly distributed, and this widespread but uneven impact can be 
said to a particular feature of economic crises as disastrous phenomena. 
Further compounding the spatial particularity of economic crises being widely but unevenly 
distributed geographically is the fuzziness of their temporal boundaries.  In marked distinction to 
many other events of a disastrous character, the beginnings and endings of economic crises do 
not lend themselves well to neat and tidy classification schemes.  For example, although the 
particular names of the event; ‘the 2008 crisis’ or ‘the crisis of 2008’; imply that this event can 
be seen as having properly begun in the year 2008, some commentators make the case that the 
basic mechanics adumbrative of the crisis were effectively underway a year before Lehman’s 
collapse when “trust, the ultimate glue of all financial systems, began to dissolve in 2007”.9  
Others have highlighted the rhetorical development of a causal narrative of crisis at the very top 
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of the American political leadership in the days following September 15
th
 2008 as being 
inextricably bound up in the construction of the situation at that time as one representative of 
‘crisis’ in that the development of such a rhetoric cannot be separated from the overall 
contextualization of what was transpiring as a crisis because it “is simultaneously a product of 
this context and a co-creator of it.”10  Something similar could be said regarding the fuzzy 
temporality of the ‘conclusion’ of the crisis in the United States.  While the Business Cycle 
Dating Committee of the private National Bureau of Economic Research, the official arbiter of 
when recessions begin and end in the United States, declared in September of 2010 that the 
United States’ economy had exited recession in June of 2009 based on their particular technical 
criteria of assessment,
11
 substantially uneven rates of economic recovery on the whole as well as 
widespread inconsistencies amongst major indicators of economic health (for example, GDP 
growth coupled with rising unemployment or the deterioration of household incomes, either 
nationally or regionally) tended to vastly complicate temporal assessments of when or to what 
extent the crisis had passed.  In any event, it can be asserted that economic crises have particular 
characteristics that render the temporality of their boundaries much more blurred than those of 
many other considerably more temporally circumscribed disastrous events such as the atomic 
bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 9-11 attacks on the United States, and the Indian 
Ocean tsunami of December 26
th
 2004.  Their temporal fuzziness, like their spatial 
indeterminacy, stems from their character of being complex phenomena emanating out of the 
incredibly intricate spatiotemporal structures of market systems.    
Intimately connected to both the spatial and temporal complexity and ambiguity of economic 
crises is the nebulosity of their causational or agentive character.  Crudely put, the causes of 
economic crises and the agents or sets of agents involved in the circumstances leading towards 
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their development and crystallization are exceedingly hard to discern and this characteristic 
distinguishes them as phenomena from many other types of crisis events.  They are, for example, 
simultaneously quite unlike both the agent-less phenomena of pure natural disasters and the often 
highly agent-specific manmade catastrophes of wars, genocides, and terrorist acts.  The 
continuing debates over the causes of the 2008 crisis and the agents most responsible for it bear 
ample testimony to this being the case.  The 2008 crisis has been variously blamed on 
combinations of actors and variables such as financiers, government policies, a global savings 
glut, the shortcomings of regulatory agencies, innovation in the financial industry, the 
macroeconomic backdrop, globalization, and structural changes in the prevailing capitalist 
system.  These highly systemic purported origins, already complex in their spatiotemporal 
dimensions and clearly a significant part of why the causational and agentive character of 
economic crises are so difficult to map out, are even further complicated by the theoretical 
challenges of money as a medium of exchange and of value as an abstraction.  As such, 
economic crises represent particularly singular and daunting subjects of analysis amongst crisis 
events because it is often not clear who or what is responsible for their occurrence, to what extent 
certain agents or variables are responsible for their development and unfolding, and what the 
particular nature of the interrelationships between agents and variables involved in their 
occurrence are.  Taken together, the complexity and ambiguity of the spatial, temporal, and 
causational or agentive character of economic crises render them particularly distinctive and 
challenging subjects of analysis amongst disastrous events. 
 
11 
 
The Current Study 
Considering the particularity of economic crises as events of crisis, this doctoral dissertation 
seeks to explore the construction of the 2008 crisis in American media to gain insight into how 
distinct rhetorical and communicative strategies were deployed to take this complex, amorphous 
and ambiguous event and make it sensible, comprehensible, and fathomable through their 
particular processes of endowing it with meaning, form and context.  While a great deal of 
research has been conducted on the subject of economic crises in general,
12
 there has been, with 
very few exceptions,
13
 a paucity of investigation on the question of how these phenomena are 
mediated.  This lack of research on how economic crises are communicated is therefore 
representative of a significant blind spot in the study of the communication of disastrous events, 
especially given the widespread attention given to the mediation of other large-scale disastrous 
events such as war, genocide, and natural disasters in contemporary currents of research.  This 
paucity of research on the mediation of economic crises generally is also reflected in the case of 
the study of the mediated depictions of the 2008 crisis specifically.  It is true that a budding but 
still small literature exists on how the crisis was constructed in discourse as a traumatic event,
14
 
and there have been some studies on the rhetorical construction of the crisis in the political 
sphere,
15
 in policy discussions,
16
 in print journalism
17
, as well as on how it has been depicted in 
Hollywood film.
18
  However, despite the occasional exception
19
 these studies have by and large 
tended to be fairly narrow, mostly discipline-specific or media-specific explorations rather than 
broader attempts at grasping larger structures of meaning that potentially transcend different 
media.  It is to these two interconnected blind spots in contemporary research – the study of the 
mediation of economic crises, and the study of the mediated depictions of the 2008 crisis across 
various media – that the present study is oriented. 
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In order to explore some of the various ways the 2008 crisis has been constructed in 
American media, this dissertation conducts a comparative analysis of three case studies, each 
involving a different medium and each involving a distinct implied public.  Specifically, the 
three case studies upon which this study is based are the radio-borne addresses of American 
presidents, feature-length U.S. fictional and documentary films, and articles from select 
American periodical magazines of a centre-left political character.  The radio addresses and 
articles examined were broadcasted and published respectively in the period between 
approximately September 2008 and September 2010, while the films which were analyzed were 
released in the United States between the period of October 2010 and January 2012.  The texts of 
the three media examined respectively represent three different veins of discourse that 
correspond to three different implied publics.  The presidential radio addresses represent the 
discourse of the United States’ federal government on the crisis coming from its highest echelon 
– the official head of state – and they correspond to an implied national public of the United 
States.  The feature-length fiction and documentary films are examples of texts of an extended, 
audiovisual character and they correspond to an implied American cinema-going public that has 
an interest in political and politically-inflected films.  The articles from opinion-leading center-
left American periodicals are representative of a news-oriented, influential discourse that 
corresponds to an implied public of predominately American magazine readers of a broadly left-
of-centre political inclination with above average levels of income, education, and cultural 
capital.  Combining these three case studies, the multi-media, multi-modal approach taken here 
of analyzing radio broadcasts, films, and periodical articles and taking into account their implied 
publics – that is to say, the various publics whose perceived and actual existences are implicated 
to one extent or another by virtue of their being addressed via the textual modes and matter of 
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these sets of media artefacts – is designed to capture the dynamism and richness of the mediated 
depictions of the 2008 crisis in America. 
The specific objects of study of this dissertation, sets of texts, have been chosen on the basis 
that they can be understood as the manifestations of society itself in textual form.  This 
understanding is informed by the perspective that it is primarily through texts of all sorts – 
written texts, aural texts, audiovisual texts, and various other mixed media texts – that the very 
fabric of society is externalized and objectified in textual form and that “an objectified world-in-
common vested in texts is the essential coordinator of activities, decisions, policies, and plans of 
large-scale organizations of various kinds.”20  This perspective concerning how the very matter 
of society is expressed textually and in being so expressed plays a lead role in the reproduction 
of society at the level of lived experience has long intellectual lineage, going back to Émile 
Durkheim’s positing of external social phenomena existing independently of individual 
subjectivities.
21
  Durkheim’s example of how something like law can be externalized as objective 
social reality is demonstrative of how the transference of agency from living subjects to 
sociological texts is executed,
22
 and the basic principle at the core of such an operation – that 
social reality can be inscribed into texts which in turn have a shaping effect on society, not only 
in the domain of law but in innumerable other societal domains – is at the very centre of the 
examination of the objects of study of this dissertation.  While written texts have been the 
traditional focus of such explorations in hermeneutical inquiries,
23
 this project extends this 
perspective to aural and audiovisual texts, arguing that texts of these kinds are also representative 
of the operation of the externalization and objectification of the social into the textual which 
“creates the necessary separations between what we know as individuals, located in our 
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particular places in the world, and what we come to know as the trained readers of textual 
realities”.24    
In addition to how the sets of objects of this study were chosen from a particular theoretical 
perspective that envisions texts as crucial manifestations of the social, the particularities involved 
in the analysis of the three case studies of this project requires a novel set of theoretical 
approaches, and it is according to this challenge that a rhetorically-inclined textual analysis 
approach that respects the formal distinctions among the various case studies is deployed.  In 
support of this effort, this project will draw in part on key ideas of Paul Ricoeur and John Searle 
to ground the analyses of the case studies.  Both Ricoeur’s hermeneutical approach and Searle’s 
phenomenological emphasis on the socially constructed nature of reality are rhetorically-
oriented, but they are neither dogmatic nor rigid in character and this flexibility makes them 
particularly well-suited to the analysis of a diverse set of texts of the kind that will be undertaken 
here.  Searle’s particular emphasis on how social reality is significantly constructed through the 
symbolic conventions of language
25
 and Ricoeur’s hermeneutic stress on seeing the 
interpretation of texts as the loci of world-transforming possibilities
26
 are both, in their own 
ways, angles of approach that are highly appropriate to the overall rhetorically-oriented character 
of the texts examined.   
At its core, rhetoric is language or discourse that seeks to persuade.  It has connotative as 
well as denotative concepts, and as Kenneth Burke’s broad division of language into ‘scientistic’ 
and ‘dramatistic’ approaches implies, language oriented toward the connotative, dramatistic side 
of this spectrum (such as is epitomized by rhetoric) is dramatically oriented through its stress on 
hortatory pronouncements and should be understood as a form of symbolic action which finds 
itself expressed most readily in forms such as stories, the rhetoric of oratory, and mythologies.
27
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Texts, as Ricoeur contends, play an intimate and crucial role in the construction of different 
worlds of possibility through their ability to extend the actual, existing life-world into the 
symbolic world of non-situational references that has the power and potential to transform the 
life-world through the creation of new ways of being: references are opened up by texts and 
these references in turn have the capacity to open new horizons of being-in-the-world.
28
  The 
very basis of socially constructed reality; Searle argues, is predicated in large part on the 
assignment of deontic status through linguistic signs; that the fundamental shift through which 
institutional reality calls itself into being is ultimately of a linguistic character.
29
  Combining 
Burke’s thought on the rhetorical dimensions of language, Ricoeur’s emphasis on the potentially 
world-transforming powers of “the spirituality of discourse”30 expressed through texts, and 
Searle’s underscoring that the very fabric of institutional reality is constituted by a set of 
operations that can ultimately be sourced to the set of symbolic operations characteristic of 
language, insofar as many of the texts to be examined here were created in order to be widely 
disseminated amongst their respective publics and insofar as they implicitly and explicitly carry 
in them both claims and intent in reference to a symbolically-constructed social reality (and 
indeed, in the case of some of these texts, carry in themselves explicit calls for the transformation 
and even the radical transformation of the status quo reality of the world-as-it-is), they can be 
considered as being directed toward persuasion and ultimately toward action in-the-world of one 
kind or another.  It is this rhetorical orientation toward action – toward not just mere description 
or summation, but hortatory appeal in reference to a socially constructed world – found amongst 
a variety of diverse texts that gives grounds for the rhetorically-inclined, comparative textual 
analysis approach taken in this dissertation.   
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It should be acknowledged at this point that the choice of deploying an approach rooted in 
rhetoric, hermeneutics and phenomenology was necessarily made at the expense of forsaking 
other potentially fruitful avenues of inquiry.  Other methods of textual analysis such as content 
analysis and various deconstructionist approaches in literary studies are certainly of value in their 
respective focuses on the objective and systematic identification of specific features of 
communicated messages
31
 and the rejection of essential and stable meanings of texts in favour of 
emphasizing the crucial role of difference.
32
 It was determined however that a blend of rhetoric, 
hermeneutics and phenomenology was an especially good methodological fit for the character of 
the subject matter to be examined in this dissertation.  The grounding provided to the analysis 
through these methods, particularly with respect to how they strongly highlight the historical and 
institutional contexts that shape the emergence of the sets of texts that are the chief subjects of 
the examination, is of invaluable importance to the type of analysis that was most desired.  As 
such, the rhetorical, hermeneutical and phenomenological means of inquiry used in this study 
were specifically designed to probe the philosophical and sociological underpinnings of the 
particular sets of texts in question, texts that are to be understood as artefacts representative of 
the mediation of the social; of the elements and structures of society being reflected in the 
mediated textual expressions of a culture. 
The importance and appropriateness of the hermeneutical and phenomenological approach 
deployed here is to be seen in light of this intended emphasis on the historical and institutional 
contexts of the texts in question as reflections of the society from which they emanate.  It is in 
accordance with this aim that two central assumptions of the hermeneutic tradition in particular 
serve as important conceptual guidelines in this dissertation: that “Man’s link to the past 
precedes and envelopes the purely objective treatment of historical facts”33 and that “history as 
17 
 
science receives its meanings, at the outset as well as the end of research, from the link which it 
preserves with a received and recognized tradition.”34  In this respect, the examination of the 
texts that proceeds below recognizes that it itself is grounded in a wider historical context that 
both pre-exists it and provides it with form, making a reduction to a purely objective treatment of 
the texts impossible.  Also, insofar as the analysis given here is meant to be one that is 
historically-oriented, the hermeneutic interpretations of the texts in question offered are to be 
understood as being necessarily prejudiced by the hermeneutic tradition from which they 
emanate, a tradition in which the parts of texts are interpreted in relation to their wholeness and 
vice-versa.  This approach is ultimately anchored in the belief that there is in the sciences of man 
a fundamentally unavoidable hermeneutical component; that in the examination of the 
incompleteness, cloudiness and apparent contradictoriness of texts, “interpretation aims to bring 
to light an underlying coherence or sense.”35    
Complimenting the project’s hermeneutic dimension, the phenomenological dimension of 
the approach deployed in this dissertation is meant to highlight and do justice to the task of the 
analysis of the particular character of the phenomena from which the primary objects of inquiry 
are derived: an economic crisis.  The phenomenological nature of an economic crisis is 
extremely complex and the question of what one entails has no obvious, simplified answer that 
can be appealed to.  Economic crises are at once systemic macro-level phenomena involving 
highly complex and abstract market operations, mid-level phenomena of an institutional and 
social kind, as well as lived, experienced phenomena of individuals at the micro-level.  
Furthermore, the exceptionally complicated causal character of economic crises – particularly 
their origins in the opacities of the complex operations of markets – bestow upon them a 
peculiarly dematerialized and nebulous character quite unlike many other large-scale societal 
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traumas: they are in this sense the ‘neutron bomb’ of modern disasters, spreading shockwaves of 
economic destruction out from a relatively invisible centre of origin.  Searle’s work on the 
construction of social reality is thus most aptly suited to the analysis of bodies of texts on the 
subject of a phenomenon such as an economic crisis, given its emphasis on how all institutional 
reality (as opposed to the brute reality of nature independent of man) is ultimately erected upon 
the triad of collective intentionality, the assignment of function to objects, and constitutive 
rules.
36
  Moreover, the kind of emphasis evident in the fundamental components of Searle’s 
thought on the construction of social reality has an important precedent in Durkheim’s 
conceptualization of collective representations as the ultimate wellspring of social institutions 
and social facts.
37
  Accordingly, the phenomenological approach taken by Searle and adopted 
here is not solely anchored in the domain of analytic philosophy but also lies at the heart of the 
historical enterprise of sociology.  That a phenomenon such as an economic crisis could only 
exist by virtue of collective intentionality, collective representations, social institutions and social 
facts thus makes this phenomenological angle of approach one informed by both philosophy and 
sociology.  In this manner, the phenomenological dimension of the approach of this project is 
suited to the particular character of the phenomena from which the objects of study are derived. 
With the overarching theoretical and methodological framework now established, the key 
concepts that cut across the structure of the case studies of this dissertation presently need to be 
outlined.  Narratives, media, and publics are the core conceptual components which together 
form the backbone of the conceptual schema deployed in this doctoral dissertation, and as such 
some brief elaboration of their respective importance is merited.  The central place of narrative in 
the quintessentially human cultural experience is underscored by its plethora of forms, its 
permeation of an almost endless variety of media, and through its transcultural, international, and 
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transhistorical character.
38
 At a basic level, this dissertation is about narratives and how they are 
told.  It is about narratives because the plot of a narrative is comparable to the operation of 
predictive assimilation characteristic of the productive human imagination at work through 
which manifold and scattered events are gathered into a single, whole story and in being so 
gathered the intelligible nature of the narrative as a whole is schematized.
39
  It is also about 
narratives because of the particular character of the relationship between time and narrative, 
namely that “time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated through a narrative mode”.40  
These observations have clear implications for the understanding of history, for if narratives are 
the chief means through which pluralities of discrete events are connected into a whole, and if 
the humanness of time is predicated on it being articulated via a narrative mode, it follows that 
the primary way that history, as a plural collection of discrete events located in human time, is 
made intelligible is also through its articulation in a narrative mode.  Narratives can be conceived 
of as structures or vessels of memory, and it is in this sense that it is significantly through them 
that the past, both distant and recent, becomes preserved as history.  At the same time, stories of 
the past can be conceived of as powerful shapers of emergent narratives, for it is them that are 
turned to in large part to provide the historical and referential context though which emerging 
stories become intelligible.  In this sense, stories of the past play a critical role in how such 
emerging narratives come to be shaped, eventually becoming a part of history in their own turn, 
and in becoming part of history they contribute to the shaping of stories that are to come and the 
history-to-be of which such emergent stories will eventually form a part.   
The centrality of narrative to the consideration of time and history is also reflected in 
Ricoeur’s conception of the mimetic process: that of the passage of the narrative arc through the 
stages of prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration.
41
  All narratives, including those of a 
20 
 
historical character, are prefigured by the pre-narrative orientation of the human experience of 
being able to competently navigate the sign systems of one’s culture, configured in the particular 
processes and mechanisms by which given narratives are fixed, and refigured when narratives 
are activated and come alive in the consciousness of beings living outside the narratives’ 
imaginary worlds, becoming available for dynamic adaptation and use.
42
  This dynamic character 
of narratives is particularly important to understanding the discourses of the 2008 crisis, as this 
event was constituted as an event through the stories told about ‘it’, via the narratives about the 
stories that were integrated to this it-in-construction, and how this ‘it’ was understood through 
and given form by a variety of pre-existing narratives.  It is in this sense that it can be said that it 
is through narratives that events emerge via their being recognized as such, and that this process 
of becoming-an-event is always one that proceeds through a fluid and retrospective perspective.  
The becoming-an-event process can thus be imagined as a kind of continually moving rear-view 
mirror perspective of what has already happened, thus making it the case that an event is only 
recognized as an event once the story of how it became an event has been established, or to put it 
in Hegelian terms, “the owl of Minerva spreads its wings only at the falling of dusk”:43 the being 
of an event as an event is always constituted retroactively through its belated recognition as such. 
This realization of the central role of narratives in the anthropologically-derived human 
processes of sense-making of complex events and history then brings us to the next key concept 
of consideration: media.  Insofar as stories that serve as the basis of social knowledge and 
collective memory are mediated, this dissertation is therefore also significantly invested in 
questions of media.  In the context of this study, the focus on stories and how they are told also 
means taking into account how they are mediated, for mediation is a critical part of their telling.  
The broad thrust of that which is designated by the term media – that all media are somehow ‘in 
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between’ what they refer to (something ‘out there’ in the world, whether in the past or present) 
and an imagined recipient or set of recipients – is therefore of significance to the present study.  
Specifically, the logic underlying the selection of different media types in this study – radio 
broadcasts, films, and periodical articles – serves several research aims simultaneously.  First, as 
is mentioned above the selection of a range of media types is geared towards trying to capture 
the richness and diversity of the mediated depictions of the 2008 crisis.  The necessity of such a 
cross-media investigational approach was made evident by the scarcity of research specifically 
on the mediated communication of economic crises.  Second, the choice of having three case 
studies of different media types was also made to explore what kind of deep structures of 
signification might be discernible amongst and across different media types.  The research aim 
here was to complement and enable the deep structural orientation of the dissertation’s 
hermeneutical and phenomenological approach through the setting up of such a comparative 
arrangement of media types.  Third, the specific choice of the media of radio, cinema, and 
periodical articles was designed to furnish a relation of correspondence between the bodies of 
texts of the respective case studies and the character of the phenomena upon which they are each 
based: the 2008 crisis.  Specifically, what is meant by saying that a ‘relation of correspondence’ 
was sought between the specific media types of the texts that were chosen and the character of 
the phenomena that was their topical focus is that this particular strategy of the selection of 
media types was undertaken so that a set of media characteristic of cultural modernity – radio, 
films, and the popular press – could be utilized in the analysis of the decidedly modern 
phenomena of an economic crisis. 
The particular sources of the texts of the three case studies were also chosen strategically to 
provide three distinct perspectives from which to analyze the depiction of the 2008 crisis in 
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American media.  Presidential radio addresses were selected to provide a window onto the 
depiction of the crisis derived from an institutionalized, formal perspective – the ‘official’ 
depiction of the crisis according to the federal government of the United States – and the choice 
of focusing on communication derived from heads of state is justified primarily on virtue of 
those individuals’ self-evident importance as occupants of the highest political office in the land.  
Furthermore, the analysis of presidential rhetoric has long been a subject of American political 
communication research; indeed, it is one of wide topical scope, spanning both past and 
contemporary research;
44
 and it is within this broad tradition of the rhetorical analysis of the 
speech of U.S. presidents that the analysis of this set of texts is situated.   To provide a 
perspective on the crisis drawn from more extended and complex texts of an audiovisual 
character, four films representing a combination of feature-length fictional and documentary 
cinema – Margin Call, Inside Job, Arbitrage and The Queen of Versailles – were singled out for 
analysis.  The selection of both these forms of film was made to provide a comparative dynamic 
between them as two types of political or politically inflected cinema, and the analysis of them is 
modeled primarily but not exclusively in the image of the thematic study of political cinema.
45
  
A third perspective on the crisis is provided through the analysis of periodical articles published 
in two opinion-leading centre-left American magazines: The New Yorker and The New York 
Review of Books.  These magazines were chosen on account of their well-known and esteemed 
statuses as well as their political slants in order to garner a perspective on how the crisis was 
rendered in journalistic and quasi-journalistic text-based form of a critical, generally left-of-
centre political orientation.  Combined, these three perspectives represent an attempt at providing 
a sort of ideological spectrum of mediated perspectives on the crisis which ranges from what 
could be called a relatively centrist, middle-of-the-road perspective (the presidential addresses), 
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to a potentially more radical and explicitly politicized perspective (the films), to a perspective 
ideologically-informed by an intellectually-inclined, privileged, critique-oriented and generally 
left-sympathetic but not instinctively anti-establishment political character and history.     
Along with narratives being of paramount importance to cultural processes of sense-making 
and the mediation of such narratives being a subject of particular relevance, also of great 
significance in this dissertation is the question of publics, as publics are implied by the other two 
conceptual components in that they simultaneously prompt the creation of and are created by 
mediated narratives.  Indeed, there is a strange type of circularity when one speaks of a ‘public’.  
The existence of a public seems to be simultaneously dependent upon the virtue of it being 
rhetorically addressed in discourse, yet is also predicated upon the belief that there is an actual 
context of reception implied in discourse.
46
  The essentiality of this circularity to the concept of a 
public, that “a public might be real and efficacious, but its reality lies in just this reflexivity by 
which an addressable object is conjured into being in order to enable the very discourse that 
gives it existence”,47 speaks to the complex theoretical challenge of the question of publics.  
Furthermore, such a conception of a public is a particularly modern phenomenon.  It is 
absolutely reliant on the idea of otherwise unrelated individuals being organized via texts in a 
manner not captured by terms such as ‘crowd’, ‘audience’, ‘people’ or ‘group’, and it is upon 
this distinguished basis that “this [circular] sense of the term [public] is completely modern; it is 
the only kind of public for which there is no other term.”48  Accordingly, while not focused 
explicitly on the question of publics per se, the discussion of the three case studies of this 
doctoral dissertation are to be understood as being intimately informed by such a modern 
conception of the term ‘public’ as is designated here.  The implied publics of each media type are 
to be understood as being fundamentally characterized by such reflexivity in that they are both 
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constituted by the rhetorical addresses of discourse and constitutive of discourse as the context of 
its reception.  It is in such a manner that publics, along with narratives and media, are a core 
component of the conceptual schema of this study.  All three are to be seen as being heavily 
interrelated and of fundamental importance to the analyses of the case studies upon which this 
dissertation is based.  The three distinct yet interrelated publics to which the three case studies 
correspond are therefore reflective of this project’s comparative attempt to understand the ways 
that the particularly complex and ambiguous phenomenon of the 2008 economic crisis was 
mediated, as it was through the narrative circumscriptions of such mediations that the complexity 
and ambiguity of the crisis was given form, rendered intelligible, and endowed with meaning. 
 
Chapter Outline 
This dissertation consists of five chapters in sequence.  The chapter that follows (Chapter 2) 
discusses weekly presidential radio addresses on the 2008 crisis.  A brief examination of the 
history of the analysis of presidential rhetoric in the United States is first offered to establish a 
theoretical grounding for the analysis of the texts in question.  Following this, an attempt to shed 
light upon some theoretical questions concerning the interconnections between collective cultural 
memory and media is offered.  In particular, two major arguments are outlined concerning why 
the discourse on the 2008 crisis in American media seems to mostly only date back in time as far 
as the Great Depression, an event which is ultimately postulated as having come to represent the 
inaugural economic trauma of modernity.  An argument is then advanced that the presidential 
radio addresses on the crisis must be understood within the three overlapping contexts of the 
construction of social reality, modernity, and the dynamism of language as a form of symbolic 
action.  Following this, a thematic analysis of the presidential radio addresses on the crisis is 
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offered which is structured primarily through the identification of salient metaphors, rhetorical 
strategies, and topical emphases that were apparent amongst the various addresses that were 
examined. 
 The examination of the presidential radio addresses on the 2008 crisis in Chapter 2 revealed 
that the dominant framework through which the 2008 crisis was constructed in these broadcasts 
was that of it being a collective cultural experience of economic trauma of a nation.  It was 
depicted in large part as the story of a disaster that had befallen an ‘us’ – the imagined collective 
of the American people, coextensive across both time and space – and in being framed as a 
calamity that had befallen a nation the rhetoric of the addresses substantially harnessed 
affectively-loaded mytho-ideological conceptions of America and American history to evoke 
themes of collective belonging, strength, and perseverance.  In particular, the metaphoric 
portrayal of the 2008 crisis as storm or as sickness and the American economy as an architectural 
structure or as a machine were oft-used, as were other tropes that seemed to carry moral, 
religious or quasi-religious connotations such as industriousness, fairness, sin, redemption and 
salvation.  Furthermore, that the 2008 crisis was actually of an international character in many 
ways but ended up being constructed predominately as a national experience in the presidential 
radio addresses was itself telling.  This seemed to follow in the steps of the way other, previous 
economic crises were also constructed primarily as national experiences of calamitous events, 
taking their place amongst other crisis events of a collective character experienced in America 
such as natural disasters, wars or acts of terrorism.  As a correlate of this construction of the 
crisis as a national disaster, it was also found that the presidential radio addresses deployed 
rhetoric specifically stressing the need for and implementation of emergency, exceptional 
measures of action of a robust and timely character to prevent further and potentially irreversible 
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harm from being incurred.  The 2008 crisis in this sense can be said to be located at the crossing 
point of two very modern axes: the story of a nation-state – America – as an imagined 
community firmly located in the context of modernity traumatically encountering and working 
through a quintessentially modern disastrous phenomena: an economic crisis of a capitalist 
system.  Of the three case studies examined, the presidential radio addresses most explicitly 
conjured such an imagined national public through their powerful rhetorical invocation of the 
nation-state of America as a patriotic community built on a mytho-ideologically constructed set 
of shared historical experiences. 
 The focus on the construction of the 2008 crisis created through speeches given over the 
airwaves by the holders of the highest political office in the land in Chapter 2 is succeeded by the 
analysis of the audiovisual depiction of the crisis as it appeared on film screens in Chapter 3.  
This second case study begins by outlining the methodological considerations which undergirded 
the selection of the texts, and proceeds to discuss some of the historical, cultural, and political 
significance of the context of the emergence of film as an important and distinct modern, 
mechanically reproducible medium of communication.  The political significance of film as a 
medium of historical representation is discussed in particular, and the ability of cinema’s distinct 
system of signification to open up conditions of historical possibility and make claims of 
historical truth in its representations of the past and present is highlighted.  Next, the concept of 
political cinema is theoretically examined and an argument is constructed explaining how many 
of the films on the 2008 crisis can be genealogically traced back to two loosely affiliated 
movements in American cinema which arose roughly concurrently in the 1960s: the New 
Documentary and New Hollywood movements.  The chapter then proceeds with sequential 
analyses of the four selected films on the crisis.  Multiple analytic techniques are deployed to 
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engage these complex and extended texts including narrative and thematic analysis, semiotic 
analysis, cinematographic analysis and the analysis of dialogue in order to elucidate how the 
respective selected films render the 2008 crisis in cinematic audiovisuality.     
 The findings of chapter 2 suggest that the depiction of the 2008 crisis in cinematic form was 
predominantly but not exclusively manifested as a character-driven, dramatically-oriented 
unfolding of a decidedly moral character.  The restricted freedom of agency and moral ambiguity 
of lead characters acting under exceptional conditions of crisis was a particularly evident theme 
in the two fictional films on the crisis, where a race against circumstances either partially or 
totally beyond their control was the primary fulcrum that moved the events of the plot as well as 
the principal framework in which the moral dimensions of the characters’ actions were generated 
and enmeshed.  Questions of morality figured prominently in the two documentary films’ 
depictions of the crisis as well, but in a differing manner.  In these films, the crisis itself was 
heavily moralized as the perversion or corruption of a mytho-ideological American ethos built 
around a constellation of ideas such as hard work, fairness, family values, and individual 
initiative as was evidenced through the films’ highlighting of the moral failures of particular 
individuals or groups connected to or representative of what were popularly seen as the core 
moral failures which precipitated the crisis: greed, excess, hubris and dishonesty.  On the whole, 
all four films tended to ascribe a sense of sudden shock to the advent of crisis conditions and in 
doing so they emphasized the overwhelming power of events in motion as the primary context in 
which agency was shaped.  The usage of particular cinematographic techniques such as lighting, 
mise-en-scène and editing contributed substantially to the visual generation of a sense of the 
oppressive imposition of crisis and restricted agency in the films, and the use of predominantly 
urban and often symbolically-loaded geographic settings of the films also played a major role in 
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visually coding the 2008 crisis as a phenomena associated with the built environment of cities 
and connected especially to metropolises associated with finance and money such as New York 
City and Las Vegas.  Situations of crisis transpiring in environments coded as crisis settings were 
established in such ways as the foremost frame of many of the films’ plot movements, and the 
exceptional nature of such circumstances frequently framed the domain of dramatic action via 
the restricted nature of characters’ agency in the films. 
  Whereas Chapter 3 consisted of an in-depth examination of four motion pictures on or 
clearly meant to be evocative of the 2008 crisis, the focus in Chapter 4  shifts back over to 
examining the discourse of the 2008 crisis as found in a larger number of less extended texts.  
This third and final case study analyzes articles on the crisis that were published in two New 
York-based periodicals: The New Yorker and The New York Review of Books.  The chapter 
commences with some reflections on the subject of how the events that transpired in the fall of 
2008 came to be labelled as a ‘crisis’ through a variety of discourses that constructed it as an 
unexpected event of a disastrous or catastrophic nature and goes on to pose some key theoretical 
questions concerning the depiction of disastrous and catastrophic narratives, particularly 
regarding the role of the media in the construction of such narratives.  Pertinent information 
concerning The New Yorker’s audience and history is detailed, and some initial thoughts on its 
coverage of the 2008 crisis are given. The methodological approach that was deployed in the 
categorization of The New Yorker’s articles is then explained and a thematic analysis of its 
coverage of the 2008 crisis is executed.  Chapter 4 closes with a comparative analysis of The 
New York Review of Books’ coverage of the crisis as a complement to the chapter’s primary 
focus on The New Yorker’s coverage.   Some key differences between The New York Review of 
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Books’ coverage and that of The New Yorker are outlined, and some hypotheses are advanced on 
the significance of the ‘expert’ and ‘elite’ character of the former’s coverage of the 2008 crisis. 
 The findings of Chapter 4 suggest that the 2008 crisis was depicted in The New Yorker and 
The New York Review of Books as an issue principally related to finance, economics and, above 
all, governance, both in its precipitation and in its assuagement or resolution.  Both periodicals 
primarily constructed the crisis as the domain of high figures in government and business, 
emphasizing the significance of their actions and agency with respect to responsibility for the 
crisis having occurred and in attempts to deal with the issues created by it.  In comparison to the 
presidential radio addresses and the films, the periodical articles had a decidedly more detailed 
emphasis on the institutional context of the crisis, highlighting legal and legislative specificities 
to a considerable degree.  Related to this, the discourse on the crisis of the periodicals examined, 
especially that derived from The New York Review of Books, also had a much richer and wider-
ranging historical and theoretical detailing of the origins of the crisis which was often supported 
through references to major economic paradigm shifts in the United States and elsewhere and 
this was frequently expressed in a highly advanced and challenging manner.  On the other hand, 
in terms of commonality the depiction of the crisis in the articles of the two periodicals examined 
shared with the radio addresses and the films a tendency to frame of the 2008 crisis as a national 
issue first and foremost.  Specifically, the crisis was for the most part constructed in The New 
Yorker and The New York Review of Books as an event or issue affecting the fortunes of America 
and Americans, and this emphasis can be seen as primarily stemming from the composition of 
the magazines’ readerships, which were surely overwhelming composed of American citizens, 
and the consequent editorial or journalistic perception of these readerships’ interests.  However, 
despite the periodicals’ commonality with the radio addresses and films in framing the 2008 
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crisis as primarily an American event affecting Americans, the coverage of the crisis in the 
articles of The New Yorker and The New York Review of Books was quite differentiated from the 
other two case studies in that it was considerably less affectively oriented.  The crisis was 
principally depicted in the periodicals as a policy or technical issue to be addressed by 
government, and this was a marked and unexpected departure from the heavily affect-loaded 
character of the radio addresses on the subject of the crisis and the dramatic moral presentations 
of the crisis in the films.  This eschewing of affect-oriented stories and issues in the periodical 
articles’ coverage of the crisis generally in favour of the publication of stories that were often of 
a highly technical, policy and economics-centred disposition could be attributed to a combination 
of issues, such as the editors’ and writers’ impressions of their respective magazines’ implied 
publics, the particular left-of-centre journalistic tradition of seriousness that the writers of both 
magazines seemed to practice, and the particular suitability of written texts to the systematic 
presentation of complex sets of ideas characteristic of the kind of highly complex and specialized 
policy-oriented informational matter frequently referred to in the domains of politics and 
economics in relation to the crisis. 
Finally, the concluding chapter outlines some of the major findings drawn from the 
preceding chapters respectively, synthesizes them, discusses some of the limitations of the 
research, and offers suggestions for future research directions.  The discussion comes to an end 
with some concluding thoughts concerning the ramifications of the research findings for the 
study of media depictions of the 2008 crisis specifically and for further research on mediated 
constructions of economic crises generally.  I suggest that the kind of broadly-based yet depth-
oriented hermeneutical analysis conducted in the study provides a fertile avenue of inquiry for 
interdisciplinary scholars to explore how media narratives of complex and ambiguous disastrous 
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events are created and shaped, and furthermore, how they play a crucial communicative role in 
forming publics’ consciousness of such phenomena.  Ultimately, such an approach is grounded 
within a longstanding and deeply engaging humanistic tradition of textual analysis, and it is this 
tradition which constitutes the basis of this project. 
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Chapter 2 – History, Memory, & Crisis: The 2008 Economic Crisis in 
the United States’ Presidential Radio Addresses 
 
I am certain that my fellow Americans expect that on my induction into the Presidency I will 
address them with a candor and a decision which the present situation of our people impels. This 
is preeminently the time to speak the truth, the whole truth, frankly and boldly. Nor need we 
shrink from honestly facing conditions in our country today. This great Nation will endure as it 
has endured, will revive and will prosper. So, first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the 
only thing we have to fear is fear itself. 
  
(President Franklin D. Roosevelt, inauguration speech; Washington, D.C., March 4
th
, 1933) 
 
 
Although he was not the first American president to deliver a radio-specific address,
1
 Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt was the first president to make the giving of radio addresses a semi-regular 
practice.
2
  It is perhaps telling that the first of a series of thirty addresses by Roosevelt, later to be 
known as his ‘fireside chats’, was retroactively entitled ‘On the Bank Crisis’.  Broadcast eight 
days into his presidency at the height of the Great Depression on March 12
th
 1933, this address 
spoke to an America where unemployment had almost reached a staggering 25%, a nation 
traumatized by over three years of economic contraction.  At the very end of the address, 
Roosevelt stated: 
After all there is an element in the readjustment of our financial system more important than 
currency, more important than gold, and that is the confidence of the people. Confidence and 
courage are the essentials of success in carrying out our plan. You people must have faith; you 
must not be stampeded by rumors or guesses. Let us unite in banishing fear. We have provided 
the machinery to restore our financial system; it is up to you to support and make it work. 
It is your problem no less than it is mine. Together we cannot fail.
3
 
Seventy-six years later, another American president also took to the airwaves to speak to the 
nation, again in a time of economic crisis.  This time it was George W. Bush.  Speaking on 
September 20
th
, 2008, five days after the bankruptcy filing of Lehman Brothers, Bush said: 
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In the long term, Americans can have reason to be confident in our economic strength. America 
has the most talented, productive, and entrepreneurial workers in the world. This country is the 
best place in the world to invest and do business. [...] We will weather this challenge too, and we 
will do it together.
4
 
 
The resemblances between the statements of Roosevelt and Bush are curious enough.  In their 
radio addresses, both men speak of confidence, unity, and overcoming in times of economic 
hardship, and both make reference (Roosevelt implicitly; Bush explicitly) to a history: the history 
of the American nation.  That there are such resemblances between the content of the two 
statements and the contexts of the two statements – that both make rhetorical appeals to 
American confidence and unity and both were made at moments of national crisis – points to an 
important relationship: the relationship between media and collective memory.   
In this chapter, I will explore the rhetoric of the weekly presidential radio addresses 
pertaining to the 2008 crisis and discuss it as a distinct vein of discourse of this crisis in the 
United States.  To do so, I shall first give a brief account of the historical development of the 
particular rhetorical character of addresses made by presidents of the United States with an 
emphasis on how the rhetoric of such presidential addresses can be understood within a 
theoretical framework of charismatic leadership as a kind of crisis discourse.  Following this, in 
order to prime the analysis of the actual addresses given by American presidents during the 2008 
crisis, I will outline an argument concerning how The Great Depression may be understood as 
the watershed historical event which provided the overarching template of the modern discourse 
of economic crises in America and that accordingly the discourse of ensuing economic crises in 
America – including the 2008 crisis – have been significantly shaped by the lasting impact of the 
cultural memory of The Great Depression in America as the inaugural economic crisis of 
modernity.  After this discussion, I will conduct an analysis of the radio addresses on the crisis 
given by Presidents Bush and Obama through articulating five broad themes that were 
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discernible in these addresses in order to explore how the meanings of the crisis were rendered in 
this rhetoric emanating from the highest level of the American political leadership. 
 
The Rhetoric of the Presidential Pulpit  
To explore the discursive construction of the 2008 crisis through the regularly scheduled weekly 
radio addresses of American presidents, a practice initiated by Ronald Reagan in 1982 and 
continued in one form or another by every U.S. president since Bill Clinton,
5
 two particular 
subjects are in need of discussion presently.  First, the subject of the history of the rhetoric of 
presidential addresses needs to be briefly detailed in order to ground the analysis of the discourse 
of the national radio addresses of Presidents Bush and Obama on the 2008 crisis.  Second, an 
examination of how this discourse may be seen as intimately related to the discourse of previous 
economic crises is required.  This examination in its own turn requires some discussion of the 
relationship between media and collective memory. 
The study of presidential rhetoric has been a subject of particular interest amongst the study 
of American political communication.  Different strands of research on presidential rhetoric have 
highlighted a variety of subfields of this topic, ranging from the broad historical evolution of the 
character and purpose of presidential rhetoric in the United States
6
 to the analysis of the 
charismatic exercise of presidential rhetoric,
7
 including during periods of crisis,
8
 and a variety of 
topics related to both of these.  These two subfields are of particular interest to the current study, 
given the clear importance of the historic development of presidential rhetoric and the particular 
context of the crisis as the specific setting in which the attempts to deploy charismatic, 
persuasive rhetoric in the addresses by Presidents Bush and Obama were made.  Accordingly, the 
evolution of the modern rhetorical presidency will be briefly detailed below and will be followed 
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by a short discussion of charismatic leadership, the rhetoric of leaders during crises, and the 
study of presidential rhetoric.   
To begin with the consideration of the broad historical evolution of presidential rhetoric, it is 
highly noteworthy that presidential rhetoric has been theorized as having been manifested in two 
broad historical forms in the United States’ history (with a short transitional period between the 
two), essentially representing a process of transition from an older, pre-modern model to the 
current modern model.  Specifically, it has been argued that prior to well into the twentieth 
century it was actually quite rare for American presidents to communicate directly to the public.
9
  
Throughout the nineteenth century, American presidents “rarely spoke directly to the people, 
preferring communication between the branches of government.”10  In the rare instances during 
this period where presidents did seek to deliver popular speeches, such speeches differed 
markedly from the kind of policy speeches aimed at a domestic audience that were to become 
commonplace in the modern era.
11
  However, after a transitional period epitomized by Theodore 
Roosevelt’s presidency where both the archaic model of presidential rhetoric and the modern 
model familiar in the contemporary period coexisted, with the latter gradually becoming 
dominant, presidential rhetoric exhorting ‘the people’ directly became commonplace.12  The 
development of a modern, direct form of rhetorical address to a national public, intimately 
related to the development of various mass media, on the part of U.S. presidents has been 
theorized as representing a development whose chief significance is that it can be conceived of 
as a form of governance in and of itself: 
Popular or mass rhetoric, which Presidents once employed only rarely, now serves as one of their 
principal tools in attempting to govern the nation [...] Today, a president has an assembly-line of 
speechwriters efficiently producing words that enable him to say something on every 
conceivable occasion.  Unless a president is deliberately “hiding” in the White House, a week 
scarcely goes by without at least one major news story devoted to coverage of a radio or TV 
speech, and address to Congress, a speech to a convention, a press conference, a news release, or 
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some other presidential utterance.  But more important even than the quantity of presidential 
rhetoric is the fact that presidential speech and action increasing reflect the opinion that speaking 
is governing.  Speeches are written to become the events to which people react no less than 
“real” events themselves.13 
 
The presidency of Woodrow Wilson has been cited as a watershed era in presidential rhetoric, 
and the two heavily interfused pillars upon which this ‘Wilsonian concept of the rhetorical 
presidency’ was built – first, that the President should use oratory to shape public opinion and 
that this should take precedence over intergovernmental communication, and second, that 
presidential rhetoric should harness public sentiment and express the public’s desires14 – were 
clearly in part predicated upon the usage of the dominant mass media of the time: a popular 
press.  While the emergence of the rhetorical presidency in the United States has been 
characterized as having primarily arisen from doctrinal imperatives rather than from the 
development of modern mass media per se,
15
 the importance of the mass media in this process 
should nevertheless not be overly downplayed: a two-sided, reciprocal relationship can be said to 
have existed between the development of mass media and the advent of the modern presidency.
16
 
 With the historical context of the modern rhetorical presidency now sketched out in brief, 
some important considerations concerning the character and uses of presidential rhetoric in times 
of crisis should now be outlined.  The connection of crises to the development of charismatic 
leadership has long been an object of study, going back to Weber’s idea of charismatic 
authority,
17
 and it has been asserted that “crises provide opportunities for leaders to take bold, 
forceful action and may increase the willingness of subordinates and others to follow the 
leader.”18  A substantial amount of research has been conducted on charismatic leadership itself, 
with studies having been conducted on a range of subjects such as the fundamental rhetorical 
elements of charismatic speech,
19
 the crucial importance of leaders’ deployment of rhetorical 
strategies in the framing of highly impactful messages,
20
 and the potential profundity of the 
37 
 
impact of leaders’ speeches on followers.21  In the context of the rhetorical leadership of 
American presidents specifically, although it may seem to be a rudimentary point to make it 
should be mentioned that “in U.S. politics, the president’s words are more prominent than any 
other speaker.”22  However, while occupying the highest political office in the land in America 
confers considerable symbolic value on the rhetoric of the occupant, there remains a lack of 
consensus regarding how such rhetoric is effectively or successfully deployed.  For example, 
some scholars have displayed a tendency to orient their research toward the question of whether 
particular presidents’ specific uses of rhetoric have been successful in the achievement of their 
predefined political goals.
23
  Other scholars have adopted a much more broad and nuanced 
perspective on how presidential rhetoric functions, preferring to downplay ‘effects’ altogether 
and instead emphasize that the power of the presidential usage of rhetoric, like that of rhetoric 
more generally, lies not strictly or even primarily in the creation of short-term desired effects of 
persuasion but rather in the selection of what is said, the manner of its saying, the audience to 
which it is addressed, the conditions under which it is said, and the ostensible outcome because 
“there is no way to discern with certainty that the selections made by the speaker were the causal 
factors operative in the behavior manifested by the audience, whether that behavior was in line 
with the intentions of the speaker.”24  Questions of the effectiveness and causational dynamics of 
presidential rhetoric aside; however, it is suffice to say for the moment that the study of 
presidential rhetoric in situations of crisis has been a subject that has received substantial 
scholarly attention, and that some of this research will be discussed in the analysis of Presidents 
Bush’s and Obama’s radio addresses on the 2008 crisis that will ensue below shortly. 
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1929: The Inaugural Economic Crisis of Modernity 
The question of memory is a complex one undoubtedly.  One avenue of inquiry among many 
concerning memory is ‘who remembers?’  For the ancients, such as Plato and Aristotle, this was 
never a question – it was surely the individual person who remembered – and it was only with 
the emergence of sociology, particularly through the adoption by Maurice Halbwachs of the 
Durkheimian school of methodological holism, that the concept of collective consciousness and 
memory came to stand in opposition to the individualistic conception of memory held by the 
ancients.
25
  Collective memory is distinct from individual memory in that it “is not ‘natural’ or 
existent only in the mind of individuals, but is rather the result of social processes that result in 
material forms outside of the human subject that engages with them.”26  Practices of collective 
memory are common to all societies, and collective memory in its simplest form can be thought 
of as a “repository of shared cultural images, narratives, and visions of the past.”27  
Consequently, it is only to collective memory which history can refer in any of its claims as to 
the veracity of memory and it is thus to collective memory that history corresponds.
28
  However, 
questions concerning the veracity of collective memory are complicated by the fact that much of 
what is considered to be a part of the domain of ‘tradition’ and thus associated with actual 
historical roots can be considered as having been invented in the modern era, such as is the case 
of many traditions which have been used to legitimate nationalist ideologies.
29
  Bearing in mind 
the complexity of the linkages between collective memory and history as well as the ambiguous 
nature of the relationship between history remembered and history imagined, an examination of 
how the American collective memory of the history of economic crises can be understood in the 
context of the 2008 financial crisis can now be pursued in earnest. 
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Throughout the discourse of the 2008 crisis, the spectre of Great Depression is repeatedly 
conjured.  Sometimes this spectre is referred to by its name, at other times its presence is implied 
indirectly through the mentioning of the 2008 crisis as “an economic crisis unlike any we'd seen 
in generations”30 or “a historic economic crisis”,31 but, like a gravitational field located 
somewhere in the past, the force of its impact stretches forward in time as the unrivalled 
collective memory of economic trauma in modern Western history.  The Great Depression has 
long been the yardstick with which subsequent economic crises affecting the United States have 
been measured and has served as the historical and cultural reference point of the popular 
imagination of economic crises in America and in the West more generally.  It is an enduring 
part of the collective popular memory of the United States,
32
 situated as it was as a period of 
unprecedented economic difficulty following a decade of prosperity in the wake of America’s 
full taking to the world stage in the First World War and preceding the return to world war and 
the post-WWII role of the United States as the economic and military superpower of the West.  
Accordingly, the Great Depression can be situated as part of the narrative of the history of 
‘modern America’ and it stands unrivalled as the inaugural modern economic trauma that 
temporarily reversed the fortunes of a nation otherwise on a historical trajectory toward 
increasing economic might and affluence.  However, as benign and straightforward as such 
claims may sound, they bring about an intriguing question: what, in particular, is the basis upon 
which the Great Depression assumes the position that it does?  Why does it seem that, in the 
popular memory of the history of economic crises in the United States, nothing seems to have 
ever happened before 1929?  It is to these questions to which we must turn before proceeding too 
much further apace. 
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If the ultimate American reference point for the discourse on the 2008 crisis, indeed for 
economic crises in America more generally, is the Great Depression, then the question of why 
there seems to be a distinct lack of references in the discourse of the 2008 crisis to economic 
crises further removed in time than the Great Depression must be examined.  Part of the answer 
lies in that the experience of economic crises can be said to be firmly situated as part of the 
economic experience of modernity.  Before a certain historical point, the widespread and 
collective experience of economic hardship due to a severe downturn in the capitalist business 
cycle as is commonly referred to by a term such as ‘economic crisis’ is an essentially unknown 
phenomena.  The history of the development and expansion of market society, first in Western 
Europe than elsewhere, is a well-known one and there is no need to account for it at length here: 
it goes almost without saying that something like an economic crisis cannot be experienced as a 
truly collectively-felt event until phenomena such as the depreciation of capital assets and the 
mass unemployment of wage labourers occur on a wide enough scale to be considered to be 
veritably ‘societal’ in scope.  In short, as has often been argued, in Western Europe right up until 
the end of the Middle Ages markets were, at best, only of the most marginal economic 
significance but from the 16
th
 century onward they came to play an increasingly important 
economic role.
33
  Accordingly, no such quintessentially modern phenomenon as an economic 
crisis of any truly societal scope was known until at least the 19
th
 century, as it was not until this 
century of ‘the great transformation’ that the increasing dominance of markets over society, the 
boom and bust cycles of capitalism –something never before experienced in a comparable 
manner – was becoming a lived reality for many in societies that were being radically 
transformed by industrialization.
34
  However, that economic crises as phenomena of modernity 
are only really experienced from the 19
th
 century forward is only part of the answer to the 
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question of why the Great Depression is essentially the most historically removed reference point 
in the presidential radio addresses on the 2008 crisis.  Indeed, it is the smaller, somewhat more 
straightforward part of the answer.  To gain further insight into why the presidential radio 
addresses on the 2008 economic crisis seem to essentially make no references to any times of 
economic hardship before 1929, the question of how the relationship between media and the 
collective memory of economic crises in the United States is a crucial factor in this being the 
case must be investigated. 
Arguably, it can be advanced that the iconic stature of the Great Depression as the historical 
zero-point for economic crises in America can be substantially attributed to two overlapping sets 
of developments, both of these related to what might be termed the advent of ‘cultural 
modernity’ or ‘mass society’.  Furthermore, although both of these sets of developments can in 
many ways be related to the economic modernity discussed above that eventually came to be 
with the pronounced intensification of the social instillation of market society in the wake of the 
industrial revolution, they should not be considered as synonymous with it.  Firstly, important 
technological and cultural developments of the American mediascape had occurred in the United 
States by the time of the 1929 crisis.  Given that media artefacts are repositories of collective 
memory of great importance, the fact that a set of certain media forms closely associated with the 
presence of a mass society such as photography, moving pictures, sound recordings, radio, and a 
popular press were strongly present in a substantially developed form by 1929 is highly 
significant.  In particular, the development of photography, sound recording, radio, and cinema 
in the second half of the nineteenth century was of enormous consequence to collective social 
memory, as it was with such developments that “writing ceased to be synonymous with the serial 
storage of data.”35  As a consequence of these developments, the hegemony of writing as the 
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primary media repository of collective social memory was eroded and eventually displaced as 
these newer media forms became increasingly dominant ways of preserving collective memory, 
particularly popular collective memory.  It was because these newer media forms had developed 
substantially in America by the end of the 1920s that the memory of the Great Depression is by 
and large a popular memory, a popular memory primarily not encapsulated in lines of inked 
characters but rather in the media forms of photography, popular recorded song and cinema; 
media forms characteristic of mass society. 
To stress the significance of the widespread presence of contemporaneous non-literary media 
forms as a crucial factor in how the Great Depression became constituted as a collectively 
experienced event over the time of its occurrence and how after it had passed it would come to 
remain firmly part of the American popular memory, the relative absence of previous economic 
crises from the American popular collective imagination can be cited as evidence.  There had 
been numerous market ‘panics’ in the United States sometimes accompanied by recessions 
throughout the 19
th
 century but these events never became an ingrained part of the American 
collective popular memory at least substantially in part on account of the ways in which they 
were mediated or, to put it another way, on account of the ways in which they were not 
mediated.  For example, the media representations of the most temporally proximate major 
economic slump which affected the United States prior to the Great Depression – The ‘Long 
Depression’ of 1873-1879, formerly known as the Great Depression until it lost its title to the 
economic crisis which followed the 1929 collapse
36
 – seem decidedly pre-modern or archaic in 
comparison to those of The Great Depression.  Of the Long Depression there are no iconic 
photographs, no moving images of the pain it inflicted, no radio broadcasts of presidents 
addressing the American public in the face of it, and no legacy in popular culture worthy of the 
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term.  An 1873 depiction from The New York Times of a run on the Fourth National Bank, No. 
20 Nassau Street is characteristic of the way this crisis was represented visually in image form: a 
hand-drawn illustration of a crowd pressing their way up the steps of the bank
37
 and a woodcut 
reproduction of another bank run
38
 seem almost quaint and soft, almost unreal in a sense 
actually, in comparison to the sharp, black and white photographs of a run on New York’s 
American Union Bank early on in the Great Depression
39
 and of a crowd milling outside the 
New York Stock Exchange the day of the ‘Black Tuesday’ crash of October 30th 1929.40  The 
marked difference in the media representations of what was to become known as the Long 
Depression and the Great Depression point to the crucial role played by media forms in the 
establishment of collective popular memory: the fifty-six years between the two crises had been 
witness to key changes in the mediascape that, at least in significant part, resulted in the former 
being largely not preserved in popular memory while the latter was firmly established in it.  As 
such, an argument can be advanced that this qualitative difference in the character of the vessels 
of popular collective memory themselves goes a substantial way in explaining the almost 
complete absence of references to pre-1929 experiences of economic hardship in the discourse of 
the presidential radio addresses on the 2008 crisis: that the memories of major economic crises 
prior to 1929 were not registered in a qualitatively comparable manner in part explains their 
invisibility.     
The second set of developments which resulted in the Great Depression becoming a 
permanent part of the American popular memory revolve around the ongoing transformation of 
American society and social life that was accelerating after the end of the First World War, 
developments that signaled the taking of root of a modern, consumer-based mass society.  The 
changes to the mediascape described above thus broadly overlap with changes in America more 
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generally, as they developed roughly concurrently and in connection with other major social 
changes which made the way of life of many in America by the time of the Great Depression 
recognizable to future generations as a being representative of a state of mass society that would 
be recognized henceforth as part and parcel of a continuing era of cultural modernity: 
[...] it was in the twenties and the thirties that the characteristic institutions and habits of 
consumer culture – the motion picture, the radio, the automobile, the weekly photo-
newsmagazine, installment buying, the five-day work week, suburban living [...] assumed the 
central position they still occupy in American life...
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This ascendance of a way of life in the 1920s and 1930s that would be in familiar in many ways 
to the ways of life of generations that would follow – a way of life characterized by familiar 
forms of news media, entertainment, transportation, patterns of work and leisure, and above all 
consumption – is of great importance to why the disruptive impact of the Great Depression 
would be remembered in the manner that it was: it was in many ways an event which had 
adversely impacted the flowering of a way of living in America that would become increasingly 
normalized as the default state of affairs in the decades to come. 
Based on the above grounds, it can be asserted that the presence of a way of life in America 
that could properly be said to be one characteristic of a consumer-oriented mass society had 
developed to a substantial extent by the period of the Great Depression’s occurrence, and that the 
combination of this being accompanied by significant changes in media forms that allowed the 
Great Depression to be documented in ways that were recognizably modern and popular were of 
great significance to why the Great Depression was to become firmly established as the inaugural 
economic trauma of modernity of America in the collective American memory.  A crudely 
reductive way of putting it would be that a fully modern feature of economic modernity (a 
systemic economic crisis of great proportions) had been unleashed on a developing modern 
consumer-based mass society and had been registered in a set of modern media and cultural 
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practices in a way that would make it recognizable to future generations as representing 
something proximate to their own lives and experiences.  In being so established, the media 
depictions of the Great Depression became the primary template for the media representations of 
economic crises that were to follow it and the Great Depression became the ultimate point of 
comparison for future periods of economic hardship – a kind of lasting example of how bad 
things could get economically in America – while the periods of economic duress that had 
preceded the Great Depression were primarily consigned to the domain of historians rather than 
becoming permanent, inextricable episodes of great significance in the American popular 
memory.  In this sense, both the qualitative character of the vessels of memory and that which 
filled them during the Great Depression were of great relevance to why it would be remembered 
in the manner that it was, and to why the spectre of its memory would be conjured again in 2008. 
One consequence of the Great Depression being registered through the media forms that it 
was, that is to say, through the media forms characteristic of a modern mass society, was that an 
iconography of economic crisis in America was established and that this iconography could and 
would be activated in future times of economic crisis.  It is in this sense that the Great 
Depression became something akin to what Patricia Leavy calls an ‘iconic event’, an event 
which comes to stand for something beyond itself and whose meanings can be mobilized in a 
variety of ways: 
An iconic event attains mythical status within the culture and also comes to serve as a 
representational vehicle for a host of purposes.  An iconic event, though sufficiently compelling, 
undergoes a social process whereby, in addition to the inherent quality of the ‘pure’ event, it 
takes on “layers,” serving as a representational vehicle and attaining mythic status.42 
 
Through the mediated depictions such as the newsreel footage of men in soup lines and 
panicking stock-floor traders, the FSA-commissioned photographs of crushing rural poverty 
taken by figures such as Walker Evans and Dorothea Lange, and the popular songs and films 
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which have become inextricably associated with it, the Great Depression and its zeitgeist have 
become iconic of economic crises in the popular American imagination.  So many of the 
dominant media representations of the 2008 crisis reflect that this is the case: from the images of 
shell-shocked traders and just-let-go workers to the visuals of plunging graph lines to the stories 
of the jobless and the destitute told in the press or relayed via other forms of popular culture, it is 
apparent that much of what the Great Depression made iconic as representative of economic 
crises in America has been carried over into the popular imagination of the 2008 crisis.  While 
certainly not a case of a straightforward or simple borrowing of the iconography associated with 
the Great Depression, that the some of the most recognizable mediated depictions of the 2008 
crisis did in many respects bear an uncanny resemblance to those associated with an economic 
crisis whose advent had preceded it by almost eighty years does stand as evidence of the 
longevity of the iconographic template of economic crisis wrought in American media and 
culture by the Great Depression.  There may not have been a 2008 equivalent of Brother Can 
You Spare a Dime?, but the noticeable presence during the crisis of ideas and images clearly 
associated with or reminiscent of the Great Depression testifies to the enduring legacy of the 
Depression as an iconic event that would serve as the definition of ‘economic crisis’ thereafter in 
America. 
In the context of the presidential radio addresses on the 2008 crisis, this carrying over of the 
memory of the Great Depression is evident in that many of the references in the addresses speak 
to the notion of a great nation shockingly and stunningly blindsided by a largely unforeseen 
economic calamity yet capable, even destined, to emerge strong and victorious.  One particular 
way of connecting the 2008 crisis to the Great Depression in the addresses was through the 
repeated appeals that were made to the ‘imaginary’ of the American people by presidents Bush 
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and Obama as a rhetorical strategy of speaking of and dealing with the crisis.  This imaginary 
was firmly rooted in a mythology of a certain America, an America mythically constructed from 
history whose people were shaped by historic destiny.  As asserted by Roland Barthes, myth 
should be understood as a form rather than a set of objects, that is to say a form of speaking 
neither restricted to speech or writing that is itself a message.
43
  Furthermore, it is held that myth 
always has some sort of historical foundation, and that it is made of material which “has already 
been worked on so as to make it suitable for communication”.44  The deployment of mythic 
rhetoric in the presidential radio addresses on the 2008 crisis can thus be understood as a 
rhetorical strategy designed to persuasively communicate ideas already broadly familiar and 
endowed with certain connotations to an imagined American national public.  The frequent 
presidential appeals made in the addresses to the imaginary of an American nation with a mythic 
history of resilience, perseverance and success – both generally and in the face of economic 
crisis specifically – should be primarily understood in this manner.  In their addresses to the 
nation during the crisis, George W. Bush and Barack Obama drew selectively upon the collective 
cultural memory of past economic crises in America, particularly that of the Great Depression, in 
order to attempt to rhetorically frame the crisis as an event which ultimately would be overcome 
by virtue of the American people’s storied mythic history.  It is in this manner that the iconic 
stature of the Great Depression as the inaugural modern economic crisis event of America and 
the West more generally can be seen as having provided the ultimate point of historical reference 
for the discursive construction of the 2008 crisis in the presidential radio addresses. To speak of 
economic crisis was to speak of the mythic status of Great Depression, and to speak of the Great 
Depression was to speak of the mythic history of the American people.    
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As a final note of relevance before commencing the analysis of the presidential radio 
addresses in detail, it should be emphasized that the presidential radio addresses on the 2008 
crisis should be understood within a successive series of overlapping contexts that make them 
meaningful and intelligible instances of rhetorical communication.  Three particularly key 
contexts to understanding how the addresses function rhetorically is that they are clearly 
speaking in and to the terrain of what John Searle designates as ‘social reality’,45 that they must 
be understood as rhetorical constructions whose meanings are located firmly within the context 
of modernity, and that they should be understood as operating within a framework of language as 
a constructed form of symbolic action.  For example, presidential appeals for confidence and 
faith in the American financial system serve as a powerful reminder of how the symbolic 
commodity of money, like so many other elements which together constitute social reality, is 
grounded in the triad of the assignment to function, collective intentionality, and constitutive 
rules.
46
  The distinctly human edifice of social reality, often manifested in the form of 
commonplace, everyday institutional facts, such as money, property, and marriages, differs 
fundamentally from the brute reality upon which they are erected and which exists apart from 
any human impressions or inclinations.
47
  It is in this sense that the presidential radio addresses 
are clearly and wholly enmeshed in a sea of institutional reality of which they themselves are 
part.  In additional to their contextual grounding in socially constructed reality, the presidential 
addresses should also be understood as being firmly rooted in the context of modernity.  For 
example, they speak to an imagined community, that of the American people, in the sense 
outlined by Benedict Anderson in his descriptions of ideological nationalist narratives that are 
explicitly self-conscious and originate from the modern period forward
48
 and in doing so they 
both create and address a public in the modern sense via a modern mass communication system.  
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Also, the presidential addresses often espouse what might be called ‘modern knowledge’ given 
that the discourse of economic crises is clearly located in the domain of modern thought, that 
such a type of discourse can exist only in the context of modernity.  Regarding the third context 
mentioned above, that of language as a form of constructed symbolic action, the presidential 
addresses should be understood as performative utterances that are rhetorically geared toward 
producing an effect through their employment of what Kenneth Burke called ‘terministic 
screens’, these being the means by which “any nomenclature necessarily directs the attention into 
some channels rather than others.”49  The addresses are clearly highly choreographed rhetorical 
performances constructed of linguistic symbols that are designed to influence, to persuade, and 
to precipitate action – they are examples of ‘language as doing’.  Taken together, these three 
contexts establish that what is needed for the analysis of American presidential radio addresses 
on the 2008 crisis is a multi-dimensional approach that emphasizes that such addresses are 
shaped by characteristically human ways of constructing complex social reality, by the epochal 
forces of history, and by the complex nature and exercise of language as a form of symbolic 
action. 
 
‘We Shall Weather This Storm’ or ‘Unity, Freedom, History’ 
 
Mark 4:37  
And a great windstorm arose, and the waves were breaking into the boat, so that the boat was 
already filling. 
 
The study of the rhetoric of leaders has been an important topic of interest in research on 
leadership and this has been manifested in a variety of different approaches on this subject, 
ranging from what rhetorical strategies are critical to leaders’ masterful and spellbinding use of 
rhetoric
50
 to how the rhetoric of charismatic leaders makes frequent reference to the traditions 
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and history of collectivities to inspire high levels of commitment amongst followers.
51
  Within 
this broad area of research, the use of figurative language by leaders has been a subtopic of 
considerable interest.  It has for example been asserted that the use of linguistic imagery of a 
strongly sensorial nature has an ability to harness followers’ life experiences in a distinctly more 
powerful manner than that achieved by language of a more purely intellectual character
52
 and 
that leaders’ use of image-based rhetoric leads to them being perceived as having a more 
powerful and dynamic presence.
53
  Of particular importance, it has been suggested that the 
consummate use of imagery has been of critical importance to American presidents’ abilities to 
persuade the public to support their visions.
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  While the present study does not focus explicitly 
on empirical issues related to persuasion, this relation between the use of imagery in presidential 
rhetoric and public persuasion does point to how the presidential radio addresses as texts are 
designed to resonate with an implied public, that of the American nation imagined, and it is with 
this in mind that one of the most salient examples of figurative language discernible in the 
presidential rhetoric on the 2008 crisis will now be examined: that of the crisis as storm. 
The metaphor of storm, or variations of this metaphor or closely related to it, was frequently 
deployed in the presidential radio addresses’ depictions of the 2008 crisis.  Even without using 
the word storm itself, shadings in the direction of this metaphor are evident in President Bush’s 
radio address of September 20
th
 2008, five days after the Chapter 11 bankruptcy of Lehman’s 
Brothers, where in the midst of a plunging stock market he sought to reassure the American 
public with the words “we will weather this challenge too”.55  In the weeks and months 
afterward, the metaphor of the economic crisis as storm was used frequently by Presidents Bush 
and Obama.  On some occasions, its usage was evocative of the nautical experience of a ship at 
sea which was threatened by a tempest (“I'm confident that the United States of America will 
51 
 
weather this economic storm”56; “we will have come through these difficult storms stronger and 
wiser and grateful to have reached a brighter day”57; “the economic storms we're weathering now 
will have given way to brighter and more prosperous times”58; “Democrats and Republicans 
alike to steer our economy through these difficult times”59).  At other times, the usage of the 
storm metaphor for the crisis was of a more general nature (“We're cleaning up the wreckage of 
this storm”60; “I'll be unveiling additional ideas aimed at accelerating job growth and hiring as 
we emerge from this economic storm”61).  Such usages of the metaphor of storm seemed 
designed to reinforce group solidarity through the use of ‘we’ or its equivalent and to provide 
comfort through the rhetorical positioning of the economic crisis as a difficult experience but one 
that would not last, with the promise of better to come after the enduring of a difficult test 
wrought from without.  Above all, the figurative use of the storm metaphor in the rhetoric of the 
presidential addresses was representative of an in-group directed appeal to faith and hope in the 
face of adversity, essentially carrying the message that the innate strength of the group was the 
guarantor of the eventual overcoming of present trials and tribulations.   
The usage of storm as a metaphor for disastrous events inflicted on and experienced by 
collectivities has a long history significantly predating its use in reference to economic crises.  
For example, storms are often used in religious texts as an expression of God’s displeasure, 
absence, or as a sign of oncoming calamity
62
 and they have a significant history of being used in 
secular literature as well, such as in Shakespeare’s The Tempest where a storm is used to 
illustrate the helplessness of mortal men in the face of nature’s fury.63  On a basic level, the 
metaphor of storm can variously signify speed, power, wrath, and unpredictability; however, its 
usage in describing economic crises, a usage located firmly within a modern context, is worth a 
pause for consideration.  As has been mentioned above, markets had historically played at best 
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only a marginal economic role in any society prior to the large-scale development of capitalism, 
and it was not until the 1800s with the full-fledged commencement and then consolidation of the 
industrial revolution in a handful of mostly West European countries that their impact could truly 
be considered to be highly significant in terms of their ability to impact the material welfare of a 
society at large.  From this period forward however, markets did indeed have an increasingly 
significant impact on the material welfare of societies which had undergone or were undergoing 
such developments, and did so in a way that had never before been known. 
The now-familiar experience for many of living within market-based society makes it 
difficult to imagine what the magnitude of the impact of this great transformation in historical-
material conditions of life was like for those who first experienced its coming.  That markets 
greatly shape a kaleidoscope of critical elements of life is anything but unfamiliar to those living 
in societies in which the market has assumed a dominant role in the allocation of resources over 
an extended period, but for those who lived in the societies which were first subject to such 
developments of historic proportions, they must have seemed awesome and even terrifying given 
the scale and scope of the changes that were brought about.  Polanyi’s assertion that “a deep-
seated movement sprang into being to resist the pernicious effects of a market-controlled society.  
Society protected itself against the perils inherent in a self-regulating market system – this was 
the one comprehensive feature in the history of the age”64 certainly supports this perspective that 
widespread, traumatic disruption of the very fundamentals of life and the very fabric of society 
came with the advent of market society in the nineteenth century.  The traumatically disruptive 
effect of the coming of market society was in many ways experienced as a calamity by those 
whose livelihoods were threatened or destroyed, whose securing of the basics of life and dignity 
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were endangered or outright thrown into chaos, so there already existed a basis for the perception 
of the impact of market society as catastrophic in the very first instance.   
With this historical context in mind, the concept of the metaphor of storm representing 
economic catastrophe is in many ways quite appropriate, for at an experiential and affective level 
those who experienced the coming of market-based society and those who had been impacted by 
the first economic crises might well have perceived the effects of these as similar in many 
respects to the primordial wrath of nature: the scale of disruption and destruction of human lives 
would suggest this was indeed the case.
65
  Having one’s livelihood, the welfare of one’s family, 
and perhaps even one’s life put in peril by the vagaries and violence of market conditions must 
have been incredibly distressing as well as baffling for those afflicted by early economic crises.  
And the possibility that a damaging crisis that could impact a society so widely could issue forth 
not from Mother Nature but rather from the economic activity of humans themselves was 
certainly a novel phenomena of the experience of those living in the dawn of the age of market 
society.  Writing of this particular aspect of the new reality – general crises of capitalism – 
Engels in 1877 elaborated on the scale of societal disruption and misery brought forth by these 
phenomena, phenomena that he asserted were previously unknown to the world in a comparable 
manner barely a half-century beforehand: 
And in fact, since 1825, when the first general crisis broke out, the whole industrial and 
commercial world, the production and exchange of all civilised peoples and of their more or less 
barbarian dependent people have been dislocated practically once in every ten years.  Trade 
comes to a standstill, the markets are glutted, the products lie in great masses, unsalable, ready 
money disappears, credit vanishes, the factories are idle, the working masses go short of the 
means of subsistence because they have produced too much of them, bankruptcy follows upon 
bankruptcy, forced sale upon forced sale.
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The experience of this new reality of living in market society, whereby the longstanding 
historical and anthropological situation immemorial of man’s economy being “submerged in his 
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social relationships”67 was effectively reversed was therefore undoubtedly a traumatic and 
bewildering one for those who suffered the first economic crises.  No wonder the scale of 
devastation wrought brought about comparisons to the disasters of nature: the economic 
maelstroms of the nineteenth century that left such swathes of human destruction in their wakes 
were indeed the same winds in which Benjamin’s ‘angel of history’ had been caught up.68  
There is some evidence that suggests that the use of the storm metaphor in signifying major 
economic disruptions actually predates even the full coming of market society in the nineteenth 
century.  For example, the metaphor of economic catastrophe as storm is discernible in William 
Hogarth’s Emblematic Print on the South Sea Scheme.  In this print, the London cityscape 
afflicted by demonic figures is shrouded under dark clouds in a lament of financial losses 
incurred because of the disastrous collapse of the share prices of the British South Sea Company 
in 1720.
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  That market forces could unleash the damage they did in the manner they did 
certainly provides some understanding regarding why the metaphor of storm – violent, 
mysterious, sudden, arbitrary – was deployed in describing economic catastrophes even earlier 
than the occurrence of generalized, society-wide economic crises.  The religious connotations of 
some of the imagery of Hogarth’s print also suggest a carrying over or transference of signs 
associated with religion into signifying practices used to represent economic catastrophe dating 
back to at least the eighteenth century.  Further insight into why the metaphor of economic crisis 
as storm seems to have such a rich historical lineage even if misguided or misleading analytically 
with respect to the actual mechanics of how such crises occur can be gleaned by examining the 
writing of Engels once again.  Commenting on the false parallelism between the forces operative 
in society and those operative in Nature, Engels’ assertion that “the forces operating in society 
work exactly like the forces operating in Nature: blindly, violently, destructively, so long as we 
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do not understand them and fail to take them into account”70 is instructive.  This assertion is 
representative of what might be called a properly modern understanding of the properly modern 
phenomena of economic crises: it makes the claim that economic crises are perceived as 
arbitrary, savage, and devastating like natural calamities only in the absence of a proper (and 
modern) understanding of them.  The widespread usage of the storm metaphor in the presidential 
radio addresses is partially explained by this: the complex mechanisms by which economic crises 
are operative are arguably not the domain of popular understanding, and the continued appeal 
and power of the rhetorical usage of the storm metaphor for them – including in the presidential 
radio addresses on the 2008 crisis – is at least in part founded upon this fact. 
With a rudimentary detailing of the history of the metaphor of economic crisis as storm now 
established, the question of what is then to be made of the choice of Bush and Obama to 
frequently use storm as a metaphor to describe the 2008 economic crisis can now be approached 
from a more historically informed perspective.  However, before delving into this question fully, 
some brief elaboration of the concept of metaphor itself is also warranted.  One perspective on 
metaphor that is strongly influenced by Nietzsche’s work is that it, like all of what is referred to 
broadly as ‘figurative language’, should actually not be seen as being categorically distinct from 
literal language, but rather that “all language is a mixture of the literal and the figurative, since 
every linguistic utterance has some element of the customary and some element of the novel”.71  
Since the everyday human use of language “inevitably involve transpositions, transformations 
and distortions”,72 the use of metaphor should be seen as characteristic of the nature of language 
itself instead of being conceptualized as that which exists in opposition to a not-really-existing 
‘real’ or ‘actual’ language.  Moreover, the ambivalence at the conceptual heart of metaphor is 
also captured in how metaphor’s “most intimate and ultimate abode, is neither the name, nor 
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even discourse, but the copula of the very to be.  The metaphorical ‘is’ at once signifies both ‘is 
not’ and ‘is like.’”73  This ambivalence in metaphor’s ability to simultaneously signify difference 
and resemblance connected by being also serves to render the distinction between figurative and 
non-figurative language problematic.  
With the sharp theoretical division between figurative and non-figurative language 
dissolved, the position of figurative language as being inherent in the human linguistic condition 
rather than being additional to it being firmly adopted, and the ambivalence at the centre of the 
concept of metaphor recognized in all its ambivalence, the storm metaphor for economic crisis 
can be more fruitfully explored.  Indeed, with such a perspective adopted the usage of the 
particular economic crisis as storm metaphor can be read as working rhetorically on multiple 
levels simultaneously.  On one level, the metaphor of economic crisis as storm serves as a 
transposition of a highly complex phenomena (an economic crisis) to a linguistically-based sign 
(‘storm’) based on the subjective perception of that phenomena (that an economic crisis is 
perceived ‘as storm’).  This operation is indicative of how the plastic nature of language conjures 
an impression of a reality that is never directly knowable, for “there is absolutely no escape, no 
backway or bypath into the real world”.74  A similar assertion is made in Lacanian theory in its 
claim that all reference to an external reality is always already bound up in the realm of the 
Symbolic and cannot therefore be grasped directly as such, that the Real is never directly 
accessible through the Symbolic.
75
  Given that the 2008 crisis was popularly perceived to have 
occurred relatively suddenly, the recourse to the metaphor of storm in description of it seems 
appropriate on this level.  At another level though, the metaphor description of economic crisis 
as storm appears to be less than appropriate.  Specifically, the recourse to the metaphor of storm 
serves to position the 2008 crisis rhetorically in relation to the unpredictable forces of nature, 
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which endows it with connotations of an agent-less character that seems to be rationally not in 
accordance with its character of being a man-made disaster.  A tension therefore exists in the 
storm metaphor for the 2008 economic crisis: the perception of its suddenness and power is 
broadly connotative of that which is designated by storm whereas the idea of it being an agent-
less phenomena of storm-like character seems to misrepresent its character in this respect.    
The presidential radio addresses’ discursive construction of the 2008 crisis through the storm 
metaphor as a kind of outside force, as a disturbance from without setting itself upon some sort 
of presumed prior harmonious and taken-for-granted state of affairs rather than as an explicitly 
man-made disaster arising from very specific socioeconomic mechanisms is itself of some 
consequence to the understanding of the depiction of the crisis in the addresses.  In being so 
portrayed, the rhetorical use of the storm metaphor for the crisis by Presidents Bush and Obama 
positioned the American public they were addressing as being foundationally united in an 
ostensibly collective experience of the ‘storm’ of the crisis and also morally bound by this 
imagined unity in the battle to withstand its ravages.  Some of the ideological implications of this 
kind of rhetorical positioning of the crisis are plain to see.  The rhetorical construction of the 
crisis as an outside that force that had to be withstood by the American nation at large, as is 
evidenced by the repeated appeals in the presidential addresses to the first-person collective 
mode of address which designates such a united imagined national entity already is indicative of 
a discursive operation whereby an intrinsically good and united America is conjured and that the 
forces of the crisis are seen as antithetical and apart from this essentially good and united 
America.  In such a manner, an operation of distancing and an operation of disavowal of sorts 
can be hypothesized as being present in the discourse of the presidential radio addresses.  The 
crisis is distanced rhetorically from the realm of human causality via the deployment of the storm 
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metaphor (despite the point of fact that economic crises such as the 2008 crisis are indeed man-
made calamities), and the rhetorical conjuring of a supposedly good and united America which 
must collectively bear and withstand the ravages of the crisis disavows the responsibility of 
factions or elements within this imagined national entity for the occurrence of the crisis.  These 
interpretations show how the presidential usage of the storm metaphor in relation to the 
economic crisis is demonstrative of the plastic and multi-layered role played by figurative 
language in the discursive construction of complex social phenomena, and how such rhetorical 
operations function ideologically to absorb the crisis into dominant ideological conceptions.       
 Connected to, but also in some ways quite distinct from, the usage of the economic crisis-as-
storm metaphor deployed in the presidential radio addresses discussed above are the oft-repeated 
appeals in the addresses to the history of the resilient character of the American nation.  It has 
been argued that an important feature of the rhetoric of charismatic leadership is that of frame 
alignment, that “in their speeches, charismatic leaders interpret the present and the past; link 
present behaviors to past events by citing historical examples; articulate an ideology clearly, 
often using labels and slogans; provide a vivid image of the future; exemplify certain identities 
and values”.76  This aspect of the rhetoric of charismatic leadership is vividly apparent in the 
presidential radio addresses on the 2008 crisis.  Drawing heavily on mytho-ideological concepts 
associated with the United States, these addresses often appealed to the idea of the history of the 
United States as a nation that had always overcome, sometimes citing the supposedly special 
place of America amongst the brotherhood of nations and in world history.  Such appeals were 
frequently employed by presidents Bush and Obama to invoke the idea that whatever pain the 
United States might be suffering or would suffer due to the crisis, it would eventually emerge 
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triumphant because this had already been confirmed by the America’s past historical 
experiences.   
The level of specificity in the appeals to an American history of resilience often varied 
considerably.  Sometimes they were rather vague, appealing simply to a past history of 
overcoming obstacles the American nation had faced in the times gone by, such as is evident in 
statements such as “When we have faced difficult tests in the past, the American people have 
always risen to meet them”77 and “Yes, this is a moment of challenge for our country, but we've 
experienced great trials before. And with every test, each generation has found the capacity to 
not only endure but to prosper, to discover great opportunity in the midst of great crisis.”78 At 
other times the appeals were made that linked America’s past with certain values that were either 
implicitly or explicitly claimed as part of the nation’s ethos, such as was evident in President 
Bush’s comments early on in the crisis concerning the central place of freedom and individual 
initiative in the American ethos: 
We're a country where all people have the freedom to realize their potential and chase their 
dreams. This promise has defined our Nation since its founding, this promise will guide us 
through the challenges we face today, and this promise will continue to define our Nation for 
generations to come.
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Just a week later on October 25
th
 2008, Bush was sounding the same note when he asserted again 
the key role of individual initiative in the historical record of ‘prosperity’ and ‘success’ of the 
American nation.  However, in a particularly interesting instance of wording choice, the word 
‘economy’ appears to stand in for the concept of ‘nation’ at one point in this address, almost as if 
the two were synonymous, and this conceptual twinning of the two itself is an extremely 
revealing aspect of the particularly market-oriented ideological thrust of Bush’s rhetoric: 
Throughout our history, we have seen that when Americans are given the freedom to apply their 
talents and imagination, prosperity and success follow closely behind. For over two centuries, 
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that principle has allowed our economy to overcome every obstacle it has faced. And we can all 
be confident that it will do so again.
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This wholesale convolution of American history, the American people, the idea of freedom as 
the enabler of individual initiative, and individual initiative as the guarantor of collective 
economic success clearly serves as a tacit ideological endorsement of the free market system.  In 
particular, Bush’s assertion that the “principle [of freedom] has allowed our economy to 
overcome every obstacle it has faced” is significant in that it positions economic success as the 
arch-proof of the righteousness of both the contemporary American way of life and of American 
history.  In the face of popular outrage at the economic calamity that had just broken out in full 
force not much more than a month before this address was given, Bush’s words here serve as a 
remarkably conservative endorsement of the very free market approach that was so heavily 
implicated in the coming of the crisis. 
Such statements based around appeals to the history of the American nation’s record of 
success are highly revealing in that they seem to combine three distinct but highly interrelated 
mythic elements to achieve their powerful rhetorical gestures.  First, the establishment of the 
mythic ‘we’ of the American nation as an imagined community serves as a rhetorical device that 
seeks to reiterate the unity of this entity by tapping into the popular mythos of the history of 
America as a country whose citizenry is and has been fundamentally united.  The assertion of 
this unity – a unity not only of present citizens but also an ostensible unity of the present 
citizenry of America with past citizenries of that country – serves to ideologically efface 
antagonisms amongst particular groups in America both contemporaneously and historically, the 
two often being heavily interlinked.  The connection here to Gramsci’s theory of hegemony, 
particularly his contention that “common sense is not something rigid and immobile, but is 
constantly transforming itself”,81 is all too clear on this account.  The erasure of group 
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antagonisms through the claiming of fundamental unity in the presidential radio addresses on the 
2008 crisis thus fulfills a hegemonic function through the commonsensical proclamation of 
America as an entity united throughout history as a kind of organic whole, as this masks a history 
of antagonisms amongst different groups while simultaneously affirming the naturalness of the 
current ruling order as the product of this ostensible history of a nation united.     
Second, the use of the word ‘freedom’ as a signifier is also highly mythic given the 
connotations associated with that word in the United States: it is one of the ‘God words’ whose 
inherent truth and goodness is held to be self-evident.  Freedom is the strongest and most 
pervasive signifier of America in American culture, to the point where it has been asserted that 
“there is perhaps no value that Americans cling to more tightly than freedom.”82 Freedom in this 
sense is to be understood as a value; a value both held and dispensed by the nation, so much so 
that the symbolic lines between the two become porous.  The usage of the term freedom in the 
rhetoric of U.S. presidents has a long history, and the use of this term in the rhetoric of the 
occupant of the highest political office in the land has great power, as “freedom is probably 
America’s primary political symbol, and presidents are certainly America’s primary 
storytellers.”83  The use of the term freedom in the presidential radio addresses on the 2008 crisis 
as a hallmark of the history of the American people thus serves a powerful rhetorical device, as it 
directly signals that the President as leader supports a core value of the American population and 
in articulating these particular evocations of the history of the collective and of a critical shared 
value are designed to garner support.  Moreover, the plasticity of freedom as a political signifier 
in the discourse of the radio addresses is important on account of the fact that “for presidents, a 
discourse rich in familiar political symbols is strategically valuable because symbols are highly 
ambiguous and therefore highly adaptable.”84  No political symbol is more familiar in the United 
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States than freedom, and the high degree of flexibility of freedom as a signifier – ‘free 
individuals’; ‘the land of the free’, ‘a nation founded on freedom’, ‘free markets’, ‘free will’ – 
makes it a particularly potent rhetorical weapon to wield in a time of crisis in America and its use 
by Bush and Obama in their speeches concerning the 2008 crisis can be understood in this 
context.            
Thirdly, the appeals to history as the great judge of righteousness and wrongfulness, of truth 
and lack of truth, also serve an important mytho-ideological function.  Closely related to the 
presidential rhetoric concerning American solidarity in a time of crisis and freedom as an arch-
value, these appeals to history do so by invoking and legitimizing the myth of a great and 
prosperous nation whose greatness and prosperity would have been absent had it not been in the 
right (and ‘right’ here should be understood to mean ‘righteous’ in the widest sense of the term).  
In this manner, the historical record of the United States as a powerful and affluent country in 
comparison to many other countries serves as the verdict of history on the rightfulness of the 
American project in the present, past and future and is harnessed in this fashion in the 
presidential radio addresses on the 2008 crisis.  The rhetorically interlocking and conceptually 
interdependent mythic structure of nation, freedom, and history thus serves as the basis of a 
powerful rhetorical appeal in the presidential radio addresses on the crisis.  It also important to 
note that such appeals presuppose a very modern temporal framework: that of ‘the nation’ as a 
“sociological organism moving calendrically through homogeneous, empty time [...] a solid 
community moving steadily down (or up) history.”85  Given that, as has been asserted above, 
economic crises must be understood as quintessentially modern phenomena, the rhetorical 
appeals to the history of the American nation in the face of such crises, of its history as ‘proof’ of 
righteousness and as ‘destiny’ of the nation’s eventual overcoming of the crisis as is evidenced in 
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the passages from the presidential radio addresses cited above sets up an intriguing symmetry in 
which both the crisis and the symbolic solution to the crisis are ultimately predicated on a 
modern context.  Interestingly then, in the rhetoric of the presidential radio addresses the impact 
of a quite modern problem – an economic crisis – ends up being addressed in the main by a 
rhetorical appeal which itself is deeply invested in the context of modernity – that of nationalism 
– in the form of the explicit referencing of the mythic history of the American nation. 
 
‘The Locus of the Irreparable’ or ‘State of Exception’ 
Conspicuous at times in the discourse of the presidential radio addresses on the 2008 crisis is the 
rhetorical positioning of the need for immediate and dramatic action as necessary or having been 
necessary in order to prevent otherwise irreparable harm that could or would result from 
exceptional and even unprecedented circumstances.  It is not accidental that the bulk of the 
espousing of such a rhetoric calling for action on pain of irreversible damage in the addresses 
happened to coincide roughly with the debating of legislation deemed to be of an emergency 
nature – specifically, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, the American 
Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009, and the automobile industry bailouts.  This rhetoric can 
thus be seen as attempts to both persuade the public and in doing so put pressure on legislators, 
reflecting the Wilsonian precept that the president “has no means of compelling Congress except 
through public opinion.”86  The concept of the locus of the irreparable as a rhetorical device is a 
constructive way to gain insight into this particular rhetorical strategy.  Essentially, the crux of 
this idea is that “the locus of the irreparable may be said to warrant “extraordinary” measures – 
actions which go beyond the usual, customary, or what most people would approve.”87 The 
persuasive power of rhetorical appeals to the locus of the irreparable thus can be said to lie in its 
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ability to frame a particular context or situation as exceptional, that is to say beyond the 
parameters of normalcy and normal consideration, and in doing so overcome resistance to 
courses of action which themselves are outside of what would be considered conventional, 
approvable, or acceptable. 
The rhetorical device of the locus of the irreparable was used by Presidents Bush and Obama 
to garner support for exceptional legislative measures that were proposed to deal with the crisis, 
some of which ran counter to certain groups’ ideological preferences or counter to popular 
sentiment.  President Bush’s justification of his support of the eventual decision by the U.S. 
government to bail out banks and other troubled financial institutions is quite representative of 
this rhetorical strategy.  On September 20
th
 2008, after declaring that “America's economy is 
facing unprecedented challenges, and we're responding with unprecedented action”,88 Bush went 
on to outline the logic of government intervention to save the floundering financial sector based 
on a logic that non-intervention on the part of government would be courting potentially 
unmitigated and irreversible economic and financial damage: 
Given the precarious state of our financial markets and their vital importance to the daily lives of 
the American people, Government intervention is not only warranted, it is essential [...]These 
measures require us to put a significant amount of taxpayer dollars on the line, but I'm convinced 
that this bold approach will cost American families far less than the alternative. Further stress on 
our financial markets would cause massive job losses, devastate retirement accounts, further 
erode housing values, and dry up new loans for homes, cars, and college tuitions.
89
 
 
Though not a statement of irreparability in the existential sense, the case Bush laid out for 
government intervention in the face of the crisis in his address was indeed one that was anchored 
in the idea that a failure to act to would result in a level of damage that, once inflicted, could not 
be easily undone.  In using this rhetorical tactic, he constructed a stark binary between dramatic 
action in avoiding disaster and inaction that would guarantee it.  A week later on September 27
th
 
2008, echoing his previous comments on the ‘unprecedented’ challenges to the U.S. economy, 
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Bush stated that “this is an extraordinary period for America's economy”90 and went on to outline 
again why decisive government intervention to shore up the financial industry was necessary to 
prevent even greater economic harm to the nation, despite such intervention being counter to his 
ideological position concerning free markets, and despite it being quite unpopular amongst the 
American public given the lead role of the financial industry in the creation of the crisis: 
When the government asks you to pay for mistakes on Wall Street, it does not seem fair, and I 
understand that. And if it were possible to let every irresponsible firm on Wall Street fail without 
affecting you and your family, I would do it. But that is not possible. The failure of the financial 
system would mean financial hardship for many of you. 
  
The failure of the financial system would cause banks to stop lending money to one another and 
to businesses and consumers. That would make it harder for you to take out a loan or borrow 
money to expand a business. The result would be less economic growth and more American jobs 
lost. And that would put our economy on the path toward a deep and painful recession.
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The repeated emphasis in these passages on the dire consequences of the potential failure of the 
U.S. financial system, that the choice of allowing it to potentially fail, that is to say, to not take 
action to prevent it failing, represented a rhetorical strategy that aimed to frame the 
precariousness of the situation and the implied brief window of opportunity to prevent lasting 
consequences of great harm as the logical basis for action.  The rhetorical framing of the crisis as 
exceptional in this way was therefore argumentatively deployed to support the taking of 
extraordinary means of action that would under other circumstances be deemed unacceptable or 
inconsiderable. 
The outstanding feature of the framing of choice on the issue of government intervention in 
the financial sector in the early phase of the 2008 crisis was the stark black-and-white 
presentation of two mutually exclusive options: action and the manageability of an unwelcome 
and undesired situation, or inaction and assured, considerable harm.  The projection of precarity 
in the rhetoric of the presidential radio addresses was instrumental in setting up of this binary.  
66 
 
Precarity was made to be more or less synonymous with exceptionality in regards to the situation 
in question, that is to say a state of ‘precariousness’ was rhetorically presented as essentially 
equivalent to a state of ‘exceptionality’: that the U.S. economy was in a precarious state was 
itself presented as exceptional.  Indeed, the relationship between the precarious and the locus of 
the irreparable, that “the precarious becomes identified with the locus of the irreparable, 
however, when that which is threatened need not be lost, when choice is possible”92 was 
repeatedly and ardently underscored as justification for immediate action, and also as 
retrospective justification of actions already taken.  For example, such rhetoric is evident in some 
of Bush’s speeches in which he justifies the 700 billion dollar bank bailout (“Without decisive 
action, this credit crunch threatens to harm our entire economy”93; “As a strong believer in free 
markets, I would oppose such measures under ordinary circumstances. But these are no ordinary 
circumstances. Had the Government not acted, the hole in our financial system would have 
grown larger”94) as well as in his justification of the automobile industry bailout (“Under 
ordinary economic circumstances, I would say this is the price that failed companies must pay 
[...] But these are not ordinary circumstances. In the midst of a financial crisis and a recession, 
allowing the U.S. auto industry to collapse is not a responsible course of action.”95).  Bush’s 
remarks appear to work rhetorically on more than one level in that they in a sense address two 
distinct audiences.  On one level, the justifications of the extraordinary measures taken or to be 
taken can be seen as being targeted at a general, imagined U.S. public which included segments 
that were either skeptical of or outright opposed to government intervention in the financial or 
auto industries.  On another level, Bush’s rhetorical justifications of the extraordinary bailouts, 
particularly his emphasis that the measures were indeed highly unusual exceptions to an overall 
ideological doctrine otherwise supported by him wholeheartedly under ordinary circumstances 
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(that of free markets and non-interventionism) can be seen as being specifically targeted at 
Republican Party supporters.  In particular, such clear and deliberate efforts to stress the 
exceptional circumstances justifying government intervention seem targeted at factions 
positioned toward the outer limits of the right-wing base of the party, such as the Tea Party. 
These elements were likely to be those most vehemently opposed to any kind of government 
intervention whatsoever, this being close to the equivalent of ideological heresy for them, and it 
follows that President Bush’s rhetoric on the subject of the bailouts should be read in this light. 
In January of 2009, when Barack Obama came to occupy the office of the President of the 
United States, a remarkable degree of continuity in the usage of the rhetoric of the locus of the 
irreparable as the basis of government action on the crisis was apparent.  In his first weekly 
presidential address on January 24
th
 2009, Obama made a similar call for action to that of former 
President Bush on the basis of the potentially irreparably damaging consequences of inaction: 
We begin this year and this administration in the midst of an unprecedented crisis that calls for 
unprecedented action. Just this week we saw more people file for unemployment than at any time 
in the last 26 years. And experts agree that if nothing is done, the unemployment rate could reach 
double digits; our economy could fall a trillion dollars short of its full capacity, which translates 
into more than $12,000 in lost income for a family of four; and we could lose a generation of 
potential as more young Americans are forced to forego college dreams or the chance to train for 
the jobs of the future. [...] In short, if we do not act boldly and swiftly, a bad situation could 
become dramatically worse.
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Such rhetoric concerning the necessity of action in the face of the potentially disastrous 
consequences of inaction was to be repeated again by Obama two weeks later on February 7
th
 
2009: 
And the time for action is now, because if we don't move swiftly to put this [American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act] plan in motion, our economic crisis could become a national catastrophe.  
Millions of Americans will lose their jobs, their homes, and their health care. Millions more will 
have to put their dreams on hold.
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After the passage of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act by Congress on February 
10
th
 2009, the usage of the locus of the irreparable as a rhetorical device geared toward 
influencing the passage of major legislation designed to deal with the immediate emergency of 
the crisis essentially seems to disappear.  The specific context of the need for Congress to pass 
legislation to address issues made acute by the crisis appears to have been what had enabled the 
locus of the irreparable to occupy the position of prominence in the presidential rhetoric that it 
did in late 2008 and early 2009.  The question of government intervention was framed as a 
decision whether to act and prevent great harm or not act and guarantee harm, given the 
exceptional context of the situation.  The prevention of unnecessary harm was itself presented as 
a societal value in this context, for the framing rhetoric of the locus of the irreparable represents 
“an attempt to interpret and define these [commonly-held] values in the particular contexts of 
judgement”,98 and the prevention of unnecessary harm was surely such a value.  However, once 
the different pieces of emergency legislation had been passed by Congress, the urgent warnings 
of disaster potentially being nigh ceased, and the crisis seemed to enter a different phase.  It is no 
coincidence that it is roughly around this time – the late spring of 2009 – that a shift in the 
discourse of the presidential radio addresses on the crisis seems to become discernible. 
 
‘The Blame Game’ or ‘It’s Mostly Not Us’ 
The attribution of responsibility is a particular intriguing theme within the discourse of the 
presidential radio addresses on the 2008 economic crisis, and the rhetoric deployed concerning 
this theme shows a marked degree of variability.  On some occasions, particular groups or 
collections of groups were attributed degrees of blame for the crisis while at other times 
substantially wider phenomena – sometimes presented so wide as to give the impression that no 
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one party or set of parties in particular was predominantly at fault for the crisis – were cited as 
blameworthy.  In the presidential radio addresses, the blameworthiness of multiple parties is 
claimed on the whole even though the financial industry eventually is singled out as being 
particularly culpable for the crisis, with the rhetorical emphasis on the culpability of the financial 
industry being particularly pronounced during the period when President Obama was trying to 
drum up public and political support for reform and regulation legislation targeted at Wall Street 
(later passed by Congress as the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
in July 2010).  On the whole; however, what is most remarkable in the discourse of the 
presidential radio addresses concerning responsibility for the crisis is the degree to which the 
crisis is moralized as resultant of activities and phenomena that ran contrary to ostensibly 
American values, as the result of an overlapping nexus of that which was coded as ideologically 
deviant such as greed, recklessness and selfish self-interest.  In this sense, the mythical 
imaginary of America – America the good, the right, and the prosperous – served as the 
dominant foil to which responsibility for the crisis was reflected off of, and it was through such 
rhetorical positioning that the crisis was significantly framed as one rooted in moral failure.  At a 
basic level, the crisis was depicted in the presidential radio addresses as having come about 
because of a deviant straying from the tried-and-tested path of values that had made America 
great by certain culpable parties.  Accordingly, while the mention of macro-systemic causes of 
the crisis were not altogether absent from the rhetoric of the presidential radio addresses, they on 
the whole took a decided backseat to the depiction of the causes of the crisis as predominantly 
stemming from moral failure, particularly in the form of a forsaking of supposedly American 
values or principles that were antithetical to activities and phenomena that had led to the crisis.   
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Given the immediate origins of the crisis in the bursting of U.S. housing market bubble, it is 
probably somewhat unsurprising that initially financial firms involved in real estate dealings and 
some homeowners were accorded responsibility for the crisis having occurred.  For example, 
“the problems of individual firms”99 and “mistakes on Wall Street”100 are mentioned early on, as 
are “responsible homeowners”.101  The mention of ‘responsible homeowners’ is particularly 
intriguing.  Despite this group being mentioned in the context of extending government relief to 
some whose home ownership had supposedly been threatened by actions not of their own doing, 
the rhetorical construction of them as a group implies that their opposite existed: irresponsible 
homeowners.  Indeed, the great degree of interconnectedness between blameworthy lenders and 
borrowers is probably aptly captured in President Bush’s citing of “troubled assets that are 
weighing down banks' balance sheets and clogging the financial system”:102 irresponsible and 
sometimes predatory lenders had extended financing to those who had borrowed and spent 
beyond their means in many cases.  However, as the breadth of the crisis became more and more 
clear, the attribution of blame also expanded, as can be seen by Bush’s November 15th 2008 
statement that “this crisis included failures by lenders and borrowers, by financial firms, by 
governments, and independent regulators.”103  It is therefore the case that a presidential rhetoric 
of collective responsibility was thus evident even in the early days of the crisis under the George 
W. Bush administration. 
With the changing of the guard in the White House in January of 2009, the attribution of 
responsibility for the crisis became considerably more politically partisan in character.  Blaming 
both the crisis and the set of circumstances that supposedly precipitated it broadly on the policies 
pursued throughout George W. Bush’s two terms in office, on February 7th 2009 President 
Obama stated, “let's be clear: We can't expect relief from the tired old theories that, in eight short 
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years, doubled the national debt, threw our economy into a tailspin, and led us into this mess in 
the first place.”104  Interestingly, it is around this time that references of blame for the crisis itself 
almost completely vanish from the rhetoric of the presidential radio addresses for a short period, 
save for two mentions of ‘responsible homeowners’ on February 14th 2009 and March 7th 2009 
respectively as well as a brief citing of “the broken regulatory system that made this crisis 
possible”105 on February 21st 2009.  Why pointed rhetoric concerning the attribution of blame for 
the crisis briefly stops during this period cannot be conclusively known, but one suspects that the 
bi-partisan passing of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act in February 2009 might be 
a particularly significant reason for this being the case.  In the immediate aftermath of the 
passing of this major legislation in Congress by both parties it might have been perceived as 
unstatesman-like or politically disadvantageous for President Obama to issue direct criticism of a 
partisan kind during this time.  However, after this approximately two-and-a-half month lull in 
the direct and frequently partisan attribution of blame for the crisis, the rhetoric of blame coming 
from the presidential pulpit shifted squarely back to the two previous White House 
administrations.  Linking together terms such ‘economic downturn’, ‘credit crisis’, ‘fiscal 
disaster’ specifically with George W. Bush’s years in power by virtue of his citing the year 2000 
as a dividing point between supposedly good times and bad times, on April 18
th
 2009 Obama 
stated: 
It's not news to say that we are living through challenging times: the worst economic downturn 
since the Great Depression, a credit crisis that's made that downturn worse, and a fiscal disaster 
that has accumulated over a period of years.  In the year 2000, we had projected budget surpluses 
in the trillions, and Washington appeared to be on the road to fiscal stability. Eight years later, 
when I walked in the door, the projected budget deficit for this year alone was 1.3 trillion.
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These comments were again echoed over a year later with Obama stating that “The truth is, it 
took nearly a decade of failed economic policies to create this mess, and it will take years to fully 
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repair the damage.”107  The temporal parameters of the attribution of blame for the crisis were in 
this manner significantly extended with a Democratic president sitting in the White House: what 
had been previously spoken of as a crisis that had more or less been primarily caused by 
developments related to the housing bubble in the addresses of George W. Bush was recast 
significantly in the addresses of Barack Obama as a crisis that had germinated over a much a 
longer period and which reflected fundamental differences between the policies pursued by each 
of the two major American political parties. 
While the obvious intent of Obama in singling out the Bush years in such a manner would 
have been to score political points by attributing ultimate responsibility for the crisis as the 
cumulative outcome of the policies pursued during that period and consequently disavowing any 
responsibility from his own administration for the dreadful state of economic affairs that 
followed in the wake of the 2008 crash, the mentions of ‘fiscal disaster’ and ‘failed economic 
policies’ already imply something more.  Specifically, this presidential rhetoric served to 
construct a narrative that the economic path that America had taken during the Bush years, by 
virtue of its disastrous result in a devastating economic crisis, was itself to be considered as 
having run morally counter to that associated with the imaginary of a strong and prosperous 
America built upon mythic American values such as hard work, integrity and individual 
initiative.  This rhetorical strategy thus depicted the George W. Bush years in power retroactively 
as a period not only representative of policy failure but also, and more fundamentally, as 
representative of a period of collective or national moral failure, as a period when the right path 
that had made America great had been lost.  It was in such a manner that the wide scope of 
policy failure that had contributed to the development of an economic crisis was cast 
retrospectively as moral failure: the dire economic conditions that America had found itself was 
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framed as having resulted from activities that did not reflect the values and ideals of America, as 
the result of the deviation of a set of values and ideals that had traditionally made America great 
and prosperous.  This vein of discourse concerning the attribution of blame for the crisis was 
thus coloured in a way that made the narrative of what had happened seem reminiscent as much 
of a morality story as it was of a strictly economic or political one.  This blurring of the lines of 
blame for the crisis across morality, politics, and economics itself could be said to have 
performed an ideological function: whatever had gone wrong politically and economically must 
have been morally unsound as well.  This powerful moralizing of the crisis in the rhetoric of the 
presidential addresses thus conveyed in an affectively resonant way to the American public a 
certain narrative how such a great nation with such a shining history of success and prosperity 
could have found itself in the economic doldrums that it did.  It may have been true that a major 
reason for the crisis having occurred was that “professional and political ideas that emerged in 
the 1970s during a time of stagflation and excessive regulation of the economy continued to 
drive thinking and policy into the 1990s and 2000s, when economic conditions and the structure 
of the economy were much different”,108 but such macro-economic explanations stretching back 
decades in time were not articulated in the presidential radio addresses, in significant part 
because they lacked a powerful affective explanatory dimension and elegant simplicity that 
would be necessary for them to resonate with the intended public of the addresses.  This public 
consisted for the most part not of professional economists, academics, or policy theorists but of a 
highly heterogeneous mix of individuals, the majority of whom undoubtedly had only scant 
knowledge of the history and nuances of such wide-spanning and complex institutional 
phenomena.  A narrative of the crisis that was intelligible to this public and which targeted them 
in a powerfully affective manner was the narrative that ultimately was offered in chief. 
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The use of a rhetoric that employed a failure of morality as a kind of master lens through 
which the economic crisis and the events that led up to it could be viewed took on several 
distinct manifestations in the discourse of the presidential radio addresses. At times the 
attribution of moral responsibility was cast quite widely, with the blame for the crisis being 
located at the level of the social or the systemic.  This framing of the crisis in the form of the 
United States as a nation or society having been on a morally misguided and flawed economic 
trajectory is discernible in Obama’s radio addresses of September 5th 2009, close to one year 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers: 
The fact is, even before this recession hit, the savings rate was essentially zero, while borrowing 
had risen and credit card debt had increased. Many were simply struggling to stay afloat as 
incomes were stagnant or falling and jobs were scarce—that's important to remember. But there 
were also those who spent beyond their means. And more broadly, tens of millions of families 
have been, for a variety of reasons, unable to put away enough money for a secure retirement. 
Half of America's workforce doesn't have access to a retirement plan at work. And fewer than 10 
percent of those without workplace retirement plans have one of their own. We cannot continue 
on this course. And we certainly can't go back to an economy based on inflated profits and 
maxed-out credit cards, the cycles of speculative boom and painful busts, a system that put the 
interests of the short term ahead of the needs of long term.
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The broad scope of the malaise outlined here is notable, especially in its emphasis on collective 
moral responsibility and how the overall direction of the economy is framed as an immoral one.  
The identification of broad national malaise in the face of a crisis had been a feature of previous 
presidential rhetoric as well, as was for example evidenced through Jimmy Carter’s speeches in 
the summer of 1979 during the Iranian hostage crisis,
110
 and the parallels of the thrust of Carter’s 
rhetoric to that of Obama’s are notable.  Obama’s mentions of an economy based on ‘inflated 
profits’ and ‘maxed out credit cards’ clearly carry negative connotations of avarice and 
indebtedness of a societal scope, of a sort of large-scale sickness of the social body.  ‘Inflated 
profits’ implies artificial gain as opposed gain earned, and ‘maxed out credit cards’ signifies 
overspending and possibly predatory lending as well.  The criticism of ‘short term interests’ 
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carries negative connotations of temporariness, irrationality, illegitimacy and even reproachable 
self-interest when contrasted against ‘long term needs’, which carries largely positive 
connotations of lastingness, rationality and legitimacy.  The cumulative effect of such statements 
is the rhetorical depiction of a society afflicted by a kind of spiritual malaise of which the crisis 
was an expression. 
A final highly noteworthy feature of the passage cited above from Obama’s September 5th 
2009 address is how in it the mechanics of capitalism are themselves portrayed as moral failures 
rather than systemic features.  Specifically, ‘the cycles of speculative boom and painful busts’, 
cycles that are characteristic of capitalism as an economic system, are portrayed negatively but 
they are notably portrayed as negative based on them being representative of a broader moral 
failure rather than as a systemic feature of such a system.  Free market capitalism is actually 
vociferously defended by both Bush and Obama in their radio addresses on the crisis, with the 
former for example stating that “the crisis was not a failure of the free market system. And the 
answer is not to try to reinvent that system”111 and the latter stating that “I have long been a 
vigorous defender of free markets.”112  The blaming of human moral failure for the crisis having 
occurred as opposed to any inherent systemic features of the prevailing economic system is 
further evidenced at the end of Obama’s September 5th 2009 radio address where he states that 
“we're ready to take responsibility for our future once again, as individuals and as a nation.”113  
The overall narrative of ‘responsibility’ needing to be retaken is based on an indictment of the 
nation as having lost its way rather than any reproach of the fundamentals of the prevailing 
economic system, in terms of its motivating factors, mechanisms, and systemic tendencies. 
While the rhetoric of the presidential radio addresses did tend to cast the 2008 crisis as 
having chiefly occurred due to the moral failure of a nation, there were instances in this rhetoric 
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where responsibility for the crisis was much more narrowly attributed to specific parties.  
However, even in these cases the doings of such parties were still cast predominately in a moral 
light, as failures of the soul rather than the result of inherent systemic pressures such as the drive 
for profit.  This was particularly evident in Obama’s characterizations of the role played by the 
financial industry in precipitating the crisis.  Coming at the time when he was attempting to rally 
Congressional support for Wall Street reform legislation, while readily acknowledging that the 
crisis had in part come about as a “result of an era of easy credit, when millions of Americans 
borrowed beyond their means, bought homes they couldn't afford, and assumed that housing 
prices would always rise and the day of reckoning would never come.”114 Obama then went on to 
lay a larger share of the blame for the crisis at the feet of the financial industry in his December 
12
th
 2009 address, asserting that “much of [the responsibility for the crisis] was due to the 
irresponsibility of large financial institutions on Wall Street that gambled on risky loans and 
complex financial products, seeking short-term profits and big bonuses with little regard for 
long-term consequences.”115  The morally-laden rhetorical juxtaposition of the negative 
connotations of ‘short-term’ with the positive connotations of ‘long-term’ is again apparent here, 
as it was in Obama’s September 5th 2009 radio address.  This emphasis on the moral failure of 
financial firms, as the worst culprits in a wider scene of moral failure, was again apparent in 
Obama’s words in the address he delivered ahead of a meeting of the Banking Committee of the 
United States’ Senate in March of 2010: 
Of course, there were many causes of the economic turmoil that ripped through our country over 
the past 2 years. But it was a crisis that began in our financial system. Large banks engaged in 
reckless financial speculation without regard for the consequences and without tough oversight. 
Financial firms invented and sold complicated financial products to escape scrutiny and conceal 
enormous risk. And there were some who engaged in the rampant exploitation of consumers to 
turn a quick profit, no matter who was hurt in the process.
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This citing of the immoral recklessness, greed and deception of financial firms as being not only 
significantly responsible for the crisis but first amongst those responsible for it was a particularly 
salient feature of Obama’s rhetoric during the crisis117 and can be theorized as being part of a 
wider rhetorical attempt in the presidential radio addresses to attribute responsibility for the crisis 
to moral failure.  That this rhetoric emphasized the moral failure of particular parties as opposed 
to foregrounding systemic features that might otherwise have been cited stands as powerful 
evidence of how the rhetoric of the presidential radio addresses framed the 2008 crisis as one 
borne out of the moral failings of persons and groups as opposed to one originating from 
systemic motivations that would influence such persons and groups to take, if not actively 
pursue, such morally questionable or condemnable courses of actions.  
As has been detailed above, the depiction of moral failure in the presidential radio addresses 
as the primary cause of the 2008 crisis can be seen in essence as being predicated upon the 
concept of a betrayal of the mythic imaginary of America, of America as a place where hard 
work would be rewarded, affluence widely (though not of course equally) distributed, where 
fairness and honesty were virtues, a betrayal foremost orchestrated by a powerful financial 
industry that pursued its interests at the expense of the American people at large.  While ultimate 
responsibility for the crisis was spread about, an amorphous corporate America bore the brunt of 
the presidential ire in the end.  This contention is substantiated by another one of Obama’s radio 
addresses, given nearly two years after the collapse of September 2008: 
For a decade, middle class families felt the sting of stagnant incomes and declining economic 
security. Companies were rewarded with tax breaks for creating jobs overseas. Wall Street firms 
turned huge profits by taking, in some cases, reckless risks and cutting corners. All of this came 
at the expense of working Americans, who were fighting harder and harder just to stay afloat, 
often borrowing against inflated home values to pay their bills. Ultimately, that house of cards 
collapsed.
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The contrasting of the plight of middle class working Americans, Americans who might dream 
of “a good job with a good wage; a secure and dignified retirement; stable health care so you 
don't go broke just because you get sick; the chance to give our kids a better shot than we got”119 
with misguided (Bush-era) government policies, corporate avarice, and financial firms’ 
irresponsibility demonstrates well how the presidential radio addresses discursively constructed 
the responsibility for the 2008 crisis as a crisis stemming from a moral failure of systemic 
dimensions.  The reference to a ‘house of cards’ is a particularly striking one, as it rings with 
connotations of weakness, deceptive appearances, and even lack of spiritual substance.  In this 
statement, the ostensible causes of the crisis – greed, recklessness, self-interest – are constructed 
in an oppositional relationship to the mythic imaginary of America as a nation whose backbone 
is composed of middle class, family-oriented, working Americans.  Ultimately, the framing of 
responsibility for the crisis along the lines of morality, as an event which occurred because of a 
failure or betrayal of the nation’s spirit or ethos, epitomized above all by the actions taken by 
certain reckless, selfish, even deceptive and unpatriotic parties, served to construct the crisis as 
one whose origins lay as much in the realm of morality as in the realms of politics and 
economics, if not more so.  The ‘house of cards’ thus symbolically stands for the morally hollow, 
cynical and self-serving economic system built by such parties, a system whose moral essence 
was rhetorically framed in contrast to that represented by a mythic imaginary of an America 
based on values such as honesty, hard work, and earnestness, an ultimately unsustainable 
structure destined to collapse on account of the immorality of its architects and, by extension, the 
immorality of its architecture. 
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‘The House Built on Sand’ or ‘The Metaphor of Architecture’ 
Matthew 7:27 
And the rain descended, the floods came, and the winds blew and beat on that house; and it fell. 
And great was its fall. 
 
Language and speech acts are central to the production of social reality.
120
  Institutional facts as 
the bedrock of social reality are dependent on language’s essential feature of being a system of 
“symbolic devices, such as words, that by convention mean or represent or symbolize something 
beyond themselves”,121 and the existence of a host of concepts key to the constitution of the idea 
of something such as an ‘economy’ – such as money, commodities, assets, and value – are 
clearly language-dependent: they cannot indeed exist at all outside such a linguistic framework.  
When figurative language is then used in representing already linguistically-dependent social 
reality, further interpretive challenges are posed.  If something like an ‘economy’, an 
institutionally-produced and linguistically-based aspect of social reality, is depicted via 
figurative language, we are already dealing with multiple levels of meaning.  It is with this 
context in mind that another salient metaphor discernible in the presidential radio addresses is to 
be examined: that of the American economy as architectural structure. 
The widespread presence of the metaphorical description of the U.S. economy as 
architectural structure in the discourse of the presidential radio addresses is a highly noticeable 
feature that merits some analysis.  In some ways, the metaphor of architecture appears to be 
dissonant with the metaphor of the storm discussed earlier.  Whereas the metaphor of economic 
crisis as storm is essentially disembodied and removes human agency in its transposition of the 
economic into the realm of the impersonal phenomena of nature, the metaphor of architecture 
constructs the economic as a shared, quintessentially man-made enterprise or edifice that is 
anchored firmly in the realm of human agency.  While the two metaphors are dissonant logically, 
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they nevertheless can be said to operate together ideologically by virtue of their shared affective 
intensity.  Indeed, it is actually through such dissonance that the two can be said to function 
together ideologically, as ideology can and often does function through the juxtaposition of 
figures and positions that may be logically inconsistent with each other yet can appear as united 
through feeling and passion.
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The deployment of the metaphor of architecture in the rhetorical construction of the U.S. 
economy is also significant in that it is partly constitutive of a narrative of the economic crisis 
itself that emerges in the presidential addresses: that the crisis resulted from having an economy 
built on an unsustainable foundation and that recovery from the crisis would be dependent upon 
the rebuilding of the American economy on a qualitatively different basis.  The rhetorical power 
of this narrative operates along multiple dimensions of intelligibility and affect.  First and most 
basically, the concept of ‘strong foundations’ as a requisite for long-lastingness, security and 
stability is one that can be said to be widely culturally recognized and easily understood by the 
implied national public of the addresses.  Second and related, this narrative served as a 
convenient explanatory heuristic of a moral character for why the crisis happened in the first 
place: that the collapse into crisis was due to the economy being built upon faulty (and by 
extension, morally deficient) grounds and that its reconstruction required a more solid (and by 
extension, morally worthy or sound) basis.  Third, this narrative lent itself well to the rhetorical 
construction of the U.S. economy as a kind of shared, collective, even organic project under the 
wider umbrella of the historical project of America and the American nation.  That Americans 
together would rebuild their economy better and stronger than before, as they had done when 
faced with economic adversity in the past, fit well with the larger mythic imaginary narrative of 
an America that would always overcome adversity generally and emerge even stronger.  The 
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power of narratives emphasizing the history of the collective has been identified as a key feature 
of the rhetoric of charismatic leaders,
123
 and the desire to project such an impression of 
leadership on the part of presidents Bush and Obama explains why they deployed such rhetorical 
appeals to a mythic American history of collective endeavour and overcoming to them in their 
attempts to be the voice of the nation in a time of great national difficulty.   
The metaphor of economy as structure, particularly expressed as the architecture of an 
edifice, is used repeatedly in the presidential radio addresses: it is indeed the most frequently 
deployed metaphor in the presidential rhetoric on the 2008 crisis.  From the first mention of it 
within the period of analysis on March 21
st, 2009 (“It's an economic blueprint for our future, a 
vision of America where growth is not based on real estate bubbles or overleveraged banks, but 
on a firm foundation”124) to the last mention of it over eighteen months later on October 2nd 2010 
(“Over the past 20 months, we've been fighting not just to create more jobs today, but to rebuild 
our economy on a stronger foundation.”125), the frequent recourse to the metaphor of architecture 
is a remarkably telling way that the rhetoric of the presidential radio addresses depicted the 
economic crisis that began in 2008. 
Above and beyond the more obvious connotations of repair and reconstruction that most 
readily come to mind, what is most notable in the deployment of this metaphor is how the idea of 
‘rebuilding’ contained in it implies both a fixing and setting right of what was broken and flawed 
practically and spiritually.  In the context that it is used, the idea of rebuilding simultaneously 
suggests the need for the rectification of a practical state of affairs that had become unacceptable 
and the renewal of a project that has great intrinsic spiritual worth but which has run afoul.  
Indeed, the implication of this kind of rebuilding – of rebuilding in the face of disaster – is that 
such action is simultaneously a matter of practical necessity as well as a matter of spiritually 
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necessary renewal.  The injunction to rebuild at all, that ‘we must rebuild’ (as opposed to 
abandon) is evocative of both the practical and the spiritual, that something of core value worthy 
of preservation and with the potential of invigorated renewal exists below the wreckage and that 
both practical action and spiritual fortitude are necessary to accomplish this.  Moreover, the line 
between practical action and spiritual fortitude is far more porous than it initially seems: the two 
can be seen as mutually reinforcing, and the former can be seen as evidence of the latter, that toil 
and the exercise of reason is evidence of faith. 
This particular rhetorical mix of spiritual renewal and practical action with respect to the 
rebuilding of the American economy (and by extension, the rebuilding of America) is discernible 
in varying ratios throughout the rhetoric of the presidential addresses and is frequently 
mentioned.
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  This pervasiveness of the metaphor of architecture, of the (re)building of new and 
strong foundations, can be partially explained by how it works rhetorically on and between so 
many levels of meaning.  Building is a commonly understood activity and well as a collective 
one, and the architectural metaphor seems an apt one to capture these meanings.  Strong 
foundations are seen as necessary to support that which is built upon them against external 
threats and the particular religious connotations with respect to this idea
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 have cultural 
resonance in America.  The labour of (re)building is both demonstrative of spiritual commitment, 
penance for past transgressions, and the promise of renewal after corruption and loss through 
effort and faith.  Also, the idea of (re)building also carries with it strong patriotic connotations in 
that it is representative of the historical promise of American prosperity and success in the face 
of adversities (whether in the form of natural or man-made catastrophes) through its evocation of 
mythic American values such as strength and resilience.  Linkages between the realms of the 
practical, the spiritual, and the historic thus proliferate within the metaphor of architecture and its 
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wide usage in the presidential radio addresses to discuss the American economy and the policies 
being pursued to combat the crisis is substantially predicated upon the dynamic and multiple sets 
of meanings and associations it evokes.   
As a final comment on this subject, it should be added that the character of several of the 
dominant metaphors deployed in describing the crisis itself – the crisis as ‘collapse’, ‘meltdown’ 
and ‘tsunami’ – also laid the groundwork for the extensive use of the architectural metaphor for 
the economy in the presidential radio addresses.  The connotations of these dominant metaphors 
emphasized structural breakdown, and the deployment of the reverse of this in the presidential 
radio addresses’ rhetoric of (re)building can be seen in part as a reaction to a discursive field 
which in many ways had already been marked and established.  In other words, the use of a 
narrative revolving around the rebuilding of the economy in the presidential addresses was one 
whose form was in part shaped by the discourse of the crisis as catastrophic structural breakdown 
that preceded it: the discourse of catastrophe in this way precipitated the discourse of rebuilding 
as renewal.  Indeed, the widespread deployment of the metaphor of architecture in the 
presidential radio addresses on the crisis can be seen as the redeployment of a particular set of 
conceptual vocabulary previously used in American history to frame rebuilding in the face of 
tragedy in terms of moral renewal being associated with meaningful, practical concrete action, as 
has been observed in relation to how the efforts to salvage and refit damaged ships of the 
American Pacific Fleet after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and the repairing and 
rebuilding of sites damaged or destroyed by the September 11
th
 2001 attacks were respectively 
framed as stories of resurrection and renewal.
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  In summary, the themes of rebuilding and 
renewal apparent in the deployment of the metaphor of architecture in the presidential radio 
addresses on the 2008 crisis can be seen as a symbolically-rich, highly affectively-oriented 
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rhetoric responding to an event which had been framed as catastrophic, and as part of a larger 
rhetorical tradition in America in which responses to tragic and catastrophic events have been 
constructed through the deployment of themes of resurrection and renewal.  
 
‘The Pain of Exchange Value’ or ‘Empty Buildings & Idle Bodies’ 
The damage wrought by the 2008 crisis was articulated in a variety of ways in the presidential 
radio addresses: economic contraction, wiped out investments, and homes and jobs lost or under 
threat of loss were some of the ways it was described.  The last of these two, the potential and 
actual loss of home ownership and employment, were particularly salient subjects in the 
addresses.  That these two subjects figured so prominently in the discourse of the presidential 
radio addresses is understandable given that both were highly representative of the crisis in 
mainstream narratives of it, albeit in differing ways.  For the most part, the rhetoric used to 
describe the traumatic impact of the economic crisis on homeowners and workers was that of 
empathy for their pain, struggles, suffering and anxiety.  However, while it is expected that a 
head of state would generally seek to be a voice of empathy and support when so many were 
afflicted by a crisis of national scope, some important questions remain outstanding.  How, for 
example, was this rhetoric configured to speak to the experiences of pain, struggle, suffering, and 
anxiety in the face of the 2008 crisis?  What discourses were drawn upon in the creation of this 
rhetoric?  In this rhetoric, what relations were outlined between the micro-level such as 
distressed individual homeowners and workers and the macro-level of phenomena such as the 
variance in home values, the rate of unemployment, the fortunes of business and large-scale 
industry, the net effects of economic contraction or expansion?  What subject positions did the 
discourse of the addresses tend to construct, and how did it construct these?  What dominant 
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frameworks were deployed in the rhetorical construction of economic distress?  What kind of 
agency was attributed, either directly or indirectly, to ‘the economy’ over the course of the 
crisis?  The broad exploration of these and related lines of inquiry can do much to shed light 
upon the many ways in which the discourse of the presidential radio addresses depicted the 
experience of the crisis of homeowners, workers, and other adversely affected groups.    
 While many visuals have come to be associated with the 2008 crisis, such as freshly let-go 
workers carrying their belongings out of office buildings and high officials testifying before 
congressional hearings, there is perhaps no image more emblematic of it than a ‘foreclosed’ sign 
in front of a vacant home.  In fact, there seems to be a broad metonymic connection between the 
motif of ‘home’ and the metaphor of architectural structure deployed in relation to the economy 
which was outlined in the previous section.  Specifically, there are grounds to assert that the idea 
of home being represented as place of protection arguably has a general connection to the 
concept of civilization being represented as the protective structure of the built environment in 
contrast to the wilds of nature and in this sense the motif of home in the discourse of the 
addresses can be seen as related to the broader, collective activity of (re)building.  First, similar 
to how the emphasis on strong or firm economic foundations discussed above can be 
hypothesized as being strongly connected to religious ideas, there is a long history of association 
between the built environment and civilization evident in the Judeo-Christian religious tradition 
in which the institutions of the home, the temple and the church are representative of the 
divinely-sanctioned human conquest of nature.  Secondly, the collapse of the built environment, 
often symbolized in the form of ‘ruins’ or their equivalent in literature and art, is also of 
significance to this theme.  For example, in the literature of the 18
th
 century, the trope of ruins as 
connected to the history of the self-derived destruction of imperial nations due to their misguided 
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pursuit of power and worldly resplendence emerged as a distinct hermeneutic tradition.
129
  
Indeed, the grand narrative of the founding of the State upon a wild nature, its development into 
the massive physical edifice of empire, and the collapse of the built environment and its 
subsequent transformation into ruins is particularly well-captured visually in the American artist 
Thomas Cole’s famous series of paintings, The Course of Empire.  This series, meant to illustrate 
the stages through which all empires were held to pass, envisioned five distinct stages: The 
Savage State, The Arcadian or Pastoral State, The Consummation of Empire, Destruction and 
Desolation.  The painting of the final stage, ‘Desolation’, depicts only ruins;130 the formerly life-
sustaining built environment reduced to “a few decaying columns and colonnades overgrown by 
briars and ivy”.131 
What is most interesting in Coles’ work for the purposes of the discussion here is how the 
visual conveyance of the physical decay of the built environment is also symbolic of moral 
decay.  In it, the drive toward grandeur is associated with collapse and decay, and this idea of the 
large-scale collapse of the built environment as symptomatic of societal or civilizational decay 
due to the loss of moral bearings finds a degree of resonance in popular images associated with 
the foreclosure epidemic associated so closely with the 2008 crisis.  The home that is in chaos or 
in a state of disrepair or loss can be said to represent a metonymic connection to chaos, decay or 
the loss of direction at the level of the societal, and the collapse of the household due to the 
corruption of morals also finds it parallels at the level of the social.  Or to put another way, the 
abandoned foreclosed homes of the crisis can be seen as symptomatic of societal sickness, of a 
malaise of the national spirit manifested in physical form.  Many popular narratives of the 
housing market collapse did indeed frame the massiveness of it as indicative of a nation that had 
lost its moral compass in the irresponsible pursuit of grandiose luxury and profit, that a toxic 
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nexus was formed between those who bought more than they could afford and those that were 
willing to finance them for the sake of their own profit, and this sentiment can also be detected in 
the presidential radio addresses at times.  A sense of the extent of the home foreclosure epidemic 
over the course of the crisis can be rendered via statistics.  In 2008, 861,664 families lost their 
homes to foreclosure and more than 3.1 million foreclosure filings were issued; this latter figure 
translates as approximately one in every fifty-four homes.
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  Around 2.9 million foreclosure 
filings were made in 2009 with 945,000 homes being repossessed, and in 2010 the number of 
foreclosures filed rose to 3.5 million with 1,125,000 homes being repossessed.
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  In total, 
between January 2007 and December 2011 the number of completed foreclosures was 
somewhere in excess of 4 million.
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  Such statistics indicate that the epidemic of foreclosures 
during the 2008 crisis may have actually surpassed the rate at which homes were being 
foreclosed during the Great Depression.
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  Given this massiveness of the issue of home 
foreclosure and the lead role of the housing bubble in preparing the groundwork for the initiation 
of wider crisis, it is clear why many tend to associate the 2008 crisis with home foreclosures and 
why the image of a foreclosed house is so powerfully suggestive of the crisis.  
As compelling as they are of themselves, statistics such as those cited above concerning the 
damage done to home ownership in the United States by the crisis should be understood within a 
wider cultural context in which home ownership is particularly valorized.  The centrality, 
desirability, and social value of ‘home’ and home ownership in American culture are well-known 
and documented: owning one’s own home in the United States is “widely viewed as an integral 
part of the American dream.”136  Among industrialized developed nations, United States has 
ranked somewhat in the middle on home ownership rates: at 65% its home ownership rate as of 
2002 was higher than that of Japan (60%), France (54%) and Germany (43%), while lower than 
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that of Italy (82%), the United Kingdom (69%) and Canada (68.4%).
137
  The extensive history of 
government and government-supported enterprises and programs designed to enable and 
promote home ownership, such as the Federal Housing Administration, the Federal National 
Mortgage Association, and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation, further reflects that 
the importance of owning a home is not only a culturally-desired aspiration in the United States 
but also one reflected at the political level as well.  This political support for home ownership is 
also reflected in the tax code with the policy of the tax deductibility of mortgage interest 
payments being “perhaps the best known federal housing policy [...] deeply ingrained in the 
economic and social fabric of the country.”138  In particular, the goal of home ownership for all 
those who aspired to it, even those particularly challenged in their pursuit of it, was politically 
encouraged in the United States on account of property ownership being seen as “a way to put 
lower-income families on a path to social and financial stability by forcing savings and making 
for a more involved citizenry.”139 
The combination of the cultural significance of home ownership, the political capital 
invested in the project of home-owning, and the many economic and financial issues related to 
owning a home is discernible in the discourse of the presidential radio addresses on the 2008 
crisis.  Given that the crisis originated substantially in the U.S. housing market bubble, 
particularly through the widespread issuing of ‘sub-prime’ mortgages whose borrowers were 
charged up to 4% higher than those with stronger credit histories,
140
 the close identification of 
the crisis with homeownership issues is a readily apparent feature in the presidential addresses at 
the outset of the crisis.  On September 20
th
 2008, a mere five days after the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, President Bush pointed to the problems of the housing market, specifically those 
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related to sub-prime loans, as a kind of ground zero of the events that were unfolding at that 
time, stating that: 
Problems that originated in the credit markets and first showed up in the area of subprime 
mortgages have spread throughout our financial system. This has led to an erosion of confidence 
that has frozen many financial transactions, including loans to consumers and to businesses 
seeking to expand and create jobs.
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A week later, Bush again emphasized the central role played by the housing market in the 
initiation of the crisis, suggesting that although the problems in the U.S. economy were complex 
their kernel could be located in “uncertainty over mortgage backed securities.  Many of these 
financial assets relate to home mortgages that have lost value during the housing decline.”142  
This initial fingering of the housing market as the immediate trigger of the wider crisis would 
dissipate in time however in the presidential addresses as the full scope of what had gone wrong 
in the lead-up to the crisis gradually became apparent. 
 Given the combination of the 2008 crisis having clear and immediate roots in the housing 
industry and home ownership being a culturally celebrated value in the United States, the 
presidential rhetoric on the subject of homeowners themselves was particularly interesting in its 
attempt to balance criticism of irresponsibility with promises of support for those homeowners 
who supposedly deserved it.  Indeed, an ambiguous tension between homeowners as relatively 
helpless victims of forces beyond their control and homeowners as individuals who were 
significantly responsible for their own misfortunes seems present in the addresses, and perhaps 
for good reason given that the line between the two was perhaps more fluid than it might have 
seemed to be at first glance.  For example, on September 27
th
 2008, in the same address in which 
he first spoke of the necessity of passing the 700 billion dollar bank bailout package then being 
debated in Congress, President Bush stated “I know many of you listening this morning are 
frustrated with the situation. You make sacrifices every day to meet your mortgage payments and 
90 
 
keep up with your bills.”143  This rhetorical strategy of speaking primarily of and to responsible 
homeowners would be repeated again in the presidential addresses several times, as it was on 
October 11
th
 2008: 
[...] the decline in the housing market has left many Americans concerned about losing their 
homes. My administration launched the HOPE NOW Alliance, which brings together 
homeowners and lenders and mortgage servicers and others to find ways to prevent foreclosure. 
We're also making it easier for responsible homeowners to refinance into affordable mortgages 
insured by the Federal Housing Administration. Americans listening today can know that if 
you're struggling to meet your mortgage, there are ways you can get help.
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The logical convolution in this statement of ‘homeowners’ (in the first two sentences) and 
‘responsible homeowners’ (in the third sentence) and Americans who are having difficulty 
carrying their mortgages (in the fourth sentence) and the implied but never-mentioned 
‘irresponsible homeowners’ is remarkably expressive of the ambiguity of the presidential 
rhetoric on the subject of home ownership and foreclosure.  While irresponsible homeowners no 
doubt played a role in laying the groundwork for the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble, the fact 
that the victims of the collapse of the housing sector clearly went well beyond those who in all 
likelihood most deserved to suffer misfortune based on their recklessness or the foolhardiness of 
their personal decisions (since the general loss of homes’ values affected even those homeowners 
who arguably could be said to have been acting ‘responsibly’) makes it the case that the line 
between ‘responsible’ and ‘irresponsible’ homeowners was effectively blurred, and this seems 
reflected in the ambiguity present in the rhetoric of the presidential addresses on this subject. 
The continued and widespread usage of the term ‘responsible homeowners’ in the rhetoric of 
the weekly radio addresses delivered by President Obama
145
 is telling of the sensitivity with 
which the topic of home foreclosure was treated.  Arguably, it may be advanced that the usage of 
‘responsible homeowners’ in the presidential rhetoric is indicative of an ideological crossing-
point or fault-line.  As was discussed above, home ownership has historically been both a 
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culturally celebrated and politically sanctioned aspiration in the United States.  Home ownership 
carries with it connotations of maturity, responsibility, stability, domesticity and security: all 
traits which are deeply supported ideologically in American culture and myth.  These 
connotations associated with home ownership stand in contrast to that of the supposed 
‘irresponsible’ homeowner.  Those who bought what they could not afford and borrowed to do 
so are framed as immature, irresponsible, reckless, selfish and lacking in judgment: in short, as 
not deserving of the great privilege of homeownership.  The condemnation of such individuals 
was well-captured in Obama’s biblical-sounding apocalyptic indictment of the “millions of 
Americans borrowed beyond their means, bought homes they couldn't afford, and assumed that 
housing prices would always rise and the day of reckoning would never come.”146  As such, the 
usage of ‘responsible homeowners’ in the rhetoric of the presidential addresses, despite the 
logical insufficiencies involved in this term, can be seen as an attempt to navigate this 
ideological plane.  Through such a rhetorical balancing act, home ownership was thus retained as 
a desired status, and those deemed ‘responsible’ in their endeavours related toward obtaining this 
status (importantly, an implied majority) were to be sympathized with and even perhaps helped 
for being caught up in a calamity not really of their own making.  By contrast, those depicted as 
irresponsible in their exercise of home ownership were deserving of neither sympathy nor 
assistance because the actions that they took were held to run contrary to the connotations of the 
status they were aspiring to, and furthermore they are to be condemned on account of causing 
harm to others who were deemed to have been ‘responsible’ since their irresponsible actions 
affected the housing market at large.   
On the whole then, it can be asserted that the ultimate effect of dividing the issue concerning 
the plight of imperiled homeowners during the 2008 crisis into the binary categories of 
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responsible and irresponsible homeowners in the rhetoric of the presidential radio addresses 
(mostly implicitly through the repeated citing of the plight of ‘responsible homeowners’) was to 
frame this issue as chiefly a moral one.  In framing it in such a manner, the prickly issue of home 
foreclosures as a major aspect of the crisis was articulated in a manner that was ideologically 
palatable to the imagined broad American national public at which the presidential rhetoric was 
directed.  Quite similar to the way that the attribution of responsibility for the economic crisis at 
large was largely cast in moral terms, the plight of endangered homeowners was also framed as a 
moral issue as much as it was framed as a political or economic one; indeed more so.  The effect 
of this issue being so framed was also similar to the effect of the crisis at large being framed 
predominantly in moral terms: the emphasis on the responsibility or irresponsibility of 
homeowners as individuals took relative prominence over other more meso-level or macro-level 
factors that could have been highlighted instead.  Through this rhetorical emphasis on the moral 
dimensions of the foreclosure issue, the myth of America as a place of opportunity, of aspiration 
for the better, where individual merit and responsibility would ultimately be rewarded remained 
intact and unquestioned.  While individuals such as irresponsible homeowners could and would 
err (or for that matter, while unethical parties such as mortgage lending companies could morally 
err via their adoption of predatory or otherwise questionable lending practices), their failings 
were principally their own and it was these moral failings that were depicted as chiefly 
responsible for the housing debacle rather than a failure of the nation or of its political and 
economic system at large.       
 While the issue of home foreclosures was particularly strongly associated with the 2008 
crisis, a different phenomenon more strongly associated with economic crises in general was 
even more central in the rhetoric of the presidential radio addresses: unemployment.  
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Unemployment is a multi-dimensional subject in that it is simultaneously located at the 
intersection of several veins of discourse.  For example, from one angle unemployment may be 
seen as being related to personal initiative and educational levels while at another it may be seen 
as related to large-scale macro-economic variables which affect many regardless of their 
personal traits.
147
  In the context of economic crises, it is undoubtedly the case that the macro-
economic perspective eclipses the focus on the individually-based factors in relation to 
unemployment.  However, the significance of unemployment is also manifest in a variety of 
ways within the macro-economic context of economic crises.  At one level, it is part of what 
might be called a discourse centred on economics.  It is related to phenomena such as the growth 
or shrinkage of gross domestic product, and it is classified as a ‘lagging indicator’ that tends to 
follow behind the fluctuations of other macro-economic variables that precede it.
148
  On another 
level, unemployment in the context of economic crises is symbolically registered in the domain 
of the psychosocial in the sense that it comes to symbolize feelings such as anxiety and 
insecurity of those directly afflicted by it as well as of the social body at large; as a kind of social 
sickness.  The multiple levels at which the issue of unemployment is manifested in the context of 
economic crises found expression in the presidential radio addresses, as this problem was 
depicted both as a technical problem to be resolved by technical means and also as a social 
scourge that needed to be combated through the efforts of the nation. 
The issue of unemployment and its concomitant features such as reduced economic activity 
and increased personal and familial hardship figured very prominently in various discourses on 
the 2008 crisis, and this was evident in the way that it was spoken of both as part of economics 
broadly speaking and as representative of a kind of collective trauma of the social body, with 
connections between these two being widespread.  Whether in the form of movies concerning 
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those rendered unemployed by the crisis such as The Company’s Men, novels concerning the 
unemployed and underemployed pooling resources to survive such as Paul Auster’s Sunset Park, 
or rhetoric from the oval office promising help for the unemployed and imploring out-of-work 
Americans to hang in there and hold out for better times, unemployment was one of the most 
direct and obvious issues associated with the crisis.  Indeed, one can go so far as to say that in the 
rhetoric of the presidential addresses it was unemployment that served both as the ultimate 
economic measure of the impact of the crisis and as the primary symbolic register of how the 
nation, as the collective body of its citizenry, was affectively impacted by the crisis.  Though 
rates of unemployment in the United States during the crisis differed considerably based on 
variables such as geographic location and race,
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 this issue was the one which affected the 
nation more widely than any other and as such it was registered in a plethora of discourses of the 
2008 crisis.   
To put the issue of unemployment during the crisis into numerical perspective, civilian 
employment in the U.S. reached its zenith at 146,407,000 jobs in January of 2008 and hit a low 
of 137,960,000 jobs twenty-four months later in December of 2009,
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 meaning that almost 8.5 
million jobs were lost during this period.  Furthermore, though the U.S. recession is dated as 
having technically ended as of June 2009, as of October 2011 (a full twenty-seven months after 
the official end of the recessionary period) civilian employment stood only at 140,302,000 
million jobs,
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 meaning that national employment at that point was still over 6 million jobs less 
than in January 2008.  Linking together unemployment, the loss of economic productivity, and 
the potentially crippling resultant effects of these, Obama’s first weekly radio address as 
President on January 24
th
 2009 began by foregrounding the historic nature of the crisis’ impact 
on employment in the United States: 
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We begin this year and this administration in the midst of an unprecedented crisis that calls for 
unprecedented action. Just this week we saw more people file for unemployment than at any time 
in the last 26 years. And experts agree that if nothing is done, the unemployment rate could reach 
double digits; our economy could fall a trillion dollars short of its full capacity, which translates 
into more than $12,000 in lost income for a family of four; and we could lose a generation of 
potential as more young Americans are forced to forego college dreams or the chance to train for 
the jobs of the future.
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Throughout the mediated depictions of the crisis, statistics and statistical commentary concerning 
unemployment did often indeed serve as a key barometer of both the severity of the crisis and the 
rate of recovery, and this was also the case in the presidential radio addresses.  These figures 
were used both as updates of the most recent changes to job numbers, and as references to the 
overall impact of the crisis to date. 
The repeated citing of employment figures in the presidential radio addresses (notably, 
coming most often at or near the very beginning of the radio addresses in which they were 
mentioned, and also prominently mentioned after the release of major government employment 
reports) effectively acted as a sort of meta-narrative of the crisis, as can be discerned through a 
sampling of statements from Obama’s radio addresses during his first year in power.153  The 
widespread recounting and explanation of such employment figures in the rhetoric presidential 
radio addresses indicates the crucial importance and position of employment as the key 
economic indicator of the state of the United States during the crisis: the salience of jobs 
statistics, above and beyond all other potential economic indicators, point to the centrality of 
employment as the most important nexus point of the macroeconomic (the economy at large) and 
the microeconomic (the employment status of the individual).  Whereas other phenomena (such 
as home foreclosures) afflicted or threatened many, and whereas other indicators (such as Gross 
Domestic Product figures) were perceived as important but were at a major remove from the 
level of microeconomic experience, the near-universality of the need and desire for employment 
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cut across almost all lines: virtually all wanted gainful formal employment, and if jobs were 
increasingly being lost it was perceived as a sign of a sickness of national scope.  Related to this, 
one observation to be made here is that the repeated citing of such statistics resembles ongoing 
diagnostic reports; that they function as a measure of the economic ‘health’ of the nation.  
Considering this observation more deeply, it may be further asked as to what is constitutive of 
this kind of health; where its underlying conceptual grounding lies.  Arguably, the broad answer 
is ‘activity’. 
 Activity may at first seem to be a rather peculiar answer, however, broadly construed, 
activity or the lack thereof in a large social sense does indeed seem to be what is being kept track 
of, commented on, and prognosticated about.  Consider first the case of the unemployed: is their 
unemployment not effectively the lack of their activity in the wider economic sphere, this taken 
from them by forces largely, if not completely, beyond their control, given the context of an 
economic crisis?  Is not ‘the most severe downturn since the Great Depression’ essentially a 
downturn of economic activity?  Were not the ‘shuttered factories and businesses’ formerly hubs 
of activity in a gigantic economic apparatus?  Probing even deeper, it may be asserted that the 
lack of activity may be interpreted as being representative of something even more fundamental: 
the loss of potential.  The idea of the loss of potential is apparent at both the macro and the micro 
levels of the issue of unemployment.  At the macro level, the social body is in pain on account of 
the distress of large numbers of its members who are suffering from lack of work, and its 
unrealized potential can be discerned in indicators such as the contraction of GDP.  What it could 
potentially produce is not being produced: its potential is going unrealized.  The level of sickness 
of the health of the social body at large is in turn significantly mirrored in the figure of the 
unemployed.  Not only are the unemployed in distress on account of the many problems 
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connected to not having an income such as having difficulty making ends meet, not being able to 
enjoy a standard of life they may have been formerly accustomed to, and being depressed about 
not having gainful unemployment, they are also idle: their human potential is not being realized.   
In considering unemployment in America as a kind of social sickness in the context of the 
2008 crisis, the degree to which the significance of the ‘loss of potential’ might theoretically be 
seen as being related to the moral beliefs of certain Protestant sects that had a particularly notable 
influence in the development of American cultural values is an intriguing question.  Certainly, 
Weber’s observation concerning the parallelisms of ethics between Protestantism and capitalism, 
in particular the assumption that “work is one’s calling”154 comes most immediately to mind.  
The idleness of men is the reverse of this essentially.  That it is morally wrong or sinful for men 
to not be engaged in their calling to work (both for them and for the society of which they are 
part) and furthermore to have been rendered idle against their will due to the macro-economic 
phenomena of mass unemployment does seem to be detectable in the rhetoric of the presidential 
radio addresses.  Unemployment is in this sense an affront to both the divine and human 
decency.  That a background perspective based around the idea of work being a fundamental 
human right and dignity for those who desire it is present in the presidential discourse on the 
crisis is evidenced in several instances.  For example, there is an assumption that the jobless 
would prefer to be employed, that “there are millions of Americans trying to find work”155 who 
only are asking for “a chance and a fair shake.”156  Further supporting this contention is how the 
crisis as the cause of mass unemployment is depicted as a malevolent force that has intervened 
from without, like a natural disaster, that “the worst recession since the 1930s had wreaked 
havoc on the lives of so many of our fellow Americans.”157  In the rhetoric of the presidential 
addresses, the lack of work for so many is depicted as representing a wound to the social body 
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itself (“too many of our neighbors are still out of work”158), and at times the plight of the 
unemployed is made synonymous with the plight of the nation itself (“we will be relentless in 
our efforts to put America back to work”159).  Unemployment is in this way depicted as the great 
scourge of the 2008 crisis, in opposition to God’s design for man and simultaneously at odds 
with the American faith in the enterprising activity of the individual as the core engine of the 
American nation’s history of success and prosperity. 
The multiple dimensions along which the importance of work is construed, economically, 
socially, and for the individual in the United States were particularly evident in President 
Obama’s radio address of April 9th 2010.  In this particularly spiritually-oriented address given 
shortly after Easter, Obama listed work first amongst what he called “those aspirations we hold 
in common as brothers and sisters, as members of the same family, the family of man”:160 
All of us know how important work is, not just for the paycheck, but for the peace of mind that 
comes from knowing you can provide for your family. As Americans and as human beings, we 
seek not only the security, but the sense of dignity, the sense of community, that work confers. 
That's why it was heartening news that last month, for the first time in more than 2 years, our 
economy created a substantial number of jobs, instead of losing them. We've begun to reverse 
the devastating slide, but we have a long way to go to repair the damage from this recession, and 
that will continue to be my focus every single day.
161
 
 
This idea of work as simultaneously an economic necessity for both the individual and those 
most directly connected to them, as a value related to personal dignity, and as an integral part of 
the constitution of community (and one might add national) cohesiveness underscores the 
richness of this notion in the discourse of the presidential radio addresses concerning the subject 
of unemployment.  Work is construed as a human right which finds ideological support both in 
the mythic idea of America as a land where those who are willing to work could and would find 
success and in the Protestant ethic concerning work which undergird this myth to a substantial 
degree.  That the phenomenon of mass unemployment due to the crisis was portrayed as an evil, 
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and an outside evil at that, is further evidenced in the presidential rhetoric in statements such as 
“after a recession that stole 8 million jobs”.162  The metaphor of theft certainly hammers home 
the point that jobs are depicted as a fundamental right for those who want work, and that for 
people to be deprived of them against their will is a morally condemnable phenomenon – the 
thievery of something people are entitled to – that is incompatible within the wider moral terrain 
in which the issue of work is discursively constructed in the presidential addresses.   
 An interesting correlate to the concept of unemployment as a lack of activity which served as 
a barometer of the overall economic health of the social body during the 2008 crisis is how the 
American economy itself was frequently depicted in the presidential radio addresses as a kind of 
giant machine whose kinetic energy of motion (or lack thereof) was indicative of the economic 
state of the nation.  The metaphor of economic health discussed above as represented through 
unemployment figures indicative of unrealized potential as social sickness is alternatively 
conceptualized in the presidential radio addresses at times by the metaphoric depiction of the 
crisis as a kind of large scale mechanical failure.  The metaphor of mechanical failure for 
economic crises has some history to it.  In December 1930, John Maynard Keynes had written 
“We have magneto trouble.  How, then, can we start it up again?”163 in reference to the moribund 
state of Britain’s economy a bit over a year into the Great Depression.  The metaphor of the 
economy as giant machine is intriguing in that it assigns agency to the economy, but it does so 
by representing this agency as profoundly mysterious and powerful, similar to the workings of 
nature or the divine.  Given this mysterious and powerful agentive character, in the context of an 
economic crisis the question of ‘how to get it working again’ becomes in large part a matter for 
economic experts, whose role it is to understand the mechanics of such a complex machine.  For 
the national public of the United States; however, it appears that rhetoric of the presidential radio 
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addresses on the 2008 crisis mostly was focused on trying to reassure them that measures were 
indeed being taken to fix the problem and that it would eventually be fixed.  The particular 
measures to be taken and the logic by which they would function on the whole were less 
important than conveying the impression that government was indeed taking action and that the 
actions taken would work.  
Kinetically-oriented rhetoric concerning the economy appeared in the presidential radio 
addresses as early as October 4
th
 2008 when President Bush stated that the bipartisan rescue 
package that had just been passed by Congress would help by “getting our markets moving”.164  
Rhetoric depicting the economy as a kind of gigantic machine was used frequently in the 
addresses, as a sampling of statements to this effect makes apparent.  For example, legislation 
such as the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act was designed to “to jump-start our 
struggling economy”165; evidence of economic recovery were seen as signs that “the gears of 
America's economic engine are slowly beginning to turn”166; the Treasury Department’s 
Financial Stability Plan was said to have helped achieve “the stability we need to get our 
economy moving forward again”167; it was asserted that in the face of recession “there is nothing 
more important than to do everything we can to get our economy moving again”168; the 
American public was reassured that extensive consultations were held to discuss what could be 
done to “spur hiring and get this economy moving again”169 and was told that hard choices were 
made to “pull our financial system back from the brink and get our economy moving again”.170   
The metaphor of the functioning of the economy as represented by kinetic, machine-like 
activity readily brings to mind ideas associated with the notion of production.  This is apparent in 
instances where the economy or economic activity was referred to as the producer of jobs (“for 
the first time in more than 2 years, our economy created a substantial number of jobs, instead of 
101 
 
losing them”171), when references were made to the physical apparatuses of production being 
revived due to increased economic activity (“once-shuttered factories humming with new 
workers”172), and when sub-components of the economy were spoken of as having machine 
power-like properties in a larger kinetic-mechanical oriented entity (”Small businesses have 
always been the engine of our economy “173; “the jobs that power our economy”174).  At bottom, 
the power of the rhetoric of the economy as machine in the presidential radio addresses seems to 
be that it took something exceeding complex and intangible (‘the economy’) and metaphorically 
represented it in a simplified manner that could be commonly understood by the intended target 
audience: that the American economy was like a machine, like a physical apparatus composed of 
multiple moving parts which worked together and did something.  Furthermore, another source 
of strength of the machine metaphor was in how it reassured the American public that the 
economy could be ‘fixed’.  If machines broke down and could be fixed, so too could the 
economy be repaired.  Along the lines of such a logic, the metaphor of the economy as machine 
can therefore also be understood as an appeal to support widespread government intervention to 
combat the crisis.  In normal times, government was to keep its distance and let the free market 
allocate resources, but the particular situation of the crisis was an exception, and the economy-
as-machine metaphor was arguably helpful in this respect in overcoming deeply held suspicion 
of the hand of government, a suspicion in many ways substantially embedded in American 
history and culture.  The State was the only actor big enough to oversee this reparative operation, 
and the economy as machine metaphor thus served the end of supporting the narrative justifying 
government intervention.  In the absence of other mechanics, the State would try its hand.        
As a final commentary on the prevalence of the kinetic metaphor of the economy as 
machine, it is notable that much of what is implied by this metaphor is manifested in a more 
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subtle manner in the many instances in the presidential radio addresses in which the economy is 
spoken of as growing or needing to grow again.  The metaphor of the economy as organic entity, 
second only to the metaphor of the economy as machine in the presidential rhetoric on the 2008 
crisis, is deployed on a large number of occasions (“But we will not create the jobs we need 
unless the economy is growing”175; “now our economy is finally growing again”176; “For the past 
6 months, our economy has been growing again.”177; “Even though our economy is growing 
again, these are still tough times for America”178; “That's why we need to take new, 
commonsense steps to help small businesses, grow our economy, and create jobs”179; “Yes, the 
economy is growing instead of shrinking, as it was in 2008 and the beginning of 2009.”180).  
Economic growth is depicted as an inherent good in the presidential rhetoric on the crisis, and 
the positive and easily understood connotations associated with the concept of growth (such as 
nurturance, bounty, naturalness, and cooperative activity) appears to be where the strength of this 
metaphor lies.  The crisis in this sense was depicted as something that had arrested economic 
growth, and the task at hand in combating it was therefore the restoration of the implied ‘natural’ 
pattern of growth of the American economy.         
While movement and growth may appear somewhat dissonant at first since the former seems 
largely connotative of the kinetic-mechanical while the latter seems largely connotative of the 
organic, the distance between these two metaphors is not so great and the usage of both of them 
in the presidential radio addresses on the crisis should be seen as intertwined and 
complementary.  To a significant extent, movement can be equated with growth, and its opposite, 
lack of motion or stillness, can be equated with atrophy.  Furthermore, both mechanical 
movement and growth are conceptually close in that they both are representative of ‘proper’ or 
‘natural’ states of function.  It can even be suggested that the conceptualization of 
103 
 
movement/growth as positive and stillness/atrophy as negative reflects the logic of capital and 
capitalism.  Specifically such a conceptualization seems apt based on the ideas that capital, as 
‘value in motion’, as value accruing more value, and that capitalism, as a system ultimately 
premised on unlimited economic expansion, are both inherently biased in this regard toward 
movement and growth.  Moreover, one might also contend that such a bias toward 
movement/growth might also be seen as reflective of modernity in the sense that such a bias is 
also highly compatible with the broad notion of ‘progress’ as a key characteristic of modernity: 
that movement through time in modernity is associated with the ever more improved state of 
man on a march toward utopia. 
In this chapter, I have analyzed the discourse of the 2008 crisis manifest in the weekly radio 
addresses of American presidents through outlining and discussing salient themes that were 
detectable in said addresses.  This analysis was foregrounded by a discussion of the historical 
development of presidential rhetoric with particular attention to how such rhetoric can be seen as 
representative of charismatic leadership, especially under conditions of crisis.  In the next 
chapter I shall be focusing my analysis of the discourse of the 2008 crisis not on the public 
addresses of American presidents but rather on the messages and meanings crafted by 
filmmakers.  This move from the airwaves to the silver screen to examine the depiction of the 
2008 crisis in the audiovisual medium of cinema is a qualitative one in many ways and its 
significance will be discussed in detail.  However, before beginning this new path of inquiry, to  
conclude the discussion of the current chapter, it can be asserted that throughout the rhetoric of 
the U.S. presidential radio addresses the 2008 crisis some distinctive links can be postulated 
across a variety of topical areas which together form nebulous networks of meanings.  These 
networks form interlocking chains of signification that cross various thematic territories.  For 
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example, the idle, unproductive bodies of the unemployed are reflected in the stillness or atrophy 
of the economy at large and of the machinery of production, a stillness or sickness indicated 
through intangible phenomena such as stagnant or shrinking GDP and high rates of joblessness 
as well as physically manifest in phenomena such as shuttered factories and the flows of the 
internal economic migrations of desperate job seekers.  These in turn are reflected in phenomena 
such as falling home values and the physical structures of foreclosed and boarded up houses – 
places which were once locations of hope, aspiration, and human activity but which had come to 
lie empty and quiet, devoid of their purpose of sheltering human life, their fate a material sign of 
the exercise of the spectral agency of the intangible market as well as a sign of society having 
lost its moral compass.  Whole abandoned neighbourhoods of such houses, their physical 
structures often decaying and gradually showing signs of reclamation by nature, come to stand 
for societal decay on a large scale and as a weaker version of the decay evident in Coles’ 
painting Desolation.  Such constellations of ideas, sometimes tightly clustered and sometimes 
loosely related, sometimes relatively congruent and other times seemingly dissonant, were 
evident in the presidential rhetoric of the 2008 crisis.  Indeed, such variable constellations of 
ideas related to the crisis were also evident well beyond their manifestations in the presidential 
radio addresses, and it is with this in mind that the exploration of cinematographic discourse on 
the crisis is set to begin.
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Chapter 3 – Screened Crisis: The 2008 Crisis in Cinema 
 
It’s just money; it’s made up. Pieces of paper with pictures on them, so we don’t have to kill 
each other just to get something to eat. It’s not wrong. And it’s certainly no different today than 
it’s ever been. 1637, 1797, 1819, ‘37, ‘57, ‘84, 1901, ‘07, ‘29, 1937, 1974, 1987—Jesus, didn’t 
that one fuck me up good—’92, ‘97, 2000, and whatever we want to call this. 
(John Tuld; character in J.C. Chandor’s Margin Call) 
 
The economic crisis which commenced in 2008 was registered in a variety of media in both 
analog and digital forms, such as radio and television broadcasts, books, newspaper and 
periodical articles, blogs, videos and films.  Amongst the more entertainment-oriented media 
forms of popular culture, cinema was a particularly rich avenue of expression of discourse on the 
crisis.  A substantial number of documentaries and feature films either directly about the crisis or 
clearly derived from themes of it were created in its wake, varying from works produced by 
major film studios to independent productions.   
In the last chapter, I conducted an analysis of the discourse of the presidential radio 
addresses on the 2008 crisis through an examination of the regularly scheduled weekly 
broadcasts of speeches of President George W. Bush and President Barack Obama and through a 
discussion of five areas of thematic emphasis that were discernible in these broadcasted 
speeches.  In this chapter on the cinematic discourse of the 2008 crisis, after offering some brief 
reflections on the theoretical complexities present in the relationship between cinema and 
history, I will discuss the roots of the films on the crisis in the new documentary and new 
Hollywood movements and then proceed to analyze four select films on the crisis that were 
chosen to represent two distinct yet interconnected cinematic narrative types: the ‘critical 
political documentary’ and the ‘political feature film’.  The four films selected – ‘Inside Job’  
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(2010) ‘Margin Call’ (2011), ‘The Queen of Versailles’ (2012) and ‘Arbitrage’ (2012) – were 
chosen on account of their being both critically acclaimed and culturally significant.  They have 
currency as films directly about or clearly inspired by the crisis which elevates them beyond 
other films that could have been chosen which were either simply popular but only tangentially 
about the crisis (such as Magic Mike or Killing Them Softly) or about the crisis or clearly inspired 
by it but lacking widespread critical acclaim or salient cultural significance (such as Wall Street: 
Money Never Sleeps or Capitalism: A Love Story).  This strategy of selecting critically acclaimed 
and culturally significant films which had the crisis at the heart of their narrative matter and 
which were representative of the two narrative types of the critical political documentary and the 
political feature film justifies the relatively small number of texts selected.  While a certain 
degree of arbitrariness of selection can be said to have been exercised in the selection of these 
four films, it can indeed be asserted that their selection was made after a great deal of careful 
contemplation of other potential candidates for analysis.  The four share the commonality of 
having attained widespread critical recognition as the best films on or inspired by the crisis, were 
certainly considered culturally significant and had popular levels of reception well beyond 
marginal,
1
 and as a group they are highly representative of two major narrative types of political 
cinema which this doctoral dissertation sought to examine. 
 
Of Frames and Fragments: Cinema, Representation, & History  
One assertion that has been made concerning media is that they are “spaces of action for 
constructed attempts to connect what is separated”.2  History itself cannot ever be directly known 
given that the past is always continuously and irrecoverably receding in time, and on this account 
the past can only be grasped indirectly and its reconstruction is always the work of the 
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imagination.
3
  As such, the past is difficult to access: it is “in effect, recreated from fragments.”4  
The question of the nature of the relations between cinema, representation and history is 
undoubtedly complex.  An era of burgeoning cultural modernity characterized by a popular 
hunger for knowledge and for knowledge of history in particular significantly shaped the 
development of cinema, and cinema’s particular qualities as a medium of communication must 
be understood in this light.  Cinema must be seen as genealogically connected with photography 
as an unprecedented historical development of media in which the visible could be captured in 
such a real-to-life and verifiable manner by means other than human vision – of sight as belief.  
Tony Barta points to the importance of the particularly modern world into which the developing 
and new media forms of the nineteenth century emerged, a world where “the ‘mass media’ 
arrived in time for ‘the masses’ to have versions of the past mediated to them in apparently 
incontrovertible form”5 via mechanically reproduced media such as motion pictures and the 
phonograph which ushered in a “a new era of verisimilitude, disbelief – and suspension of 
disbelief.”6  The accompanying political potential of the medium of cinema was noticed and 
diagnosed by theorists contemporaneous to the early development of film.  Walter Benjamin for 
example argued that the social significance of film in particular could not be considered aside 
from “its destructive, cathartic aspect, that is, the liquidation of the traditional value of the 
cultural heritage”7 and in particular he seemed keenly aware of how the language of film could 
be located on an arc of signification that was qualitatively different than that of traditional 
media.
8
  Others such as Siegfried Kracauer stressed how cinema’s political significance needed 
to be understood through a theoretical framework which recognized the collective character of 
the production of film as an artistic endeavour, its being directed at anonymous mass audiences 
with the purpose of satisfying the desires of such masses, and how the power of the visual and 
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narrative motifs of film reflect collective psychological dispositions.
9
  While the particular 
interpretations of the political significance of film, the mechanics of its manifestations, and how 
it should be understood in relation to larger historical and cultural contexts varied, a broad 
consensus existed that the advent of cinema was a major development of serious political import. 
As part of a wider set of modern media characterized by their mechanically-reproduced 
nature and by their being aimed at the destruction of the traditional aura; an aura which “no 
longer correspond[ed] to the paradigmatic shifts in the spatio-temporal register of human 
perception”10 in the age of technological revolution, the new technically reproduced visual and 
audiovisual media such as the photograph and film were destined for exhibition value as opposed 
to the ritual value that works of art in the age before mechanical reproduction were primarily 
valued for.
11
  However, while certainly a part of a historical trajectory of other mechanically-
reproduced media, cinema operates through its own distinct system of signification in which “the 
impression of movement kicks the image chain into a wholly different trajectory from that of the 
still photograph [...] its metonymic links are not with another system (photography, say, or 
painting) but internal to the image chain.”12  In its conveyance of history, the distinct qualities of 
cinema as a form of narrative unfolding in time, as a “constructed space whose realities are those 
of the story – of history – not of any experience or as-it-happened reality”13 lent themselves quite 
capably to the representation of the historical and were harnessed as such.  Indeed, the first 
coming of world war highlighted this aspect of the relation between cinema and history, and 
particularly the effect of the former on the perception of the nature of the latter.  The newsreels 
showing the chaotic clashes of the armies of the great powers made history appear fluid and 
undetermined, that in doing so “the screen foregrounded ‘history’ – the process – as unstable and 
open.  The fragmentation of real landscapes and real people and real powers made ideas of 
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transforming political change imaginable.”14  The portrayal of history in film was thus seen as 
potentially altering the possible courses of history itself. 
In a broad sense, it could be asserted that film emerged onto a battleground shaped by 
history, and that its emergence has had an effect on that battleground.  The representation of 
history in films in particular highlights cinema’s powerful properties of representation: the 
fragmentary nature of history was often concealed in cinema because “films took you [into the 
past] as if there was nothing simpler, every part of the process of representation disguised.”15  
The propagandistic potential of “the experience of being ‘sucked in’ to the diegetic magic of the 
cinema screen”16 has been clearly harnessed on many occasions for political ends.  In particular, 
one of the strongest examples of cinema being used in an overtly political manner to construct 
vastly divergent versions of history was in the Second World War when the clashing fascist, 
capitalist and communist powers all tried to use it to portray history in ways that were in 
alignment with their respective political orientations, worldviews, and goals.
17
  The legacy of this 
overtly political use of cinema during World War Two was that for a while “distrust of film’s 
propaganda power contended with its documentary force.”18  However, later in the post WWII-
era, the political use of cinema in the West, this time not by states but by private parties, started 
to undergo a tremendous period of development, most notably starting in the 1960s and 
particularly so in the latter half of the decade.  It is arguably the developments that occurred 
during the course of this period which are of the most significance to a discussion of the films on 
the 2008 crisis, and it is therefore presently necessary to discuss their importance. 
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Political Cinema Revisited: New Documentary & New Hollywood 
  Understanding the emergence of a certain kind of political cinema in the United States 
during this era is fundamentally important to an analysis of films on the 2008 crisis, as many of 
the codes, techniques and narrative strategies widely deployed in these films first emerged in a 
coherent manner at this historical point.  Moreover, as compared to the discourse of the 
presidential speeches and that of the periodical articles, both of which have a relatively self-
evident relation to the crisis as sets of texts, the cinematic discourse on the 2008 crisis is a much 
less easily definable category given the sometimes murkier character of the relation between 
such films as texts and the crisis.  In several important respects, the political cinema tradition of 
which the films on the 2008 crisis can be considered part is a particularly culturally-shaped 
genus that comes out of a specific cultural context, arguably more so than the presidential 
speeches and the periodical articles which, while certainly not emerging out of a cultural void by 
any means, tend on the whole to be less explicitly shaped by particular cultural contexts: their 
forms and sets of signifying practices are on the whole less culturally contingent.  On account of 
this particularity, a brief discussion of the distinct genealogy to which the specific films on the 
2008 crisis to be examined below belong is merited toward the end of providing a historically-
informed contextualization of the factors and forces that have most significantly contributed to 
its existence as a coherent genre.  In short, the emergence of this type of cinema in a complex 
crucible where a variety of culturally-specific developments mixed in very particular 
configurations does not have a parallel in either formal speeches by heads of states or articles 
penned by journalists in magazines and consequently is in need of explication.       
To begin, it can be asserted that there was a series of developments in American cinema 
starting approximately in the late 1960s which led to a marked increase in the production of 
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politically-oriented movies: while various film histories have attempted to explain the particulars 
of why this happened when it did, the only general point of agreement is that it happened when it 
did.  This period in American cinema history is distinguished by a proliferation of films of a 
recognizably political character that differed markedly from those produced in the periods which 
preceded it and which mark it as a watershed era in American film.  No single development can 
be said to be wholly or even primarily responsible for this development having happened as it 
did when it did.  Rather, it is the case that the conditions of possibility for such a kind cinema to 
emerge came into being during this era and in the United States through a confluence of 
developments of political, economic, technical, and technological character.  The cultural turmoil 
of this period in the United States, such as the rise of the student and anti-war movement was 
certainly substantially responsible for this development, but other changes in the wider 
mediascape at the time (such as the rapid rise of television as a mass medium and its displacing 
of film for many purposes of audiovisual entertainment) and even in the portability and 
affordability of film equipment (lighter, cheaper cameras were becoming increasingly available) 
also contributed to the increasing political nature of some forms of cinema by the end of 1960s.  
Two sorts of broadly politically-oriented cinema styles could be said to have developed during 
this decade: the new documentary/semi-documentary film and the political feature film.  These 
two new cinema styles, which respectively can be considered as connected to two loosely 
affiliated movements in American cinema occurring at roughly the same time  – ‘New 
Documentary’ and ‘New Hollywood’ – are  distinguishable from other previous forms of 
American cinema in that they were considerably more politically pointed in character, discussed 
subjects and issues that hitherto had been either censored or accorded taboo status, and often 
featured particularly fierce critiques of major political and cultural institutions.   
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While distinct from each other in several respects, these two cinema styles also shared a not 
insignificant amount in common.  Of the two styles, the new documentary/semi-documentary 
film was probably the most closely aligned with the student and anti-war movement and its 
aftermath.  Documentaries such as Gimme Shelter (on the infamous 1969 Rolling Stones concert 
at Altamont Speedway) and Don’t Look Back (based primarily on Bob Dylan’s 1965 tour of the 
United Kingdom ) offered glimpses into political and cultural upheaval, and in doing so they 
shed light on the social tensions present in American society and beyond.  The lines between 
documentary and fiction were sometimes blurred in the new documentary/semi-documentary 
style, such as was the case in Haskell Wexler’s Medium Cool, a film loosely based around the 
violence at 1968 Democratic National Convention in Chicago which blended both fictional and 
non-fictional content in a charged and politically critical manner.  Although not as closely related 
to the student and anti-war movement, the rise of what was to be called ‘The New Hollywood’ in 
the 1960s led to the creation of feature films that were far more overtly politically-oriented than 
previously known in America.  Feature-length films such as Dennis Hopper’s box office smash 
Easy Rider (a landmark film focusing significantly on the rise and fall of the counterculture 
movement), Alan Pakula’s All The President’s Men (based on the Watergate scandal), and 
Michael Cimino’s The Deer Hunter (centred around the carnage of the Vietnam War) all were 
strongly political in bent, going in-depth on subject matter and issues that previously were 
largely considered either explicitly or implicitly too socially or politically provocative to be 
given treatment in feature film. 
It is to these two broad traditions of politically-oriented film that arose in the 1960s that the 
lineage of the popular films on the 2008 crisis can be traced, as many of these film on the crisis 
do indeed bear many of the hallmarks of the new documentary/semi-documentary film and the 
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political feature film, both of whose basic forms were developed in this era.  Institutional 
changes in the U.S. film industry and more general changes in the American mediascape were 
also key in the rise of both movements.  The impact of the unfavourable 1948 Supreme Court 
ruling concerning the monopolistic practices of Paramount Films led to the weakening of a major 
cornerstone of the classical Hollywood period business model, one which relied heavily on the 
vertical integration achieved through major studios’ ownership of theatre chains.19  This 
development loosened corporate concentration and control in American cinema and in doing so 
opened up new possibilities for political expression in film.  Along with this blow, the rise of 
television as a domestically-based and highly affordable entertainment medium starting in the 
late 1940s had a devastating long-term impact on box office revenues, which by 1952 had 
declined to half the 82 million a week attendance figure of 1946, and which with the exception of 
a short-lived recovery in the mid-1950s continued to drop until 1966, at which point attendance 
was but a quarter of the 1946 figure.
20
  Though some researchers have asserted that television 
was “only one aspect of a wider process of social change that undermined and shifted the social 
and cultural position of cinema”,21 it remains hard to downplay the significance of its impact on 
the fortunes of the major Hollywood studios: the loss of revenue in the face of competition with 
television was a spur towards greater creativity in the United States film industry.  No matter 
what the particular configuration of contributing factors, the sting of such massive revenue losses 
shook the Hollywood establishment and its reflexive conservatism considerably, opening up the 
necessary space for experimentation beyond the tried-and-true and that which had previously 
been considered safe cinematic territory.   
Outside of the long-range damaging impact brought on by Supreme Court rulings and the 
firm establishment of television as a competing audiovisual entertainment medium, as the 1960s 
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turned into the 1970s American cinema increasingly found itself in a rapidly changing socio-
cultural landscape marked by increasing levels of politicization.   It was into this new and 
tumultuous social context, marked by social tension, violence and war, political upheaval, and 
the coming-to-age of the counterculture generation that film in America would have to reinvent 
itself to a significant extent. As described by Geoff King, this transformation in American film 
was formed in the crucible of a torrent of culturally significant events: 
The civil rights movement, race riots: ‘black power’.  The counterculture, hippies, drug-taking: 
‘flower power’.  Youth, popular music and fashion.  Protests against the war in Vietnam.  
Student radicalization and the ‘New Left’.  A new wave of feminism and demands for gay rights.  
Political hopes, dreams and nightmares.  Kennedy, the Kennedy assassination.  Another 
Kennedy: another assassination.  Martin Luther King: assassination.  My Lai, Cambodia and the 
shooting of students at Kent State.  Battles on the streets of Chicago.  Nixon.  Watergate.  
Humiliating withdrawal from Vietnam.  The oil crisis and a reduced scale of global American 
economic power.
22
 
 
The beginnings of this sea-change in American culture and society was marked in cinema by the 
surprising box office successes of two 1967 films, ‘Bonnie and Clyde’ and ‘The Graduate’, 
which led to the widespread release of a collection of films over the next couple of years that 
were almost immediately coined ‘the New Hollywood’ in the popular press.23  The subsequent 
decade of the 1970s was marked by many films which broached, sometimes quite explicitly, 
subject matter that had previously gone largely untouched or significantly underdeveloped in 
America cinema such as sex, politics, and violence.  This movement was led by a new breed of 
highly self-conscious auteurist filmmakers who differed in important respects from the 
generation that had preceded them.  Importantly, they were the first generation of American film 
makers who had received formal training in cinema theory and production and many of them had 
been exposed to the important influence of cinematic movements on the other side of the 
Atlantic such as French New Wave and Italian Neorealism.
24
  The pieces had fallen in place for 
Hollywood to reinvent itself in a new and invigorated way.   
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Happening roughly concurrently with the New Hollywood movement and in large part 
inspired by similar influences was the New Documentary movement.  In the United States, 
figures such as Richard Leacock, D.A. Pennebaker and the Maysles brothers deployed 
documentary techniques associated with cinema vérité and developed lightweight and 
inexpensive film gear that “enabled a whole generation to take to the streets to capture a reality 
that was rapidly becoming more fantastical than anything springing from the febrile brow of 
even the most inventive screenwriters.”25  Indeed, the groundbreaking work of these filmmakers 
can be seen as having set the stage for the later revival of documentary film by directors such as 
Errol Morris (The Thin Blue Line) and Michael Moore (Roger and Me) in the late 1980s, figures 
whose work significantly influenced the development of subsequent politically-oriented 
documentary films such as those on the 2008 crisis.  It is to this intertwined dual lineage of New 
Hollywood and New Documentary that many of the American films on the 2008 crisis owe their 
origins, and with this cultural context now outlined the analysis of the cinematic discourse of the 
crisis – distinct in character from the discourse of both the presidential radio addresses and that 
of the periodical articles in its unique cinematic audiovisuality and its particular political 
economy – will now commence with the analysis of the first of the four selected films: Margin 
Call. 
 
Margin Call 
Described by one critic as “the best movie ever made about Wall Street”26 and by another as “a 
tale of greed, vanity, myopia and expediency that is all the more damning for its refusal to 
moralize”,27 J.C. Chandor’s directorial debut ‘Margin Call’ (released October 2011) has been 
considered the best fictional film based on the 2008 crisis to have emerged
28
 and even one of the 
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best films of 2011.
29
  A feature film starring an A-list cast, which included actors such as Kevin 
Spacey, Stanley Tucci, Demi Moore and Jeremy Irons, Margin Call takes the viewer inside an 
unnamed financial firm on the eve of the crisis.  Claustrophobic and dark, the narrative of the 
film extends across an approximately thirty-six hour period in which a junior level financial risk 
analyst discovers that his company is critically over-leveraged with toxic mortgage-backed 
securities, after which the grim news travels up the chain of command.  The story of this 
Lehman-esque firm unfolds primarily between sunset and sunrise in the rooms of their 
Manhattan headquarters on Wall Street with striking night shots of New York’s cityscape 
appearing periodically to ground the plot’s location at the very geographic centre of the 
American financial industry.   
Margin Call is complex in its articulation of economic collapse.  On one level, the film 
serves as an indictment of those figures of high finance whose purported greed and recklessness 
resulted in the catastrophic economic damage of the crisis.  However, the title of the film itself 
suggests something considerably more nuanced than this.  The term ‘margin call’ refers to 
difficult decisions that must be taken as a result of financial losses.  Without delving 
unnecessarily into the technical minutiae of the term, a margin call is a situation in which an 
investor who has borrowed money must take a certain course of action in the face of a 
depreciation of the value of their investment in order so that the equity they have remaining 
meets a certain threshold (a margin) that they had previously agreed to with the brokerage whom 
they had borrowed funds from.  In such a situation, the investor must either deposit more funds 
or liquidate their position: in the absence of doing either, the brokerage itself can sell the 
investor’s holdings in the position until the marginal requirement of their equity is restored.  That 
the term margin call therefore designates the involvement both of forces which operate outside of 
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an investor’s control (such as the market conditions which have caused the depreciation of an 
investment’s value) and of decisions which consequently need to be taken by the investor 
affected by the play of such forces (decisions which can negatively affect parties other than the 
investor, adding a moral dimension to decisions potentially taken) is indicative of a kind of 
ambiguous tension between agency and lack of agency: of a tension between actions willingly 
taken by an agent and actions forced upon an agent.  This ambiguous tension based around hard 
decisions that must be taken under difficult circumstances is at the heart of the film’s narrative. 
 
‘Deux Ex Numeris’ or ‘The Semi-Autonomy of the Economic’ 
The often dark and suffocating setting of the action in Margin Call is tonally indicative of the 
restricted degree of agency of the firm’s characters.  The vast majority of the film occurs in the 
confined spaces of the firm’s headquarters, and it is within this highly restricted spatial 
environment that looming disaster is uncovered, discussed, and acted upon.  This sense of spatial 
restriction is combined with another force of pressure: that of temporality restricted.  One notable 
way the film conveys the restricted nature of time is the time stamp that periodically appears in 
the lower left corner of the screen over the course of the film.  This visual feature is used to 
create the feeling that time is an adversary against which the characters in the film are competing 
and to show the viewer how the pressure of time shapes the dilemmas, decisions, and actions of 
characters.  The combined signifiers of spatial and temporal restriction endow Margin Call with 
a suffocative quality meant to emphasize the highly restricted nature of the desperate actions of 
characters operating against obscure forces much more powerful than themselves. 
The lack of tangible adversaries for the characters of Margin Call to fight against raises an 
important question: what is it that restricts their actions so severely and threatens to suffocate 
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them?  In short, the answer is ‘the market’.  In Margin Call the market is represented as an 
omnipresent, apparition-like force, a spectre of sorts that is simultaneously everywhere but 
nowhere in particular. Throughout the film, the economic is visually represented in many scenes 
through graphics shown on banks of computer screens.  At times, images of these screens seem 
almost ubiquitous.  The graphics, primarily consisting of mathematical codes and the curvature 
of graph lines whose meanings appear arcane, give the impression that the power of the 
economic is mysterious, like some sort of complex language that defies easy decipherment.  The 
visibility of the economic on the technical apparatus of computer terminal screens throughout the 
film is matched by its veritable invisibility in the realm of the non-virtually mediated.  In Margin 
Call it is as if the economic inhabits a realm separated from the ordinary world of the human and 
as if it operates almost semi-autonomously from that world.   
This interpretation of the economic operating as a semi-autonomous mysterious force in 
Margin Call seems to be particularly supported by the pivotal sequence upon which the entire 
film turns.  In the sequence, junior risk analyst Peter Sullivan (played by Zachary Quinto) is 
looking into the incomplete work of his just-fired boss Eric Dale (played by Stanley Tucci) and 
eventually discovers that the firm is in dire trouble due to its being so overleveraged with 
troubled assets.  The sequence is intercut with scenes of a grim-faced Sam Rogers (Kevin 
Spacey) driving home from work at night and then at a veterinarian’s office with his terminally 
ill dog, giving it an already ominous and foreboding feel that is heavy with tropes of death and 
darkness.  Building up to the moment of discovery, Sullivan alternates between scribbling down 
what looks like complex mathematical formulae and looking at his computer screen and typing 
on his keyboard, looking much like some sort of modern day version of an archaeologist trying 
to crack the resistant code of some long-lost religion’s prophecy.  Furthering a sense of tension 
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and disorientation which points to something akin to the activity of mysterious unworldly-like 
powers being at play, the camera’s focus during the scenes of Sullivan working on his computer 
trying to solve the riddle is unsteady, and there is also a marked divide between focus and lack of 
focus in the shots of Rogers driving home as everything other than his face and the reflection of 
his face in the rear-view mirror is not in focus.  This unsteadiness of focus increases in the 
sequence to the point where much of what is in the scenes becomes almost completely blurred at 
times as Sullivan gets closer and closer to breaking the code and to the horrible realization of 
what is going on with his firm.  A change in the audio background also parallels the effects of 
these visual techniques.  A mournful-sounding, increasingly echo-infused song is replaced by 
what sounds like the low and tense electric hum of a sort of generator-like apparatus accented by 
eerie, discordant notes which serve as a sonic bridge between the mournful song and the 
commencement of a suspense-building, mystical-sounding repetitive pattern of percussive 
instrumentation.  The camera’s focus becomes noticeably and increasingly blurred and erratic 
when the generator-like sound occurs, almost as if some invisible gravity-like force is bending 
and distorting the fabric of reality.  The percussive instrumentation which follows the generator 
sound then becomes punctuated by increasingly menacing sounding strings, signaling what 
seems to be representative of a descent into some other realm beyond that of the ordinary world.   
The moment when Sullivan does crack the code, his unbelieving eyes fixated on the screen 
in front of him, the screen itself reflected in his eye for the viewer, is one of the most powerful 
and memorable moments in the film.  Notably, Sullivan is shown wearing earphones throughout 
his code-cracking efforts.  The impression given is that he is fully communing with the invisible 
powers of the economic, that he is immersed in this experience and contacting the economic in a 
séance-style mediated manner.  It is a kind of deus ex numerus moment when what is portrayed 
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as mysterious but enormous powers are discerned out of the numbers by Sullivan.  Indeed, the 
screens which display the language and play of the cryptic numbers throughout the film function 
as kind of visible surface-level portal to the incredible but invisible power behind them.  As the 
realization of the import of what Sullivan has discovered dawns on him, the background of the 
shot slowly pans up to reveal the out-of-focus glowing blue computer screens behind him.  It is 
the mysterious but massive power of the economic that is signified by these screens, which go 
from being totally absent in the moment-of-discovery shot to half-filling it: their presence and 
power is essentially revealed and the message is that their force was already present but hidden.  
The screens veritably loom up slowly behind Sullivan (as if creeping up behind him like a 
spectral figure) at the exact moment that he deciphers the code that reveals the powerful import 
of what they, as technologically mediated windows to a mysterious power which resides 
somewhere else, bear.  It is in such a manner that the film positions the economic as a spectral 
force which has a kind of semi-autonomous agency located in a realm above and beyond yet still 
somehow connected to that inhabited by the film’s characters.  The semi-autonomous agency 
assigned by the film to the economic effectively demarcates the broad limits of the agency of the 
film’s characters: their actions happen only against this backdrop of the suffocating spectral 
force of the market that menaces them throughout the film. 
In addition to the way that visuals and visual effects are used in Margin Call to ascribe a 
sense of semi-autonomous agency to the market conditions which circumscribe the agency of the 
film’s characters, the dialogue of characters themselves also contribute to the construction of a 
notion of the economic as a force operating on a level which is largely beyond their abilities of 
influence and control.  One example of this can be discerned in a scene which starts 
approximately forty-three minutes into the film where, after having had the initial boardroom 
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meeting concerning Sullivan’s discovery, division head Jared Baker (played by Simon Cohen) 
has a short discussion with chief risk management officer Sarah Robertson (played by Demi 
Moore) in which she confirms that Sullivan’s findings concerning the precarious state of the 
firm’s finances do in fact check out: 
Cohen: So? 
Robertson: It’s legit.  The kid killed it.  The formula’s worthless. 
Cohen: What do you mean? 
Robertson: It’s broken. 
Cohen: There are eight trillion dollars of paper around the world relying on that equation?? 
Robertson: Well we were wrong. 
Cohen: No, you-you mean YOU were wrong. 
Robertson: Don’t get me started: we discussed this.30   
This conversation between Cohen and Robertson points to a failure of human mastery over the 
economic.  The formula/equation spoken of in their exchange is depicted as the means through 
which the firm was supposedly exercising control over the market, but the heated exchange 
between the two establishes that the knowledge represented by it had become flawed and no 
longer represented such a means of control.  Not only is it no longer of use in its former capacity, 
its deficiency has become the harbinger of oncoming disaster for the firm.  A reversal of power 
relations has been performed essentially: the firm was formerly in control of the economic 
through its mastery (and in exercising such control reaped profits; had its money making more 
money, through a kind of magical assertion of command it would seem), but now that such 
mastery has been lost it is instead the firm that is at the mercy of the markets, engaged in a 
desperate attempt to avoid disaster and just survive.  Moreover, the emphasis on the singularity 
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of this former means of control (‘The formula’, ‘that equation’) is also noteworthy in producing 
such an image of mystical control: it gives the impression of it having had almost supernatural-
like powers of knowledge or explanation, that it served the firm as kind of magical leash through 
which the beast of the market could be controlled and serve the firm’s purposes.  Such instances 
of character dialogue serve to reinforce an idea in Margin Call of the operations of the market 
having a kind of semi-autonomy which becomes a threatening force once control over it has been 
lost.  The mystical character of human control over the economic, exercised through esoteric and 
mathematical means, is depicted as all too tenuous in the film.   
There are other instances of character dialogue in Margin Call that also tend to ascribe a 
quality of semi-autonomy to the operations of the market, to ascribe to it a sort of spectral agency 
that somehow defy human attempts at controlling it.  Indeed, the economic takes on a slightly 
Frankenstein-esque quality in the film.  Previously under the control of its human masters at the 
firm, it has now rebelled against them and has become a threatening force bringing unforeseen 
disaster instead of being a thoroughly domesticated ally serving the firm’s ends.  The parallels 
here to another force often assigned spectral agency – Nature – are evident enough.  However, 
although the impression that the market possesses a kind of semi-autonomous agency is put into 
the mouths of several characters in Margin Call, there is also cause to question whether the 
film’s overall position on this subject is that straightforward.  That Margin Call contains a degree 
of ambivalence in regards to depicting the market as possessing a semi-autonomous character is 
for example illustrated through the film’s decided ambiguity when claims of the market’s semi-
autonomy are made by characters which are portrayed as villainous.  For example, although 
Cohen and Robertson speak of market conditions as having spun outside of their will and 
control, a lingering sense remains that they are actually significantly to blame for what has 
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happened.  That Cohen (who, arguably, is the least sympathetically-regarded character in the 
entire film) immediately starts to blame Robertson in order to deflect any personal responsibility 
or blame from himself gives the impression that the cause of the disaster the firm faces is in 
some ways all too human.  It therefore can be asserted that the film’s position on the degree to 
which the economic can be conceived of as a wild force wreaking destruction of its own accord 
and the degree to which it can be conceived of as a creation of man which has backfired is one 
that is mixed rather than clear-cut.  While the complexity and power of the economy has 
outstripped the human ability to control it, an impression that given individuals are in large part 
to blame for having created the very conditions of possibility for this to happen – and that 
someone has to take the fall for events having played out contrary to expectations – is residually 
present in the film.  A price for the hubris of having believed that something as powerful and 
complex as the economy could be made a docile servant of the human will must be exacted. 
A further example illustrating the complex way in which Margin Call seems to attribute a 
semi-autonomous character to the market while also undermining such a notion occurs 
approximately halfway through the film during an exchange between Peter Sullivan and the 
firm’s CEO John Tuld.  In the exchange, Tuld – a character whose name was almost surely 
designed to be evocative of disgraced former Lehman Brothers C.E.O. Dick Fuld – likens the 
(positive and profitable) flow of the economic to the play of music and appears to claim that such 
macro-scale operations of the market function outside of his control, and by extension, he 
implicitly makes the argument that it also functions outside of the control of any person or group 
in particular: 
Tuld: So, what you're telling me, is that the music is about to stop, and we're going to be left 
holding the biggest bag of odorous excrement ever assembled in the history of... capitalism.  
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Sullivan: Sir, I’m not sure that I would put it that way, but let me clarify using your analogy.  
What this model shows is the music, so to speak, just slowing.  If the music were to stop as you 
put it, then this model wouldn't even be close to that scenario.  It would be considerably worse.  
Tuld: Let me tell you something Mr. Sullivan.  Do you care to know why I'm in this chair with 
you all?  I mean, why I earn the big bucks?  
Sullivan: Yes. 
Tuld: I’m here for one reason and one reason alone.  I'm here to guess what the music might do a 
week, a month, a year from now.  That's it.  Nothing more. And standing here tonight, I'm afraid 
that I don't hear a thing.  Just... silence.
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Tuld’s claiming that all he does is guess what the market will do in the future is however 
undermined by his portrayal in the film as a Dracula-like villain of sorts, as a kind of aristocratic 
dark prince of high finance.  Although in a difficult position, Tuld is not portrayed as weak in the 
film but rather as powerful: even his appearance at firm’s headquarters by helicopter, gives the 
impression of his figure being a locus of power, that he is the embodied incarnation of something 
very powerful that has materialized seemingly out of another realm altogether to deal with grave 
circumstances.  Furthermore, Tuld’s claims to only deciphering the import of forces greater than 
him are also undermined by what actually happens in the film: his knowledge of his firm’s 
exposure leads him to order a massive selloff of their assets that does severe damage to other 
firms as well.  This is very far from Tuld’s claim of being just a passive actor responding to 
market conditions more or less: he clearly is a powerful and active shaper of them.  In this sense, 
while Tuld’s claims that the operations of the market are akin to the music on a merry-go-round 
and that the stoppage of the music is metaphoric for a bull market being replaced by a bear 
market, that he in his position as CEO of a major financial firm is so obviously an active and 
powerful agent affecting the creation of those very market conditions undermines his claims of 
merely having a passive, interpretive role.  Far from portraying Tuld as just an actor or even a 
powerful actor simply reacting to changes in market conditions, Margin Call portrays him as a 
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cold-hearted villain with a lot of power who is only interested in his own fortunes and that of his 
firm and who does indeed have the power to radically shape market conditions, not just for his 
own firm but also across a very large array of market actors.  While the film does in some ways 
portray the market as having a semi-autonomous force of agency, it never fully divorces this 
from the realm of the human and of the morality of people and their actions.  The ambiguous 
position adopted by the film, which appears to straddle both ends of this spectrum, seems to 
suggest that the ‘truth’ on this subject lies in a messy, shades-of-grey in-between area.  
The kind of depiction of the economic as a semi-autonomous force straddling the realms of 
human control and realms outside of such control that is evident in Margin Call is not without 
parallels in other cinematic representations of the 2008 crisis
32
 and its presence in such other 
films is telling.  A final example in Margin Call of the market being characterized as operating 
through some kind of semi-autonomous spectral agency is apparent in an important scene late in 
the film.  In this scene, Tuld addresses Rogers during a conversation in which the former refers 
to the market meltdown that has just happened as the latest in a long string of repeated and 
fundamentally unavoidable capitalist crises that stretch back over the course of four centuries: 
So you think we might have put a few people out of business today.  That it’s all for naught.  
You've been doing that every day for almost forty years Sam.  And if this is all for naught then 
so is everything out there.  It’s just money; it’s made up.  Pieces of paper with pictures on it so 
we don't have to kill each other just to get something to eat.  It's not wrong. And it's certainly no 
different today than it’s ever been.  1637, 1797, 1819, 37, 57, 84, 1901, 07, 29, 1937, 1974, 1987 
- Jesus, didn't that fuck me up good - 92, 97, 2000 and whatever we want to call this.  It's all just 
the same thing over and over; we can't help ourselves.  And you and I can't control it, or stop it, 
or even slow it.  Or even ever-so-slightly alter it.  We just react.  And we make a lot of money if 
we get it right.  And we get left by the side of the side of the road if we get it wrong.  And there 
have always been and there always will be the same percentage of winners and losers.  Happy 
foxes and sad sacks.  Fat cats and starving dogs in this world.  Yeah, there may be more of us 
today than there's ever been.  But the percentages - they stay exactly the same.
33
          
The kind of vision of power and inevitability sketched out by Tuld here is striking.  He 
essentially minimizes the role of human agency vis-a-vis the large-scale economic to an 
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extremely secondary role of merely reading the tea leaves of the economy.  In doing so, Tuld 
elevates systemic power to a level that seems almost cosmological in its inevitability and 
repetition.  His listing of the dates of previous capitalist crises certainly suggests historic proof of 
the indubitableness of their occurrences, and it insinuates that such crises are part and parcel of a 
system based on capital itself.  However, that these claims are made by a character portrayed so 
clearly as a villain in the film and whose words and deeds do not seem to always bear 
resemblance to each other somewhat undermines their strength.  Rather, the overall impression 
that Margin Call conveys is that while the market may indeed be powerful and its operations 
mysterious, it ultimately is the product of men and that claims to innocence and lack of 
responsibility such as those made by Tuld should be taken with more than a few grains of salt.  
While the agency of the characters in the film is restricted in the face of the crisis faced by the 
firm, the concept of human agency is never jettisoned altogether.  As such, Margin Call 
navigates ambivalently between agency and lack of agency and between the morality and 
immorality of human actions in dire situations created by economic crisis. 
When all evidence is considered, despite the kind of foregrounding of the economic as 
operating in a semi-autonomous manner, the overall position in Margin Call on the semi-
autonomy of the economic appears to be on the whole much more ambiguous and nuanced than 
it initially seems.  The viewer is led in both directions on this and inserted into a field in which 
conceptions ostensibly at odds with each other clash and mix.  Indeed, the complex moral and 
ethical question that is at the centre of the film’s narrative and which is reflected in the film’s 
title – that of what to do in the face of oncoming disaster: the question of saving one’s own skin 
and sacrificing those of others in doing so (and Tuld’s position in the film on this is clear and 
unencumbered by any broader concern for the welfare of others, which is why he is a villain in 
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the film: as he puts it, “If you’re first out the door [of a burning building], that’s not called 
panicking”34) – would be moot altogether if this was the case.  Much of the power of Margin 
Call as a film based on the 2008 crisis comes from its walking the line between attributing power 
to impersonal-like systemic forces and to individual human actors, the intersection of these two 
representing a grey moral area that stretches across self-interest, self-preservation, the welfare of 
others, and responsibility for actions taken under difficult and atypical conditions of crisis.   
In summary, while Margin Call does portray the operations of the market as incredibly 
powerful and of a mysterious character on a number of occasions primarily through its use of 
visuals and character dialogue, the film does not go so far as to endorse the idea that they operate 
at a level so above the volition and responsibility of individuals in the powerful positions of high 
finance that such persons are to be absolved of blame for economic disaster.  Rather, it can be 
said that the film is highly ambiguous regarding the issue of the semi-autonomy of the economic 
and that there is a marked degree of tension in its renderings of it.  While the omnipresent, data-
filled computer screens and the figure of Sullivan trying to solve the riddle that will reveal the 
chaos about to be unleashed does go some way in making the film appear to attribute to the 
market a kind of spectral agency somehow operating above the realm of human control, other 
instances in the film appear designed to project a sense that crises of capitalism, however 
mysterious and powerful the forces that bring them into being may be, are indeed man-made 
disasters for which men are ultimately responsible.  As such, the position of Margin Call on the 
degree and character of the semi-autonomy of the market and the degree of human agency in the 
face of large-scale macro-economic phenomena is decidedly mixed, and seemingly is 
intentionally so.  Arguably, the refusal of the film to take a firm or fixed position on this subject 
through its adoption of such a strategy of tension and ambiguity is one of its great strengths.  
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Such a mixed, non-static position allows for the recognition of the existence and importance of 
major systemic forces and factors while not abandoning the idea that moral responsibility or 
culpability exists for financial actors such as firms and individuals.  Furthermore, the film’s 
critique of how such financial actors can attempt to use the existence of systemic forces and 
factors to rationalize or dismiss their own role in the creation of economic crises can also be 
considered one of its major strengths: while there may be a situational morality to moments 
when margin calls must be made, moral considerations are never dismissed wholesale and 
human agency in such matters is never abdicated completely.  Margin Call’s powerful focus on 
the question of what should be done or not done and why in such situations is undoubtedly a 
major element, if not the preeminent element, of what makes this film a riveting one and one that 
received so much critical acclaim. 
 
Inside Job 
Shifting from Margin Call’s fictionalized portrayal of events drawn from the real world to the 
highly stylized documentary portrayal of such real world events themselves, the film Inside Job 
will now be discussed.  Considered by many critics to be the preeminent documentary on the 
2008 crisis, Charles Ferguson’s Inside Job is a powerful and damning indictment of the U.S. 
financial industry and its leading players.  Ferguson, also director of a scathing documentary on 
the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq entitled No End in Sight, makes no bones in Inside Job 
regarding who he considers to be at blame for the crisis: the U.S. financial industry at large.  
Indeed, this position was even echoed at the beginning of his Oscar acceptance speech for Inside 
Job where he stated: “Forgive me, I must start by pointing out that three years after our horrific 
financial crisis caused by financial fraud, not a single financial executive has gone to jail, and 
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that’s wrong.”35  Ferguson’s preoccupation with justice is evident throughout Inside Job, which 
frames the 2008 crisis as a grave and premeditated crime inflicted on the United States that was 
orchestrated by the American financial industry. 
The film, described by one critic as “a Moore film with the gags and stunts removed”36 and 
by another as “the exposé of the decade”,37 is divided into five parts that map out a narrative arc 
which spans from the background of the Reagan-era government deregulation of the U.S. 
financial sector to the aftermath of the crash in 2010.  As is suggested by its title, Inside Job 
frames the 2008 crisis as a heist orchestrated by those inside the circles of high finance.  It is in 
many ways reminiscent of a detective story which, in its damning portrayal of the U.S. financial 
industry, is designed to raise both shock and outrage in the viewer.  While it has been asserted by 
some scholars that many popular narratives concerning the 2008 crisis have laid the blame for it 
“on the shoulders of individual bankers as much as, or even more than, on systematic failure”,38 
Inside Job takes a somewhat different tack in its narrative. While indeed emphasizing the greed 
of individual financiers at times, it tends on the whole to portray the crisis as having resulted 
from the collective and deliberate action of those in high finance as a group.  This group is 
presented as a collection of co-conspirators involved in a colossal crime.   
Inside Job essentially tells the story about how the U.S. financial industry set out to 
deliberately unshackle itself from government regulation enacted in the years after the Great 
Depression in order to enrich itself at the expense of Americans at large.  The film dates the 
ascent of the U.S. financial industry as having started in the 1980s, and it levels the charge that it 
is this particular sector’s actions that have repeatedly caused major economic crises since that 
decade, the 2008 crisis being the most recent and biggest example.  The film is not an indictment 
of capitalism per se (it’s quite notable that capitalism isn’t a subject of discussion in the film at 
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all really), but rather an indictment of the greed and excess of a particular group of individuals 
conceived of as representing an industry.  In Inside Job, economic crises are not primarily 
portrayed as originating from systemic factors congenital to capitalism, nor primarily derived 
from any general deficiencies in human nature.  Instead, the film essentially makes a case that 
the economic suffering incurred by so many on multiple occasions has been caused by a 
relatively small band of those whose unrestrained greed and insidious cooptation of the spheres 
of government, business and even academe has essentially allowed them to repeatedly hijack the 
economic system of America at large and plunge it into chaos every time that it succeeded in 
doing so. 
 
‘The Politics of Excess and Duplicity’ or ‘Death of the Fetters’ 
Beneath its impressive and dizzying array of interviews, statistics, and archival material, a rather 
straightforward narrative is present in Inside Job: the lifting of government regulation pertaining 
to the financial industry in the United States has allowed those in finance to pursue their own 
enrichment in an unconstrained manner and this has resulted in repeated economic crises.  The 
broad contours of this narrative are spelt out very clearly and deliberately near the beginning of 
the film where the narrator (Matt Damon) states: 
In September 2008, the bankruptcy of the U.S. investment bank Lehman Brothers, and the 
collapse of the world’s largest insurance company, AIG, triggered a global financial crisis.  The 
result was a global recession, which cost the world tens of trillions of dollars, rendered 30 
million people unemployed, and doubled the national debt of the United States.  This crisis was 
not an accident; it was caused by an out-of-control industry.  Since the 1980s, the rise of the U.S. 
financial sector has led to a series of increasingly severe financial crises. Each crisis has caused 
more damage, while the industry has made more and more money. 
The historical dimensions of Inside Job are demarcated to reflect this narrative.  At the start of 
Part 1, entitled ‘How We Got Here’ the narrator states that in the forty years which followed the 
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Great Depression the United States never experienced a single financial crisis.  The implication 
of this is that the Great Depression served as such a traumatic collective experience that the 
malevolent forces that caused it were sealed away through preventative government regulation 
and that their being sealed away in such a fashion led to an era of unprecedented economic 
growth and prosperity in the United States.  Accordingly, a very black-and-white periodization 
scheme is established in the film: there are forty years of success and prosperity in the United 
States based on economic growth overseen by the watchful eye of the federal government from 
about the late 1930s to the early 1980s, and from the 1980s forward there is periodic economic 
instability stemming from a lack of government control over a rogue industry. 
 This particular periodization scheme says a great deal about the narrative of Inside Job and 
its portrayal of the 2008 crisis.  The crisis is not represented by the film first and foremost as a 
generalized structural crisis of capitalism brought into being by the boom-bust business cycles 
inherent to a market system.  Rather, the crisis is portrayed as a phenomenon borne out of the 
deliberate dismantling of the regulatory structures that had ensured the continued ‘proper’ 
functioning of what is portrayed as a, by-and-large, benevolent free-market capitalism that had 
brought America prosperity over the four decades which followed the Great Depression.  By 
taking the deregulation of the U.S. financial sector under Reagan as the point of origin of the 
2008 crisis, Inside Job establishes a narrative for the crisis that is simultaneously structural 
(concerning the subject of the deregulation of the U.S. financial industry) and moral (concerning 
the self-interested and condemnable actions of the U.S. financial industry).  It could also be said 
that the structural dimension of the narrative is effectively how the narrative functions 
intellectually in the film whereas the moral dimension of the narrative functions in an affective 
manner.  The primary argument of the film essentially combines these structural and moral 
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narratives in a highly interwoven manner.  It holds that the immoral greed of the U.S. financial 
sector resulted in the removal of regulatory structures which up until the 1980s had constrained 
their activities.  The repealing of the Glass-Steagall Act, which essentially forbade the mixing of 
commercial and investment banking, is an example of such a conjoining of structural and moral 
origins of the 2008 crisis in the film.  The removal of these regulatory structures is depicted as 
having allowed the financial sector to engage in a whole range of immoral or unethical activities 
designed to make them fantastic sums.  The notorious practices of the U.S. financial industry 
now routinely associated with the 2008 crisis, such as firms betting against the very products 
they sold their clients, predatory lending, and the complex and deceptive packaging of security-
backed mortgages therefore framed as having arisen directly in the context of the structural 
deregulation of that industry.  Another way of putting this is that Inside Job makes a case that 
that the federal government has since the 1980s failed to fulfill its duties of protection to the 
American population by removing the structural safeguards to the unconstrained profiteering of a 
fundamentally morally corrupt industry and that the 2008 crisis is one disastrous consequence of 
this abdication of responsibility.  This fingering of the removal of structural safeguards as a 
primary cause of the crisis, discernible amongst various accounts of the crisis provided by 
several commentators, is thoroughly moralized in Inside Job.  
 While Inside Job’s position on the effectiveness of government in economic matters can be 
said to be mixed because it associates a long period of economic growth with strong governance 
in the form of effective regulation while associating a weakening of government regulation with 
the disastrous ascent of the U.S. financial industry, there is never such a degree of ambiguity in 
the film concerning the American financial industry itself.  This industry is repeatedly and 
strongly condemned as thoroughly bad-intentioned and nakedly self-interested.  The film takes 
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pains on several occasions to emphasize the deliberate malfeasance of the financial industry 
through a variety of cinematic codes.  For example, when one interviewee is asked by Ferguson 
whether actors in the financial industry “knew they were doing something dangerous?”39 when 
they issued thousands upon thousands of highly risky subprime loans, the interviewee (Sam 
Hayes) replies without hesitation: “I think they did.”40  To further emphasize the intentional 
malice of the financial industry on this issue, an on-screen message shown immediately 
afterward Hayes’ reply reads that the investment banks actually had a preference for subprime 
loans because of the higher interest rates attached to them.
41
  There are several other examples of 
such a type in Inside Job;
42
 however, it is sufficient to say for the moment that the film makes a 
concerted attempt to establish the moral guilt of the U.S. financial industry through the provision 
of information meant to demonstrate the premeditated and malicious nature of many of the 
actions taken by that industry which ultimately led to the widespread economic damage of the 
crisis.  It is in this way that the U.S. financial industry on the whole is framed as the villain of the 
film’s narrative. 
It is exceptionally clear that the narrative in Inside Job is hinged upon portraying the U.S. 
financial industry as a villain whose actions move the plot forward.  However, it should also be 
mentioned that this narrative itself is a priori reliant on a largely unstated but unmistakably 
present imaginary binary between a set of mythic ideas associated with America which are 
ideologically sanctioned and celebrated and an opposing set of concepts associated with the 
United States’ financial industry which are ideologically coded as negative or deviant.  Although 
seldom explicitly stated in the film, ideas such as hard work, fair play and individualistic 
entrepreneurialism represent a mytho-ideological ‘American way’ which (in combination with 
strong government oversight) was responsible for four decades of steady and supposedly crisis-
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free economic growth.  Contrasted to this American national imaginary is that which is 
associated with the financial industry.  Naked self-interest, deception, greed, parasitism and 
excess are examples of the kind of ideas and characteristics through which the film ideologically 
frames the financial industry.  While for the most part this binary tends to be implied, there are 
some occasions where the film’s rendering of it is highly explicit, sometimes to the point where 
it is unmissable.
43
  Interestingly, this binary closely resembles one which was present in the 
presidential radio addresses: that of an opposition between practices considered part of the 
mytho-ideological fabric of the United States (success commensurate with hard work, honesty 
and straightforwardness as virtues) and practices considered antithetical to this fabric (the 
gaining of wealth without due effort through rigging the playing field or outright fraud, 
deception and lack of accountability).  The theme of justice in Inside Job is significantly 
predicated on the opposition between these two, as the widespread economic suffering of the 
implied hard-working and honest American people in the face of the 2008 crisis is contrasted 
with the parasitic and duplicitous nature of the U.S. financial industry.   
Having rendered its verdict early and transparently, Inside Job mostly has the character of an 
exposition of its stated position.  Beneath the ephemeral technicalia of the names of acts such as 
‘Glass-Steagall’ and ‘Commodity Futures Modernization Act’ and terms like ‘subprime’, 
‘derivatives’, ‘collateralized debt obligations’, ‘credit default swaps’ and ‘mortgage-backed 
securities’, the charges read against those who sit in the dock ring out like a clarion call in Inside 
Job.  Guilty as charged are those of the financial industry who in their selfishness and arrogance 
chose to forsake all of which the imagined community of America abides by as standard matters 
of honour and conduct.  To execute this narrative operation; however, a full ‘othering’ of the 
financial industry is undertaken in the film to mark it as utterly separate and different from the 
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imagined national community.  To accomplish such a fundamental othering of the financial 
industry, a great deal of screen time in Inside Job is spent in an attempt to discursively position 
the financial industry as responsible for the crisis as deviant from the imaginary norms of the 
national collective.  Two primary strategies the film pursues in this attempt is to tar-and-feather 
the financial industry in the representational clothing of ‘excess’ and ‘duplicity’.  
 An attempt to represent the excess of the financial industry, particularly its greed, is apparent 
throughout many scenes in Inside Job.  From the film’s opening musical track of ‘Big Time’ by 
Peter Gabriel to shots of private jets lining runways and corporate skyscrapers reaching toward 
the heavens to the many stories recounted of the excess-filled lives of those working in finance
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and their excessive financial compensation (salaries and bonuses are often cited), Inside Job 
seeks to project an overall image of excess onto the financial industry in the making of its 
argument concerning their moral bankruptcy.  Though this projection of excess – a combination 
of grandiosity tinged with the obscene – does indeed mainly serve to further the argument of the 
film concerning the moral culpability of the financial industry, it is not exclusively used to 
reinforce that point.  Rather, ‘excess’ seems to function as a flexible signifier.  Sometimes, the 
film’s signifying of excess seems to be bereft of a strong moral dimension and appears more 
broadly synonymous with something akin to the concept of ‘scale’; however, when looking at 
the film as a meaningful whole as a text it is arguably the case that the film’s projection of scale 
is actually for the most part secondary to and supportive of a more fundamental idea of excess 
coded very deeply into this motion picture.  For example, the film often uses aerial and landscape 
shots to project an image of great scale.  From an early aerial shot of a massive hydroelectric 
dam cutting across the stunningly virginal terrain of Iceland to the many aerial shots of towering 
skyscrapers and the occasional shots of massive subdivisions of residential houses, the kind of 
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scale most often projected in Inside Job is that associated with large-scale human activity.  The 
oft-repeated shots in Inside Job of large buildings under construction, frequently with 
construction cranes perched atop them like strange giant insects, serve to turn the built 
environment into a signifier of scale.  Importantly, the scale of the built environment serves as a 
signifier of large-scale economic activity.  The massiveness of the manmade physical 
environment is harnessed by the film and tied into a foundational theme of excessiveness, a 
theme which is mostly pressed into service to single out the financial industry for blame for the 
crisis.  The imposing corporate skyscrapers arguably symbolize the towering power of the 
financial industry, and the giant hydroelectric dam built over the Icelandic landscape arguably 
symbolizes the imposition over nature of the drive for profit of multinational companies (the film 
paints with a wide brush here perhaps in associating the U.S. financial industry with 
multinational capitalism in general).  Moreover, the concept of excess is at points in the film 
explicitly coded as both unnatural and obscene.
45
  Inside Job’s projection of scale as a signifier 
of the excess of the financial industry serves to emphasize the enormity of the crime the film 
accuses the financial industry of – that ‘their greed knew no bounds’ – and also offers the viewer 
highly recognizable referents for the financial industry that signify the immensely powerful but 
overwhelmingly negative character the film seeks to attribute to it. 
Along with depicting the financial industry as characterized by excess, Inside Job also 
portrays it as duplicitous.  Excess and duplicity are intimately interrelated in the film’s portrayal 
of the financial industry as ideologically deviant, for the excess of the financial industry is 
depicted as being based on and gained through duplicity.  It is here that the unnatural drive 
toward excess, which the film codes the financial industry as being characterized by, is 
intertwined with the artificiality of false appearances and the dishonesty of that industry and 
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figures of it.  The cinematic techniques through which Inside Job executes this othering of the 
financial sector as duplicitous are several, but among them the use of interviews, which frame 
members of the financial industry and others working in their service as fundamentally 
duplicitous, stands out as particularly prominent means of achieving it. 
A particularly notable strategy executed through the use of interview clips in Inside Job is 
the insertion of the viewer into a subject position reminiscent of a juror at a trial.  The frame of 
the screen is the stand, the interviewees are often defendants and witnesses for the prosecution, 
and the voice of (mostly off-camera) Ferguson is that of prosecutor.  The influence of Michael 
Moore, who had created and refined an approach that “had created a new form of documentary 
with the potential to both entertain and, possibly, shape the public’s political imagination”,46 
through films such as Roger & Me and Bowling For Columbine, is at its most apparent in Inside 
Job’s interviews of figures in or connected to the financial industry.  The interviews with Scott 
Talbot (chief lobbyist for the Financial Services Roundtable, a lobby group of the financial 
industry), Glenn Hubbard (Dean of Columbia Business School, former chairman of the Council 
of Economic Advisors under George W. Bush), Fredric Mishkin (a former member of the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve) and David McCormack (former Treasury Under Secretary 
for International Affairs) all serve to highlight either the dishonesty or outright duplicity of each 
interviewee.  While Ferguson’s interviewing style generally is more conversational, as compared 
to that of more confrontational documentary filmmakers such as Errol Morris and Michael 
Moore
47
 (though he does not shy away from countering the particularly objectionable statements 
of some interviewees with “‘You can't be serious’ or its rhetorical equivalent”48), it is largely 
effective in condemning such ‘target’ interviewees both through what they are willing to say and 
not willing to say.   
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Ferguson’s use of a variety of means to discredit the character of his target interviewees in or 
associated with the financial industry is impressively executed as a strategy and their combined 
effect is overwhelmingly damning in Inside Job.  It can only be assumed that the majority of the 
confrontational interviews were of the ambush variety (a hallmark of the documentary style), for 
it is hard to imagine that many of the interviewees would have agreed to be interviewed had they 
known the nature of what their interviews would be like.  A couple of examples should be 
sufficient to illustrate this being the case.  In the interview with Talbot, Talbot’s own words are 
used to discredit him.  Confronted with the issue of previous large-scale criminal activity of 
member companies in his organization, he awkwardly feigns ignorance of this and goes on to 
very unconvincingly make the case that such illegality is accidental, stating that, “When you’re 
this large, and you’re dealing with this many products and this many customers, mistakes 
happen.”49  The clear implication is that Talbot is lying.  In Ferguson’s interview with Hubbard, 
verbal ambush interview tactics are supplemented with the techniques of follow-up graphics and 
narration meant to discredit him.  When Hubbard is grilled over the apparent conflict of interest 
of academics being paid to write reports designed to support the policy goals of the financial 
industry, his claim that “most academic economists, uh, you know, aren’t wealthy business 
people”50 is then discredited by a graphic shown on screen that points out that he makes a 
quarter-million dollar a years for sitting on the board of Met Life.
51
  To further highlight 
Hubbard’s dishonesty, his downplaying of the ties between academia and the financial industry 
is undercut by the film’s narrator stating immediately afterward that Hubbard was paid one 
hundred thousand dollars to testify on behalf of two Bear Sterns hedge fund managers accused of 
securities fraud.
52
  In other instances, the clear discomfort of the interviewee and what they are 
reluctant or unwilling to say effectively serves to discredit them.  In perhaps one of the most 
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awkward moments in the film, Ferguson’s repeated responses of incredulity at McCormack’s 
attempt to argue that the crisis came out of the blue finally pushes McCormack to ask, “C-, can 
we turn this [camera] off for a second?”53  The cumulative effect of Ferguson’s many ‘gotcha’ 
interviews is that the financial industry as a whole is framed as fundamentally duplicitous since 
not one member of it featured on camera in Inside Job is shown as straightforward, trustworthy, 
or honest.  The implied audience of the film is in all likelihood already shares Ferguson’s 
perspective on the culpability of the financial industry, so these tactics are really more 
expositional than investigational: no real attempt is made in the film to argue any alternative 
perspectives. 
Inside Job’s branding of the financial industry at large as duplicitous, like its coding of it as 
characterized by excess, serves to position it in contrast to an imagined ‘everyone else’ which 
also includes the viewer presumably.  In positioning the financial industry in this manner Inside 
Job strengthens the crux of its narrative regarding the 2008 crisis: that a rogue group whose 
values are fundamentally other to those of an imagined, ideologically-sanctioned ‘the people’ are 
to be held responsible for the crisis having happened.  The jury of the imagined audience of 
Inside Job is essentially being asked to find the U.S. financial industry guilty of this charge.  The 
presentation of the individuals of or associated with this particular group as deviant (primarily 
through marking their characters as abnormal and immoral through the construction of their 
excess and duplicity) is indeed an important element upon which Inside Job’s overarching 
narrative of the ‘hijacking’ of a nation by a thoroughly bad-intentioned group is dependent.  
Basically, by portraying the financial industry in this manner, Inside Job is making an argument 
for a particular interpretation of the causes of the crisis.  In doing so, the film also effectively 
denies or downplays alternative causal narratives of the crisis such as predominantly systemic 
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narratives (which by contrast are given some degree of shrift in Margin Call), narratives largely 
based on general human fallibility or narratives based on other grounds altogether (such as that 
of the psychology of markets which is evident in the discourse of the periodical articles written 
in The New Yorker).  However, to make its case convincingly Inside Job inevitably turns to the 
past to try to strengthen the credibility of the interpretation of the crisis that it offers.  
Establishing the excess and duplicity of those most immediately responsible for the 2008 crisis, 
while helpful to some extent in making the overall argument of the film through its construction 
of the villainy of the financial industry, is not sufficient in and of itself because it lacks adequate 
historical depth.  It is therefore the case that the issue of how the wider historical context of the 
2008 crisis is constructed in the narrative of Inside Job must presently be examined to gain 
further insight into how the film contributes to the creation of a particular kind of discourse on 
the crisis. 
 
‘A Thirty Year Heist?’ or ‘Histoire Court Durée’ 
The dependency of Inside Job’s narrative on the presentation of the financial industry as culpable 
for the 2008 crisis is apparent in how the film situates the crisis historically.  Right from the 
beginning, Inside Job attempts to project its narrative in a highly authoritative manner.  In the 
first minute of the film, over sombre music, text on the screen reads “The global economic crisis 
of 2008 costs tens of millions of people their savings, their jobs, and their homes.  This is how it 
happened.”54  However, there seems to be some reason to question the film’s rendering of the 
larger historical context in which it situates the crisis.  As detailed above, the basic starting point 
of the film’s narrative on the immediate origins of the crisis is the deregulation of the U.S. 
financial industry during the Reagan years.  However, the relatively brief historical period this 
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essentially designates is highly noteworthy and must be subjected to some questioning in order to 
tease out the full significance of the particular periodization scheme within which the film 
locates the origins of the crisis. 
In its discursive construction of the 2008 crisis, everything that happens historically before 
the Reagan era and after the Great Depression in Inside Job receives very little treatment.  The 
period stretching from about the end of the 1930s to the beginning of the 1980s in the United 
States is presented in a fairly obscure way in the film as a general period of stability and 
prosperity.  To be fair, there is some insinuation in Inside Job that forces and parties somewhat 
similar to those which the film blames for causing the 2008 crisis were also responsible for the 
Great Depression, as is made clear by the film’s highlighting of the repeal of the Glass-Steagall 
Act.  However, the film never strongly integrates the circumstances that led to the Great 
Depression into its discursive construction of the 2008 crisis in any detailed manner whatsoever, 
and this seems to be a rather significant omission. 
Arguably, the relative lack of historic depth of Inside Job stems from the film’s attempt to 
pin the full weight of responsibility for the 2008 crisis on the contemporary U.S. financial 
industry.  Again, while some allusions of kinship between the contemporary U.S. financial 
industry and the parties ostensibly responsible for the Great Depression are made in the film, one 
is left with the impression that in Inside Job any such parties are considered only as partially 
recognizable ancestors rather than qualitatively similar brethren of the industry blamed by the 
film for the 2008 meltdown.  It would otherwise seem to be the case that the causes of the Great 
Depression would be more integrated into Inside Job’s historical situating of the 2008 crisis. 
That Inside Job comes off in a sense as a film whose sense of history seems relatively truncated 
in scope has been pointed out by some critics, such as Peter Rainier who wrote “My only 
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criticism of the film is its somewhat ahistorical bent: Not much is said about the robber barons 
and crooks of earlier eras – as if all this chicanery had no antecedents.”55  This overall lack of 
historical antecedents for the actions of the financial industry prior to the deregulation of the 
Reagan administration is in fact crucial to the maintenance of the primary narrative of Inside Job, 
as its central depiction of the U.S. financial industry as a singularly rogue force responsible far 
and above all other potential causes of the 2008 crisis is in fact heavily dependent on the film’s 
relatively ahistorical representation of the crisis.  A deeper historical grounding of the 2008 crisis 
would have problematized Inside Job’s fundamental narrative of the crisis having been caused 
by a U.S. financial industry that was simply ‘bad’ or ‘evil’ by opening the doors for wider cross-
historical examination of the systemic causes of financial crises.  This is clearly something the 
film does not attempt to integrate into its discursive construction of the historical origins of the 
2008 crisis, and in this sense the film’s attempt to maintain a high degree of narrative cohesion 
can be correlated to its relative lack of historical depth.  
  Although the historical contours of the narrative of Inside Job seldom go further back than 
the deregulation of the financial industry under President Reagan (the brief integration of the 
Great Depression into that narrative is an exception, and the distance between the Great 
Depression and the crisis of 2008 as rendered in the film feels like a chasm) the film does 
manage to create a certain degree of historical density through its use of archival photographs 
and video footage.  The use of archival photos and videos provides a sense of Inside Job’s 
narrative having an authenticity and legitimacy that is grounded in historical evidence.  
Signifying historical proof and grounding through the use of inferior-quality or otherwise dated-
looking photos or video footage drawn from earlier decades has a long history as a strategy of 
legitimation and critique in the documentary film genre.  One particularly salient example of the 
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use of archival material was the “successful [stringing] together of old “documentary” footage in 
the form of government issued films about nuclear radiation”56 from the 1982 film The Atomic 
Café, a film which played a significant role in setting stage for the late 1980s documentary 
revival in the United States.  However, while The Atomic Café uses this technique to principally 
mock the absurdity of the American government’s claims that there would be meaningful life 
after a full-blown nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union, Inside Job uses such a technique in a 
very serious manner to attempt to endow a sense of historical authenticity to the charges it levels 
at the U.S. financial industry.  Archival photos and videos serve as exhibits drawn from the past 
in the film’s making of its case for the guilt of the financial industry: they are provided to 
convince the jury of the audience of this guilt by adding a sense of historical depth to that case. 
In Inside Job, the use of archival footage therefore serves in some ways to make up visually 
for the film’s relative narrative ahistoricity through the textual thickening of its historical 
rendering of the period from the 1980s to the present moment of the film.  The archival material 
deployed in the film provides a sense of legitimacy and authority to the film’s narrative through 
creating the perception that its explanation of the origins of the 2008 crisis can be traced back to 
a past that once existed and is verifiable through its textual traces.  The film’s use of the 
verisimilitudinous media of photos and videos for demonstrating historical claims is important in 
this respect: visual traces of the past in particular hold credibility, and their concomitant real-to-
life quality functions as a signifier of truth.  This exercise of tracing the origins of the 2008 crisis 
back into the past in Inside Job also takes the character of a hidden mystery or truth removed in 
time being uncovered or revealed, and this very much strengthens the effect of the courtroom-
style approach of the film.  For example, footage of a younger Alan Greenspan, of congressional 
hearings from the 1980s, of President Reagan, and of financial services executives being 
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prosecuted for the Savings and Loans disaster all work together to create a visual texture of 
history in Inside Job which is designed to provide historical credibility to the case the film 
makes.  Ultimately, this air of historical credibility is used to further the primary narrative 
argument of the film: that the 2008 crisis was the result of a plot hatched in a den of thieves, an 
‘inside job’ orchestrated by the U.S. financial industry which resulted in economic disaster being 
wrought upon the United States.  
While archival material is an important means through which the thirty-or-so-year history 
the films depicts as having led to the 2008 crisis is fleshed out and harnessed for narrative 
credibility in Inside Job, the central and authoritative voice of the narrator is what more than 
anything else establishes the viewer’s subject position as it guides them through the five parts of 
the film’s narrative that cover the thirty-year period in question.  In conjunction with the text 
which is occasionally displayed on screen, the voice of narration is the spine which runs through 
the film and keeps its constituent components united.  Endowed with an air of authority and 
omniscience that is meant to be shown as stretching over both time and space (for example, 
cinematic techniques such as the frequent use of aerial or overhead shots while the narrator is 
speaking give a powerful and authoritative sense of omniscience to the narrated voice, and the 
use of narration over archival material serves as a powerful signifier of authoritativeness as 
well), the narrator’s voice stitches together a large number of smaller stories into the bigger story 
of the film’s narrative of the financial industry being responsible for the 2008 crisis.  The thirty-
year span on which the film’s narrative is focused is in large part given coherency by this 
powerful voice.  As is implied by the title of the film, the story which the narration constructs 
through its bringing together of bits of evidence is that of a crime and, as the omniscient and 
authoritative voice presiding over this case, the voice of the narrator is also the voice of truth and 
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justice.  The narration of Inside Job is thus a primary part of the crime’s dissection, a 
demonstration of the case created by that dissection for the film’s audience, and an implicit 
signifier of truth and justice.  The voice of the narrator in Inside Job validates the historical 
dimensions of the case made in the film by repeatedly testifying to its coherence as a meaningful 
whole, to its truth, and ultimately to its righteousness.   
The overarching structure of the film Inside Job, held together by the voice of the narrator, is 
also an important way in which the film as a text works as a meaning whole.  As was just 
mentioned above, the story told in Inside Job takes the form of a five part investigation.  The 
narrative trajectory of these five parts collectively span a period of three decades, basically 
beginning in the 1980s and ending in the present day of the film, though the parts (and the parts 
of the parts) of the film do not always proceed in a totally neat, chronological historical 
sequence.  The manner in which the parts of the film build upon each other successively creates a 
sense of the gradual revelation of a deeper and more damning understanding of the crime that the 
film accuses the financial industry of.  Chronologically, the five parts the story of the crime 
Inside Job proceeds through are the deregulation of the financial industry as pushed for by its 
members (‘Part I: How We Got Here’), their self-serving inflation of the speculative housing 
bubble (‘Part II: The Bubble [2001-2007]’), the inevitable descent into crisis (‘Part III: The 
Crisis’), the lack of accountability for the damage done (‘Part IV: Accountability’), and how 
little has changed in the aftermath of the crisis (‘Part V: Where We Are Now).  The 2008 crisis is 
in this way simultaneously portrayed as an event unfolding within given historical parameters 
and as a morality tale of a historic event.  Even more importantly, as the word ‘We’ in the titles 
of Part I and Part V indicate, Inside Job depicts the story of the 2008 crisis as a journey of the 
imagined community of the American nation through both a designated period of historical time 
146 
 
and an affective experience of collective suffering and injustice.  The journey is therefore one 
that proceeds through both historical time and through a temporal terrain that is marked through 
affect and drama. 
Ferguson’s choice of dividing Inside Job into five parts is a highly significant one because 
this particular scheme of division gives the film coherence partially on account of this form’s 
long history and its symbolic qualities as form: the five-part sequence is the same structure used 
in both ancient Greek and Shakespearean tragedies.  As Linda McDowell points out, this kind of 
structure has been used in a variety of literary and dramatic works based on the 2008 crisis and is 
reflective of “the five-fold nature of traditional tragedies, where the five acts are exposition, 
rising action, climax, falling action, and finally the denouement.”57  This form underscores the 
tragic nature of the narrative in Inside Job and also serves to arrange the presentation of the 
film’s dramatic movement in a representational structure which many viewers are already 
familiar with.  This particular structure is also important in that it gives the primary argument of 
the film a considerable degree of cogency through its bringing together in a highly organized 
fashion a body of material that otherwise might have been presented in a convoluted, incoherent 
or unclear fashion.  Such charges were sometimes leveled at other films on the 2008 crisis, such 
as Michael Moore’s Capitalism: A Love Story, of which one critic asserted “in passages, the 
movie is eloquent.  In sum, it is scattershot.”58  On the whole, Inside Job could be said to be 
highly coherent in terms of the narrative structure of its argument while at the same time 
somewhat lacking in historical depth due to the relative inattention that any historical period 
receives prior to the bracket of the thirty-year period that the film’s narrative focuses on.  Indeed, 
a case can be made that the film’s lack of historical depth outside of this period is partially a 
consequence of the film’s five-part dramatic structure, a structure which is clearly built around 
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the ascent of the U.S. financial industry as the villain who moves the tragic narrative of the film 
forward.  In this sense, it can be said that in Inside Job the representation of tragedy is given 
more weight than the representation of history as a structural consideration of the film’s 
narratives.  It is the former which predominantly shapes the latter and not vice-versa.  Tragedy 
comes first and history comes second in how Inside Job is structured and works as a text which 
evokes a particular set of meanings designed to provoke particular types of reaction in the public 
at which it is aimed.        
In sum, the dramatic five-part structure of Inside Job and the somewhat limited historical 
contours of its narrative might be attributed to a combination of the expectations of the film’s 
genre (although a documentary, Inside Job was a film meant for widespread theatrical release 
and was therefore designed to be both entertaining and accessible to audiences), its plot 
movement (the need for a villain is fulfilled by the financial industry, and the five-part dramatic 
structure was a strong fit for such a villain-based narrative), and the overall ideological context 
of the film’s imagined audience and the ideological inclinations of its producer (that Inside Job 
was produced predominantly for American audiences unlikely to be opposed to free market 
capitalism in general, as well as being the creation an American entrepreneurial director: Charles 
Ferguson).  Certainly, the film’s emphatic blaming of the U.S. financial industry for the 2008 
crisis, as well as for other financial crises in the United States since the 1980s, allowed it to skirt 
difficult questions concerning systemic issues of capitalism more generally or of capitalism in 
the United States specifically.  Some of these consequences of the film’s approach are apparent 
right at the very end of the film, where the voice of the narrator states: 
For decades, the American financial system was stable and safe. But then something changed. 
The financial industry turned its back on society, corrupted our political system, and plunged the 
world economy into crisis. 
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At enormous cost, we’ve avoided disaster, and are recovering. But the men and institutions that 
caused the crisis are still in power, and that needs to change. 
 
They will tell us that we need them, and that what they do is too complicated for us to 
understand. They will tell us it won't happen again. They will spend billions fighting reform. 
 
It won't be easy. But some things are worth fighting for.
59
 
These closing passages sum up Inside Job’s discursive construction of the 2008 crisis very 
succinctly.  It comes up short on history in the long sense and has a certain degree of vagueness 
in its causal explanations.  It lays out a narrative that specifically blames the financial industry 
for the fiasco of the economic collapse of 2008 and it ideologically positions that industry as 
other to a mytho-ideologically privileged and sanctified American nation.  The final line of the 
film, pronounced over a moving aerial shot of the Statue of Liberty, answers to a significant 
extent the question of what the “some things [that] are worth fighting for” are.  Presumably, 
these are the mytho-ideological values of America represented by this iconic monument: 
opportunity, hope, equality, and freedom.  The resemblance of the implied meanings here to 
what is was said in the presidential radio broadcasts is striking: these values parallel quite closely 
many of the same mytho-ideological values attributed to America and the American people 
which were spoken of in the broadcasts by Bush and Obama.  It is to this eternal wellspring of 
the hope and promise of America and its people that Ferguson ultimately turns to at the end of 
Inside Job: that which is right, good and just is the final counterpoint to all the wrongness, 
corruption, and injustice wrought by perpetrators of the 2008 crisis.  Among the films on the 
2008 crisis, Inside Job is a par excellence example of a film in which the narrative is heavily 
dependent upon a particular ideologically-laden set of myths concerning the American people.  
The highly ideological binary division that is detectable throughout much of the narrative of 
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Inside Job, sometimes quite obviously and sometimes quite subtly, is thus affirmed resoundingly 
at this final moment before the credits roll. 
 
Arbitrage 
Whereas documentaries such as Inside Job, Capitalism: A Love Story and Plunder: The Crime of 
Our Time tended to focus on the 2008 crisis as a traumatic and immoral calamity inflicted on a 
nation by greed-driven elites of various configurations, feature fiction films on the crisis by and 
large represented the crisis in a different manner.  In particular, such politically-oriented fictional 
feature films were substantially more driven by character-based, dramatic narratives that focused 
around particular persons or groups of people being caught up in the economic impact of the 
crisis or dealing with situations which were metaphoric of or otherwise closely connected to the 
economic collapse.  Nicholas Jarecki’s Arbitrage can certainly be classified amongst such films.  
Described by one critic as a film that “becomes far more complex than just dramatized anti-
corporate polemic, or even a simple fall from grace”,60 Arbitrage takes the viewer on a grim 
journey into a world that is clearly marked as an after-the-crash one.  A character-driven, slickly 
shot movie that in some respects is reminiscent of a European art film in its rendering of the 
crisis, Arbitrage is a darkly dramatic and highly suspenseful tale that recognizably and 
strategically plays out principally in the financial hub of New York City.  Often blurring the lines 
between right and wrong, at the heart of Arbitrage are two related and overlapping storylines.  
The first storyline revolves around the efforts of the film’s protagonist (hedge fund magnate 
Robert Miller, played by Richard Gere) to sell his business empire before the depths of its 
troubles and his fraudulence are revealed.  This storyline of the concealment of financial losses is 
doubled by the film’s other storyline: Miller’s attempt to conceal his involvement in the death of 
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his mistress so that he can continue to attempt to conceal his firm’s losses until he succeeds in 
selling it.  As the fairly ambiguous, double-sided thrust of its title implies, Arbitrage tells a story 
not of sharp black-and-white divisions of right and wrong, but rather one in which such clear-cut 
moral distinctions are impossible to maintain under the pressure of the need to act quickly and 
with cunning in a multi-level and shifting situational terrain. 
 
‘Intimations of Crisis’ or ‘Asleep at the Wheel’ 
 Arbitrage is a film whose coherence and meaning is significantly dependent on the 2008 
crisis and the articulations of that which has come to be associated with it.  Although not as 
directly based on specific events related to the 2008 crisis as either Margin Call or Inside Job, 
Arbitrage is clearly infused by the discourse of the crisis and is meant to be understood in light 
of the crisis as context.  That Arbitrage is a ‘crisis film’ that should be grouped amongst other 
such films that are either directly about the crisis or clearly shaped by it is apparent both via 
fairly explicit and literal references in the film to the crisis and also via substantially more subtle 
and metaphoric sets of meanings and associations.  This rich referential tapestry of Arbitrage as a 
crisis film, encompassing elements such as its plot, characters, setting and audiovisual aesthetics, 
makes Arbitrage a rich and multi-dimensional work that undeniably draws on the discursive 
matter of the 2008 crisis for both its form and power as a text.  It is a film in which corporate 
misconduct, moral dilemmas, and hard decisions made under difficult, high-pressure 
circumstances intersect in an after-the-crash fictionalized real world. 
 Arbitrage establishes its connection to the crisis in a very explicit manner at the very 
beginning of the film by opening with a sequence of Miller being interviewed on a financial 
affairs television show discussing the collapse of the U.S. housing market and his business 
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philosophy.  Miller is presented in this sequence as an esteemed and prescient corporate guru of 
sorts, one of the few who anticipated the economic crash.  The imagined viewer is likely to be 
familiar with this image of the media interviewing an expert figure who ‘saw it coming’ as there 
were many interviews of such figures in the aftermath of the market crash, so much so that these 
particular types of interviews could be said to be part of a kind of ‘post-mortem’ discourse of the 
economic crisis.  Having the film start off with a direct reference to the U.S. subprime mortgage 
crisis as the origins of a wider economic crisis and conveying this to the viewer in such a highly 
familiar form as a media interview with a ‘knowing expert’ immediately positions the film as a 
text with a specific context outside of itself to which it refers and which the viewer is intended to 
recognize.  To the audience, such a commencement to the film essentially establishes 
immediately and in no uncertain terms that what they are watching is to be understood via the 
narrative prism of the crisis.  It is through this opening act of framing that the setting of the film 
is established as a historically specific one – that the ‘crisis era’ is the historical context of the 
film – and that the events which are to unfold in the film from that point forward are to be read in 
light of a context formed by phenomena, themes, and events related to the crisis. 
News reports signifying economic crisis are, for example, are used in Arbitrage to 
emphasize the crucial role played by the media in the formation of popular discourse on the crisis 
and of the particular signs that came to symbolize the crisis in the popular imagination: the film 
uses such reports to inscribe crisis into its textual matter.  The play-by-play style of media 
reportage on the state of the crisis-stricken economy (particularly that of twenty-four-hour news 
channels such as CNN, FOX News, and CNBC) was a media form strongly associated with the 
2008 crisis in the United States and the usage of clips of such reportage in many of the films on 
the crisis to signify the crisis should be understood accordingly as the deployment of a highly 
152 
 
recognizable signifier meant to be understood by the films’ implied publics.  In Arbitrage, media 
reports of economic news are deployed as signifiers of the economic crisis on at least two 
occasions.  The audio of a report on economic news can be heard the first time that Miller is 
shown on screen aboard his private jet, and the chatter of market news again occurs in a later 
scene when Miller turns on the television in his limousine.  On the second occasion, the news 
heard is also related to the film’s plot: Miller struggles to contain his rage when he hears that the 
news of further nationalization in Russia – the country where so much of his money is tied up, 
possibly never to be recovered – is spooking investors.  Arbitrage also skillfully weaves the eye 
of the media as a popular signifier of the crisis into its own narrative in the opening media 
interview sequence via the use of polysemous character dialogue.  After establishing the crisis as 
the film’s context with Miller’s discussion of the subprime housing bubble at the beginning of 
this sequence, the film ominously foreshadows the difficulties that Miller himself will face later 
by having it conclude with him saying on the subject of the housing collapse: “So it’s not 
surprising that we see these asset bubbles, but when reality sets in of course, they burst.”61  The 
insinuation is that Miller himself will face some sort of day of reckoning of a like kind, as is 
emphasized by the shot going black as Miller utters these words.  It is in such a manner that 
Arbitrage calls upon the audience’s knowledge of the story of the U.S. housing crisis to read the 
significance of the cinematic codes of this sequence in order to make sense of the film’s narrative 
as it is unfolding.  The media thus stand as signifiers of the 2008 crisis in Arbitrage, and 
references to the mediated character of the crisis are used as polysemic signs to be read by the 
audience in the context of the film’s narrative.  Such sets of complex relations between content, 
context, and narrative are characteristic of how Arbitrage functions as a sophisticated cinematic 
text. 
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Along with integrating explicit references to the crisis through the use of highly recognizable 
signifiers such as media interviews with experts and media reports on economic news, direct 
connections to the 2008 economic crisis as the context of Arbitrage are also established through 
the insertion of financial and financially-related references and terminology into the dialogue of 
its characters.  For example, financial terminology associated with the crisis is put into the mouth 
of Miller who says in conversation with one of his close associates: “Quants?  Derivatives 
structures?  What was that about?”62  In an explosive conversation with his daughter and Chief 
Financial Officer Brooke, Miller declares, “I’ve done housing, I’ve arb’d credit swaps, I have 
done it all.”63  Less terminologically-oriented references abound in the film as well.  Detective 
Bryer fumes that Miller “does not get to walk just cause he’s on CNBC.”64  Miller tries to 
comfort a distraught Julie disappointed by low sales at her debut art show by telling her that “the 
market’s a disaster right now; nobody’s moving anything.”65  This kind of explicit marking of 
Arbitrage as being about the 2008 economic crisis through the deployment of financial and 
financially-related references and terminology popularly associated with the crisis in the 
discourses of media and popular culture is present throughout the film.  The extensive integration 
of discourse on the crisis drawn from the real world into Arbitrage’s fictional narrative 
demonstrate that the crisis is not cosmetically grafted onto the film’s plot but rather that it is 
fundamental to it.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine Arbitrage being coherent in the manner that it 
is without having the crisis as its principal context of meaning.  The set of associations through 
which the film structures the creation of much of its meaning is simply too deeply tied into the 
context and discourse of the crisis for it to mean in a recognizably similar way without it.  
In addition to the fairly explicit and literal means through which the film is connected to its 
context of the 2008 crisis as described above, Arbitrage also deploys a series of much more 
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subtle and metaphoric strategies of representation in accomplishing this feat.  The film makes a 
practice of using such strategies to create tone, symbolize ideas and weave together key themes 
that subtly reference the crisis or that popularly associated with the crisis.  Examples of this in 
Arbitrage are many.  The title display sequence which follows the opening interview sequence is 
a case in point.  In this highly stylized sequence, a calming audio track accompanies a serene in-
motion aerial shot filmed high over the clouds and then is gradually replaced by the deafening 
sound of jet engines. The shot then changes to that of a private jet cleaving through the air.  
Symbolic of enormous wealth and luxury, ‘high-flying’ and ‘the sky’s the limit’ attitudes, and a 
general detachment from their (mostly earthbound) fellow citizens,
66
 private jet aircraft were 
accorded a particular place in the popular discourse of the 2008 crisis and the specific display of 
one of them in such a key establishing shot seems anything but accidental.  Another key 
metaphoric reference that is arguably linked to the 2008 crisis is that of ‘the hidden wound’.  The 
grotesque injury that Miller’s character receives in the automobile crash that kills Julie remains 
hidden to most characters throughout the film.  Miller’s attempts to conceal this injury parallels 
his attempt to hide his firm’s massively injurious losses, and this in turn can be linked to the 
attempts of many financial firms to try to conceal their losses or massive exposure in the period 
leading up to the crisis.  However, it is another metaphoric reference to the 2008 crisis which is 
of even more importance in Arbitrage and for good reason: the metaphor of being ‘asleep at the 
wheel’. 
The sequence in which Miller dozes off while driving Julie late at night is probably the most 
pivotal one in the film as well as that with the richest degree of metaphoric significance in 
relation to the 2008 crisis.  It is in this sequence that the second storyline (Miller’s attempt to 
avoid responsibility for Julie’s death) is imposed on top of and intensifies the first (Miller’s 
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attempt to sell his secretly imperiled firm).  The metaphor of being asleep at the wheel broadly 
refers to the idea of negligence in not performing one’s duties causing disaster.  Variations of 
this metaphor, principally but not exclusively applied to government regulators, entered into the 
popular discourse of the 2008 crisis on account of what was perceived as a general failure of 
those in positions of knowledge and power to foresee it and take preventative measures.
67
  
Arguably, in Arbitrage this metaphor is also of a more general application which suggests the 
ending of a dream-like state where things seemed to be going well ending abruptly in unforeseen 
disaster.  Set to the sound of Billie Holiday’s One More Chance (a case could be made for the 
significance of this particular song selection in relation to the film’s plot, given the song’s 
mentions of ‘jury’ and ‘trial’, as well as its titular refrain of “one more chance”), the sequence is 
at first quite a serene-seeming one, with a sleepy and affectionate Julie snuggling against a 
faintly smiling Miller as he drives her Mercedes through the night towards “a place upstate. Very 
beautiful, on the water.”68  However, Miller, exhausted from his travels and the stress he has 
been under due to trying to sell his secretly deeply troubled firm begins to nod off, his eyes 
repeatedly fluttering shut.  Finally, he does actually fall asleep, at which point the car drifts 
slowly to the left, striking a concrete barrier.  The audio of the Holiday song then comes to an 
abrupt halt and is replaced by the loud sound of metal scraping against concrete and as Miller 
snaps back to consciousness the car flies spinning into the air then violently rolls over several 
times upon impact with the ground.  When the vehicle finally comes to a rest, a dazed Miller 
realizes he is bleeding from his head and then turns to his right to see Julie dead beside him, a 
vicious wound across her neck testimony to the fact that she was almost decapitated.  This 
particular cinematographic means of moving the plot forward is significantly demonstrative of 
the film’s connection to the 2008 crisis.  Having Miller’s falling asleep at the wheel as the 
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immediate cause of disaster seems to be an intentional strategy to metaphorically link the 
narrative of Arbitrage to that of one particular popular conception of the narrative of the 
economic crisis in almost unmistakable terms. 
The significance of this car accident scene sequence can arguably be read in more than one 
way as being metaphoric for the 2008 crisis.  One way of reading it is that it metaphorically 
suggests the American economy’s seemingly sudden descent into catastrophic conditions of 
crisis.  All seemed well, perhaps even dream-like with the economy apparently humming along 
nicely, home prices appreciating, until apparently suddenly and without warning things came to a 
disastrous, screeching halt with the crisis.  Indeed, it was the case that popular depictions of the 
crisis did portray it as a disaster that had emerged suddenly and violently, and the seemingly out-
of-nowhere suddenness and shocking violence of the car crash in Arbitrage certainly carries 
connotations of such a kind.  This broad interpretation is given further credibility by virtue of the 
fact that Miller, a businessman in the high circles of finance, is the one behind the wheel driving 
who causes the accident, as this can be taken as suggestive that those in the financial industry are 
responsible for the crisis but that others were dragged along innocently and paid a heavy price 
for their mistakes.  That Miller survives and Julie dies can be interpreted via this lens also.  
Indeed, Miller’s responsibility for and survival of the fatal crash could be seen as signifying that 
those responsible for the ‘crash’ of the economy end up living to fight another day (as does 
Miller in his surviving of the car crash) while others are irrevocably affected in a negative 
manner, some even losing ‘everything’ (Julie losing her life could be considered symbolic of 
such).  Finally, yet a third potential interpretation can be offered that is related to the business of 
finance itself.  That minute attention to detail is considered critical to success in financial matters 
(and conversely, to the avoidance of disastrous failure) can be related to how Miller brings on 
157 
 
disaster at the moment when his ability to pay attention fails.  Whatever the merits and 
weaknesses of the particular interpretations of the car accident scene sequence in Arbitrage 
offered here, it certainly does seem to be the case that it was deliberately presented as such in 
order to metaphorically be evocative of the film’s context of the 2008 crisis.  It is the 
combination of such subtle and metaphoric references to the 2008 crisis, along with the more 
explicit and literal references discussed above, that make Arbitrage such a sophisticated, 
multilayered crisis film. 
 
‘Subjectivity and Ambiguity’ or ‘Whose Thousand Shades of Grey?’ 
 Arbitrage bears a degree of similarity to some other films on the crisis such as Margin Call 
in that it has difficult, often morally ambiguous decisions having to be made under the duress of 
exceptional circumstances as a major theme.  This theme can be considered a sub-theme of a 
more general theme of being forced to take exceptional actions under conditions of crisis that go 
against what would conventionally be done or contemplated under normal circumstances as was 
detailed above concerning the presence of a theme of a ‘state of exception’ in the presidential 
radio addresses.  Broadly speaking, such a theme basically involves the suspension of the 
conventional rules and codes of action or conduct due to the existence of exceptional 
circumstances which either justify or provide a rationale for such a suspension.  Whereas in 
Margin Call the exceptional action of the unnamed firm in dumping its toxic assets is dispersed 
amongst many characters in the film, in Arbitrage the exceptional action is entirely concentrated 
in the character of Miller.  It is he who takes extraordinary actions in the face of extraordinary 
circumstances and it is overwhelmingly his actions that are coded as morally ambiguous in the 
film.  As such, the situation of Miller in Arbitrage can be seen as part of the film’s attempt to 
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project the idea of crisis conditions representing a grey zone with respect to the exercise of moral 
judgments that would otherwise be largely condemned under normal circumstances. 
Arbitrage’s plot reflects the moral ambiguity of its protagonist. Miller’s double attempt to 
evade responsibility for Julie’s death and to sell his firm before his corporate fraudulence is 
discovered is what moves the narrative along. The moral ambiguousness apparent in each of 
these situations is what sets the tone of the film.  The lines between what is considered morally 
reprehensible, morally laudable, and morally acceptable are thoroughly confused.  Miller is 
indeed guilty of fraud through the illegalities he commits to conceal steep losses incurred due to 
a disastrous business decision on his part.  However, Miller’s fraudulent actions are not 
completely motivated by self-serving motives.  He is keenly aware that if the ship of the firm 
sinks others beyond him as the captain will suffer for his lack of judgment: many jobs will be 
lost, the financial fortunes of his family members will be affected, and his daughter’s burgeoning 
career in finance will be all but destroyed.  Something similar goes for Miller’s attempt to evade 
responsibility for Julie’s death.  Miller is clearly responsible for her death, but exceptional and 
extenuating circumstances again cloud the moral terrain of the actions he takes to evade 
responsibility.  Miller being arrested for her death would mean the end of his efforts to sell his 
company and therefore would cause great damage to many parties.  Additionally, her death was 
indeed an accident (albeit an accident caused by his negligence), and the fact that he strongly 
supported Julie’s career aspirations and seemed to be sincerely in love with her further 
complicates the matter.  It is in this manner that the more general crisis-related theme of 
exceptional actions taken under exceptional circumstances is transposed onto the character of 
Miller in Arbitrage: Miller acts in morally questionable ways in exceptional circumstances under 
the motivations of both self-preservation and of preventing harm happening to others.  Under 
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such exceptional circumstances, black-and-white moral judgments are largely eschewed in the 
film and instead the narrative navigates through many overlapping and murky shades of grey that 
swirl around the figure of Miller.  
A significant part of what makes Arbitrage a gripping, complex and interesting film are the 
ways it invites the viewer to identify with the morally ambiguous actions of Miller to a 
significant extent.  Arguably, Arbitrage establishes an oscillating and tentative structure of 
identification for the viewer with the character of Miller.  He is cast as neither a hero nor a 
villain, neither fundamentally good nor intrinsically evil.  Indeed, it can be asserted that much of 
the power and appeal of Miller’s character in the film is that the audience’s identification with 
him is always incomplete. Arbitrage repeatedly positions the audience to identify with the 
character of Miller but they are also called upon by the film repeatedly to resist identifying with 
him completely.  Miller the corporate fraudster apparently hell-bent on self-preservation also 
seems to be looking out for the interests of his family and others; Miller the loving husband and 
parent is also a cheating spouse and cold-hearted boss; Miller the self-confident and successful 
business magnate is also haunted and tortured, teetering on the verge bankruptcy, mental 
breakdown and incarceration.  An effect of this considerable but always-incomplete 
identification with Miller is that one starts to root for him to come out on top in the end but 
without a clear sense of why.  We want him to find a way of selling his imperiled company and 
somehow get away with it though he is in essence a crook.  We want him to outmanoeuvre the 
detective that seeks to ensnare him though we know he is guilty of the crime that has put him in 
the crosshairs.  We want him to see him win the game by breaking the rules.  It is substantially 
through this always-incompleteness of identification with Miller that the audience’s oscillating 
and tentative structure of identification with him is so strong.  There is a similarity here perhaps 
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to how some of the great power of ideology functions through how the structures of the subject’s 
identification with it is always incomplete; that the maintenance of a ‘gap’ between the subject’s 
identification with an ideology via the instillation of a kernel of disbelief is essential to its 
effective functioning.
69
  In this sense, there is a certain level of denial of the desire to see Miller 
succeed in his evasions – is he not indeed a scoundrel, liar and thief, who deserves what he 
should get?  Yet the film transports the audience along with Miller as he ducks and weaves 
through the predicaments he finds himself embroiled in and there is an undeniable sense that, 
while his plight is not their plight, and while his life is very unlike theirs (the film makes a point 
of showing that Miller is so removed from everyday life via his enormous wealth that he doesn’t 
even know of the existence of the popular and ubiquitous restaurant chain Applebee’s!) they on 
the whole nevertheless support his cause and want victory of one kind or another to be his. 
Furthermore, influencing the audience to identify chiefly with Miller, despite his many 
flaws, transgressions and his evident detachment from the world inhabited by ordinary people, is 
the fact that many in the set of characters which surround him in the film are often less than 
endearing or palatable themselves, indeed, so much so that he ends up looking good by 
comparison.  Amongst the main characters of the film, Miller’s wife, Ellen, for example comes 
off overall as mostly detached and self-centred.  Late in the film she shows no qualms in 
attempting to blackmail her husband, and her casual reply of “It’s only two million [dollars]”70 
when she wants to know why her husband has yet to cut her a cheque for one of her pet charities 
really underscores what little regard she has for money, and particularly for money that is not 
hers.  Ellen’s detached snobbery is highlighted at other points in the film as well,71 and this 
hardly invites strong identification with her.  Miller’s mistress Julie is also in some ways a less 
than sympathetic character.  Her outbursts of anger against Miller often seem juvenile, and her 
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quite self-centred disposition is borne handily through the trendy art-socialite aspirations of her 
character.  Those representing the law in Arbitrage don’t come off as particularly sympathetic or 
redeeming characters either: they don’t play by the book and display sadistic tendencies.72  Even 
the characters most sympathetically portrayed in the film – Jimmy Grant (a young man who 
becomes entangled with Miller’s attempt to evade responsibility for Julie’s death) and Brooke – 
are not really portrayed in the film in a manner that makes the viewer identify with them 
strongly: both are fairly uninteresting, one-dimensional characters that lack charisma and appeal.  
The film’s spotlight of identification is thus firmly on Miller.  All the other characters invite only 
a weak degree of identification on account of either their particular mix of personality traits or 
relative flatness as characters. 
Surrounded by such a constellation of other characters, Miller’s character, with all its 
blemishes and moral ambiguity, actually ends up being portrayed relatively favourably in 
Arbitrage.  The complexity of his character gives it depth.  He doggedly and under extremely 
trying circumstances pursues goals that would in theory benefit both him and others.  It is he that 
is the primary locus of action in the film as well, and both the plot and the viewer are carried 
along by the shrewdness, sneakiness, and virtuosity of his actions (particularly through his 
machinations to evade being ensnared by police Detective Bryer, who is fully convinced Miller 
is guilty of vehicular homicide and is willing to play dirty to nab him for it), inviting 
identification with him to a significant extent.  Furthermore, Miller is a bit hard to dislike on the 
whole in Arbitrage.  He and his milieu are portrayed as attractive and desirable in many ways.  
Miller is handsome, well-dressed, charismatic, and commanding.  He is clearly powerful and 
esteemed, and bears the trappings of both.  The film presents him being interviewed on 
television, featured on the cover of Forbes, flying around on his private jet and being chauffeured 
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around New York City.  Miller is at the centre of the film and clearly stands out from everyone 
else around him: there really is no one else for the viewer to identify with to any remotely similar 
degree.  The cumulative effect of the moral ambiguity of the character of Miller operating under 
exceptional circumstances, the relative lack of cause for identification with other characters, the 
positioning of Miller as the central locus of skillful action, and the attractiveness of him and his 
milieu is that the audience is invited to identify with him and his actions in large part.  Arbitrage 
in this way takes the general crisis-related theme of ‘exceptional actions taken under exceptional 
circumstances’ and projects this directly onto the particular character of Miller.  The conditions 
that Miller finds himself in throughout the film (extremely close to the ruin of his business and 
being imprisoned for fraud, and only steps way from both of these being guaranteed if he is 
found out for his role in Julie’s death) are hardly ordinary ones, and his morally ambiguous 
actions – concealing fraud, but doing so to save the jobs and careers of others; avoiding 
responsibility for Julie’s death, but doing so partially in order to pursue goals whose attainment 
would be impossible from behind bars; lying to those closest to him, but betraying their trust in 
large part because he knows they are not morally capable of doing the dirty business of whatever 
it takes to get out of a situation of which there truly is no clean nor honest way out in one piece – 
are meant to be understood in this context of the rules of normalcy being suspended and the court 
of survival reigning supreme. 
A final major theme in Arbitrage that has been alluded to above but not adequately discussed 
up to this point is that of appearances versus reality.  Like the metaphoric theme of being asleep 
at the wheel, the metaphoric connection of the theme of (false or superficial) appearances and 
(actual or underlying) reality has a strong association with the 2008 crisis.  Several salient 
narratives of the crisis for example contained themes outlining that the impression amongst 
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political and economic elites that everything was going well economically on the surface level in 
the United States in the run-up to the crisis masked deeply problematic underlying realities.  Like 
everything else in Arbitrage, this theme of appearance versus reality is projected chiefly onto the 
character of Miller.  This is apparent of course in the basic narrative thrust of the film (Miller’s 
attempt to conceal the reality of his imperiled firm and the truth of his involvement in Julie’s 
death).  However, the film’s rendering of the theme of appearances versus reality actually runs 
much deeper than this.  Specifically, a variety of cinematic techniques are used in several scenes 
to foster this theme.  The interview sequence at the beginning is certainly a good example of this 
in many respects.  In this sequence, the sincerity of Miller’s assertions of his humble origins and 
his conservative, almost frugal-sounding articulation of his business philosophy is coded as 
suspect through the way in which scenes of him making such claims are cross-cut with scenes of 
his opulent Gramercy residence and the servants working within it.  In addition to the effects 
produced by this use of editing the cinematographic techniques deployed in the sequence also 
signify this theme of appearance versus reality as the actual embodied figure of Miller in this 
sequence is always shown as being distant and obscure whereas the mediated images of him on 
the screens of television cameras are close up and sharp.  A division between the apparent Miller 
that he wishes to project to the world and a more hidden and removed Miller is created in this 
fashion.  However, amongst all the scene sequences in the film, it is the concluding one that is 
probably the most illustrative of this, and therefore this sequence should be discussed in some 
detail to complete the argument concerning Arbitrage’s rendering of a theme of appearances 
versus reality. 
As with the opening interview sequence, the final sequence of the film is of great importance 
by virtue of its positioning in the narrative.  The scene is centred on Miller’s imminent 
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acceptance of an award at a company gala.  In it, a particular set of camera and editing 
techniques are deployed to emphasize the two sides of Miller’s character throughout the film as 
respectively representative of apparent surface appearances and underlying concealed reality.  
Specifically, the scenes in this sequence are edited to alternate between a faceless, obscure Miller 
being shot from behind and a smiling affable Miller shot from in front.  The frontal shots are 
indicative of the apparent surface-level and visible foreground of Miller’s character (his public 
‘face’ visible to the world around him: confident, rich, successful, charming, charismatic, and 
respected) whereas the shots of Miller from behind are indicative of his character’s largely 
unseen, hidden ‘background’ (the invisibility to all but a few in the film of his desperation, near-
despondency, cunning, deceitfulness, and darkness).  The audience has been privy to both of 
these versions of Miller throughout the film, and the cinematic jumping back and forth between 
them at the very end seems meant to produce a jarring and lasting final impression. 
Miller seen from the front in the shots of this sequence is smiling, attractive, and sociable.  
He is portrayed as all that he outwardly seems to be to most people, playing the role he projects 
so convincingly: that of a confident, affable and successful hedge fund magnate.  Miller seen 
from behind is a much more enigmatic figure.  His face remains almost completely unseen as he 
walks forward through those applauding him towards the podium, cinematically rendering him 
as a powerful, mysterious and even vaguely menacing force that contains much more than the 
shining, flawless and fully visible surface-level Miller as seen from the front.  From behind, he is 
represented as a force to be reckoned with as the audience well knows by this point, having been 
carried along on a journey in which Miller has seemingly escaped both fraud and manslaughter 
charges; apparently outsmarting and outmanoeuvring those intent on destroying him or 
controlling him.  As has been the case throughout the film, the audience is invited to look both 
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with Miller and at Miller.  It might even be mused that through this editing technique the 
audience is positioned by the film as an accomplice of sorts to Miller by being forced see him in 
the same manner as those who are unaware of the desperate and questionable actions he has 
undertaken but also being forced to see ‘with Miller’ in the shots from behind.  That he is filmed 
from about the middle of his back up when shot from behind with the camera following his 
movements as he walks through the packed room certainly gives the impression that the viewer 
is being invited to move with his perspective.  The alternation between seeing Miller from the 
front and from behind goes on throughout the entire extended sequence, elevating the level of 
tension.  Finally, after whispering some words to his daughter on stage (what he says remains a 
mystery to the audience, but the look on Brooke’s face suggests she is not happy to hear it), 
Miller walks up to the microphone, gazes out at the audience, and prepares to speak.  The 
audience never gets to know what he was about to say as the screen then goes black, and it is in 
this manner that they are left wondering one final time what Miller will do or say next, as has 
already been the case so many times throughout Arbitrage.  The subtext here, one which could 
be strongly associated with the 2008 crisis, may be that in conditions of crisis the lines between 
right and wrong and between appearance and reality are blurred and that what matters ultimately 
is survival.  The impression left is that Miller has indeed survived, at least for now, and that what 
comes next remains a mystery.  The parallels of this can be read as metaphoric of the crisis: the 
disastrous has transpired, further potentially irreversible disaster had been courted, what needed 
to be done (however distasteful, questionable, or morally dubious) has been done, and an eerie 
calm reigns as what is to come next and how the story ends are essentially still not known.      
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The Queen of Versailles 
The majority of the documentaries on the 2008 crisis were highly seriously in nature.  They 
spoke to serious issues of suffering, injustice, and often broached topics not typically taken 
lightly such as unemployment, homelessness, and the traumatic experience of the loss of wealth.  
However, this was not completely the case in every film on the crisis.  Lauren Greenfield’s The 
Queen of Versailles is one of the few films on the 2008 crisis in which humour was a major 
component, though to call it a comedy would probably be inaccurate.  Released theatrically in 
the summer of 2012, this riches-to-(almost-kind-of)-rags film was widely critically appraised and 
won several major awards, including that of U.S. Directing Award for Documentary at the 2012 
Sundance Film Festival at which it premiered.
73
  Described variously as “a timely, engaging, and 
richly drawn portrait of the American Dream improbably composed of equal parts compassion 
and schadenfreude”,74 “the American Dream inflated to ridiculous extremes, until it bursts”75 and 
“both the quintessential documentary about the Great Recession, and quite possibly the most 
Schadenfreude-filled movie of all time”,76 the plot of The Queen of Versailles follows the 
fortunes of a billionaire family, the Siegels.  In the midst of constructing what would have been 
the biggest single-family home in the United States, the Siegels are adversely impacted by the 
crash of 2008.  Unlike the other three films examined above, The Queen of Versailles wasn’t 
originally intended to be a film touching on the subject of the crisis at all, as Greenfield’s 
original intent was simply to document the construction of the Siegels’ palatial home.  However, 
partway through filming the 2008 crash occurred and the impact of it had the unintended 
consequence of the film taking a very different direction, something neither Greenfield nor the 
Siegels had ever expected.
77
  Starring septuagenarian time-share magnate David Siegel and his 
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wife Jackie, The Queen of Versailles is a unique and multi-dimensional film rich in meaning that 
is both shaped by the 2008 crisis and symbolic of it in many respects. 
 
‘Where Myths Collapse’ or ‘Ideology Ad Absurdum’ 
 The Queen of Versailles is a film that is based around the intersection and interplay of two 
concepts that are heavily mytho-ideologically weighted: that of upward social mobility and that 
of the centrality of family in America.  Even more specifically, it can be asserted that the film is 
a story of the upward mobility of an American family gone berserk, a story of that which is 
normally ideologically sanctioned and celebrated in American culture being carried to extreme 
and grotesque ends, often with extreme and grotesque results.  As such, the Queen of Versailles 
is a film about the mytho-ideological concepts of upward mobility and family but one in which 
the dynamics of these larger mythic formations are played out through a story about the often 
quite quotidian and even banal activities and interactions of the very unordinary Siegel family. 
 Much of the artistic and critical merit of the Queen of Versailles can be attributed to how the 
film skillfully plays with well-known mytho-ideological codes generally and those of upward 
mobility and family specifically.  On the whole, the film tends to present these codes not for the 
sake of their simple affirmation but rather to question them, critique them or raise the irony 
apparent in how they are manifested in the actions or relations of the Siegels.  The different ways 
this complex articulation of such mytho-ideological codes is achieved varies considerably.  On 
some occasions jarring or contrasting visual or verbal juxtapositions are used or insinuated to 
undermine the presentation of a typical mytho-ideological position that the film is referencing. 
On other occasions, exaggeration is used similarly to discredit or undermine the claim of such a 
position.  And yet at other times, the validity of a mytho-ideological position is so called into 
168 
 
question by contextual evidence to the contrary that the credibility of its claims to truth and 
meaningfulness ring variously as hollow, warped, or otherwise lacking. 
 The film’s portrayal of its two main characters, Jackie and David Siegel, are a case in point 
of well-known mytho-ideological codes being played with and critiqued.  Humble origins are for 
example claimed by each of them in the film in statements they make to the camera, referencing 
the myth of social mobility through individual hard work and achievement in America.  
However, the validity of this myth is repeatedly undercut in The Queen of Versailles.  David’s 
business is shown to function in a predatory manner and the foundations of its success are shown 
to be built not so much upon hard work as upon a cynical insight on David’s part regarding a 
weakness of human nature in desiring to feel wealthy and be treated as such even if not.  Jackie’s 
ascent to wealth is shown to be based on nothing more than the accidents of her being 
stereotypically beautiful and having married a very rich man.  David and Jackie’s marriage 
receives similarly critical treatment in the film.  It is portrayed in large part as an unnatural 
marriage that has emerged out of and is undergirded by enormous wealth, to the point that its 
very essence is completely permeated by this.  The opening scene sequence of the film uses 
camera and editing techniques to emphasize their considerable difference in age (he is over three 
decades older than her) and the absurd vanity connected to obscene wealth at the heart of their 
union is implied through them being shown professionally photographed together, her in his lap, 
on some sort of gaudy, ornate throne: the image is not representative of any typical ideal of 
marital bliss but rather a bizarre, twisted distortion of it.  In another scene, David and Jackie’s 
referencing of the warmth, coziness and sanctity of the American family home upon returning 
from a trip (Jackie is shown saying “There’s no place like home” while David says “Through 
these hallowed gates”) is undercut, even obliterated, by the massiveness and opulence of the 
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‘home’ they pull up to.  The film makes it clear that there are very few homes like their home, if 
it can even be called a ‘home’ really. This pattern of referencing widely recognized mytho-
ideological codes concerning home and family through the Siegels and then showing the 
absurdity of it being assigned to them is repeated over and over again throughout the film. 
 The primary means used in The Queen of Versailles to represent a grotesque distortion of the 
mytho-ideological concepts of family and upward mobility is the coding of the Siegels and their 
home as unnatural, artificial or abnormal.  As has been mentioned above, this is apparent in the 
way that David and Jackie’s marriage is coded at the start of the film, but it is so widespread 
throughout the film that it merits some additional discussion.  Jackie in particular is singled out.  
Her enormous fake breasts, her botox injections, and chemical skin-peels are prominently 
featured in the film to code her as abnormal and artificial.  Even the family pets are brought into 
the mix in establishing these themes, as one of Jackie’s dead pet dogs is show in a preserved life-
like state in a glass case in the family house while two other former pets have what appear to be 
marble-hewn burial markers worthy of a human in the backyard.  And perhaps most importantly 
of all there is brobdingnagian Versailles itself.  The connotations of the name ‘Versailles’ 
already seem to be loaded with significance in relation to the 2008 crisis given the associations 
of how the actual Versailles was built in the late days of the ancien régime of the soon-to-be 
overthrown French monarchy.  The opulence of Versailles thus stands as a signifier of a self-
indulgent, utter detachment from reality in the face of oncoming tumult and collapse and in 
standing as such is linked to issues popularly associated with the 2008 crisis.  It’s monstrous 
proportions and excessive lavishness (David states that it will have “Two tennis courts-- one will 
be a stadium court”78; Jackie proudly declares that “In our new house, we have 30 bathrooms”,79 
and it is also mentioned that it will include a sushi bar, health spa, movie theatre, ice/roller rink, 
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and a full-size baseball diamond) is the movie’s ultimate signifier of the American dream of 
family and upward mobility spun out of control to the point of ridiculous absurdity.  Versailles is 
of particular importance because it represents a crucial link between the excess of the Siegels and 
the excess associated with the 2008 crisis: that of how the American dream of ownership of the 
single family home was at the very heart of the subprime mortgage crisis which developed into 
the wider economic crisis of 2008.  The fuller articulation of this tale, however, also involves the 
elaboration of another consideration: namely, how this dream of ownership of the single family 
home was co-opted, perverted and ultimately turned into the economic disaster of a nation by the 
American financial industry.  The Queen of Versailles makes a concerted attempt to connect the 
two in its narrative.          
   
‘A Tale of Two Buildings’ or ‘Fantasy Lands and Sunset Strips’ 
 While the connections between The Queen of Versailles and the 2008 crisis are 
multitudinous, a central core of associations between this text and the crisis can be identified. In 
brief, it can be argued that the film’s tale of the building of the massive house, the near-
bankruptcy of the business that was the ultimate source of funding of this leviathan project, and 
the dysfunction of the family at the centre of it all together serve to form an intricately 
interlinked microcosmic representation of the 2008 crisis.  Specifically, the film can be seen as a 
micro-level narrative built on the highly interwoven nexus of family, upward mobility, home and 
the American dream.  Obversely, it can be argued that The Queen of Versailles also makes a case 
that the crisis itself can be seen as being the macro-level manifestation of the elements that are 
metaphorically and metonymically represented through the elements of the film and its narrative.  
The linkages of associations across both the micro and macro levels as well as between them 
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together form a complex tapestry of meanings connecting the story of the Siegels as a family to 
the story of the 2008 crisis as an event in America.   
The relationship between the subprime housing crisis in the United States as the origin of 
a much wider economic crisis that irrupted in 2008 and the questionable and even criminal 
business practices in America associated with the subprime implosion was well-documented and 
heavily discussed in the aftermath of the crisis.  In The Queen of Versailles, the two issues are 
conjoined in the form of the story of two properties that David Siegel seeks to retain ownership 
of: his family’s under-construction home of Versailles and the flagship edifice of his business, 
the PH Towers Westgate.  Both are depicted in the film as manifestations of the perversion of a 
mytho-ideological constellation of dominant values and ideas such as hard work, business 
success, family, home, and upward mobility.  Furthermore, the two main geographical settings in 
which Versailles and the PH Towers Westgate are located – Orlando, Florida and Las Vegas, 
Nevada – are also of great significance.  Florida and Nevada were major centres of the housing 
boom which ended in the housing bust, with home foreclosure filings being issued to 4.5% of all 
households in the former and 7% of all households in the latter in 2008, making Nevada the 
worst affected state that year and Florida tied for second worst-affected along with Arizona.
80
  
The choice of these particularly crisis-stricken geographical locations in the United States as the 
primary settings of the film thus appears less than happenstance.  Moreover, these two locations 
also carry particular sets of connotations with respect to concepts such as family, the American 
dream, fantasy, artifice, consumerism, and excess, concepts which were all implicated to various 
degrees in many narratives concerning the advent of the crisis and which found expression in the 
themes of the film.  The complexity of the connections between The Queen of Versailles and the 
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2008 crisis is evident in how the tangled interplay of these concepts is signified in the film’s 
highlighting of these two locations: the film uses them to communicate particular meanings. 
The Queen of Versailles begins in Orlando Florida, the location of the Siegels’ “starter 
mansion” and also the location of the construction of their cherished Versailles.  Versailles’ 
proximity to Disney World Orlando is coded as significant in the film.  The Versailles-Florida-
Orlando-Disney World chain of signification in The Queen of Versailles is represented as a 
turning away from an ideologically imagined ‘real world’ of American everyday life toward a 
world of fantasy based on a grossly exaggerated dream of family, affluence and home.  This 
serves to tie the events in the film to popular narratives of the 2008 crisis in America, which 
frequently portrayed the crisis as having arisen when the illusion that the supposed economic 
prosperity of the George W. Bush era would continue, marked by phenomena such as increased 
rates of homeownership and ever-rising real estate values, came to a screeching halt for so many 
when the fantasy evaporated and reality set in with the coming of the subprime housing crisis.  It 
is certainly the case that the Siegels’ Versailles can be read in the film as a kind of absurd private 
Disney World, a whole single-family fantasy land to be filled with so many excessive pleasures, 
all of it fuelled by the massive, obscene wealth of the Siegels.  It is indeed in such a manner that 
the film codes the Siegels and Versailles as associated with an increasingly detached slide from 
the world of reality and into a world marked by fantasy and excess.  The representations of both 
the family and their gargantuan home are designed to serve as a microcosmic hyper version of 
that which was held to have happened across the United States on a grand scale over the 
trajectory of the crisis: a losing of touch with the moorings of reality (in terms of ideas and 
measures such as proportionality, projections of what was necessary, and what could or should 
be afforded) into excess and fantasy, leading to the disastrous end suffered by so many families 
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who bought homes that they ultimately could not afford: exhaustive battles to attempt to retain 
ownership of their homes with foreclosure, eviction, and the loss of a lifetime of savings being 
the ultimate fate of some.   
In The Queen of Versailles, the Siegels’ are presented as being one of these cases but 
elevated to the nth degree and moving about in their own bizarre orbit, almost completely 
unhinged from the moorings of reality that even the most self-indulgent of the non super-rich 
still were at least remotely tethered to even in their most outlandish moments.  Their excess 
really knows no bounds (as is clearly signified by their building of Versailles, a true monstrosity 
that is ugly in its ostentatious display of the excessive), and even their later attempts to rein in 
their pleasure-filled extravagant lifestyles end up being laughable: the message of the film is that 
they are incorrigibly corrupted.   The connection of the Siegels and Versailles to Disney World 
and Orlando, Florida, can be read through this framework of ‘the fantasy having taken over’.  
Disney World’s connotations as an escapist place of magic and fantasy, and even more 
specifically as a destination for families to engage in the experience of the fantastical are 
associated in the film with both Versailles (as the single-family fantasy gone haywire) and the 
housing bust in Florida (as the aftermath of the single-family fantasy gone haywire, but with 
actual dire consequences for those affected).  This parallelism is underscored in how the 
increasingly dilapidated state of uninhabited Versailles is depicted in the film as a microcosm of 
the largely abandoned Orlando neighbourhoods filled with spacious, vacant houses which are 
also put on display.  The empty decay of both, quiet but progressive, is symptomatic of a kind of 
rot at a moral level.  They are each coded as examples of the American ideal of the family 
domicile gone badly wrong in being blown out of proportion, as respective micro-level and 
macro-level examples of how this ideal gone berserk via an absurd turn into fantasy and excess 
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has led to unforeseen disaster.  Both signify the American dream of home and family having lost 
its moorings in wider social reality and in doing so having skyrocketed rhapsodically upwards 
only to collapse into ugly ruin. 
A number of cinematic techniques and strategies are deployed in The Queen of Versailles to 
convey the narrative of an ascent into fantasy and a descent back into reality.  The bookending of 
the film’s narrative with references to the fireworks of Disney World are for example a sign of 
this location’s importance as a signifier of fantasy to the plot of the film.  Early on in the film 
when all is still going well for the Siegels, David mentions with pride that an observation deck is 
being built at Versailles so that his children can watch the nightly fireworks of adjacent Disney 
World.  Through the use of this interview clip, the film firmly links the family fantasy palace of 
the Siegels (Versailles) to the family fantasy world of the United States (Disney World): they 
together represent an America characterized by the quest for the attainment of fantasy and 
desires.  This depiction of America on the ascent into fantasy is eventually counterpointed by the 
depiction of the descent back into reality.  At the very end of the film, after it is revealed that 
Versailles has gone into foreclosure, a series of symbolically-loaded scene sequences occur 
which tellingly come to a conclusion with the fireworks of Disney World as seen from the point 
of the now abandoned Versailles.  This sequence is clearly framed in the film as representing a 
kind of rude awakening back to reality after the giddy and fantastical heights of the housing 
boom, the fall from a euphoric ‘the sky’s the limit’ state into the hangover of unpleasant reality.  
In an interview which is part of this sequence, David offers some telling remarks that sum up the 
story of the 2008 crisis rather well as a kind of journey through a fantasy land where all was 
going so well that it just seemed like it would keep on going that way forever, until of course it 
all came crashing down: 
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We need to live within our means.  Don't spend money that we don't have.  Don't spend money 
that we think we're going to eventually have.  Spend what we do have.  You know, get back 
to reality. [...]  Well, if I could turn the clock back, there would be a lot of things I would have 
done differently.  Instead of having 28 resorts, I would have had 15 resorts. [...]  It's a vicious 
cycle.  No one is without guilt, and I'm the same way.  You know, they were giving me cheap 
money and I was using it to build big buildings and buy more resorts.  And then when they 
stopped giving me the money, I'm suddenly, "Whoa, how do I pay for all this?".  Okay, this 
could go on forever.  Can we wind it up, please?
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After David is done speaking, a montage of shots of a dilapidated and neglected Versailles at 
dusk is shown, and a shot of the yellow-orange sun fading down through a cloudy sky strongly 
emphasizes this feeling of an ending happening as well as of yet more troubled times to come.  
To further emphasize this theme of the end of the fantasy and the return to reality, between the 
scenes of the montage Jackie is shown speaking to the camera and her words also evoke the idea 
of a period of fantasy having come to an end.   Explaining her ignorance of Versailles having 
gone into foreclosure, she states “I guess I'm in this fantasy world, you know?  Until reality 
hits.”82  After Jackie finishes speaking a succession of shots shown from the inside of a quiet and 
vacant Versailles are shown.  Through one of the windows, the fireworks of Disney World are 
shown going off in the distance and the music being played is the same music with which the 
film started.  The overwhelming impression conveyed is that the trip through the fantasyland 
(representative of the economic boom times) is over; that the exploding fireworks of one fantasy 
world (Disney World) seen from another fantasy world (Versailles) signal its fiery end.  The 
message is that fantasy chapter has concluded, and a difficult return to reality has begun. 
Running parallel to the thematic importance of sunny Orlando, Florida in The Queen of 
Versailles is the other main geographical location featured in film: Las Vegas, Nevada.  As 
mentioned above, Las Vegas and Nevada already have salience in this film on the 2008 crisis on 
account of their being hotbeds of the foreclosure epidemic.  However, the city of Las Vegas has 
particular symbolic significance in The Queen of Versailles that goes well beyond this.  Las 
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Vegas is in many ways the dark parallel fantasy world to Orlando and Disneyland.  Whereas 
Disneyland carries the connotations of a family-oriented dream-like world of fairytale innocence 
and pleasure, Las Vegas is the seedy adults-only underbelly, a neon-lit place that carries the 
connotations of sinful pleasures, seductive dreams of desire, overt artificiality and excess.  These 
two worlds are very much conceptually connected in The Queen of Versailles.  In short, the 
film’s conceptual rendering of the two is that the excess-filled and grossly distorted family 
fantasy world represented by Versailles is underwritten by a shady fantasy world of naked 
profiteering based on highly questionable, if not altogether amoral, business practices; that 
behind the phantasmagoric dreams of idyllic home and family is dirty, ill-gotten money, a 
swindle.  Westgate Resorts and its iconic Las Vegas property the PH Towers Westgate represent 
this dark underwriting side of the equation in the film in all its shadiness.  The Queen of 
Versailles attempts to capture the dynamic between the two by weaving the story of Versailles as 
representative of the American homestead inflated to grossly exaggerated proportions with that 
of Westgate Resort and its towers as representative of corporate greed, hubris and moral 
bankruptcy.  In this way, the film stitches the two together as a microcosm of the 2008 crisis, 
depicting it through the Versailles-Westgate dynamic as a crisis born in the single family home-
derived housing bubble which was inflated in significant part through the deceptive and 
predatory tactics of profit-minded corporate powers.    
The story that a family-based fantasy of happiness, pride and pleasure based around home 
ownership was erected on the corrupt foundations of shady go-for-bust corporate business 
practices, ultimately collapsing into the housing bust and eventually into wider economic crisis 
became a commonly-held narrative of the origins of the crisis in the aftermath of the 2008 
meltdown.  The unrestrained corporate greed for profit maximization, captured post-facto in the 
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spreading into media and popular discourses of terms associated with the predatory practices of 
the home mortgage industry such as NINJA loans (loans given to those with ‘No Income, No 
Job, or Assets’) and ‘suicide’ or ‘exploding’ loans (loans which would, after a teaser period of 
low rates, quickly rise to unsustainable rates) became permanently associated with the housing 
crisis.  Once the crisis had spread beyond the housing market and became generalized, an 
alphabet soup of acronyms associated with the casino-like instruments of the financial industry 
such as such as MBSs (mortgage-backed securities) CDOs (collateralized debt obligations), 
CDSs (credit default swaps) also entered those discourses and quickly became shorthand for 
corporate-financial alchemy, if not outright deception, that had been designed to ‘manage’ risk or 
increase profit margins, ultimately with disastrous results.  In particular, the securitization food 
chain, linking the mortgage industry to Wall Street, became indelibly linked to and even 
synonymous with the origins of the crisis.  In short, the mortgage and financial industries came 
to be known in the popular imagination as the ground zero of both the housing bust and the 
economic crisis it spawned.  This is reflected in The Queen of Versailles’ portrayal of David 
Siegel’s company Westgate Resorts which, although neither a mortgage nor financial firm per se, 
is essentially used in the film to represent the role of such firms in the precipitation of the crisis. 
The highly interconnected character of Versailles and Weston Resorts is made evident 
throughout The Queen of Versailles.  It is clearly shown that the construction of the palatial 
Versailles is bankrolled by the wealth of David Siegel’s empire, and the narrative of the film cuts 
repeatedly between the two storylines of David’s attempt to retain possession of both Versailles 
and the luxurious PH Towers Westgate to underscore the connection between them.  The PH 
Towers Westgate is portrayed in the film as a kind of tower of Babel, a leviathan project of 
hubris whose success was predicated on the belief that the fortunes of Weston Resorts could only 
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continue to rise.  This misguided belief founded upon past successes and driven by dreams of 
ever greater and greater success, these manifested in ever and ever more excessive forms (such 
as the decadent opulence of the PH Towers Westgate), ultimately prove to be a lost wager when 
it is revealed at the end of the film that David was forced to sell his cherished flagship building.  
Connected to this, Weston Resorts is repeatedly shown in a negative light as a business in The 
Queen of Versailles, which unflatteringly presents it as being of a similar character to the 
corporations that powered the housing boom and whose highly unethical and even illegal 
practices set the stage for its eventual bust.  Indeed, the parallelism in The Queen of Versailles 
between the business practices of Weston Resorts and the dynamics of the housing crisis are so 
uncanny that one critic of the film wrote that “it's fascinating to observe how David's time-share 
business was a mirror of the subprime-mortgage crisis; how his salespeople skillfully roped in 
customers who clearly couldn't afford what they were buying”.83  The film’s message in 
highlighting the connections between Versailles, the PH Towers Westgate and Weston Resorts is 
clear: corporate overconfidence, deception, hubris and greed drove a housing boom in a culture 
that had been seduced by a hijacked and distorted dream of wealth, home and family based on an 
irrational and ultimately misguided belief that things could only get better and better, resulting in 
widespread economic disaster for a whole nation.  
There is a concerted attempt in The Queen of Versailles to portray Westgate Resorts as 
representative of the companies deemed most responsible for the subprime crisis, and this 
attempt is evident in multiple scenes which portray the business practices of Westgate as highly 
similar to those of the companies that were popularly blamed for the housing bust.  Westgate 
Resorts is shown to be fuelled by cheap money (as David readily acknowledges on more than 
one occasion in the film
84
) and its sales staff are shown hard-selling dreams of idyllic family 
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vacation getaways via their timeshared properties for just 10% down (at one point in the film 
David says “When this [the shooting of the film] first started, we were taking anybody that was 
breathing.”85).  The film has scenes in which both David and his son Richard elaborate on how 
free tickets to Vegas and Disneyland shows are used to lure potential buyers to 90-minute high 
pressure sales presentations, mirroring the ‘free lunch’ predatory tactics of the mortgage 
industry.  In particular, Richard Siegel’s comments on how Weston Resorts sees such potential 
buyers as targets to be preyed upon and the tactics used to snare them are particularly gallingly 
evocative of the kind of predatory tactics used by home mortgage companies that fuelled the 
subprime housing bubble: 
100 % of the people that we're talking to are--it's not a nice word, but we call them "mooches." 
They're coming in for a sales presentation on their vacation for a free gift.  So we train our 
salespeople on how to take someone greedy like that and get them to buy today.  We do 100 % 
of our sales on the first day.  They will not buy today if they don't get a "great" deal, if they don't 
believe they're getting a great deal.  We sell them as low as $8,900 for three nights in a studio 
every other year, all the way up to $149,900, which is a four-bedroom New Year's week every 
year forever, their entire lives. They pass it on to their kids. Their kids pass it on to their kids. 
Time-sharing--typically you sell every unit 52 times because you sell it by the week.
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It is such a manner that The Queen of Versailles presents Weston Resorts as the mirror-image of 
those deemed most responsible for the subprime crisis.  The company’s bread and butter is 
conning people, their ostensible focus is selling the dream of the American family getaway, and 
their practices of multiple selling are highly reminiscent of Wall Street’s tactic of “slicing and 
dicing debt tied to single-family homes and selling the bonds to investors around the world”,87 a 
tactic of essentially multiplying manifestations of the same thing by breaking it into fragments 
(and thus masking its same-thingedness) that brought global markets to the verge of collapse 
once the lack of sustainability of so many homeowners’ debt was revealed on the balance sheets 
of companies all over the world.  As such, in The Queen of Versailles Westgate Resorts 
symbolically stands for so many adjectives which have been used to describe those considered 
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amongst the chief architects of the crisis: predatory, unscrupulous, deceptive, cynical, dishonest, 
conniving, and immoral. 
The location of the PH Towers Westgate in the city of Las Vegas serves in The Queen of 
Versailles to symbolize the whole array of unethical corporate practices popularly associated 
with the 2008 crisis.  Approximately half of the film is set in Las Vegas, Nevada, and 
Greenfield’s choice as director to have this location as the other geographic pole to Orlando, 
Florida, appears to be a deliberate attempt by her to establish a strong relationship between the 
symbolic significance of the two locations in reference to the subprime crisis and the subsequent 
economic crisis.  Las Vegas is symbolic in the film of both excess and the grotesque, a kind of 
perverted hyper-extension of the American dream of wealth and success into something sordid, 
bizarre and somehow also repellent despite its allure.  Las Vegas’ glitzy neon-lit boulevards, its 
plethora of curiosities, its non-stop whir of activity, the hypnosis radiated by its dazzling displays 
of the luxurious and the fantastical have long been considered simultaneously fascinating, 
attractive, and repulsive.  A consumer dreamland of pleasures, one can see very much why Jean 
Baudrillard called Las Vegas “the absolute advertising city”88 on account of its massive 
projection of commodity spectacle.  This city of excess and fantasy built on money paid for 
dreams (or, more properly said, the chasing of dreams) is metaphoric in the film for the calamity 
of the 2008 crisis: dreams were sold, money was gambled, shirts were lost, and the house 
ultimately won.  Las Vegas is presented as the urban, material manifestation of that which is 
associated with the greed and excess which led to the crisis; this itself is a warped and perverted 
version of the American dream of success, wealth and happiness.        
The set of scene sequences of the opening gala of the PH Towers Westgate in The Queen of 
Versailles codes Westgate resorts, its shiny new flagship property, and Las Vegas as symbolic of 
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the boom times before the crisis struck.  Signs of wealth, excess, desire and the absurd mingle 
together in this sequence.  The camera lingers on elaborate displays of expensive chilled seafood 
presented in terraced structures carved out of ice.  Shots of corridors filled with glowing 
boutiques are juxtaposed with multiple shots of attractive young women clad in colourful and 
outlandish-looking skimpy costumes.  The combined effect of these signifiers and the editing 
techniques is that an almost not-quite-real madcap alternative reality is created, and the viewer is 
led through it as if in a strange fantastical dream.  That the sequence is meant to signify a kind of 
dreamscape is further reinforced when it comes to a close.  As it ends, a transitional sequence 
begins with the camera focused tightly on a sign that reads “Come Live the Dream”.  This is 
apparently the slogan of Weston Resorts, as it is highlighted at several other points in the film on 
the company’s signs, banners and brochures.89  It is at this exact point that Greenfield bifurcates 
her film into its pre-crash and post-crash components.  With a voiceover of David linking them 
together, a series of scenes are displayed showing the crash hitting via a montage of images of 
shocked traders and media reports discussing the meltdown, and what happened before this point 
in The Queen of Versailles is consigned to the realm of a strange, evaporated dream.  David’s 
words capture this sentiment of the end of a dream perfectly: 
We were in line to do a billion dollars in sales for the year.  Everything was great.  We were on 
top of the world.  All we were thinking about was adding more resorts and employing more 
people and growing the company larger, and it came to a screeching halt.
90
 
 
David’s dreams of the never-ending expansion of his time-share empire thus come to a 
screeching halt in a manner parallel to the way the U.S. mortgage and financial industries’ 
dreams of the limitless expansion of the housing market came crashing down violently.  The bet 
that the good times would just keep going and going was lost.  These dreams were based on a 
gamble, and the settings of Las Vegas and the PH Towers Westgate in ‘Sin City’ are well-used in 
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the film to make the point that the 2008 crisis was the result of a kind of reckless casino 
capitalism that powered the housing boom and spread a dangerous poison throughout the entire 
U.S. financial system by the fall of 2008.  The economic engine that powered the business 
empire that was fuelling the construction of the Siegels’ Versailles fantasy home had stalled, and 
the family-fantasy world that ultimately rested upon so many casino chips, upon so many (bad) 
bets placed upon the table of the U.S. economy, quickly turned into a nightmare. 
 
‘The Bankruptcy of Morals’ or ‘The Pathogenesis of Wealth Obscene’ 
 As was briefly detailed above, at the centre of The Queen of Versailles is a narrative that 
revolves around family and upward social mobility in America.  While the broad contours of this 
narrative have been discussed already, a closer examination of how it is depicted through the 
film’s rendering of the Siegels is warranted on account of the crucial links The Queen of 
Versailles makes between extreme wealth, obscenity, the corrosion of family values and moral 
impoverishment.  The film is a story of an American family whose upward mobility into obscene 
wealth has led to dysfunction; to a familial malaise that emerges in absurdity, perversion, excess, 
and moral bankruptcy.  The Queen of Versailles is not the only recent post-crisis film with such a 
narrative of corruption through wealth.  Martin Scorcese’s 2013 film The Wolf of Wall Street has 
some interesting parallels with The Queen of Versailles (albeit in a differing form), such as its 
protagonist Jordan Belfort’s moral bankruptcy in relation to his family being associated with his 
increasing detachment from reality due to his obsessions with power and wealth.  The basic 
narrative trajectory of this theme of corruption through wealth in The Queen of Versailles is, 
however, not actually one of the rise from humble beginnings into great wealth accompanied by 
a subsequent deterioration of the compass points of morality: the Siegels are already obscenely 
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wealthy at the start of the film, and Greenfield makes a point of stressing that they are no normal 
family right from the beginning.  Rather, the film takes the viewer into the already bizarre world 
of this super-rich family and showcases how their dysfunction increases and is brought into even 
sharper relief by the slide of their fortunes.  The Siegels are made out to be a freakish version of 
the all-American family, a family so tainted and warped by wealth and excess that even their 
attempts to cope with their changed fortunes in the aftermath of the economic implosion of 2008 
end up being a tragicomedy of dysfunction.  The extreme wealth of the Siegels is essentially 
portrayed in The Queen of Versailles as the source of a strange spiritual sickness that afflicts 
them; that is, a sickness of the soul of the family unit that the film takes pains to highlight on 
numerous occasions.  They cannot be a normal family on account of this illness, and there is 
something quietly horrible about their attempts to wear this mantle. 
 A primary strategy undertaken in The Queen of Versailles to highlight this gulf between the 
conventional idea of American family and the Siegels is to use scenes, settings or situations 
which are evocative of the ideological norms conventionally associated with the concept of 
family in order to emphasize just how far removed the Siegels are from such ideological norms.  
This practice of showing the Siegels in conventional family situations to emphasize their 
differentness and dysfunction is firmly established very early in the film in order to set the tone 
for what is to come.  For example, the first time the Siegel family is shown as a unit is in a 
family photo in which they are wearing matching sweaters.  This typified family photo 
connotative of ordinary family-ness in America is then undercut the next time they are seen as a 
group in the film, which is in the cabin of a private jet.  In the subsequent scene they are shown 
exiting the jet onto the tarmac: hardly the image of the conventional family in travel together.  
This general insertion into the prototypically familial of that which is anything but is conveyed 
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again in the scene that immediately follows.  In the scene, an ornately-framed portrait of Jackie 
with two of her children is shown, but the typical earthy warmth of this very conventional 
mother-with-children scene is undermined by how Jackie is dressed.  Her highly revealing, 
sexualized attire which is reminiscent of some sort of bizarre and misguided attempt at 
portraying a kind of Greek mother-goddess figure obliterates the pretenses of normality 
associated with such a picture.  While many more examples could be provided of the film’s 
portrayal of the Siegels’ removal from the world of the everyday of the typical American 
family,
91
 it is suffice to say that the Siegels’ vast wealth is coded early on in The Queen of 
Versailles as a marker of difference and dysfunction.  Indeed, it is the case that signifiers 
associated with conventional ideas of family seem grotesquely twisted into absurdity when they 
are symbolically related to the Siegels in the film.         
 Beyond great wealth being coded as a warping factor in the Siegels’ ability to assume the 
trappings of common signifiers of family, The Queen of Versailles also presents fixation on 
wealth and excess as corrosive to the conventional set of affective relations of which family is 
connotative of such as care, love, and affection.  In an interview, Richard Siegel frames business 
as being in opposition to intimate family ties as he states: “My father and I aren't close on a 
personal level because it's always been a business relationship.  When we talk it's all about 
business.  We're father and son, employer, employee, but we're not close.”92  In an even more 
glaring example, the association the film makes between obscene wealth and dysfunctional 
family relations is apparent in a statement David makes that suggests that he doesn’t really know 
the interests of his children in the manner a father is expected to be knowledgeable.  His 
statement that “The children have their own wing [in Versailles].  They have their playroom with 
a stage where they can perform and do their – whatever they do”93 comes off as grotesque, words 
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from the mind of a man who has too much money and too little knowledge of his kids’ lives.  In 
a similar vein, Jackie directly equates her decisions to have so many children with her ability to 
hire many nannies to take care of them.  Clearly, The Queen of Versailles tends to establish a 
negative correlation between great wealth and dominant ideological conceptions of ‘normal’ or 
‘healthy’ family dynamics and environments, and this becomes all the more obvious after the 
crash occurs and the Siegels' fortunes deteriorate. 
 The ultimate example in The Queen of Versailles of great wealth having a corrosive effect on 
family relations and a perversion of an ideological natural or normal order is David Siegel’s 
progressive detachment from his family as the film goes on.  David is portrayed as becoming 
neurotically obsessed with money after his firm’s fortunes are adversely affected by the crash 
and his relations with his family clearly deteriorate.  David’s withdrawal from and descent into 
fighting with his family can be located in a long cinematic tradition spanning across films as 
different as Citizen Kane, Scarface, and The Wolf of Wall Street in which a correlation between 
an obsessive preoccupation with upward mobility, wealth and power are associated with a 
deterioration of marital or family relations.  David is shown in the film as increasingly losing 
touch with his family and descending into petty fights with them.  He is shown yammering about 
business dealings on his cell phone repeatedly at family events such as his son’s little league 
baseball game and a birthday dinner given for him at the family home.  He becomes brusque, 
mean and accusatory in conversations he has with family members.  The film eventually shows 
him having become physically separated from his family in the family home for the most part, as 
he withdraws into a room in the home that he has turned into a makeshift office within which he 
on multiple occasions has hostile conversations with his wife or children.  Surrounded by stacks 
of files (presumably business files), he shuns away from contact with his wife and children, 
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treats them rudely when they try to converse with him, and is very much a bitter version of Kane 
isolated in a small chamber of a Xanadu that is falling apart around him.   
The film makes it clear that David has integrated the idea of wealth and success (these being 
very connected if not synonymous in his mind) deeply into his ego structure, so deeply in fact 
that he becomes absolutely fixated with getting ‘back on top’ and seems to care much more 
about this than his family.  As a case in point, David’s close to wholesale self-identification with 
success and upward mobility is portrayed in one of the scenes shot at his birthday dinner.  When 
he is asked by Jackie, “What would you wish for in the last 25 years of your life?  Besides me, of 
course”,94 a voiceover of David saying “If I have to live to 150, that’s what I’ll do.  You know, if 
that’s what it’s gonna take to get back on top again”95 is played over the scene.  This deliberate 
attempt by the filmmaker to create an oppositional dynamic between love of family and love of 
money and business success thus underscores David’s moral bankruptcy as well as his 
irrationality.  A final example of David’s descent into becoming a money-obsessed curmudgeon 
is his repeated castigations of his family members to turn off the lights to save electricity costs.  
That the same man, whose intent it was to build the largest single-family private home in 
America, outfitted with luxuries bordering on (if not surpassing) obscenity, has now become 
mean and petty to this degree marks the psychosis at the root of both his desire of extravagance 
and his power-tripping over those nearest and dearest to him once things have taken a turn for 
the worse: he is egotistically obsessed with being in absolute control and for him the means of 
control is money.  David’s obsession with money and success is in this way marked as 
fundamentally and abnormally at odds with the norms of family relations and it serves as the 
penultimate example of The Queen of Versailles’ wider framing of excessive wealth and desire 
of money as fundamentally antagonistic to that which is ideologically associated with the 
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concept of family.  While money is quantitative by definition, dominant ideological conventions 
hold that love should not be and David’s obsession with finances is in such a manner depicted as 
not only utterly at odds with the ideologically-sanctioned belief in the unconditional character of 
love, care and affection of family but also as an actively corrosive force sabotaging the very 
possibility of such. 
 As a final note on the film’s rendering of the constellation of associations between extreme 
wealth, upward mobility, and the ideological values associated with family, The Queen of 
Versailles’ negative correlation between great wealth and normal or healthy family dynamics and 
environments is not just portrayed in the deterioration of the family relations of the Siegels but is 
also made evident in other forms as well.  For example, the idea that upward mobility gone 
haywire has resulted in a kind of strange moral decay is symbolized in the film through the 
progressively worsening condition of the physical environment of the Siegels’ household.  As 
they are forced to cut back on their live-in staff, the mansion the Siegels live in becomes 
increasingly messy, disorganized and chaotic.  Their many pet dogs end up going to the 
bathroom on the floors inside the mansion on a regular basis, and the sight of the animals’ feces 
laying around haphazardly inside the luxurious monster-sized building is symbolic of a kind of 
collapse from the inside of the grandeur of the family’s wealth and excessive lifestyle.  The basic 
necessities of life are not even provided to other pets that die of neglect (a pet lizard and fish 
meet such ends).  A darkly comedic Christmas morning scene features a frantic search to save 
two newly bought puppies whose location no one seems to know from a pet python on the loose 
somewhere in the house whose location no one seems to know either.  A general lack of firm 
attachment to the reality of their new financial circumstances is symbolized by Jackie in the film.  
She is shown compulsively shopping at Walmart buying many toys the family already owns (as 
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well as buying multiple copies of the same multi-player games), bringing them back to the 
family’s already toy-filled garage.  Jackie is thus depicted as a creature afflicted by permanent 
dysfunction, her indiscriminate and compulsive shopping habits simply transplanted from their 
natural habitat of luxury boutiques to retail outlets frequented by average Americans.  
Furthermore, her self-proclaimed “present to myself” on Christmas is a tiny tin of caviar of 
which she joyously says “Oh, I just can’t wait to eat my caviar.  How much is this?  Like 
$2,000?”96 serves as further evidence that the film portrays her as having become so corrupted by 
a lavish life of excess that she is essentially incorrigible in this regard.  There are many other 
scenes in the film which point to the general moral decay of the Siegels in the film.  One 
particular scene in which the Siegels’ long-time live in caregiver Nebab tearfully recounts how 
she hasn’t seen her son who lives overseas in her native country of the Philippines for almost 20 
years is especially powerful and heartbreaking: the lavish, selfish spending of the Siegels on 
show throughout the film gives the impression that they could have easily brought the two 
together at any particular point in the eleven years that Nebab had worked for them as a nanny 
had they more than an iota of sensitivity beyond their orbit of themselves (the sole exception to 
this in the film is Jackie’s attempt to help one of her high school friends whose house had gone 
into foreclosure: one can only speculate why this was included in the final cut).  In any case, the 
overall impression left is that the Siegels’ obscene wealth has robbed them of much of their 
ability to care properly about anyone but themselves: their richness, even after the change in their 
family’s fortunes, has corrupted them through and through and remains on them like a stain that 
cannot be removed.  For them, there can be no reformation to a standard of life that can be 
defined as normal by any stretch of the imagination. 
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In this chapter, I reflected upon some of the theoretical complexities of the relationship 
between cinema and history, presented an argument concerning how the origins of the films on 
the 2008 crisis as a body can be traced to the two distinct cinematic narrative types of the 
‘critical political documentary’ and the ‘political feature film’ derived from the New 
Documentary and New Hollywood movements, and then offered analyses of four selected films 
on the crisis of a critically acclaimed and culturally significant character.  In the next chapter, I 
will be again changing the focus of my analysis to a qualitatively different mediated discourse of 
the 2008 crisis: that of the crisis as depicted in the discourse of periodical articles of two 
renowned American periodicals. 
Before beginning this new line of inquiry, some brief concluding thoughts on the cinematic 
discourse that has just been discussed are warranted, especially since aspects of it are also 
discernible in the discourse of the periodical articles.  Collectively, what stands out most 
regarding the cinematic discourse of the crisis that has been examined here is its strongly 
dramatic character.  While the individual films examined each had significantly divergent 
renderings of the crisis, they share a powerful commonality in that they each use characters and 
plots as means to encode and enact dramatic movement into their matter as texts.  The qualities 
of film as an audiovisual media, one which is in certain ways already highly disposed toward 
producing the dramatic through its harnessing of the power of the moving image in conjunction 
with sound, is surely of importance in this being the case.  Furthermore, this dramatic force is 
manifest in contexts that are particularly morally-driven.  For example, although many of the 
instances in The Queen of Versailles just discussed above are humorous in nature and are 
undoubtedly at least in part present for their entertainment value to the audience, their inclusion 
in the film can be seen to be part of a greater patchwork of the film’s coding of obscene wealth 
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as a dramatic rendering of moral or spiritual decay.  The tale of the Siegels thus functions 
metaphorically as a dramatic, microcosmic version of the story of the 2008 crisis itself: the 
unrestrained, obscene pursuit of money and the accompanying desire for luxurious excess 
corrupts the soul and ends in moral bankruptcy.  The Siegels’ decaying household is thematically 
connected in this sense to thousands upon thousands of empty houses decaying all across 
America in the wake of subprime crisis.  Both are broadly representative of the American dream 
of family and the family homestead gone berserk and crash-landing in disaster.  The Queen of 
Versailles, along with the other three films on the crisis discussed above, thus stands as a creative 
and complex text in which the disastrous character of the 2008 crisis is understood and rendered 
in dramatic fashion against backdrops of implied states of normalcy based on ideologically-
sanctioned versions of how the world and life should be. 
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Chapter 4 – Stories from New York: The 2008 Crisis in The New 
Yorker and The New York Review of Books  
 
So many things have gone wrong; so many people are to blame; so many people are now 
screwed. Often, the media exaggerates the significance of the ups and downs of the financial 
markets, while the sophisticates in the marketplace take them in stride. Not this time. 
 
(Nick Paumgarten; The New Yorker; September 29
th
, 2008) 
 
When Lehman Brothers collapsed into bankruptcy in September 2008, the news of this event 
travelled around the globe with rapidity.  The economic impact that followed in the wake of the 
fall of this storied financial firm was quickly registered in newspaper articles, television shows, 
and radio broadcasts in both analog and digital form as well as in other forms of media.  The 
initial distinguishing feature of both media and policy discussions of what was eventually to 
become known retroactively as ‘the 2008 crisis’, ‘the financial crisis’, and ‘the great recession’ 
was that they were “marked by a prevalence of catastrophic and traumatic imagery.”1  This 
observation points toward a variety of intriguing questions concerning the nature of the 
discursive construction of ‘events’ in the media, particularly the media’s depiction of disastrous 
or catastrophic events, and these questions have a direct bearing on the media’s portrayal of the 
2008 crisis.  It can be asked for example ‘What role do media outlets play in the attribution of 
significance to disastrous events?’; ‘What processes or mechanisms might be said to be at play in 
the media’s discursive construction of catastrophe?  Of economic catastrophe?’; “What 
discourses are drawn upon by the media in their construction of narratives of economic crises?’  
While the breadth of these questions put them beyond the scope of what can be fully examined 
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here, they do point to the complexities inherent in the examination of mediated accounts of 
events characterized as disastrous, such as the 2008 crisis.   
In the previous chapter, through the analyses of four exemplary films, I discussed the 
particular ways in which the cinematic discourse of the 2008 crisis powerfully depicted the crisis 
through its overall emphasis on the audiovisual play of characters enmeshed in the dramatic 
unfolding of plots of a decidedly morally-oriented character.  In this chapter, I will attempt to 
probe some of the broad territory the questions above entail by examining the construction of the 
2008 crisis in two New York-based periodicals: The New Yorker magazine and The New York 
Review of Books.  In what follows below, a brief introductory discussion of each of these two 
periodicals will be provided, with each of these introductions being followed immediately by 
analyses of the periodicals’ respective coverage of the 2008 crisis over the approximately two-
year period of September 2008 to September 2010.  It should be noted at this point that The New 
Yorker’s coverage of the crisis will be discussed more extensively than that of The New York 
Review of Books on account of the fact that a far larger number of articles on the crisis were 
published in The New Yorker as compared to The New York Review of Books.  As such, the 
analysis of The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis will be subdivided into thematically-based 
subsections and be preceded by a subsection briefly outlining some general observations and 
methodological considerations whereas the analysis of The New York Review of Books’ crisis 
coverage will not be similarly subdivided nor preceded by a subsection outlining general 
observations and methodological considerations. 
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The New Yorker 
Having been in publication since February 1
st
 1925,
2
 The New Yorker ranked among the top 
fifty most widely read consumer magazines in the United States as of June 2009, with a paid 
circulation rate of 1,049,942 printed issues.
3
  Founded by Harold Ross, an itinerant news writer, 
The New Yorker “established a niche for high-quality fiction, nonfiction, reviews, and cartoons, 
always appealing to a well-educated and sophisticated audience.”4  Although Ross had originally 
imagined that his magazine would be read by a relatively small urban elite, The New Yorker 
ended up being widely being adopted in middle America, striking a chord with “a great many 
Americans who everywhere were yearning for the joys and benefits of metropolitan life – this in 
a nation that was being rapidly transformed from a rural to an urban society.”5  The 
contemporary readership of The New Yorker is in many respects still broadly reflective of its 
traditional broad-based, upper-middle class appeal.  Demographically, as of 2009 the average 
age of the readership of The New Yorker’s print edition was 47 years old, and the $109,877 
average household income of its readers
6
 was well over twice that of the $49,777 median U.S. 
household income for the same year.
7
  Somewhat similarly, 66% visitors to the website 
NewYorker.com were age 35 or older, with 30% of visitors having a household income of $100, 
000 or more.
8
  Such statistics point to a readership that is generally older and possesses well 
above-average incomes, and which in all likelihood is in possession of higher than average 
educational credentials and levels of cultural capital.  With this broad picture of the public which 
reads The New Yorker now established, an analysis of how 2008 crisis was manifested in the 
pages of this periodical will be presently offered. 
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General Observations and Method 
What at first glance is most remarkable about the articles on the 2008 crisis in the pages of The 
New Yorker as a body is the overall relatively highbrow slant of the discourse.  The articles 
tended to predominantly centred on complex matters of business and policy rather than on 
human interest stories often associated with the crisis such as unemployment and the loss of 
homes.  This general approach seems reflective of an attempt by The New Yorker to cover the 
2008 crisis in a manner that foreground the fundamental, ‘real’ issues as perceived by the writers 
and editors.  This particular approach to covering the crisis seems to evidence that The New 
Yorker was continuing a long-standing, left-of-centre journalistic approach to public affairs 
issues in which such serious issues are focused on while populist, affective-oriented appeals to 
the public’s emotions are largely avoided.  Approximately two years of issues of The New Yorker 
were examined, spanning the period from September 2008 until September 2010.  In total, 
ninety-two articles were determined to be about the crisis and were analyzed.  A loose system of 
data coding was adapted based on the content of the articles and seven thematic categories were 
consequently established: ‘the psychology of money and markets’, ‘government and 
governance’, ‘the economy in general’, ‘finance and real estate’, ‘foreclosure and 
unemployment’, ‘international’ and ‘miscellaneous’.  In instances where an article was 
potentially classifiable in two or more of the categories, discretion was used to judge which 
category it was assigned into.  The seven categories will now be examined in sequence. 
 
‘The Psychology of Money and Markets’ or ‘Animal Spirits Revisited’ 
While the lion’s share of coverage of the 2008 crisis in The New Yorker was dedicated to issues 
and persons of and within the high circles of power in business and government, a quite 
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interesting strain of discourse centred on the psychological dimensions of money and markets 
was most immediately apparent as a distinctive category upon analysis of the articles as a whole. 
Fourteen articles were classified in this category, representing 16.3% of all articles examined.  A 
non-exhaustive account of some of the subjects addressed in the articles that were classified 
within the category of the psychology of money and markets include rationality and irrationality 
in market behaviour, the effects of confidence, certainty, uncertainty and anxiety on investor and 
lender behaviours, the psychodynamics of group financial behaviour, the effects of abstraction 
and mathematicization on psychological perceptions of risk-taking, the psychology of wealth and 
spending, risk-reward behavioural dynamics, finance and esotericism, the psychology of the 
collective memory of financial hardship, and the psychological typologies of market actors.  
Although they cover a fairly heterogeneous array of topics, the articles classified under the 
category of the psychology of money and markets share a broad commonality in their collective 
emphasis on deploying models of the mental or the psychological as a primary prism through 
which both the micro and macro-scale activities of markets and money can be understood.  This 
mental or psychological approach ostensibly undergirding the activities of finance and markets is 
sometimes referred to in the articles of this category as an alternative causal explanation for the 
2008 crisis or for particular phenomena associated with it. 
As mentioned above, mental, quasi-mental, relational and affective states such as 
uncertainty, anxiety, confidence, faith and trust figured very prominently as topics of the articles 
in the category of the psychology of money and markets, and the prominence of these in the 
discourse of The New Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 crisis was not restricted primarily to any 
particular period of time within the two-year span of the analysis (such as the early, middle or 
late stages) but rather was broadly evident throughout it.  To begin with an example from early 
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on in the coverage period, the narrative approach of the late September 2008 article “Public 
Humiliation” is demonstrative and anticipatory of an approach that is also evident in several 
other articles classified under the psychology of money and markets whereby a supposedly 
commonsensical or conventional understanding of a phenomenon is introduced at the start of the 
article and then an alternative, supposedly more fundamental explanation for said phenomenon is 
proposed.  “Public Humiliation” begins by listing off some oft-cited causes of the crisis (firms 
being caught up in the housing bubble, over-reliance on mathematical models of risk, the 
rampant leveraging of bad market bets) but then identifies the decisions of several big financial 
firms to go public as a key causal factor for the crisis because it supposedly put such firms at the 
mercy of the psychodynamics of the stock market.
9
  This pattern of a conventional explanation 
being floated and then a case being made for an alternative situation is also evident in the articles 
“That Uncertain Feeling” and “Everyone’s Watching”.  In the former article, uncertainty is at 
first cited as a conventional reason for stock market volatility and then the supposedly 
mammalian phenomenon of ‘herding’ is proposed as an alternative explanation.10  In the latter 
article, large swings in investor confidence are ultimately attributed to an over-availability of 
information in a highly interconnected global marketplace instead of the purportedly 
conventional explanation of a lack of adequate information being identified as the cause of these 
phenomena.
11
 
While not all the articles categorized under the psychology of money and markets follow 
such a clearly identifiable pattern of floating conventionally-given explanations for phenomena 
followed by the assertion of and elaboration upon a ‘real’ or more fundamental causal 
explanation,
12
 the broad commonality of the articles’ emphasis on biologically-based 
psychological factors as primary variables in understanding the operations of money and the 
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market as a means of explicating the crisis does seem apparent in them as a body.  Arguably, this 
approach of looking for a psychological basis for macro-level phenomena is in some ways highly 
reminiscent of the neoclassical school of economics’ attempt to synthesize the insights of 
classical economics with those of the psychological school.
13
  Supporting such a contention is 
the use of some of the key ideas of John Maynard Keynes in John Cassidy’s October 5th 2009 
article “Rational Irrationality”.  In a manner very similar to the two articles already discussed 
above, Cassidy proceeds to argue that while many explanations have been offered for the 2008 
crisis (such as greed, stupidity, overconfidence, and the irrationality of crowd mentality in 
market behaviour) there is something that has been overlooked which is even more fundamental 
to what happened and more difficult to counter (in terms of avoiding future crises) due to its 
system-derived origins.  Specifically, Cassidy attempts to make a case that “the root problem is 
what might be termed ‘rational irrationality’--behavior that, on the individual level, is perfectly 
reasonable but that, when aggregated in the marketplace, produces calamity”,14 and to support 
this assertion he then goes on to bring in the authority of John Maynard Keynes to legitimize and 
buttress his argument.
15
  Similarly, the unclear and thus problematic psychological basis of 
‘rationality’ discussed in John Lanchester’s article “Outsmarted”16 also reflects Cassidy’s 
perspective to a considerable extent. 
While the particular intent of such psychologically-based arguments concerning the 2008 
crisis can only be speculated upon, a couple of points concerning their general tilt can be 
postulated.  First, locating phenomena associated with the crisis at the intersection of the 
microeconomic psychological level and the macroeconomic systemic level provides a 
sophisticated account of the crisis that avoids merely blaming particular market actors or 
abdicating the issue of blame altogether through the citation of purely systemic causes.  Second 
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and related, the association of such an approach’s emphasis on relatively mid-level phenomena 
encompassing both micro and macro variables with esteemed figures such as Keynes and 
recognized traditions such as the neoclassical school legitimizes the approach taken by writers 
such as Cassidy and Lanchester by bestowing a sense of seriousness to their pieces.  Third, it can 
advanced that this approach allows leeway for the writers to offer a measured level of critique to 
problematic aspects of capitalism as a system while not having to entertain in any way the 
rejection of capitalism in favour of some other economic system, something that would be 
ideologically unacceptable in a periodical such as The New Yorker.  Related to this, the citing in 
articles of a figure like Keynes (who sought to mitigate the destructive effects of the capitalist 
boom-bust business cycle but never argued for the adoption of a system other than capitalism) is 
also very much in this spirit of providing a critique of unfettered capitalism without advocating 
its rejection as an economic system.  Fourth and related, such an approach can also be considered 
ideologically significant in the sense that it goes against the dogmatic espousal of deregulation 
and free market fundamentalism commonly associated in many quarters with the 2008 meltdown 
since its tenets clearly make an argument that the theoretical possibility of a market model which 
would always function smoothly based on the activity of rational market actors is always 
foreclosed in advance by richness, complexity, and imperfectness of human psychology at both 
the individual and the group level.  In sum, the approach taken in the articles of the psychology 
of money and markets category in The New Yorker comes off as sophisticated, authoritative, 
ideologically palatable, as well as a politically expedient, popular or fashionable journalistic 
depiction of the 2008 crisis.  
 Before moving on to discuss the next category of articles of The New Yorker on the 2008 
crisis, some brief commentary on a notable sub-category of the psychology of money and 
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markets category is merited.  The articles in this subcategory share the commonality of focusing 
specifically on how certain psychological principles are operative with respect to money and 
markets that distinguish the character of thought in this realm from that of thought as applied to 
other areas.  In these articles a general line of argumentation is offered which claims that the 
psychological processes operative in relation to money and markets differ in some salient ways 
from conventional psychological processes.  In particular, such articles often make the case that 
such distinct psychological principles can be seen as manifest in the presence of certain character 
traits and behavioural dispositions amongst those working in finance, these being especially 
apparent in the form of narcissistic ego character development and other pathologies.  John 
Lanchester’s “Melting Into Air” is a case in point.  This article, consisting of a set of book 
reviews interwoven with commentary on the peculiar mentalities of major figures of finance, 
such as billionaire Warren Buffett, lays out a case that the thought processes of those working in 
finance is qualitatively distinct from those working in non-financial fields because the black-and-
white nature of making money or losing money through financial transactions leads to something 
resembling a narcissistic ego complex for those who are financially successful in such an 
environment.
17
  Something quite similar is also said in the July 27
th
 2009 article “Cocksure”.  
After briefly discussing the failure of regulators and the incompetence and/or lack of adequate 
information of Wall Street as two primary and conventional explanations for the widespread 
making of disastrous decisions by many banks, author Malcolm Gladwell goes on to suggest that 
in spite of these oft-cited explanations “the first wave of postmortems on the crash suggests a 
third possibility: that the roots of Wall Street's crisis were not structural or cognitive so much as 
they were psychological.”18  He then cites ‘overconfidence’ as the key psychological trait that 
may be at the root of the 2008 meltdown and bases most of his demonstration of this argument 
200 
 
around a psychological profile of the figure of former Bear Stearns C.E.O. Jimmy Cayne.
19
  This 
kind of marking of the field of finance and those working in it as psychologically distinctive in 
The New Yorker is an interesting feature of its coverage of the 2008 crisis, and its appearance in 
other articles classified in this category as well further underscores its thematic importance as 
part of the magazine’s intellectually-inclined, left-oriented depiction of the crisis.20  To some 
extent, it could be said that such psycho-profiling of those working in the financial industry as 
deviant is evidence of an attempt by The New Yorker to lay the blame for the crisis on such 
individuals.  However, insofar as the explanations offered are psychologically-based as opposed 
to morally-based, they also tend to downplay the degree of the personal responsibility of such 
individuals by framing the matter as a case of them being ‘who they simply are’ being expressed 
in a given institutional environment: the world of finance.  Regardless of the interpretation given 
here of the articles in this particular and notable subcategory of articles, the search for underlying 
psychological explanations for the 2008 crisis – whether in relation to the psychology of money 
and markets specifically or in relation to the psychological makeup of particular individuals 
working in finance – is a particularly distinctive feature of The New Yorker’s coverage of the 
crisis.  That the magazine has such a noticeable emphasis on this avenue of inquiry into the 2008 
crisis when it might have emphasized other subjects of interest instead is certainly remarkable. 
 
‘Government and Governance’ or ‘The View From the Helm’ 
Of the ninety-two articles from The New Yorker that were analyzed, twenty-eight, or slightly 
more than 30%, of the articles were classified under the category of ‘government and 
governance’.  That such a large percentage of the articles on the crisis in the pages of The New 
Yorker were on subjects related to this category is to some extent unsurprising.  The obvious 
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political dimensions of the crisis such as the failure of government regulators and the emergency 
intervention of the federal government in the U.S. financial sector were major subjects of 
discussion of discourses both popular and academic, and this explains in large part the strong 
presence of articles in this category.  Despite the crisis being characterized predominantly as an 
economic one it was undoubtedly a political one as well, and particularly so with respect to the 
burning questions of what could, should, or was being done by government.  In The New 
Yorker’s coverage, it was generally the case that the roots of the crisis, the courses of actions to 
be taken in the face of it, and the attempts at initiating changes to prevent a similar crisis from 
occurring in the future were seen as crucially involving an array of governmental actors, 
agencies and policies. 
A great deal of topical variety is apparent in the articles classified under the category of 
government and governance.  Articles were focused variously on different branches of 
government, government agencies, high-ranking individuals, partisanship, and institutional 
histories amongst other topics.  In particular, The New Yorker’s coverage in this category 
displays a marked tendency of focusing on high level circles of power, especially of figures with 
recognized influence over policy and in possession of major decision-making capacities.  Indeed, 
this focus on wielders of power and influence – in short, on those in possession of abilities to 
‘act’ or influence significant action in one form or another – as opposed to ordinary people seems 
to be representative of The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis on the whole.  Powerful actors 
and the context of action therefore can be said to be a large part of how The New Yorker 
effectively defined the 2008 crisis. 
 Given the pronounced degree of heterogeneity of the articles classified under the category of 
government and governance, finding an effective or natural entry point to discuss them as a 
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distinct vein of the discourse on the crisis as it has been represented in the pages of The New 
Yorker represents a challenge.  With the aforementioned emphasis of The New Yorker’s coverage 
on action and the context of action in mind, it can be asserted that one way of approaching the 
category of articles presently in question is through seeing them as representative of an attempt 
to render the crisis in dramatic form.  It is in this regard that the critical framework of dramatism 
attributed to Kenneth Burke is of analytical value.  Specifically, Burke’s concept of the 
dramatistic pentad, which proposes that in the broad sense all human activity can be understood 
as drama consisting of five elements – ‘act’, ‘scene’, ‘agent’, ‘agency’ and ‘purpose’21 – can be 
considered a constructive method of approaching the articles on government and governance.   
Before getting into specific discussion of the individual articles classified under government 
and governance, a moment of explanation for what is about to be attempted is merited.  Perhaps 
one of the major reasons Burke’s dramatistic pentad seems to be so appropriate for such 
purposes is that it seems to be such a strong way to understand representations of that which is 
entailed by the concept of ‘crisis’.  Notionally, the idea of crisis has deep roots in Greek 
language and thought and is associated with a particular set of concepts which seem intimately 
connected to the idea of action.  On this subject, historian Reinhart Koselleck states: 
“Crisis” belongs among the fundamental concepts, that is to say, irreplaceable concepts, of the 
Greek language.  Derived from krino, to cut, to select, to decide, to judge; by extension, to 
measure, to quarrel, to fight – “crisis” aimed at a definitive, irrevocable decision.  The concept 
implied strict alternatives that permitted no further revision: success or failure, right or wrong, 
life or death, and finally, salvation or damnation.
22
 
 
It is worth pointing out at this juncture the similarities between the thrust of the meanings of the 
concept of crisis as described by Koselleck and the rhetorical concept of the locus of the 
irreparable discussed above in the chapter on the presidential radio addresses.  Both point clearly 
to ideas involving the difficult choice of actions to be taken under dire circumstances, actions 
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which will have consequences that, once the actions are set in motion, cannot be undone.  While 
Reinhart goes on to propose three semantic models through which the concept of crisis can be 
understood as historically operative (history as permanent and ongoing crisis; crisis as the 
crossing of epochal thresholds; crisis as the final crisis of all preceding history, as ‘Last 
Judgment’23) what is to be seen as most significant here is the affinity between the structural 
division of Burke’s pentad and the concept of crisis as a way of understanding how the 2008 
crisis is articulated as discourse via the articles on government and governance in The New 
Yorker.  The framework of the pentad implies a division into ratios of dramatic movement 
amongst the five elements, and this division seems particularly suited to discussing that which is 
entailed by the concept of crisis.  In other words, insofar as drama is dramatic action in the 
context of the idea of crisis, the broad structural logic of the pentad appears to be a useful 
framework for the analysis of the articles classified under government and governance given its 
emphasis on action and the context of action in the face of the crisis.  Accordingly, the 
constituent elements of Burke’s dramatic pentad and the logic implied by them will be applied in 
an adaptive fashion to the three thematic subcategories of government and governance that will 
be outlined below: ‘players’, ‘bailout nation’, and ‘politics and policy’.   
  
HIGHLIGHTING THE PLAYERS: IMPORTANT FIGURES IN A HIGH STAKES GAME 
To borrow an analogy from the discourse of sporting contests, the articles in the subcategory 
of ‘players’ focus primarily on particular individuals in or closely associated with government or 
government-related bodies.  The eight articles classified under this subcategory (almost a full 
third of the twenty-five articles classified under the category government and governance) 
focused primarily on individual figures occupying positions of power either directly in 
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government or in a government agency at the time of publication, or whom had previously 
occupied such a position and was considered influential and also actively involved in matters 
related to the crisis.  Specifically, the individuals discussed in these articles were Ben Bernanke 
(chairman of the Federal Reserve at the time of the crisis), Timothy Geithner (appointed as 
Secretary of the Treasury in 2009), Peter Orszag (director of the Office of Management and 
Budget in the Obama administration from its beginning until July 2010), Sheila Bair (chair of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation under both G.W. Bush and Obama), former Secretary of 
the Treasury Larry Summers, Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer, and former Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker.  The articles on these figures seem to share an approach that 
cuts across the idiosyncrasies of the four authors responsible for them in that a quasi-
biographical approach is taken, whereby the biographical background of each figure in question 
is provided, their rise to their current or former positions of power detailed, and their proximity 
to either actions taken in response to the crisis, and/or to the circumstances which ostensibly led 
to the crisis, explained.  Most likely stemming from this quasi-biographical approach, the articles 
in this subcategory also tended to be considerably longer than the vast majority of the other 
articles classified under government and governance. 
With the crisis as the overarching context or ‘act’ of the dramatic unfolding, the need for 
action was highlighted in the articles on the particular individuals that were profiled and 
discussed.  Action was thus framed not just as necessary but urgently necessary, and as such the 
agency of such individuals in the midst of the dramatic act of the crisis tended to be stressed 
within the articles: the activity of these individuals was the basis of dramatic action in narratives 
which ultimately revolved around the situation of the crisis.  For example, the December 1
st
 2008 
article, “Anatomy of a Meltdown”, focused on Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke, begins: 
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“Some are born radical. Some are made radical. And some have radicalism thrust upon them. 
That is the way with Ben Bernanke, as he struggles to rescue the American financial system from 
collapse.”24  In a similar fashion, the December 8th 2008 article, “Enter, Pursued by a Bear”, 
foregrounds the ascent of Timothy Geithner to the position of Secretary of the Treasury through 
reference to the crisis and a corresponding emphasis on action and on a world of doing in which 
action is absolutely necessary.  Giving the impression of Geithner being almost parachuted into a 
field of action, the article establishes near its outset both the gravity and novelty of the moment.
25
  
Geithner is framed as a figure thrust into action in desperate circumstances, “the third member of 
the fire brigade led by the outgoing Treasury Secretary, Henry Paulson, and the chairman of the 
Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke”,26 and the article provides an account of his accolades which 
give the impression of the detailing of a hero arrived to do battle for the forces of light and order 
against those of darkness and disorder.   
Through their relative stress on the dramatistic elements of act, agent, and agency, articles 
such as “Anatomy of a Meltdown” and “Enter, Pursued by a Bear” tend to naturalize and 
legitimize the roles of high-ranking government officials like Bernanke and Geithner in 
combating the crisis.  They are portrayed as the proper agents in possession of the necessary 
agency to act on the scene.  The New Yorker’s evident and emphatic framing of the domain of 
action in response to the crisis as the territory of elites located in the high circles of government 
seems to be of significance.  While it can certainly be contended that stories on high-ranking 
officials are newsworthy in and of themselves, one might also raise the point that there is a subtle 
but significant political dimension to such coverage.  Specifically, insofar as The New Yorker 
tends to be a media outlet which represents a fairly centre-left perspective of the American 
political landscape, the quite considerable degree of attention it pays to the actions of high level 
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figures within government and government agencies can also be construed as a political 
endorsement of an ideological perspective that government has a legitimate, desired, and indeed 
crucial role to play in the face of economic turbulence in a predominantly free market-oriented 
societal context.  Also related to this argument is another point of relevance.  On a pragmatic 
level, this individual-centred focus can be seen as a convenient way to inform and acquaint the 
implied readership of The New Yorker regarding the particular nuances of what could, should, or 
might be done by government and government-related bodies in response to the crisis.  Another 
way of putting this is that such individual-centred stories might be seen as providing convenient 
entry points through which to delve into the nuances of policy options in response to the crisis, 
policy options which already de facto legitimize the role of government in times of crisis in one 
form or another (and there is of course a spectrum of policy options here for government, but 
‘not doing anything’ is clearly not one of them).  In this sense, while the readers of the articles 
may not be particularly well acquainted with the intricacies of government policy options that 
could be theoretically pursued in dealing with an economic crisis, having the narrative of such 
articles based around the skeleton of a person-centred story – a narrative format likely very 
familiar to the readers – represents an apt way to draw them into discussions of policy.  The 
question therefore is not one of whether government should act, but how it should act, and that 
the coverage of The New Yorker supports such a position is politically significant in itself. 
While the kind of immediate, direct emphasis on a world of expected action in a time of 
crisis, apparent in the articles on Bernanke and Geithner, is a general feature of the articles in the 
subcategory of players, it is not equally present in all the articles nor always manifest in the same 
manner.  In some articles, such as John’s Cassidy’s “Money Talks”, the relative dramatic 
emphasis is more weighted on the element of scene.  In this piece on Obama budget chief, Peter 
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Orszag, relatively tangential details are emphasized in the narrative to imbue it with an action-
oriented tone and Orszag is portrayed less as a hero to the rescue than he is as a figure of 
influence in a wider context, operating behind and on behalf of larger more important figures.
27
  
In other instances, the credentials and personal history of the individual around which an article 
is based plays as significant a role in illuminating the history of what went wrong in the lead-up 
to the crisis as they do in the framing of action to be taken in the face of it.  Such is the case in 
the July 6
th
 2009 article, “The Contrarian”, by Ryan Lizza, a piece in which act (‘act’ in the 
retrospective sense of ‘what happened?’) and agent are particularly strongly represented amongst 
the other dramatic elements of the pentad.  This article’s repeated positioning of Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation head, Sheila Bair, as a maverick outsider from small-town Kansas, who 
rang the alarm bells regarding the imminent subprime fiasco, only to be ignored during George 
W. Bush’s tenure, and whose policy advice to the Obama administration was rejected in favour 
of that offered by Timothy Geithner serves as a critique of both the policies choices of the Bush 
administration and of those of the well-heeled team assembled by the Obama administration to 
deal with the crisis.
28
  The four other articles written on particular individuals working in or with 
government follow a somewhat similar pattern whereby the persons featured are principally used 
to shed light on the nuances of policy, though their being published after the height of the crisis 
(the apex of the crisis in the United States was approximately in the late winter and early spring 
of 2009) tends to give them a more retrospective feel in general in terms of how they mostly look 
back on a disaster averted.
29
  On the whole, however, The New Yorker’s decided focus on 
particular figures in government or connected to it seems highly representative of its overall 
framing of the 2008 crisis as one in which such figures had to intervene in an emergency manner 
to save the United States at large from economic calamity.  The overarching narrative framework 
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into which these individuals are slotted is one in which the financial industry – that is to say 
private interests – drove the American nation into an economic crisis significantly due to 
misguided and lax regulatory policy and the government – that is to say the body formally 
charged with the responsibility of safeguarding the public or collective interest – had to intervene 
in an emergency capacity to prevent the crisis from potentially becoming a full-scale economic 
depression.  This narrative thus positions government simultaneously as a major part of the 
causal nexus of the crisis as well as the key supra-actor in the attempt to combat the crisis and in 
doing so The New Yorker takes a strong position on the importance of the role of government as 
both the referee and saviour-of-last-resort in a free-market context.  This position is further 
articulated in The New Yorker’s coverage of that ultimate example of government intervention 
retroactively associated with the 2008 crisis: the federal government’s dramatic actions of bailing 
out many of the very financial firms whose actions were implicated in precipitating the crisis.  
 
BAILOUT NATION: BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS - AMERICA IN CRISIS 
Related to yet distinct from the subcategory of articles which focused on particularly 
important individuals working in or with government is a subcategory of articles which were 
focused on the government bailouts of major financial corporations and the U.S. auto industry.  
While many of the articles from The New Yorker over the period of analysis touched upon the 
bailouts enacted by the U.S. federal government to some extent, four particular articles seemed 
to address the bailouts as their primary subject around which their narratives were based.  The 
specific focus of these articles on the bailouts made it the case that, as a group, they are fairly 
tightly bounded by their temporal proximity to the rescues of the financial industry and the 
automobile industry: all four of them were published within a six-month period.
30
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The United States federal government’s bailouts of troubled and perceived to be at-risk 
business entities in the financial and automobile manufacturing industries stands along with the 
home foreclosure epidemic, the joblessness explosion, and the ‘Occupy’ movement as one of the 
most memorable happenings associated with the crisis of 2008.  Quite unlike the articles on 
particular figures in or connected to government, the bailout articles were centered quite 
narrowly and squarely focused on specific events in process, and as such the degree of 
background context provided in these articles is noticeably more circumscribed in comparison to 
the articles which were focused on particular figures.  To use a visual metaphor, the ‘field of 
vision’ of the articles on the bailouts is on the whole considerably more restricted.  Whereas the 
subcategory of articles focused on particular figures working in or with government tended to 
stress the agent, agency and act elements of the dramatic pentad, the articles classified under 
bailout nation tend to on the whole have their dramatic emphasis more on the act and scene 
elements designated by Burke’s schema.  The relative narrative emphasis of these articles is 
significantly more weighted on what has happened, what is going on, what actions are being 
taken, and the background context of the situation in comparison to the relatively stronger degree 
of dramatic emphasis on agents and agency that was apparent in the articles based around 
particular individuals. 
 To begin the discussion of the articles focused on the bailouts presently in question, the 
particular period in which all four articles were published (between September 29
th
 2008 and 
April 27
th
 2009) is of significance.  Specifically, the period from about mid-September 2009 
(marked by the collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15
th
, the next-day bailout of 
insurance giant A.I.G., and the ensuing general market panic) to about mid-spring 2009 (when 
the first signs of the intensity of the economic downturn lessening seemed to be starting to 
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appear) was to be retroactively considered the time of foremost crisis for the U.S. economy.  A 
genuine sense of fear, principally stemming from a lack of being able to know or predict how 
bad the situation could or would get, was often palpable during this period in many media 
narratives.  Indeed, as Richard Holtzman has pointed out, the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 
September 15
th
 2008 is the point at which the narrative of a generalized crisis (as opposed to 
simply a subprime mortgage crisis or some similar or equivalent compartmentalized crisis) was 
established.
31
  The popular perception of the rapid speed with which events proceeded to develop 
into a full-blown general crisis from September 15
th
 forward and the connection of this 
perception to dominant media narratives is of major importance.  Several researchers have 
supported the contention that the crisis at its outset was framed in a variety of discourses as 
having come out of the blue so to speak, that there existed “a general sense that whatever we 
were witnessing was a massive and unexpected traumatic event.”32  The articles on the bailouts 
largely reflect this dominant media narrative of the crisis during the half-year period which 
started in mid-September 2008, as they display a general tendency of depicting the crisis as a 
sudden and unexpected event of extreme gravity. 
In line with such a depiction, the imminent question of government intervention to shore up 
teetering financial institutions acts almost as a discursive field of gravity in the September 29
th
 
2008 article, “Bailing Out”.  All other events discussed in it appear to be bent towards this acute 
issue, and a sense of immediate and grave danger is palpable.  The article for example links the 
upcoming presidential election directly to the collapse of Lehman Brothers
33
 and then goes on to 
argue that Lehman’s declaration of bankruptcy, bracketed by the U.S. Treasury’s takeovers of 
mortgage leviathans Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (on September 6
th
 2008
34
) and the Federal 
Reserve’s extension of an eighty-five billion dollar emergency loan to A.I.G. (on September 16th 
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2008) was a set of events which evidenced that “the economy has undeniably entered a new 
[critical] phase.”35  A good deal of the article is spent outlining the ostensible causes of the crisis, 
but what is most remarkable in it is how the proposed government bailout is framed in a 
historical context as something that is all but inevitable.
36
  The historic nature of the crisis is 
emphasized in the conclusion, where a case is made for a Rooseveltian-style wide-scale 
government intervention to save the economy from collapse and thus avert disaster.
37
  This 
conclusion also exhibits a degree of bias in favour of the Democratic Party, as it obliquely lays 
the lion’s share of blame for the crisis at the feet of highly misguided policy decisions of the 
George W. Bush administration.  The overall message of the article is unmistakable: danger is 
present, the time for action on a grand scale is nigh, and the potential of wide-ranging change of 
a historic character is pregnant within the moment.  
The second article focused on the bailout of the financial sector, “Money Talks”, is in many 
ways similar to “Bailing Out” in its emphasis on the historic nature of the crisis; however, its 
tone is considerably more alarmist in nature.  It can be speculated that this difference is in large 
part attributable to the fact that the article was written after the failure of Treasury Secretary 
Paulson’s first proposed bailout to pass in Congress on September 29th, 2008 (the article refers to 
this event specifically), as this event led the largest single-day point loss ever seen on the Dow 
Jones Industrial Exchange.
38
  In particular, the ratios of dramatic emphasis in the narrative of 
“Money Talks” are clearly most heavily weighted on ‘act’ and ‘scene’, as is evidenced by how 
the opening paragraph portrays particularly salient political figures of both major political parties 
as characters in an ongoing television series that is sadly actually reality-in-progress.
39
  In line 
with the general left-of-centre tilt of The New Yorker, Republicans are depicted as the chief 
villains in this article and their ideological intransigence in the face of impending damage of a 
212 
 
catastrophic scale is portrayed as courting disaster.
40
  Overall, the most distinctive feature of the 
articles on the federal government bailouts (including the bailouts of the automobile industry
41
) 
seems to be their concerted attempts to capture the drama of the present moment as it unfolding: 
a sense of present-ness swallowing up the horizon of what is to come exudes from these pieces.  
In doing so, they tend to frame the future course of the crisis as something that is hanging in the 
balance of critical discussions occurring in the present moment in the halls of power.  No easy 
way out is available under such circumstances, as the way between Scylla and Charybdis is 
depicted as being very narrow indeed.  Government not intervening is depicted as non-option 
that will surely result in disaster, while intervention is depicted as something quite difficult and 
dangerous in its own right but also as the only choice available.  
 
POLITICS AND POLICY 
The last subcategory of articles from The New Yorker that were classified under government 
and governance which will be discussed here has been entitled ‘politics and policy’.  This 
subcategory is wide in its topical scope, as the articles in it focus or touch on a variety of issues 
such as particular government policies, partisan politicking, and the historical and ideological 
significance of presidential administrations under conditions of crisis.  For the purposes of 
analysis here, two broad sets of articles within the politics and policy subcategory have been 
established and will be discussed respectively.  The first set of articles are focused on the 
historical dimensions and significance of the crisis in the American political sphere, while the 
second set of articles centres on issues of political partisanship.  Each of these sets of articles is 
revealing of how The New Yorker articulated the 2008 crisis in its coverage of American politics 
broadly as well as in its coverage of multiple specific dimensions of the political field of action. 
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 A particularly salient theme amongst the articles classified under politics and policy is that of 
the historical significance of the 2008 crisis politically.  These articles tend to frame the political 
significance of the crisis from different historical vantage points (for example, from the historical 
vantage point of the crisis as another Great Depression potentially, or of the crisis as a historical 
challenge for the first ever presidential administration headed by an African-American), and 
within them there is a broad division, mostly manifest in the tone of articles, between articles 
written before or while the crisis was reaching its apex and those written after the economic 
situation had stabilized to one degree or another.  Four articles seem to stand out particularly in 
their portrayals of the 2008 crisis as a historic event of political significance: “The Test” 
(November 10
th
 2008), “The New Liberalism” (November 17th 2008), “Obamaism” (April 13th 
2009), and “Obama’s Lost Year” (March 15th 2010). 
The first two of these articles, “The Test” and “The New Liberalism”, are both clearly 
framed through reference to two specific events proximate to the time of their being published: 
the advent of the economic crisis in the fall of 2008 and the presidential election of November 4
th
 
2008.  In these articles, it appears that the past is used as a means of framing the present moment 
to deliberately emphasize the ostensibly historic dimensions of political events in motion.  The 
economic crisis is in the foreground of both pieces, as each begins by referring to the times of the 
first term of President Franklin Delano Roosevelt during the Great Depression.
42
  It is through 
this reference to the past that the anticipation or realization of the assumption of new leadership 
in the highest office of the land by a Democratic President at a time of great economic distress in 
the present is framed.  Both articles frame the 2008 election in truly historic terms (in the former 
article, this is done in a barely disguised manner by referring to the historical importance of 
major planks of the Obama election campaign,
43
 while the latter outright refers to the victory of 
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Obama as “the most important victory of a Democratic candidate since 1932”44 and even goes so 
far to portray it as an epochal break
45
), and there is in each a clear attempt to project the idea of 
great opportunity through crisis, of the potential of history-making immediately in the air.
46
  This 
sense of history being actively transformed in the face of the forces unleashed by crisis is also 
evident in the April 13
th
 2009 article “Obamaism”.  In it, author George Packer gives a ringing 
endorsement of the performance of the not yet one-hundred-day-old Obama administration,
47
 
even going so far as to compare it heroically and patriotically to the actions taken by the Truman 
administration during wartime.
48
  However, the kind of optimistic-sounding emphasis on the 
necessity of bold, courageous and new leadership in a time of economic crisis and the lauding of 
the Obama’s administration’s performance under such expectations is not particularly long-lived 
in The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis.  Within a year of the publication of “Obamaism”, 
another article by Packer, entitled “Obama’s Lost Year”, was published in which a feeling of 
lament for the loss of what might have been is already palpable.  While not completely hostile to 
Obama or his administration, this March 15
th
 2010 article is clearly quite critical of both in many 
respects
49
 and its tone is neither celebratory nor enthusiastic.  The giddy hopes that were ushered 
in by the election of Barack Obama are by this point portrayed as having been largely deflated in 
the face of a devastating crisis that had cost millions their jobs and homes, and it is in such a 
context of deflated hopes and lowered expectations that the most politically pointed coverage of 
The New Yorker on the 2008 crisis emerges. 
In The New Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 crisis, the disappointment of the historic hopes 
pinned on the Obama administration in the immediate aftermath of the market meltdown and the 
hostility displayed towards the Republican Party appear to be very closely related.  Though The 
New Yorker never really seems to be particularly sympathetic towards Republicans or the 
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Republican Party at any point in its coverage (this of course being rather unsurprising given the 
magazine’s overall centre-left political disposition), it is clear that it displays a noticeably more 
pronounced degree of hostility towards them as the crisis drags on.  In this sense, even though 
the policy choices and political manoeuvres of the Obama administration are often the subject of 
criticism in The New Yorker, they tend to primarily be criticized within a framework of them 
being misguided, not bold enough, or not visionary enough.  However, when the issue of 
political partisanship is touched upon in its coverage of the crisis, The New Yorker decidedly 
paints the Republican Party as essentially villainous.  Republicans and their party are portrayed 
as obstructionist, deceptive, dishonest, and captive to special interests: they are made out to be 
those who wear the black hats in the political drama of the crisis. 
While some articles classified under politics and policy focus on policy matters specifically 
and do not seem to comment on issues of political partisanship directly,
50
 or merely take a 
passing shot at Republicans or Republican policies,
51
 two articles in this second set of articles 
within the politics and policy subcategory have political partisanship squarely at the centre of 
their narratives: “Partisanship, by the Bye” (February 23rd 2009) and “The Empty Chamber” 
(August 9
th
 2010).  In these two articles published approximately a year-and-a-half apart, the 
pro-Democrat bias of The New Yorker that is present generally in its coverage (and which also 
appears evident even in some less overtly partisan articles focused on subjects such as taxation 
and tax reform
52
) seems particularly apparent, and this political bias can be said to be considered 
a distinctive feature of the discourse on the 2008 crisis of The New Yorker.  In these two articles, 
to resort once again to the use of Burke’s schema, the relative emphasis seems to be on the agent, 
agency and scene elements of the dramatic pentad, with President Obama and his fellow 
Democrats primarily cast as protagonists in opposition to their Republican antagonists. 
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The scene in both “Partisanship, by the Bye” and “The Empty Chamber” is essentially 
located amongst the powerful corridors and chambers in Washington, most centrally in 
Congress.
53
  The former article bemoans the lack of bipartisanship in Congress compared to 
decades past, essentially laying the blame for this at the feet of the Republicans
54
 and portrays 
Barack Obama, his administration, and the Democratic Party in a relatively favourable light as 
reasonable, cooperative and even potentially benefitted by Republican intransigence.
55
  
However, although it portrays the Republicans in a negative light, “Partisanship, by the Bye” 
also contains a degree of cheekiness in some of its attacks on them,
56
 possibly because of the 
extent that the Republicans were in disarray after being severely punished in the 2008 election.  
Any vestiges of such bemusement or lightness, however, seem completely absent seventeen 
months later in George Packer’s “The Empty Chamber”.  Brimming with barely veiled and 
sometimes even outright and outraged hostility, “The Empty Chamber” seems to be fuelled by 
Packer’s perception that there has been a year-and-a-half Republican show of not merely bad 
faith but naked and cynical self-interest since the Obama administration had taken office.  The 
intensity with which the Republicans are cast in a thoroughly negative light in this article, as 
obstructionists overwhelmingly ready to forsake the common good, never mind the pretenses of 
cooperation, in order to further their own interests, is truly striking.
57
  Additionally, being 
published almost twenty-three months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, “The Empty 
Chamber” seems to represent an attempt to capture and convey a kind of national zeitgeist of lost 
hope, dreariness, and lowered expectations.  While the threat of the potential of imminent 
economic collapse is not apparent (thus differentiating this article from earlier ones), neither are 
the optimistic and even grand expectations that had accompanied Obama taking office. As such, 
“The Empty Chamber” seems to represent the terminus of a certain trajectory of The New 
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Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 crisis.  Historic hopes for the renewal and recovery of America 
with the election of Obama as a potential second coming of Franklin Roosevelt had come to be 
dashed in the face of a crisis that seems to drag on long after the worst had passed, and 
Republicans were assigned the lion’s share of the blame for why this happened.  Disaster had 
been averted, but the painful experience of the crisis had not become the midwife of something 
better.  A pronounced degree of politically partisan bitterness is thus perceptible in The New 
Yorker’s coverage as it becomes apparent that no grand historical transformation is in the works 
despite the tremendous damage done by the crisis and that the political party most responsible 
for the crisis having occurred in the first place has clearly not only conspired against sweeping 
transformational designs for something different but has even resorted to actively sabotaging 
incremental efforts at change.  The narrative arc of The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis at the 
level of discourse thus becomes one of a particular tragedy: the villains more or less win the day, 
and the destruction of the crisis becomes pointless and senseless in the absence of meaningful 
change. 
 
From Near Death to the New Normal: The Crisis and the Post-Crisis Economy 
The subject of the economy in general was a conspicuous topic of The New Yorker magazine’s 
coverage of the economic crisis in the United States that was widely held to have fully emerged 
in the fall of 2008.  Thirteen articles were classified under this category in the present study, and 
as such they represent just over 14% of all the articles that were examined.  There was a 
substantial degree of variety within the articles that focused on the economy in general.  Some 
for example concentrated narrowly on particular economic factors or phenomena (such as 
inflation or the price of oil) while others tended to be more broadly focused on collections of 
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more general indices of economic health (such as gross domestic product figures) while still 
others sought to situate economic issues or problems in overarching historical, political, or 
cultural contexts.  While exhibiting a pronounced degree of heterogeneity in many respects, the 
articles classified within this category often pointed to, touched upon, or employed similar 
themes, tropes or metaphors that tended to frequently cut across the particular content of 
individual articles.  Indeed, particularly recognizable amongst many of the articles examined was 
the use of figurative language of a biological or quasi-biological character in their discussions of 
economics and the state of the economy in the United States during the crisis.  Accordingly, a 
brief attempt will now be made to outline the significance of this discursive feature by discussing 
its widespread presence in the articles of The New Yorker which were centred on the economy in 
general.  Such an analysis holds the promise of establishing some tentative arguments regarding 
why the rhetorical construction of economics and the economy via the figurative use of language 
commonly associated with biology or the biological in these articles is pervasive as well as 
revealing of deeper structures of meaning that appear to be anchored in other, broader discourses 
rooted in their own distinct historical lineages. 
 
ENDANGERMENT, ILLNESS, HEALTH & RECOVERY: ECONOMY THROUGH THE 
METAPHOR OF BIOLOGY  
 As was similarly the case in the discourse of the presidential radio addresses, the use of 
figurative, often metaphoric, language drawing on or reflective of the discourse of the biological 
was deployed in the pages of The New Yorker to describe or explain the economy and economic 
phenomena.  This was most apparent in the prevalence of a discourse concerning the ‘health’ of 
the United States’ economy during the crisis.  At times, biologically-oriented terminology was 
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used in conjunction with catastrophic images of man-made catastrophe, such as in October 20
th
 
2008 article “Freeze!”  In its opening anecdote concerning the freezing of credit markets in the 
aftermath of the banking panic of September of 2008, the article describes that “The term of the 
hour was ‘nuclear winter’--nothing moves or grows--”.58  This metaphor of natural growth for 
the economy under normal, non-crisis conditions is then further developed when the article goes 
on to describe that “Interbank lending is the photosynthesis of finance.”59  Similarly, the 
metaphor of the economic as biological via the trope of plant growth also appears in the article 
“Oil Check”.  This article discusses the potentially negative impact of high oil prices on the 
recovery of the United States’ economy by using a biological metaphor to capture a sense of 
growth arrested prematurely, as is evidenced in the passage which reads: “many worry that 
higher prices at the pump could end up choking off the economy's putative green shoots before 
they've even had a chance to grow.”60   The figurative use of biological language to describe the 
economy – this time via the trope of physical injury which has compromised motion – again 
appears in the articles ‘Inflated Fears’ (“The economy is still limping”61) and “Blame Games” 
(“The U.S. economy is limping along”62).  While it is clear that a marked tendency of the articles 
on the economy in general using biological language figuratively to describe the state of the 
United States’ economy exists, why this seems to be the case is an intriguing question. So what 
can be said of the significance of this widespread figurative use of such biological language in 
reference to the economy during the crisis? 
Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to answer the question of the significance of the 
figurative use of biologically-oriented language to refer to the economy definitively, some 
insights on this subject can be gleaned by delving into the ideas of which this language is 
connotative.  For example, although they do so in different ways, both the arrested growth of 
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‘green shoots’ and the ‘limping’ of the economy connote ideas of natural, healthy motion or 
activity being impeded due to the unwelcome intervention of external factors.  If both of these 
biologically-derived metaphors for the economy therefore implicitly point to ideas of 
unencumbered growth and freedom of movement as default states of ‘health’, the significance of 
their particular usage in The New Yorker as ways of speaking of the state of the United States’ 
economy during the 2008 crisis must be more deeply explored in order to gain insight into what 
undergirds the recourse to figurative language of the biological in describing the economic.  The 
most immediate and perhaps obvious answer is that such figurative language has a long history 
of being deployed in the discourse of economics, for example, via oft-used terms such as 
‘economic growth’.  However, this answer is not really sufficient.  What is missing in this 
explanation is how the idea of unimpeded growth as the default and desired state of affairs of the 
economy has been thoroughly naturalized as part of the discourse of market economies.  
Arguably, it can be ventured that the recourse to biological metaphors which highlight growth 
and movement as natural, desired, and indicative of the proper functioning of the economy is 
such a distinctive discursive feature of The New Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 crisis because it is 
so reflective of the wider discourse of market-based or capitalist economics that already has such 
concepts thoroughly integrated into it.  Market economies are supposed to grow and therefore 
growth is held to be an intrinsic property of market economies.  Through such emphases market 
economies are ideologically coded as the proper, natural, and to-be-taken-for-granted form of 
(socio)economic organization versus all other potential systems of economic organization such 
as the various types of ‘tradition’ and ‘command’ economies63 existent both past and present.  
Indeed, in The New Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 crisis, nowhere is the significance of the 
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tightly interwoven nexus of meanings of growth, health, and the proper operation of the economy 
more evident than in the articulation of a notion of economic ‘recovery’.  
In The New Yorker’s articles focused on the economy in general, the quasi-biological 
metaphor of economic ‘recovery’ is widespread; so widespread in fact that it is the magazine’s 
chief metaphor for state of the American economy during the course of the 2008 crisis.  As has 
been mentioned above, one of the meanings of the term ‘crisis’ originally drawn from its use in 
antiquity is rooted in the discourse of medicine, pointing to the period at which a patient’s 
condition would either improve towards health or deteriorate towards death.
64
  While perhaps not 
cast in as dramatic a light as in this medical designation, the use of the term recovery in the 
articles on the economy in general in The New Yorker is quite noteworthy.  The first mention of 
‘recovery’ in any article classified under this category comes in the piece, “In For It”, published 
on November 17
th
 2008.  In this article, author Nick Paumgarten writes that “whoever succeeds 
[Barack Obama] in 2012, should he lose, will then have the chance to ride the recovery.”65  
Interestingly then, in this article a recovery of the economy from its moribund state is already 
assumed to be the proximate outcome of the current crisis; that there will be no devastating slide 
into depression.  In other words, in the narrative of this article, which was written at one of the 
darkest points of the 2008 crisis, is the assumption that the ultimate outcome of the crisis is 
already determined.  The use of the term recovery in this article, insofar as the author already 
assumes that an economic recovery will indeed take place in the not-so-distant future, therefore 
appears to be at odds with some of the meanings associated with the medical sense of the term 
crisis as a temporal stage of uncertainty in which one of two potential outcomes (one outcome 
positive and hoped for, the other negative and dreaded) is coming nigh. This begs a certain 
question concerning the meaning of recovery in the discourse on the 2008 crisis as found in the 
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pages of The New Yorker: if recovery is not one of two potential outcomes of a near-death 
situation, then what are some of the meanings carried by this term in the context of its use in 
journalism on the crisis?  Two potential answers seem to most readily suggest themselves. 
In one sense, the concept of recovery could be said to designate a return to a previous state 
of affairs prior to some sort of significant disruption of that state of affairs.  This sense of 
recovery, while absent of the life-or-death connotations of the antiquity-derived medical 
connotations of the term crisis, does appear to have a substantial degree in common with the idea 
of recovery in the physical sense, such as the recovery of an individual to a state of health prior 
to the onset of an illness.  However, in another sense, the concept of recovery can also be said to 
designate a different meaning that goes beyond the idea of a simple restoration to a previous 
state, one which implies a qualitative change of the specifically internal conditions which caused 
or enabled illness in the first place.  The first concept of recovery is thus more in line with the 
idea of a loss of health that is wholly or primarily externally inflicted (as in the case of a disease 
externally acquired not through the weakness of one’s immune system, or of a disaster visited 
upon a collective from without) while the second concept of recovery points more to a changed 
state of affairs after a loss of health whose origins are primarily internally located (as in the case 
of phenomena such as substance addiction and abuse, or something like a civil war within a 
nation resultant of two antagonistic visions within it clashing violently).  This latter sense of 
recovery thus carries within it a psychological and spiritual dimension that is not included in the 
former. Recovery of this latter variety does not merely involve a return to what was but rather 
also involves a changing of something internal that is perceived as being primarily responsible 
for the bringing about of illness or for the lack of a healthy state: it involves some sort of 
qualitative transformation. 
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In The New Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 crisis, elements of both these senses of recovery 
seem present.  However, in the articles focused on the economy in general the former sense of 
recovery – that being the return to a previous state of affairs – tends to predominate.  This is 
evident for example in the article “Fifty Ways To Kill Recovery” (July 27th 2009). This piece on 
how the fifty U.S. states’ use of pro-cyclical policies is endangering the federal government’s 
counter-cyclical attempts to stimulate the national economy frames recovery primarily in the 
sense of a calibration of measures designed to restore economic health.  The article comes across 
as quite clinical-sounding in its approach to discussing the economy,
66
 and the idea of recovery 
in it is not one of making qualitative changes to prevent what caused the economic collapse in 
the first place so much as it is one of the particular steps to be taken in order to improve the 
immediate situation of the economy.  The article gives the impression that it is almost as if the 
causes of the economic crisis do not matter so much, as recovery in it is framed as how to get 
past what has already gone wrong rather than to enact changes to fix what caused the situation in 
the first place.  Somewhat similarly, “Timing the Recovery” (April 19, 2010) also frames the 
economic crisis in a fairly detached, technical manner.  In particular, this article portrays 
economic recovery as something that can be achieved through the recourse to a body of previous 
historical experiences on fighting economic crises, and in doing so it casts the figure of the 
expert economist as a doctor of sorts with the knowledge and authority to orchestrate and gauge 
recovery.
67
  The last sentence of the article, “The Democrats will have to spend the next seven 
months much the way voters will: waiting and hoping that, at long last, things are finally back on 
track”,68 is particularly telling of how recovery is framed as a return to a previous, desired state 
of affairs.  The thrust of the expression ‘back on track’ in this context implies the desire of a 
return to a somewhat orderly pattern of economic growth in general (inasmuch as ‘track’ carries 
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with it connotations of both progress and order) and that conversely the trajectory which brought 
about the crisis is to be seen as an aberration or deviation from a desired, properly functioning 
state of affairs for the economy.  It is highly notable that variations of this expression appear in 
other articles on the economy in general as well,
69
 and the sum of their presence in The New 
Yorker’s coverage of the economy in general bears testimony to how the concept of recovery is 
constructed primarily as a return to a desired state of order and operative functionality rather than 
as a transformational spiritual or healing process. 
In closing the discussion on the articles in The New Yorker that were classified under the 
category of the economy in general, some final comments and speculation concerning both the 
prevalence of figurative language drawn from biological discourse and the dominance of a 
notion of recovery as a return to a previous state of affairs are merited.  First, it could be the case 
that the general criteria according to which articles were classified in this category (that, more 
than anything else, they seemed to focus on the economy in general) was such that the articles 
tended to have a bias towards the discussion of statistical information that was explicitly meant 
to serve as a barometer of the state of the economy because this information was perceived to be 
important to the imagined reading public of The New Yorker.  The logic and appropriateness of 
the use of biological metaphors is evident in this respect: how the economy as ‘patient’ was 
currently doing and likely would be doing (in terms of major economic trends such as GDP 
growth, job losses and gains, and the prices of key commodities such as oil) could be said to be 
eminently newsworthy insofar as the status of the economy at large was something that had a 
wide impact, potentially touching the financial and employment fortunes of many of the readers 
of The New Yorker and of those close to them such as friends and relatives.
70
  Second, and 
related, the dominance of a notion of recovery primarily framed as a return to a desired state of 
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affairs in the articles of this category might be partly explained by the fact that the ideas most 
intimately related to the second sense of recovery (of spiritual renewal and/or qualitative change 
preventing the reoccurrence of illness) received substantial coverage in other of the categories 
that were established to classify articles of The New Yorker’s coverage, such as in the articles 
classified under government and governance which focused on Wall Street reform.  Third, 
insofar as The New Yorker generally supported a Keynesian-style approach of government 
intervention in the economy during the crisis,
71
 its focus on the coverage of major, recognized 
indices of economic health as symptomatic of recovery (or the lack thereof) as key indicators of 
whether economic conditions were improving or not represent in a sense The New Yorker taking 
account of and assessing the impact of the very political-economic approach to the crisis that it 
broadly endorsed in its coverage.  It is in accordance with these overlapping rationales that The 
New Yorker’s coverage of the economy in general seems to display a pronounced tendency 
toward constructing the 2008 crisis as a calamity that had sickened the health of a nation and 
which had to be combated with tried-and-tested instruments wielded by government that were 
designed to restore the American economy to a naturalized, desired state of economic growth. 
 
‘Finance and Real Estate’ or ‘Crucibles of Crisis’ 
 In the aftermath of the subprime mortgage lending crisis that led to the near-collapse of the 
United States’ financial sector and pushed the American economy into recession, the complex 
and often problematic interrelationships between the financial industry, the mortgage lending 
industry and the ratings agencies came under intense scrutiny and were subject to much 
criticism.  These industries were commonly identified in mainstream media narratives as a kind 
of ground zero of the 2008 crisis, the place of origin where the general calamity that was to 
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envelop the United States and eventually many other nations had incubated and then issued forth.  
The New Yorker’s coverage of the finance and mortgage industries tends to reflect this broad 
narrative in many respects.  The key importance of the finance and real estate industries in The 
New Yorker’s portrayal of the 2008 crisis is evidenced partially through the extent of its coverage 
of them.  Over the period of analysis of September 2008 to September 2010, twenty of the 
articles appearing in The New Yorker were classified as being primarily about these industries, 
making the category of ‘finance and real estate’ the second largest of all the categories into 
which The New Yorker’s coverage was subdivided.   
The large number and evident variety of the articles classified in the finance and real estate 
category posed an analytical challenge.  Some articles were focused on explaining the 
constellation of actors involved in the subprime housing bust, others deployed the stories of 
particular individuals to provide insight into what had happened or was happening on Wall Street 
or in the mortgage-lending industry, while still others took up subjects as various as the 
institutional history of particular firms, the battered image of the financial industry, and 
particular scandals that had occurred.  There were also significant variation in length and tone 
amongst the articles on finance and real estate, as they ranged from quite extended and fairly dry 
pieces to short pieces that were mocking, sardonic, or sarcastic.  Nevertheless, despite these 
issues some notable features common to some of the articles in this category do seem to lend 
themselves most readily to analysis, and it will be in this manner that an attempt to capture and 
discuss what is most significant in The New Yorker’s coverage of the finance and real estate 
industries will be attempted.  Specifically, three broad divisions, roughly corresponding to a mix 
of features or characteristics that was apparent amongst certain articles’ style, organization and 
purpose will serve to organize the analysis of articles in the finance and real estate category.  For 
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the sake of the discussion here, these broad divisions of the articles on finance and real estate 
will respectively be referred to as ‘critical commentary articles’, ‘research-based investigative 
journalism articles’, and ‘ironic, humorous or exceptional interest articles’.  Each of these three 
broad types or kinds of articles will now be briefly discussed in order to examine how they make 
a contribution to the discursive construction of the 2008 crisis in The New Yorker through their 
portrayals of the finance and real estate industries.            
 
CRITICAL COMMENTARY ARTICLES: EXPLAINING FIASCO, EXPRESSING 
INDIGNATION 
  While many of the articles classified under finance and real estate were critical of the 
industries associated with these sectors in one form or another, some seem particularly concerned 
with explaining the role of the finance and mortgage industries from a wide angle perspective 
through trying to situate them and their activities as key parts of the bigger picture of the 
economic crisis.  These articles also went beyond simple description in their appraisals of the 
roles of the finance and real estate industries in precipitating the crisis, as they also contained a 
strong element of criticism of them.  Three articles in particular seem highly representative of 
this kind of narrative blend of style and purpose: “Wiz Bucks” (September 29, 2008), “Too 
Clever by Half?” (May 17, 2010), and “Monsters Inc.” (May 11, 2009).      
Given the immediate origins of the 2008 crisis in the collapse of the subprime real estate 
market rippling outward into the wider economy via the nexus of the finance and real estate 
industries, the emphasis of The New Yorker’s coverage on how this unfolded and the particular 
roles the finance and real estate industries had in creating the situation seems readily understood.  
The article “Wiz Bucks” represents an early attempt in The New Yorker’s coverage at conveying 
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the magnitude of the disaster that had befallen the United States, explaining how it happened and 
assigning blame for it.  Published only two weeks after the collapse of Lehman Brothers 
triggered market panic, the opening of “Wiz Bucks” reflects a sense of immediacy, indeed, of 
immediate danger, commensurate with the gravity of what had transpired since mid-September 
2008, this being the collapse of the American financial industry under the weight of its own self-
inflicted and ultimately self-destructive machinations: 
Any attempt to find causation or fault for what happened last week is fraught. So many things 
have gone wrong; so many people are to blame; so many people are now screwed. Often, the 
media exaggerates the significance of the ups and downs of the financial markets, while the 
sophisticates in the marketplace take them in stride. Not this time. Last week, the most farsighted 
market players were flabbergasted, even as they comprehended that they were witnessing a 
capitulation to some kind of greater truth--that Wall Street had got caught up in a pyramid 
scheme of its own devising.
72
 
Offering an interpretation of the genesis of the crisis as a story of how Wall Street had fallen into 
a self-deceptive fantasy of believing what it wanted to believe,
73
 “Wiz Bucks” elaborates on how 
this fantasy was fuelled by a misguided faith in the power of innovation amongst many in the 
financial industry and that it was the interconnected phenomena of wilful self-deception and 
misplaced confidence which was at the heart of the collapse.  The article gives particular 
attention to the financial innovation of credit default swaps and takes a rather acid swipe at them 
and their creators
74
 in its blaming of Wall Street for the debacle of the crisis, seeing such an 
‘innovation’ as credit default swaps as a disaster-in-waiting that had been dressed up as a 
groundbreaking advancement in risk management.  The overall tone of “Wiz Bucks” is variously 
grave, sarcastic and angry (the last paragraph in particular is darkly and angrily sarcastic
75
), as it 
seems clear that the author is both shaken and outraged by the very phenomena which he is 
explaining.  The article is thus part dissection of a complex set of phenomena seen as generative 
of the crisis and part critical polemic of the actors whose hubris and scheming led so many others 
headlong into disaster.   
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The New Yorker’s focus on the financial industry as the primary culprit behind the crisis is 
also apparent in “Too Clever by Half?”.  While this article also fingers innovation in the 
financial industry as a major causal factor in the 2008 collapse, it differs from “Wiz Bucks” 
substantially in that, rather than being framed by the very recent outbreak of the economic crisis, 
the context of its narrative is the Wall Street reform legislation that was being debated in 
Congress a full twenty months after the collapse of Lehman Brothers.
76
  The combination of 
explanation and critique that was evident in “Wiz Bucks” is also strongly present in “Too Clever 
by Half?”, though the latter being published in May 2010 gives it more of a retrospective tone of 
a looking back upon events that were now starting to recede into the past.  The article explains 
how, despite the fact that there have been some benefits resulting from financial innovation, most 
of the innovative products and techniques introduced by Wall Street ultimately had a net 
negative impact,
77
 and it also highlights how overconfidence in the power and reliability of 
financial innovation to limit risk actually ended up increasing risk through rendering the risks of 
new financial products opaque to investors.
78
  It then goes on to critique how “the cost of all 
these mad-scientist endeavors can be measured in the trillions of dollars that vaporized when the 
housing bubble burst”,79 essentially reiterating the willful blindness/magical thinking argument 
which was evident in “Wiz Bucks”.  This broad pattern of explanation (of the particulars of the 
role of the financial industry in the precipitation of the crisis) and critique (of its hubris, wilful 
blindness, greed, or recklessness) is also continued in the article “Monsters Inc.”, albeit in a 
slightly different manner given the wider frame of historical reference presented in that piece.
80
  
The similar style and purpose of all three of these critical commentary articles seem to represent 
a distinct vein of The New Yorker’s coverage of the role of the finance and mortgage industries 
in the 2008 crisis: they seem designed to specifically explain to the public of The New Yorker’s 
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readership the particulars of how the crisis originated in these industries and to also explicitly lay 
the blame for the crisis on these industries’ activities, actions, and character; in doing so, 
presenting the magazine as a voice of outrage speaking on behalf of an incensed and victimized 
nation. 
 
RESEARCH-BASED INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM ARTICLES: HUMAN WINDOWS 
INTO A SCENE OF WRECKAGE 
Whereas the critical commentary articles tended to focus on the finance and mortgage 
industries in the abstract as collections of actors, a number of other articles classified in the 
category of the financial and mortgage industries were notable in that their narratives were built 
around particular individuals, effectively using these individuals’ stories as windows into the 
origins of the crisis, its unfolding and its aftermath.  In several respects, The New Yorker’s 
coverage of the crisis in these articles resembles that discussed under the government and 
governance subcategory of ‘players’.  These articles from the finance and mortgage category are 
stylistically distinct in that they tend to be considerably longer pieces of investigative, 
substantially research-based journalism whose narratives are built around important individuals 
who were involved in the financial and mortgage industries in a major capacity and whose 
stories were in some ways microcosmically representative of salient issues of the 2008 crisis.  
Their stories are the stories of the crisis in miniature, and this strategy of using the tales of 
particular persons in the finance and mortgage industries as windows into the wider scene of 
what went wrong in these industries and how that contributed to the crisis is a noteworthy feature 
of The New Yorker’s coverage. 
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Two articles that exhibit a great deal of commonality stand out as being particularly 
representative of this type or kind of article based around the finance and mortgage industries’ 
involvements in the crisis: “The Omen” (October 20, 2009) and “Angelo’s Ashes” (June 29, 
2009).  “The Omen” is centred on the story of disgraced French trader Jerome Kerviel.  Kerviel, 
later to be convicted for his role in the making of over fifty billion Euros worth of unauthorized 
trades at the French bank Société Générale,81 is portrayed in the article as an early warning sign 
of the problems existent within the United States financial industry in the period leading up to 
the market meltdown in the fall of 2008.  Specifically, a case is made in the article that the 
Kerviel affair, rather than merely being a matter of a trader gone rogue, actually represents a 
case-in-study of so many of the systemic problems that were later to be found endemic to the 
U.S. financial industry and which were to be held in retrospect as having contributed greatly to 
the crisis of 2008.
82
 “The Omen” goes into great detail on the personal history of Kerviel and of 
his alleged fraud at Société Générale.  In particular, the article seems to function as a critique of 
finance as an industry whose motivations are inherently corrupting in how it paints a portrait of 
Kerviel as a rather ordinary person whose actions are only comprehensible within an institutional 
context of working for a financial firm.
83
  In principally blaming the nature of the finance 
industry he was working in rather than anything in Kerviel’s character or actions, the article 
essentially makes the case that the Kerviel affair is a reflection of finance as an industry: that, by 
its very nature as an industry where making lots of money is elevated above all other 
considerations, finance tends to push individuals, most of them rather ordinary in most respects 
as opposed to pathologically-inclined, to act in ways that are unethical and even criminal.
84
 
In many ways quite similar to the overall tone and message of “The Omen” is another 
biographically-centred article, “Angelo’s Ashes”.  Focused on the former C.E.O. of notorious 
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subprime lender Countrywide Financial Angelo Mozilo, “Angelo’s Ashes” is another long piece 
of investigational journalism that outlines Mozilo’s personal background, the story of his rise to 
C.E.O., his leadership of his firm during the lucrative heydays of the housing boom, and the 
sudden collapse of Countrywide’s fortunes along with many other firms that had exercised 
similar practices in the run-up to the subprime collapse.  While the story of Mozilo’s and 
Countrywide’s meteoric ascents followed by a hubris-driven, self-inflicted fall into disaster 
provides the basic narrative skeleton of “Angelo’s Ashes”,85 the article also makes a case that the 
fundamental cause of both the highly questionable practices at Countrywide and its sale under 
duress to Bank of America as a much devalued firm
86
 was based, more than anything else, in an 
insatiable drive toward increased market share and greater earnings at any and all costs in an 
industry fuelled by cheap money
87
 where quick and easy profits were there for the taking until it 
all blew up in the housing bust.  This ultimate laying of the blame on systemic forces as 
responsible for the much-maligned behaviour of mortgage lenders such as Countrywide parallels 
the emphasis on systemic causes that is apparent in “The Omen”, as does the view-from-the-
inside narrative approach also taken in “Angelo’s Ashes”.  The New Yorker’s emphasis on the 
systemic origins of the crisis is also apparent in other articles in the finance and real estate 
category as well,
88
 and this further evidences the relative importance accorded to such factors in 
the magazine’s coverage of the crisis in general. 
In summary, it can be argued that The New Yorker’s deployment of research-based 
investigative journalism articles on particular figures in the finance and mortgage industries is an 
important part of its definition of the crisis.  Indeed, there is a strong case to be made that it 
appears that part of what The New Yorker sees as its duty to its readership is putting particular 
stories and faces to well-known general narratives about the crisis (such as those of the 
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widespread misconduct and fraud in the financial industry and the inflating and bursting of the 
subprime mortgage market bubble) in order to flesh out these narratives, while simultaneously 
underscoring the magazine’s overall emphasis on systemic and institutional factors as being 
those for which the ultimate blame for the crisis is to be assigned.  In the context of its coverage 
of the financial and mortgage industries’ roles in the 2008 crisis, The New Yorker showed itself 
as willing to tell the stories of major actors to make large-scale systemic and institutional 
phenomena accessible and comprehensible, but it always made clear that the crisis was 
ultimately caused by systems and institutions, not particular persons or types of persons 
operating in them.  This stress on the systemic and institutional – of systems first and persons 
second – was a signal feature of The New Yorker’s crisis coverage of finance and real estate. 
 
IRONIC, HUMOROUS OR EXCEPTIONAL INTEREST ARTICLES: SCANDAL & 
REPUTATION 
 A final, highly notable feature of The New Yorker’s coverage of finance and real estate was 
the appearance in the magazine of a number of ironic, humorous or exceptional interest articles 
that for the most part focused on scandals that had occurred in the finance and mortgage 
industries as well as the overall deleterious impact that the 2008 crisis had on the popular image 
of business and Wall Street.  Of these articles, three in particular stand out as having quite 
common subject matter and sharing a similar narrative style: “Goldman Trust” (October 6th 
2008), “Makeover” (April 13th 2009), and “The Oath” (May 31st 2010).  All three of these 
articles centred on the financial industry are somewhat entertaining, dark and ironic interest 
pieces (as opposed to highly serious ‘hard news’ stories) of an ‘inside take’ variety centred on 
industries whose reputations, along with those of its members, had taken major public image hits 
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due to their roles in precipitating the crisis.  These articles could also be said to be ‘situational’ 
pieces of journalism in that the narratives in each are concentrated on specific gatherings taking 
place in particular places, with the authors – who were presumably in attendance at said 
gatherings – contextualizing them with reference to the impact that the crisis has had on the 
parties in the narrative.  These stories, notable by their relative brevity, seemed designed largely 
to amuse the imagined public of The New Yorker, as wit, irony, sarcasm and (often dark or 
sardonic) humor is deployed in the rendering of the articles’ narratives.  They are about as close 
to ‘light reading’ as The New Yorker’s mostly sober and cerebral coverage of the 2008 crisis 
comes. 
Popular resentment of Wall Street specifically and of business in general was high in the 
aftermath of the 2008 crisis, and this resentment found expression in numerous media outlets’ 
negative portrayals of those working in such capacities.  The New Yorker’s coverage reflected 
this popular resentment to some extent in its coverage, though it for the most part avoided 
resorting to crass caricatures of its targets and instead used witticisms and caustic portrayals as 
its primary weapons of attack.  For example, in the article “Goldman Trust”, the particular event 
around which the narrative is built is an annual gathering of Goldman Sachs alumni which had 
taken place on October 2
nd
 2008, during the period between the failure of Lehman Brothers and 
the federal government’s 700 billion dollar bailout of the banking industry.  The opening 
passages of the article immediately put this elite gathering in the context of the crisis: 
Last Thursday evening, around the time the Treasury Secretary and former Goldman Sachs chief 
executive Henry Paulson was down on one knee, begging the congressional leadership not to 
scuttle his seven-hundred-billion-dollar bailout plan, Lloyd Blankfein, his successor at Goldman, 
was hosting a private reception at the Public Library for several hundred of Paulson's fellow 
Goldman alumni. Goldman does this every year, to celebrate and strengthen the diaspora's 
spiritual and commercial bonds. The guests were private equity and hedge-fund managers, from 
some of the biggest shops in the business, and, whatever violence had befallen their portfolios in 
the preceding weeks, these men--and they were mostly men, in suits--could probably have 
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passed the hat and pooled a sum large enough to rescue, say, Washington Mutual and a bank to 
be named later.
89
 
 
The deliberate juxtaposition of Paulson’s attempt to secure a bailout from Congress for the 
banking industry with public funds and the evident wealth of the Goldman alumni in attendance 
sets the tone for the rest of the article: a sardonic commentary on the situation of a financial 
industry in need of rescue whose members seem anything but needy.  It also nicely captures the 
predicament around the issue of bailing out banks that was being widely discussed at that 
moment: that to allow the financial industry to collapse would be courting uncharted disaster (as 
had been more than adequately demonstrated via Lehman’s collapse), while the doling of money 
out of public coffers to the well-heeled and highly self-regarding financial industry, whilst many 
people lost their homes and jobs with little to no aid afforded to them, carried with it a stench of 
repugnance that would require the holding of one’s nose.  After offering a powerful description 
of Goldman’s humbling in the face of the market’s assault against it and other financial 
institutions like it,
90
 the article goes on to describe the degree to which personnel who had 
worked for Goldman had also worked in government to make the point of the problematic 
coziness between the financial industry and government.
91
  To complete its sardonic account of 
this event, the piece finishes by detailing how former Goldman Sachs CEO and then current New 
Jersey Governor, Jon Corzine, is given a toaster with the Goldman Sachs logo on it after making 
his speech at the gala.  This purposeful reference to the cheap, metallic, mass-manufactured 
household appliance is used in such a manner to emphasize the extent of Goldman’s fall of grace 
and to drive home the extent to which financial industry’s prestige had fallen in the wake of the 
crisis. 
The broad contours of this theme of the financial industry’s fall from the lofty heights of 
power and esteem are also apparent in the article “Makeover”.  The setting of the narrative in 
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“Makeover” is also that of a gathering of members of the financial industry.  This time, the 
gathering is a corporate charity gala founded by broker Rob Davis, head of a non-profit with the 
eyebrow-raising name of “Hedge Funds Care”.  The acid sarcasm in the piece of author Kate 
Julian is palpable in her recounting of the event’s purpose, as she pointedly describes how the 
aim of Davis’ efforts was to “benefit two very different causes: it would raise money for child-
abuse prevention (an issue he has been concerned about since his days as a public-school 
teacher), and it would provide image rehab for his beleaguered colleagues.”92  Julian goes on to 
sarcastically comment on the impact of the economic crisis on the financial industry’s reputation 
in her description of the scaled-down level of luxury at the 2008 gathering of “Hedge Funds 
Care”,93 and she also establishes a connection between previous financial scandals and the 
current crisis
94
 in order to create a theme of ongoing malfeasance on the part of the financial 
industry.  The overall message in “Makeover” appears to be that the financial industry is so 
thoroughly morally corrupt that even its attempts at improving its image smack strongly of such 
corruption and, therefore, should be subject to not only suspicion but also ridicule and hostility.   
The tarnished public image of the financial industry is again the primary theme in the article 
“The Oath”.  Similar in tone and substance to “Goldman Trust” and “Makeover” in its sarcastic 
and cynical account of the evidently highly self-interested concerns of the financial industry over 
its tattered reputation after the event of the crash, the narrative in “The Oath” is set at a gathering 
of aspiring business professionals with MBAs meeting at a bar in mid-town New York to 
celebrate a book launch on the subject of corporate ethics.  Notable in the article is its use of a 
literary equivalent of a split-screen that functions quite similarly to the way Treasury Secretary 
Paulson’s hand-wringing for a bailout before Congress is juxtaposed against the gathering of the 
Goldman alumni gala in “Goldman Trust”.  Specifically, author Ben McGrath makes a point of 
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mentioning in the opening of the article that Senate hearings on reform legislation of the 
financial industry were happening at the same time as the book launch gathering.
95
  The 
juxtaposition of the two scenes in the opening of the article – the business aspirants gathered to 
chat about how to reform the tattered reputation of their career field of choice in the wake of the 
crisis and the Senate hearings looking into the plethora of misconduct and even illegality 
committed by Wall Street – serve to indicate to the reader immediately that the gathering will be 
looked upon dimly.  A similar brand of dark humour to that found in “Goldman Trust” and 
“Makeover” is also clearly present in “The Oath”: McGrath provides a wry, sarcastic attack on 
the book’s two authors,96 goes out of his way to make one attendee of the gathering look like a 
complete buffoon in his highly awkward attempt to defend the much-maligned actions of 
notorious Goldman Sachs Vice-President Fabrice Touree,
97
 and uses another attendee’s lack of 
historical knowledge regarding the Hippocratic oath as a basis to continue his sarcastic 
skewering of business right until the very end of the article.
98
  Other similar ironic, humorous or 
exceptional interest articles in the category of finance and real estate also roughly parallel the 
approach and tone of the three articles discussed above in their criticism of these industries and 
particular individuals working in them,
99
 though a more sober and serious tone is struck in some 
of the six articles that were focused on the Bernie Madoff scandal.
100
  As a body, they perform 
the function of being a counterweight to the generally serious and fairly emotionally-detached 
approach that is a hallmark of The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis.  To say that they are light 
fare, however, would be mistaken: a deep sense of anger at those deemed responsible for the 
crisis or associated with its genesis, even if masked by wit and exaggeration, is the most common 
element that pervades the articles of this subcategory. 
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On the whole, it can be asserted that the articles in The New Yorker which focused on the 
financial and mortgage industries – regardless of whether they were of a critical commentary 
type, a biographically-centred investigational journalism narrative style, or a witty and sarcastic 
variety – tended to mostly emphasize institutional and systemic phenomena (even in articles 
where this was implied indirectly via narratives that centred on the fundamental corruption of 
such industries), and this approach does seem broadly in alignment with the aforementioned 
characterization of The New Yorker as a serious periodical providing sophisticated, relatively 
dispassionate journalism in contrast to populist or tabloid style invective from either the left or 
the right ends of the political spectrum.  In the end, The New Yorker does appear to attribute a 
large share of responsibility for the crisis of 2008 to the financial and mortgage lending 
industries that had become synonymous with the unethical, if not illegal, practices that were held 
by many to have led to the crisis, but in giving this verdict the magazine seems often to take 
pains to point out and emphasize the systemic and institutional complexity that it seems to have 
so intently integrated into its definition of the crisis. 
 
Missing Tales of Trauma?  The Minimal Emphasis on Foreclosure and Unemployment in 
The New Yorker’s Coverage of The 2008 Crisis 
As was discussed in detail in the section above concerning the discourse of the presidential 
radio addresses, the issues of home foreclosure and unemployment were particularly emblematic 
of the 2008 crisis in the discourse of mainstream media narratives.  These two issues received 
extensive attention in both the presidential radio addresses and in the cinematic discourse on the 
crisis and were indeed at the forefront of much of the popular consciousness in the United States 
concerning the crisis: homes with foreclosure signs in front of them and the relatively sudden 
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joblessness of millions were the most direct and tangible signs of the crisis for many.  Despite 
this being the case, neither foreclosure nor unemployment received particularly extensive 
coverage as issues in The New Yorker.  While these issues did receive a degree of attention in 
The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis, they tended to be mentioned as adjuncts to other 
subjects and topics such as the economy in general, financial reform legislation, and government 
relief programs.  As such, the relative absence of coverage in The New Yorker specifically on the 
issues of home foreclosure or unemployment (out of the ninety-two articles analyzed, only five 
were found in which either foreclosure or unemployment were clearly the principle subject of 
discussion) is surprising and in need of discussion. 
It can be speculated that the quite minimal amount of coverage dedicated specifically to the 
human impact of the foreclosure crisis and mass unemployment as issues of the 2008 crisis may 
be related to the particular character of The New Yorker as a middle to upper-middle class 
periodical, whose coverage of the crisis appeared to largely eschew affectively-loaded stories in 
favour of drier, less emotive subject matter such as government policy.  That so few articles 
focus specifically on either foreclosure or unemployment, and that these issues are mostly 
secondarily addressed in connection to wider systemic issues, seems to suggest that The New 
Yorker’s coverage frames them as epiphenomena of more deep-seated, fundamental issues that 
were seen as primarily responsible for the crisis, and that therefore the ‘real’ story of the crisis, to 
which the lion’s share of coverage is dedicated to, is focused on such fundamental issues.  This 
interpretation would explain to a significant degree the relative dominance of articles on 
systemic phenomena, especially those focused on matters of government and policy: the 
character of The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis certainly suggests a general valuing of 
stories based around ‘cold hard (and complex) facts’ over stories designed primarily to arouse an 
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emotional response.  In this sense, it is probably not an exaggeration to say that The New 
Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 crisis was substantially more head-oriented than heart-oriented.  
This overall cerebral nature of The New Yorker’s coverage, corresponding to the perceived 
character of its imagined public, can therefore be considered a significant possible reason why 
topics such as home foreclosure and unemployment were highlighted much less than one might 
have suspected them to be given their prominence in the discourse of the 2008 crisis more 
generally.  These two issues, which were certainly amongst the most prominent and emotionally-
charged topics in the discourses of the presidential radio addresses and the films that were 
analyzed in this project, decidedly take a back seat in The New Yorker’s coverage to 
intellectually challenging but drier topics such as the complex set of interrelations between 
different financial actors, the regulatory structure of the U.S. financial industry, speculation on 
the behavioural psychology underlying the behaviour of market participants, and the institutional 
histories of both government agencies and private corporations.   
When the topics of home foreclosure and unemployment were the focus of given articles in 
The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis, these issues were generally treated in relatively 
dispassionate manner, which again was somewhat surprising given their often emotionally-
charged treatment in the wider discourse of the 2008 crisis.  This further supports an 
interpretation that The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis was one in which all likelihood was 
substantially shaped by the particular image it seemed to want to project as a magazine: one of 
serious, thoughtful journalism delving frequently into the brass tacks of what happened and how 
it happened as opposed to one of stories designed to tug on heartstrings or channel popular 
passions.  This seems largely (though not totally) borne out in the three articles in The New 
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Yorker’s coverage that were specifically on the issue of foreclosure: “Eviction” (November 24th 
2008), “The Ponzi State” (February 9th 2009), and “Cash for Keys” (April 6th 2009).  
“Eviction” by Peter J. Boyer is a fairly lengthy article that has its narrative situated in the 
foreclosure hotbed of Akron, Ohio.
101
  The article uses the perspective of Donald Fatheree, a 
sheriff’s deputy tasked with executing eviction orders, as the point of departure for its stories of 
those who are losing their homes.  An almost casual grimness pervades the opening story told in 
“Eviction” as Fatheree is followed along in the midst of performing one of his rather joyless 
duties: attempting to evict a resident from a foreclosed house.  The opening passage of the 
article, with its description of how Fatheree “drove his black-and-gold cruiser into one of 
Akron's dying neighborhoods and came to a stop in front of a small white wood-frame house”,102 
in a town “so beset by foreclosures (there were several hundred last month) that it often takes a 
year or more for a foreclosure to result in an eviction”,103 immediately establishes both in style 
and in substance just how routine the foreclosure crisis had become by late 2008.  What comes 
next in the narrative however is anything but routine: the small house to which Fatheree is 
described as driving up to ends up being that of Addie Polk, a ninety-year-old woman who is 
laying inside the house after apparently shooting herself in the chest on account of being 
distraught at being evicted from her home.
104
  It is at this point that the article then does a pivot 
from the level of the personal to the wider political level, essentially reverse-engineering the 
story of the foreclosure crisis from the opening story of the discovery of the wounded Polk.  It 
goes on to detail how Cleveland Democratic Congressman, Dennis Kucinich, learned of Polk’s 
story and how it prompted him to take a particular interest in the mortgage industry’s predatory 
lending practices targeting the elderly, as was clearly the case in Polk’s story,105 and it also uses 
the figure of former real estate agent and broker, Lolita Adair, to further flesh out the widespread 
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malpractice of mortgage lenders in the period preceding the crisis.
106
  Following this, the article 
gets into the nuts-and-bolts of how the subprime housing bubble evolved into a wider financial 
crisis by detailing how bad loans were sliced up, sold to government sponsored enterprises, such 
as Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, who then resold the loans as securities to investors who were, 
however, on the hook when these loans defaulted in large numbers, prompting the government to 
step in to support teetering financial companies with public money, a policy that the article 
quotes critics as calling “privatizing profit but socializing risk.”107  The article, although centred 
on the very emotional issue of foreclosure, does not so much highlight human pain and loss so 
much as it explains the policies and regulatory framework that enabled the inflating of the 
subprime bubble and how this played a major part in what was to become the debacle of 2008.  
Another article on the topic of foreclosure, “The Ponzi State”, takes a fairly similar approach 
– that of beginning the narrative with the personal (in the form of stories about the plight of 
particular individuals) to get to the wider political and economic dimensions of the crisis – to that 
taken in “Eviction”.  Whereas the narrative of “Eviction” was framed by the tale of Addie Polk, 
in “The Ponzi State” what frames the narrative at its outset is not a particular person but a place: 
the state of Florida, one of the worst epicenters of the foreclosure crisis.  “The Ponzi State” also 
starts by describing a scene in a specific geographical place to give a location to its narrative
108
 
and then proceeds to tell the stories of a number of Florida residents impacted by the foreclosure 
crisis.  A theme of migration from more northerly areas of the United States to sunny Florida, a 
doomed journey for the many, who ran into the mostly unforeseen disaster of the housing 
collapse, is apparent as the origins from outside Florida of all the persons discussed in depth in 
the article are highlighted.  It is at that point, with the setting of the narrative established and 
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some homeowners’ stories having been outlined in brief, that the article starts to get into its 
primary theme of how the subprime crisis evolved and eventually played out in Florida: 
This is one of the places where the financial crisis began. Florida has epitomized the boom-and-
bust cycle of American business ever since a land rush in the nineteen-twenties ended with the 
devastating hurricane of 1926. The state's economy depends almost entirely on growth--that is, 
on new arrivals and the wealth they generate in construction and real estate [...] Only Nevada has 
a lower proportion of native residents than Florida. The state's growth machine did not depend 
on higher education or high-paying professional jobs; it depended on real estate and sunshine. 
Tourism and migration allowed Florida to become a low-tax, low-wage state, where living was 
relatively cheap. [...] In exurban counties like Pasco, property taxes were kept low to attract 
homebuyers, and the schools and fire stations that new arrivals expected were often paid for with 
bond issues floated on the projection of future growth--a system that Ben Eason, who owns 
Creative Loafing, an alternative weekly in Tampa, also likened to a Ponzi scheme. [...] By 2005, 
the housing market in Florida was hotter than it had ever been, and the frenzy spread across all 
levels of society. Migrant farmworkers took jobs as roofers and drywall hangers in the 
construction industry. Nearly everyone you met around Tampa had a Realtor's license or a 
broker's license or was a title agent.
109
 
 
What follows this ‘setting the stage of the disaster’ scene over the course of the narrative of “The 
Ponzi State” is a detailed description of the house of cards of the subprime boom, which in many 
respects echoes that described in “Eviction” but with an emphasis on the particularly Floridian 
manifestations of the housing boom and bust.  The article outlines the contours of the Florida 
housing bust through its citing of how an overreliance on pro-growth state government policies, 
a lack of regulation and oversight at the federal level, the political influence of the development 
industry, and the flow of cheap money from major financial institutions such as Washington 
Mutual fuelling the housing bubble together formed a complex system in which “the diagram of 
moral responsibility looked like an inverted pyramid, with the lion's share belonging to the 
banks, mortgage lenders, regulators, and politicians at the top.”110  As in “Eviction”, the human 
costs of the foreclosure crisis take a decided backseat to an emphasis on its institutional origins. 
To conclude the discussion of The New Yorker’s coverage of the issue of foreclosure here, 
the sole other article in The New Yorker which focused on this topic – a topic that was 
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pervasively covered in many other popular mediated depictions of the 2008 crisis – in the 
approximately two years of The New Yorker’s coverage that was reviewed and analyzed was 
“Cash for Keys” by Tad Friend.  “Cash for Keys” has a good number of parallels with both 
“Eviction” and “The Ponzi State”, particularly in how it takes a specific story and then 
extrapolates the general story of the subprime crisis from that story, connecting it to the wider 
crisis of 2008.  “Cash for Keys” begins in much the same way that “Eviction” begins through 
establishing the scene through the perspective of a person involved intimately in the foreclosure 
process: a real estate agent by the name of Leo Nordine.  Also paralleling “Eviction” is how a 
similar air of ordinariness under circumstances that otherwise would seem very less than 
ordinary is projected through the opening sentence’s description of how “Leo Nordine turned the 
front-door key and cat-footed into one of his three hundred homes, a four-bedroom in South 
Gate”111 as well as through other references to the casual familiarity with which Nordine goes 
about his daily business.
112
  After an early anecdote about Nordine’s stumbling across the 
presence of a family living in one of his foreclosed homes and the provision of some 
biographical information on Nordine, “Cash for Keys” then goes on to establish the larger scene 
of the housing collapse at the state level, much like “The Ponzi State” did with Florida, but now 
with reference to another epicentre of the subprime meltdown, California: 
Since 2005, new foreclosures have more than tripled, to 2.2 million in 2008. This year, the figure 
could go even higher. [...] The collapse has come as a particular shock in the Golden State, where 
flipping houses was a sport and a pastime. More than five hundred and thirty thousand 
Californians are licensed to sell real estate [...] Eight of the nation's top fifteen subprime lenders 
were based in Southern California; between 1997 and 2006, as housing prices in the state more 
than tripled, loan money sloshed into houses and then out for Escalades and Jet Skis. In 2006, 
two out of five first-time home buyers in California put no money down, relying on a variety of 
"loan products" whose nicknames foretold trouble, at least in retrospect: "liar loans"; "piggyback 
loans"; "neg am loans"; "Ninja loans" (No Income, No Job or Assets); and "exploding" or 
"suicide" loans. [...] The correction has been severe. Sixty per cent of the homes sold in 
California in January had been foreclosed in the previous twelve months, and banks, which 
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traditionally lost about thirty per cent of their investment when they sold a foreclosed home in 
the state, are now losing sixty-five to seventy per cent.
113
 
 
This passage does well in capturing the scale of the foreclosure crisis in California and it is in 
this respect that “Cash for Keys”, like “Eviction” and “The Ponzi State” demonstrates the usage 
of a narrative style in which the personal is used to get to the systemic, wide-scale political-
economic. 
However, while “Cash for Keys” does parallel the two already-discussed articles in The New 
Yorker’s coverage of the subject of foreclosure in this respect and in some others, it is distinct 
from “Eviction” and “The Ponzi State” in that it goes into considerable detail on some of the 
ugliest aspects of the foreclosure crisis such as the threats of violence against those involved in 
the process and the filthy, unsanitary conditions left inside some of the foreclosed properties.
114
  
The inclusion of such more overtly emotionally-charged and disturbing details in “Cash for 
Keys” gives it a considerably more visceral feel than either “Eviction” or “The Ponzi State”.  As 
such, this article can in some ways be considered an anomaly amongst the generally rather 
cerebral and emotionally-restrained coverage of the foreclosure crisis in The New Yorker.   
The other issue discussed widely in the discourse of both the presidential radio addresses and 
in the films on the crisis but which received almost no coverage dedicated to it in The New 
Yorker was unemployment.  A scant two articles were classified as being focused directly on this 
issue: this was much less coverage than was expected for a subject so widely discussed in other 
popular discourses of the 2008 crisis.  The relative absence of articles focused on unemployment 
specifically in The New Yorker’s coverage is hard to explain.  While it can be ventured that this 
absence could be due to the fact that unemployment was discussed as a side topic in some of the 
articles from other categories in which The New Yorker’s coverage was classified into (such as it 
was in some articles that were classified in the categories of ‘the economy in general’ and 
246 
 
‘government and governance’), this still does not adequately answer why so few articles were 
focused on unemployment proper.  Indeed, it can be speculated that the almost complete absence 
of articles focused specifically on unemployment might be on account of the same reason that so 
few articles specifically on foreclosure appeared in the pages of The New Yorker: that 
unemployment too was perhaps largely regarded as an emotionally-oriented epiphenomena of 
the 2008 crisis which took a decided backseat to the magazine’s coverage of ‘the real issues’ of 
the crisis, issues of great complexity that belonged principally to the domains of government, 
policy, and regulation.  In any case, unemployment certainly mattered, but the stories of the 
travails and difficulties of the jobless, of lives and families put in harm’s way by an economic 
crisis which wiped out millions of incomes and left some with almost nothing, were not the 
stories The New Yorker’s brand of journalism was interested in telling for one reason or another.   
Beyond having so few articles centred on the subject of unemployment, The New Yorker’s 
relative lack of emphasis on this issue is further evidenced by the quite short amount of coverage 
that is provided in the two articles that do appear.  At 940 words and 790 words long 
respectively, neither “Nice Work If You Can Get It” (March 2nd 2009) nor “Take Two” (May 4th 
2009) are particularly long pieces, and each of them approach the issue of unemployment in 
considerably divergent ways.  “Nice Work If You Can Get It” discusses the dynamics between 
unemployment, employment and wages, making an argument that, although millions of 
Americans have lost their jobs, those who have managed to hang on to theirs have actually seen 
their wages rise,
115
 and in this sense it is as much about employment as it is about 
unemployment.  The article elaborates on how “during the past two decades companies have got 
significantly better at responding quickly to changes in the marketplace”116 through their 
adoption of systems geared towards just-in-time-production, yet it is also particularly critical of 
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corporate downsizing, describing how “after the credit crisis erupted, in September, companies 
wasted no time: as fast as consumer spending was plummeting, businesses were cutting payrolls 
even more aggressively.  Companies have always wanted to do more with less; nowadays it's a 
positive obsession.”117  Notably, there are no person-centred narratives in “Nice Work If You 
Can Get It”, which further gives a rather abstract and clinical feel to an article on a subject that 
one might have expected to have been given a different, more humanized treatment considering 
the widespread and multifaceted character of its impact.   
The second article focused on the issue of unemployment; “Take Two” for its part is 
essentially a quirky and highly sardonic piece about a group of people attending a class of 
JumpStart NYC, “a free, government-funded program that is training laid-off Wall Streeters for 
new careers.”118  Somewhat surprisingly, “Take Two” actually doesn’t tend to focus on the 
travails of unemployment: the majority of the article is used to explain the character of the 
JumpStart NYC program and offer bits of biographical background of some of its participants.  
In fact, what is most notable in the article is its extremely sarcastic and harsh treatment of the 
unemployed, former Wall Street employees.  Their abilities and general competence are 
questioned (if not mocked) in several passages,
119
 in all likelihood on account of the lingering 
resentment of the financial industry given its central role in the making of the 2008 crisis.  This 
interpretation is further reinforced by the conspicuous fact that the names of the former 
employers of the participants in the program – most of them major financial firms – are almost 
always highlighted.  All in all, while “Take Two” is centred on the issue of unemployment 
through its focus on the out-of-work Wall Street workers enrolled in the JumpStart NYC 
program, the former careers of these individuals weighs heavily on the overall narrative thrust of 
the piece: the subtext is that, in causing such massive economic damage to a nation and an 
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accompanying sharp rise in unemployment, those in the financial industry who themselves lost 
their jobs are especially deserving of their fate.  This kind of coverage of the subject of 
unemployment – taking pot shots at unemployed Wall Street workers enrolled in a state-funded 
second career program – was not the kind of coverage of unemployment that this writer 
anticipated as being that which would be representative of a major American magazine’s 
coverage of an economic crisis that had rendered millions of people jobless through no fault of 
their own.  
Whatever the reasons for the relative absence of specific coverage on the issues of home 
foreclosure and unemployment in The New Yorker, that so comparatively few articles on these 
two subjects were published, is a distinctive characteristic of this magazine’s rendering of the 
crisis as a major event affecting the lives of many people.  That The New Yorker appeared to 
display a bias towards publishing hard news on issues such as government policy and the 
regulatory environment of the financial industry, as opposed to human interest stories on issues 
such as foreclosure and unemployment, could indicate that its editorial board felt that the former 
were of greater significance to an understanding of the crisis, more suitable subjects for the kind 
of journalism The New Yorker was known for, more of a match for the tastes and interests of The 
New Yorker’s readership, or some configuration of these three in whatever ratio.  In any case, the 
combination of a lack of articles specifically on the issues of home foreclosure and 
unemployment in The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis, the overall emphasis on the broad 
political and economic significance of the crisis over the personal and human impact of it in at 
least two of the three articles on foreclosure, and the rather brief and unexpected treatment of the 
issue of unemployment in the little coverage that it was afforded (a mere two articles, both brief, 
appearing in two years of coverage, one as much on the subject of how those still employed are 
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seeing rising wages as it was on unemployment; the other an essentially unsympathetic piece on 
the down-and-out former Wall Street workers training for work in new career fields) raises a 
number of interesting questions that perhaps can only be answered through further research on 
the coverage of home foreclosure and unemployment as issues of the 2008 crisis in other 
periodicals.  It is perhaps suffice to say at this point that both the amount and the nature of the 
coverage of these two issues in The New Yorker were not in line with the extent and manner in 
which they were more generally treated in the discourses of the presidential radio addresses and 
the films on the 2008 crisis that were examined in this study nor that which was apparent in the 
wider mediascape of American mainstream media journalism’s coverage of the crisis in general.  
These issues were essentially non-issues in The New Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 crisis during 
the period of analysis, and why this was the case is in need of further scholarly exploration 
certainly.       
 
Crisis Without Borders: Perspectives on the International Dimensions of the Crisis 
While the categories that were established in analyzing The New Yorker’s coverage of the 
2008 crisis which have been discussed up to this point have featured articles that focused on the 
crisis in an almost exclusively domestic American context, a distinct category of articles which 
touch on the international dimensions of the crisis was also established as part of the 
classificatory scheme through which The New Yorker’s coverage was organized in this project 
and is presently in need in discussion.  While the key feature of the articles classified in this 
category is that they focus to a significant extent on aspects of the 2008 crisis (or what was often 
referred to internationally as ‘The Global Financial Crisis’ or ‘The Great Recession) outside of 
the borders of the United States, they on the whole do not depart completely from integrating the 
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situation of the economic crisis in the United States into their discussions.  It is often the case in 
these articles that issues and events in the United States are discussed in a comparative context 
with issues and events related to the crisis occurring in other countries, or the complexity of the 
relations between events happening in the United States and events in other countries is 
highlighted in them.  In total, three articles were classified in the international category: “Lost” 
(March 9
th
 2009), “Continental Drift” (March 30th 2009) and “Debtor States” (April 12th 2010). 
Before discussing each of these three articles, two things should be noted.  First, it is notable 
that only three articles of such a character were found in the coverage of The New Yorker 
throughout the period of analysis.  This was perhaps a somewhat less than expected degree of 
coverage considering the extent to which the crisis had expanded to parts of the world outside the 
United States during the period of analysis of approximately September 2008 to September 2010.  
Whether such a relative lack of coverage of the international dimensions of the crisis reflects a 
deliberate decision on the part of the editors and writers of The New Yorker to focus the vast 
majority of their coverage on issues and topics focused primarily on the United States is a matter 
of speculation; however, one might postulate that the decidedly domestic emphasis of The New 
Yorker’s coverage may be representative of a strategy on the part of this magazine to cater to 
what it saw as what was most important, relevant, or interesting to the imagined public which it 
sought to address, a public which was undoubtedly overwhelmingly composed of American 
citizens.  Second, it is also notable that the particular international context of all three articles 
that were classified in this category was Europe or a European country.  Again, while whether 
this was a deliberate choice or essentially fortuitous is a matter of speculation of course, there is 
perhaps some cause to suspect that a combination of reasons may be responsible for this being 
the case: that it is not entirely by chance.  One reason for one particular article in this category 
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having been focused on a European country could be that the banking collapse in Iceland (the 
subject of the article “Lost”) was a major international story at the time of its occurrence and 
during its aftermath, and this might be why it received coverage in The New Yorker despite the 
fact that Iceland is far from being an economic or political powerhouse whose economic fortunes 
had the ability to strongly impact other major countries and their economies.  One might also 
speculate that the apparent suddenness of the Icelandic banking collapse paralleled in some 
important respects the unanticipated near-collapse of the American financial system as well as 
having occurred essentially concurrently with the outbreak of the U.S. banking crisis and was 
therefore considered highly newsworthy on account of these coincidences. 
Beyond the specific case of the international newsworthiness of the subject of the meltdown 
of Iceland’s banks in “Lost”, and while the rationale for the focus on Europe more generally in 
the internationally-focused coverage of The New Yorker is difficult (if not impossible) to 
determine definitively, a few potential reasons stand out as candidates (whether alone, or in 
combination) for why this ended up being the case.  Amongst such potential reasons are the 
status of many European countries as ‘advanced economies’ or ‘first world countries’ with 
modes of production and standards of living which are in many ways similar to those of the 
United States, the heavily interlinked historical experience of suffering major economic crises on 
both sides of the Atlantic (most notably during the Great Depression era), and the fact that the 
early stages of what was to eventually become recognized as the Eurozone crisis (a development 
of major significance in the context of what had become in many ways a global economic crisis 
by late 2008/early 2009) occurred or was recognized as occurring during the period of analysis.  
Whatever the actual reasons or causes for the international component of The New Yorker’s 
coverage of the 2008 crisis being specifically focused on Europe, it is indeed highly salient that 
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this continent and countries in it were chosen as the primary subjects of articles which focused 
substantially on the crisis outside of American borders and thus ended up representing the 
international dimensions of The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis when other continents and 
countries could have been chosen instead.  Kinship (or perceived kinship) of one kind or another 
between the United States and Europe (or European countries) in the face of economic crises is 
certainly implied by the particular selection of Europe and European countries in The New 
Yorker’s 2008 crisis coverage.   
As mentioned above, the first internationally-focused article to appear in The New Yorker’s 
coverage of the 2008 crisis, “Lost”, was centred on events in Iceland related to the banking 
collapse that began in that country in late September of 2008.   Telling the story of how the chain 
of events which began with the deregulation of Iceland’s banks ultimately ended in what would 
go down in history as the biggest banking collapse of any country when proportionally measured 
to the size of its economy,
120
 “Lost” is an article that stands out from the other two pieces of 
journalism classified in the international category in that its narrative remains squarely focused 
on events in Iceland for the most part as opposed to discussing Iceland in parallel with other 
parts of the world, especially the United States.  The world outside Iceland doesn’t quite 
disappear in “Lost” but rather recedes deep into the background of the article only to re-emerge 
into the narrative occasionally, most often as the harbinger of disaster.
121
  Throughout the article, 
the perspective from which the narrative is told shifts repeatedly between many different 
characters and many different scenes that author Ian Parker encounters during his journey in 
Iceland, giving an overall dizzying, disorienting feel to the piece.  This approach may be an 
intentional narrative strategy meant to emphasize the disorientation of Icelanders who 
experienced a rocketing ascent into previously unknown affluence in the boom years of the 
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Icelandic banking industry only to have it all go in the opposite direction with even more 
blinding speed.  Indeed, a degree of credibility to such an interpretation seems evidenced in what 
appears to be the scattered presence of a theme in the article of a dream-like state coming to an 
end in a rude awakening.
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  Such a theme of a heady upward journey into prosperity ending in 
sudden, sobering calamity was certainly one which was clearly substantially present in two of the 
films on the crisis that have been analyzed above, and that it reappears in The New Yorker’s 
international coverage of the 2008 crisis is of significance: the myth of Icarus’ wings melting on 
his skyward journey comes most readily to mind as a tale that most aptly captures such a theme 
of the ambitious drive toward giddying heights ending in abrupt disaster; of the intoxicated quest 
for better and better, more and more, ultimately imploding into catastrophe.   
On the whole, “Lost” in many ways broadly resembles some of the biographically-oriented, 
investigative-style pieces of journalism that have been discussed above except in that the article 
tells the story of a country and its situation instead of telling the story of an individual.  This 
quasi-biographical approach seems apparent in how, over the course of “Lost”, numerous 
particular details of Iceland’s history and culture are used to build the article’s primary narrative: 
the specific story of how Iceland went from a small, somewhat sleepy country with a rather 
simple and substantially state-controlled economy to a glitzy darling of international finance 
before plunging headlong into insolvency.  Arguably, the story of the demise of Iceland’s 
banking industry and the accompanying misery and social instability its collapse brought is in 
this way meant to reflect back onto The New Yorker’s readership the ‘truth’ of the narrative of 
the disastrous deregulation of the American financial industry in the period preceding the 2008 
crisis as well; this policy, more than anything else, is at the root of the 2008 crisis, as is 
evidenced by Iceland’s parallel experience of financial deregulation which ended in the obscene 
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enrichment of a tiny elite and bestowed a crushing burden on the nation at large that would 
ultimately have to be shouldered by its people.  This overarching narrative basically makes a 
case that once critically necessary government regulations were rolled back, reckless and 
irresponsible financial companies went on to play a lead role in plunging both Iceland and the 
United States into economic crises, thus building a case that, in the absence of strong 
government regulation, such firms are dangerous by their very nature, irrespective of their 
countries of origin.  Or in other words, unrestricted private interests in critically important 
sectors are antithetical to the common welfare approach that should be a guiding principle of a 
nation state.  The overall Keynesian-style stance of the The New Yorker – that the state has a set 
of important roles to play in ensuring the smooth operation of markets – comes across here. 
The approach taken in “Lost” of focusing specifically on the crisis experience of Iceland, but 
pointing out enough similarities of that experience so that it is evocative of many of the 
malpractices of the American banking industry, is substantially different in character than that 
taken in either “Continental Drift” or “Debtor States”.  By contrast, these two articles focus 
heavily on directly comparing the experience of economic crisis in the United States and Europe, 
and they do so as often to highlight differences between the two as they do to highlight 
similarities.  For example, as its title is suggestive of, the article “Continental Drift” discusses the 
divergent strategies of the United States and Europe in dealing with the economic crisis.  
Specifically, the article explains that, in its efforts to combat the crisis, the United States 
government is focusing on trying to restart economic growth even if that means taking on more 
national debt, whereas European governments’ approach to fighting the crisis with economic 
stimulus has been much more conservative on account of them being much more debt-adverse by 
comparison. Both nuanced and more overt differences between the U.S. and Europe on the 
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subject of how to deal with economic crises are commented upon in the article, and a key 
argument is advanced that salient differences in the cultural memories of the economic crises, of 
Weimar hyperinflation in Germany during the 1920s and American deflation during the Great 
Depression in the 1930s, are a critically important reason for differing American and European 
policies in the face of economic crises.
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  The focus on the comparative approaches of America 
and Europe in dealing with the crisis in “Continental Drift” seems reflective of an overall 
tendency in The New Yorker’s coverage of emphasizing policy matters related to governments as 
the front line of what was being done to combat the crisis: the crisis, in The New Yorker, is 
construed as an event related to governance above and beyond all other issues.  The recognition 
of the cultural and historical differences of American and European responses to the crisis, 
indeed of the differences in the very perception of what the crisis actually entailed,
124
 is 
representative of the generally intellectually-oriented, policy-heavy character of The New 
Yorker’s crisis coverage, and it can be postulated that its rendering of such coverage is connected 
to the magazine’s perception of the inclinations of its subscribers as well as to the image that The 
New Yorker sought to project of itself as a provider of a certain type of advanced, thoughtful 
journalism.  It is also possible that The New Yorker’s mostly American readership is a factor in 
the article adopting a weak, but still noticeably pro-American, position in its criticism that 
Europe is essentially hoping to benefit from American and Chinese stimulus efforts while trying 
to avoid making substantial stimulus efforts of its own.
125
  In this sense, it could be said that 
while The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis on the whole could be characterized as fairly 
objective and detached, in its internationally-oriented coverage a soft nationalist position is 
discernible.   
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The kind of comparative, policy-centred approach apparent in “Continental Drift” is also 
evident in the third and last article that was classified in the international category, “Debtor 
States”.  “Debtor States” discusses some of the differences between the U.S. and Europe in terms 
of their respective policy approaches in the face of the economic crisis, specifically focusing on 
the situation of the financially troubled American States as compared with some of the 
financially embattled so-called ‘PIIGS’:  the Eurozone countries of Portugual, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece and Spain.  The opening of the article – “Another year, another crisis”126 – captures the 
dreary sense of ongoing economic distress, now globalized to a considerable extent, that was 
present a year-and-a-half after the near-collapse of the U.S. banking sector in the fall of 2008.  
This almost tired tone here suggests that the crisis seemingly no longer commands riveted 
attention, this being a marked difference from the often on-tenterhooks, breath-holding character 
of The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis from September 2008 until approximately the late 
spring or early summer of 2009.  Instead, the threat of imminent, catastrophic collapse seems to 
have receded at this point and has been replaced by a weary recognition of ongoing difficulties 
that have been set in motion by the series that began in the fall of 2008.  After a brief outlining of 
the some of the general similarities of the respective economic difficulties of state-level 
governments in the United States and of the economically shaky PIIGS countries, the article then 
quickly changes tack and adopts the overall position that financially-stressed U.S. State 
governments are in reality better off than those of the debt-stricken European countries in 
question.
127
  Similar to that which seems discernible in “Continental Drift”, a soft pro-American 
bias is also detectable in “Debtor States”, as the article elaborates on how the lack of political 
unity amongst Eurozone countries and the dominance of large and economically powerful 
countries, like Germany, to distort Eurozone policy to serve their own interests at the expense of 
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smaller and economically weaker nations, is inferior both practically and morally compared to a 
long-standing American tradition of economically stronger U.S. States subsidizing weaker ones 
that is in contrast to the example of Europe because “the theory is that we [the states in the 
United States] hang together in times of trouble lest we all end up hanging separately.”128  The 
New Yorker’s coverage in this article thus remains on the whole intellectual and detached, as this 
article is at bottom one which is mostly interested in the differences of American and European 
policy history in the face of economic crises, yet a subtle but perceptible undercurrent of 
nationalist sentiment is indeed present in the article.   
There is one other notable feature of “Debtor States” that is particularly noteworthy and 
should be discussed.  In the last paragraph of the article, author James Surowiecki reiterates the 
pragmatic advantages of the American approach to economic crises versus that of Europe, 
stressing how Europe could benefit from the painfully learned nineteenth century experience of 
the United States’ lack of support for particular States which were floundering in the face of 
economic crisis conditions and the ultimately negative impact this had for the country as a 
whole: 
The European model would do more harm than good, as American history shows: in the early 
eighteen-forties, after the bursting of a credit bubble, many states found themselves in a debt 
crisis. The federal government refused to bail them out, and eight states defaulted--a move that 
cut off their access to credit and helped sink the economy deeper into depression. The U.S. did 
then what Europe is doing now, putting the interests of fiscally stronger states above the interests 
of the community as a whole. We seem to have learned our lesson. If Europe wants to be more 
than just Germany and a bunch of other countries, it should do the same.
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What is probably most remarkable in this passage is that the historical perspective on economic 
crises in it stretches back to well before the Great Depression.  This was a pronounced rarity in 
The New Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 crisis.  While appeals to the court of history as 
simultaneously the ultimate judge and best guidebook on how to deal with the 2008 crisis 
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appeared frequently enough in The New Yorker, it was extremely infrequent that any events 
before the Great Depression were referenced in the magazine’s coverage of the 2008 crisis 
whatsoever.  As such, “Debtor States” represents a notable anomaly in The New Yorker’s overall 
coverage of the crisis.  Furthermore, when taken together with the other two articles classified in 
the international category, it can be ventured that another part of the significance of this closing 
paragraph is that it frames the affinities between the American and European experiences of 
economic crisis as deeper than what might at first seem apparent.  In The New Yorker’s coverage 
of the 2008 crisis in a strictly American context, the Great Depression was almost the exclusive 
historical terminal point of reference; however, in the single instance of this particular 
internationally-oriented article the historical parameters of the magazine’s discourse on the crisis 
is extended to a point prior to 1929.  “Debtor States” thus stands as a highly atypical extension 
into both geographic space and historical time amongst The New Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 
crisis, which overwhelmingly was focused on events within the United States from 1929 
forward.  The crisis, as rendered here, is part of both a larger cultural and historical picture. 
In summary, the articles that were classified in the international category of The New 
Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 crisis, however limited they are in number, do say something 
about the worldview of this magazine.  While American and European differences in the face of 
economic crisis may be significant and quite worthy of discussion, and while it cannot be denied 
that a soft nationalism uncharacteristic of The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis on the whole 
pervades the articles of this category, the implicit underlying message that can be taken from the 
almost exclusive joint Euro-American nature of The New Yorker’s international coverage of the 
2008 crisis is that the contemporary experience of economic trauma of Americans is in many 
ways kindred to that of Europeans, that America and Europe share a long and overlapping 
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history of economic crises from which much can be learned, and that the policy challenges to 
governing elites on both sides of Atlantic share a good deal in common.  This message is 
important: as mentioned above, any other regions or countries could have been selected for 
treatment in The New Yorker’s international coverage, but they were not.  Although not explicitly 
stated, deep cultural and historical commonality between Europe and the United States is 
implied.  The appeal to unity and sacrifice in the face of economic crisis which is highlighted in 
the last paragraph of “Debtor States”, of the need to elevate common interests above particular 
interests, certainly seems to touch upon some Western values held in common by both America 
and Europe (such as the people being the ultimate, indisputable source of political authority and 
their welfare being the compass-point to which governance should be aimed) as well as touching 
on some aspects of the historical experiences of economic crises that both also share in common. 
A trans-Atlantic world marked by significant overlap in values, history, and challenges is 
conjured in these articles.  It can therefore be said that The New Yorker’s coverage of the 
international dimensions of the crisis construct a deep kinship between the experiences of 
America and Europe that is not paralleled by any similar constructions of kinship between 
America and any other countries or continents.  “Us, and those like us” is the message. 
   
Moments of Reprieve and Refinement?  The Crisis through Miscellaneous Coverage 
Amongst The New Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 crisis from September 2008 to September 
2010, a number of articles were published which defied easy classification into the six categories 
that have been discussed above.  Given the highly heterogeneous nature of these articles, the 
category into which they have been grouped together has been entitled ‘miscellaneous’.  As is 
suggested by its title, this category, consisting of nine articles (or just under 10% of all articles 
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that were analyzed), is one based not on the overall coherence of the articles classified under it 
but rather upon the commonality of their resistance to easy classification.  While it is difficult to 
say a great deal about them as a group beyond emphasizing their relative heterogeneity, it can be 
asserted that these articles contribute to the richness of The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis 
by virtue of their non-belonging to the other categories already detailed.  Some of the articles 
classified in this category tended to be fairly serious and factually-oriented in nature (such as 
“Hangin Tough”130 and “Greater Fools”131), but most tended to be variously quirky, tangential, 
literary-oriented or artistically-oriented in character. 
Towards the quirky, tangential, literary or artistic end of the spectrum, one subject that 
appeared in two articles from the miscellaneous category that straddled the intersection of 
politics and literature was that of the apocalyptic collapse of society or civilization.  Two articles 
in The New Yorker’s coverage of the crisis were centred on what might be called ‘the fantasy of 
decline’ in their expressions of the kind of worlds that would or could potentially be left in the 
wake of the economic crisis if it were to worsen substantially.  That both articles were published 
during the darkest period of the crisis when the economy had not bottomed out and when the 
extent of how bad things would get was still an unknown appears to be relevant to their having 
quasi-apocalyptic, end-of-civilization-as-we-know-it tinged themes.  The first of these, a short 
article entitled “The Pits” (December 8, 2008) takes the reader on an imaginary journey of what 
would become of the giant construction pits of unfinished buildings in New York City in the 
event of a full slide into economic depression.  While author Nick Paumgarten initially stresses 
that, despite imaginations to the contrary, the future New York City will pretty much look as it 
does currently,
132
 he then goes on to take a fair degree of creative and artistic license when 
discussing the future of “The Pits” to which the title of the article refers: 
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What will become of the pits? Can we turn them into half-wild swimming holes, like the granite 
quarries of New England? Ring them with barbed wire and convert them into debtors' prisons or 
internment camps for the culprits who structured synthetic C.D.O.s? They'd make excellent ha-
has, for livery horses or livestock. Corn mazes. Extreme-cockfighting arenas. Or perhaps they 
could serve, over time, as urban tar pits, entrapping and preserving in garbage and white brick 
dust the occasional unlucky passerby for the scientific edification of future generations, if there 
turn out to be any. Or they could become parking lots.
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The evident bitterness, sarcasm and dark humour in most of Paumgarten’s description of what 
kind of unlikely purposes the pits could be used for (until his somewhat dry finish on the 
potential of them becoming parking lots) appears to signal a degree of cynicism of and 
frustration at the situation of the crisis, a cynicism and frustration likely shared by many in The 
New Yorker’s readership.  In particular, his mention near the end of the article that “whoever 
ends up owning it all [all the space left vacant in New York City because of the crisis], after the 
foreclosures and the workouts are done, holds out for the big payday”134 serves to reinforce the 
overall impression of a strong sense of bitterness and jadedness being present in the article and 
evidences that Paumgarten is essentially playing to his audience in adopting this approach. 
While the image of what the New York cityscape could or would be like in a second Great 
Depression in Nick Paumgarten’s mind’s eye was at the centre of the imaginative fantasy 
narrative of economic collapse in “The Pits”, a quite different perspective on the theme of the 
economic end of the modern world is provided in “The Dystopians” (January 26, 2009).  The 
narrative of this extended article is principally held together via the author’s discussions with, 
and profiles of, a number of individuals who possess various dystopian-oriented views 
concerning the eventual collapse of Western society.  Among such figures featured in “The 
Dystopians” are boat-dwelling bourgeois survivalist/author/blogger Dimitri Orlov, dystopian 
author James Howard Kunstler, gold-obsessed currency and commodities trader Jim Sinclair, 
former hedge fund trader and ‘Black Swan’ theorist Nassim Taleb, economic doomer/survivalist 
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Gerald Celente, survivalist and Alaskan Independence Party chair Lynette Clark, and free 
Vermonter Dennis Steele.  The article details the perspectives of many of these figures 
concerning what they see as likely to be forthcoming when the basis of the civilization they live 
in begins to break down or collapses completely, and it concludes at the scene of the rather 
unconventional gathering of the Vermont Independence Convention.
135
  The tone of “The 
Dystopians” is variously curious and mocking, and the article is clearly meant as an entertaining 
exposition for New Yorker readers of the views of a heterogeneous subculture of people whose 
economic prognostications of the future of Western civilization are certainly intriguing and not 
without some insight but also lacking in popular acceptance and credibility.  What these two 
articles say, more than anything else, is that contrary to the beliefs of a tiny minority, life after 
the crisis will be very much the same as it was, with the problems of the moment remaining 
problematic.  The dreams of collapse are framed as escapist fantasies that only those with half-
baked worldviews have the luxury of entertaining themselves with: everyone else will have to 
resign themselves towards dealing with reality as it is and as it will be, with all its warts.    
Another article classified in the miscellaneous category which seems very much meant for 
the amusement or bemusement of The New Yorker’s readership also focuses on another relative 
micro-group with strongly-held but not popularly-endorsed views.  “Ayn Crowd” is a short 
tongue-in-cheek article about a group of Ayn Rand fans who have gathered at a New York City 
restaurant “for ice water and grilled cheese and a discussion of Objectivism--the philosophy, 
expressed in Rand's novels, that celebrates the individual over the collective, and argues that 
laissez-faire capitalism is the only just social system.”136  Similar to “The Dystopians”, the tone 
of author Lizzie Widdicombe in “Ayn Crowd” is also sarcastic and mocking137 and it is likely 
that the choice of publishing an article on this gathering of Rand fans in The New Yorker was to 
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portray them as slightly nutty ‘true believers’ of a libertarian vein whose principle philosophical 
views, especially manifest in their political-economic dimensions, had just been so forcefully 
discredited in the eyes of many due to the debacle of the economic crisis.  As in “The 
Dystopians”, but even more forcefully and sarcastically, the airing of this odd little clique’s 
visions of how the world should work in The New Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 crisis seems 
calibrated to underscore their marginal status.  In doing so, The New Yorker also takes a not-so-
subtle swipe at what had been the mainstream manifestation of such ideas until the crisis hit: the 
deregulatory approach that had been so zealously adopted and preached by figures such as Alan 
Greenspan and other neoliberal economists that had so recently led to the market meltdown.      
Outside of “Ayn Crowd”, two other articles classified in the miscellaneous category had 
literary-oriented themes substantially integrated into their narratives: “It Happened One Decade” 
(September 21, 2009) and “The Very Rich Hours” (February 12, 2010).  “It Happened One 
Decade” reaches back to the decade of the 1930s to shed light on the 2008 crisis, touching upon 
not only the literature of the depression-darkened ‘dirty thirties’ but also on other artistic and 
cultural forms of that decade such as films, photography, and musicals.  The article provides 
critical commentary on the aesthetic, political and ethical dimensions of art in the representation 
of suffering during the Great Depression
138
 and seems directed toward individuals in The New 
Yorker’s readership who already have a certain base-level of knowledge of the nuances of such 
subjects.  The remaining literary-based article classified in the miscellaneous category, “The 
Very Rich Hours”, is built around the reviews of The Privileges and Union Atlantic, two recently 
published novels that “deal intelligently with the implications of the recent crisis, and are 
especially acute about the moral alienation of greed, and about how hungry amoralists might use 
and abuse the idea of the family in order to nourish their ruthlessness.”139  While most of “The 
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Very Rich Hours” is spent reviewing the two novels in detail, in the opening and concluding 
sections of the article author James Wood alludes to how the concept of money undergirds the 
narratives of both novels through his referencing of some of Marx’s writings on the subject of 
money
140
 and it is in such a fashion that Wood ties his review to the crisis that started in 2008, 
writing that “Trapped in the implacable cash nexus of the recent recession, we have all had time 
to reflect on money's demonic brilliance, watching it pose as the bond of all bonds while it has 
really acted as the universal agent of divorce.”141  Quite like “It Happened One Decade”, “The 
Very Rich Hours” is an article clearly oriented toward the well-read in particular and its 
inclusion as part of The New Yorker’s discourse on the 2008 crisis should be understood in this 
regard.  Finally, two other articles that were classified in the miscellaneous category, “Big Art, 
Big Money” (March 29, 2010) and “Shadow Building” (May 17, 2010), also focus on aesthetics 
or aesthetically-related subject matter that bears a connection to the 2008 crisis in that both have 
the story of the newly opened Goldman Sachs global headquarters in lower Manhattan as an 
integral part of their respective narratives on the subjects of visual art and architecture.
142
  They, 
along with “It Happened One Decade” (and to lesser extent, “Ayn Crowd”), represent a 
qualitatively distinct vein of discourse in The New Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 crisis which, 
although of a rather cerebral character, diverges from the majority of the magazine’s 
institutionally-oriented coverage of the crisis through its catering to literary and artistic 
sensibilities.  The inclusion of such articles is arguably for the pleasure of intellectual stimulation 
more so than the educational provision of hard news, the latter being the stock-in-trade of the 
magazine’s coverage of the crisis. 
In summary, it can be said that, on the whole but with a couple of exceptions, the articles 
classified under the category of miscellaneous tended to be relatively peripheral pieces that were 
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chiefly about themes, subjects or topics related to the 2008 crisis rather than being focused on the 
crisis itself per se.  The crisis, being the major event it was, effectively functions as the launching 
point for these stories, stories which do say something about the crisis or that strongly related to 
it in one way or another, but which also diverge substantially into relatively unconnected 
domains.  These articles nevertheless say something important about The New Yorker’s coverage 
of the 2008 crisis.  Some of them seem to carry in their content and tone the political slant of The 
New Yorker as a centre-left publication catering to a readership that in all likelihood has 
relatively similar political sympathies and perspectives.  That several of them were in the main 
focused on artistic or quasi-artistic themes and subjects such as art, literature and architecture 
and were often of a fairly advanced character is an indication that The New Yorker sees a portion 
of its imagined public as interested in articles of this kind and as being intellectually and 
culturally equipped to make sense of and draw gratification from pieces which discuss the 
intersections of politics, culture, history and the arts.  That this is the case would seem to be quite 
in line with The New Yorker’s status as a relatively middle to highbrow publication.  And lastly, 
when considering that the vast majority of The New Yorker’s coverage of the 2008 crisis tended 
to focus on subjects, issues and topics that could be best described as being of a ‘hard news’ 
variety, many of the articles classified in the miscellaneous category can potentially be 
understood as reprieves of a sort from the generally heavy, serious, and very ‘real world’ 
anchored nature of the vast majority of The New Yorker’s crisis coverage.  The presence of 
articles on subjects as various as the speculation of economic dystopia, the mobilization of 
groups with extreme and often popularly-discredited political and economic views, the life and 
literature of decades gone by, and the politics and aesthetics of contemporary art and art practices 
together serve to provoke the interest, amusement, bemusement, as well as the historical, 
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political and artistic sensibilities of The New Yorker’s imagined public and in doing so they 
could be said to function as light-grade counterweights to the otherwise often grave coverage of 
the crisis that this magazine featured, as was also the case in some of the ironic, humorous, and 
special interest articles classified in the category of finance and real estate (although these tended 
to be considerably more aggressively emotive in character, as has been detailed above).  In 
including such articles amongst its broad coverage of the 2008 crisis and issues, topics and 
subjects related to the crisis, The New Yorker thus cultivates a certain textual texture to its overall 
rendering of the crisis that seems meant to correspond to its imagined public: for the most part, 
the crisis is to be regarded as a quite serious affair that must indeed be taken very seriously, but 
that does not however preclude that there should be moments when other sensibilities of its 
readership should rightfully be engaged in their experience of this magazine’s coverage.  The 
inclusion of both in its coverage of the crisis underscores the depth of The New Yorker as a 
publication that seeks to engage its readership along multiple dimensions, and this in itself says 
something about the perceived character of the implied public to which this magazine’s articles 
on the crisis were addressed.  
  
The New York Review of Books 
In order to make further analytic purchase in this study on the particular nature of the coverage 
of the 2008 crisis in The New Yorker and to provide a richer sense of the periodical-based 
discourse on the crisis more widely, coverage on the subject of the crisis from The New York 
Review of Books that appeared over the course of the approximately two-year period that began 
in September of 2008 was also examined.  While sharing a good deal in common with The New 
Yorker in that it can also be considered a relatively centre-left publication with a readership in 
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possession of high cultural capital whose income and net worth are substantially above the 
American national average,
143
 The New York Review of Books also has some salient differences 
that distinguish it as well from its fellow New-York-based magazine.  The first such 
distinguishing feature of The New York Review of Books is its circulation base of 135,000 copies 
per month.
144
  While this figure is quite large for a literary periodical,
145
 it is just a fraction of the 
circulation of The New Yorker.  Accordingly, although The New York Review of Books does 
share with The New Yorker the commonality of having a relatively affluent readership, mostly of 
a centre-left political affiliation, who are in possession of fairly high levels of cultural capital, its 
public seems to be of a substantially more narrow, potentially even ‘elite’ character.  Second and 
somewhat related, The New York Review of Books is a periodical that is primarily literary-
oriented as opposed to news-oriented.  In this sense, while The New Yorker does contain some 
literary-oriented pieces such as book reviews amongst its mostly journalistic offerings, in the 
case of The New York Review of Books it is somewhat the reverse of this model: news-oriented 
pieces do appear, but they appear as the relative exception amongst what is in the main literary-
oriented material.  This predominant focus of The New York Review of Books on literary-oriented 
material as opposed to news-oriented material also potentially evidences a more highly educated 
and sophisticated readership given the relatively high levels of intellectual and cultural capital 
associated with the indulgence in such specialized material.  Based on both of these distinctive 
characteristics, it can be postulated that The New York Review of Books is a publication whose 
public is substantially more narrow in scope than that of The New Yorker – a public perhaps 
drawn to a magazine which considers itself, and is considered by other prestigious publications, a 
highly culturally and intellectually engaging elite institution of American readers and perhaps 
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even of readers worldwide
146
 – and that its coverage of the 2008 crisis would in some ways be 
reflective of this. 
 
Expert (Economic) Knowledge and the (Over)View from Above: The New York Review of    
Books’ Coverage of the 2008 Crisis 
Above and beyond all else, two related features seem characteristic of The New York Review of 
Books’ coverage of the 2008 crisis: the magazine’s almost exclusive reliance on what may most 
accurately and productively be called ‘experts’ in the fields of economic and financial thought as 
authors for its articles, and the corresponding and distinctive ‘big picture’, overview-style 
character of the pieces written by these authors.  On the subject of this first feature of ‘expert’ 
authors, of the ten articles on the subject of the crisis that were published in The New York 
Review of Books between September 2008 and September 2010, the vast majority of these pieces 
were authored (or co-authored) by world renown, widely recognizable figures in economics and 
finance such as Nobel prize-winning economists Joseph Stieglitz, Paul Krugman and Robert 
Solow, major award-winning economic historian and Keynes biographer Robert Skidelsky, and 
billionaire investor, author and philanthropist George Soros.  Individually or in collaboration, the 
members of the very gilt-edged group composed of Stieglitz, Krugman, Solow, Skidelsky and 
Soros are responsible for eight of the ten pieces.   While perhaps not as recognizable as the five 
distinguished figures just mentioned, this pattern of having experts as authors also holds for the 
two other articles on the crisis published in The New York Review of Books, which were written 
respectively by highly reputable economics journalist, analyst and author Jeff Madrick
147
 and 
esteemed British-American author and journalist John Cassidy.
148
  It is therefore the case that all 
of the articles on the crisis in The New York Review of Books that were examined in this study 
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were written by individuals who are highly regarded and often internationally recognized experts 
on economic and financial affairs.  The New York Review of Books’ editorial selection of such a 
stable of expert authors to write on the 2008 crisis in its pages is significant in what it says about 
The New York Review of Books as a publication, its imagined public, its particular depiction of 
the crisis, and it is indeed matters related to such considerations that are presently in need of 
further elaboration. 
While much could be hypothesized on what roles are played by experts of various types, 
what the nature of expertise is, and what social factors are key in constituting the nature of ‘the 
expert’ and expertise, exploring these issues in detail are beyond the scope of this study and a 
simplistic and perhaps even rudimentary notion will be advanced here instead, one drawn out of 
the experience of analyzing the articles on the 2008 crisis as found in The New York Review of 
Books.  In the context of The New York Review of Books’ coverage of the 2008 crisis, the expert 
is he who ‘knows more’ and ‘knows better’ than pretty much everyone else (save fellow experts 
perhaps) on a given subject or set of interrelated subjects.  Furthermore, in The New York Review 
of Books’ coverage of the 2008 crisis it is apparent that the exercise of such expertise is not just 
limited to the expert’s ostensible higher understanding of the objects of his expertise or his being 
able to explain that understanding to others, but that it also crucially involves the provision of 
prescriptive action on that related to his expertise.  In other words, expertise consists not merely 
of knowing but also of telling, of recommending courses of action on the basis of superior, 
authoritative knowledge.  In this sense, the expert’s role in the articles on the 2008 crisis in The 
New York Review of Books is not only that of providing superior knowledge but also of 
answering a series of questions which ultimately point to a single, central question in one way or 
another, the question of ‘What is to be done?’  This dual role of the expert as the repository of 
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unsurpassed knowledge and the authority on what action is to be taken is evident in the character 
of the articles on the crisis which are authored by the ensemble of economic experts featured in 
The New York Review of Books.       
The double role of the expert apparent in The New York Review of Books coverage of the 
crisis that has been outlined above seems manifest principally in two often highly interconnected 
tendencies that were discernible in the articles that were analyzed: an overall tendency on the 
part of the authors towards providing extremely wide-ranging analyses of an often highly 
complex character in their pieces and a quite notable tendency of them recommending specific 
prescriptive courses of action on the subject of what should be done in response to the economic 
crisis.  Beginning with the former, whereas it was generally the case that most of the articles on 
the crisis in The New Yorker tended to discuss particular aspects of the economic crisis (such as 
how the subprime mortgage bubble became so dangerously inflated or what particular ways of 
distributing stimulus funds would be most productive in jumpstarting the economy), the majority 
of the articles published in The New York Review of Books display a tendency to attempt to grasp 
the crisis in a noticeably wider-ranging manner, often emphasizing the wholeness of the crisis as 
a totality rather than concentrating on the relative importance of what could be considered its 
individual constituent parts or particular compartmentalized aspects of it.  This kind of bird’s eye 
approach deployed in the articles of The New York Review of Books appears to be representative 
of an attempt by the authors to establish what they saw as the fundamental causes and mechanics 
of the crisis and to consequently advance arguments regarding what kinds of corrective actions 
were necessary and how these should be implemented.  Particularly noticeable in this regard is 
how the articles on the crisis published in The New York Review of Books feature analyses that 
go into great detail in their explanations of what led to the crisis and in their arguments of what 
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should be done to combat it, with their authors often delving into the complexities of economic 
theory to articulate both their diagnoses and prescriptions. 
This kind of attempt at getting at ‘the fundamental’, of establishing a deeper level of 
understanding accessible exclusively via the realms of economic theory, reminiscent of the way 
the articles from The New Yorker that were classified under the subject of the psychology of 
money and markets postulated fundamental psychological causes of the crash, is evident for 
example in the article “He Foresaw the End of an Era” by John Cassidy.  In what is partially a 
review of George Soros’ 2008 book, The New Paradigm For Financial Markets: The Credit 
Crisis of 2008 and What It Means, and partially an exposition of Cassidy’s own considerable 
knowledge of the network of factors that led to the economic crisis, Cassidy lays the groundwork 
for his take on the 2008 crisis by highlighting what he sees as a theoretically significant feature 
of a market system with respect to the circulation of economic information vis-a-vis that 
characteristic of non-market economic systems
149
 and then proceeds to outline what he refers to 
as a dominant perspective on the basis of the role of financial markets in a capitalist economy.
150
  
However, at this point in the article Cassidy challenges some of theoretical premises underlying 
this perspective (a perspective he notes as being dominant), particularly what he sees as some 
theoretical weaknesses of the Chicago School’s ‘efficient markets hypothesis’ and ‘rational 
expectation hypothesis’151, and links them to the economic meltdown.  He ultimately argues that 
the historical record shows that piecemeal, on-the-fly assembled solutions to banking crises are 
rarely successful and that the only way to prevent a progressive deepening of the United States’ 
economic freefall is through the federal government stepping in with taxpayer money to socialize 
the financial industry’s losses152 and in this way links his theoretical and historical expertise to 
the articulation of a specific course of action to be taken.  The rigour of Cassidy’s explanation 
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thus effectively functions to support the authority of his recommendations: the article, in its 
length, level of theoretical complexity, and historical reach functions as a signifier of the special 
status of its author as authority on the subject in question and one in possession of the expert 
knowledge necessary to prescribe what should be done. 
A similar connection between theoretical and historical expertise and the authority to 
advocate a specific course of action is also apparent in “The Crisis & What to Do About it” by 
George Soros.  Soros establishes right at the beginning of this late 2008 article what he sees as 
the outstanding characteristic of the crisis: that it came not from a particular singular cause 
outside the wider financial system itself but rather from within the financial system as a whole.  
In a manner highly reminiscent of Cassidy’s critique of the Chicago School’s theoretical 
weaknesses, Soros goes on to cite this failure of the financial system from the inside as evidence 
of theoretical failings in the dominant paradigm of financial markets: 
The salient feature of the current financial crisis is that it was not caused by some external shock 
like OPEC raising the price of oil or a particular country or financial institution defaulting. The 
crisis was generated by the financial system itself. This fact—that the defect was inherent in the 
system—contradicts the prevailing theory, which holds that financial markets tend toward 
equilibrium and that deviations from the equilibrium either occur in a random manner or are 
caused by some sudden external event to which markets have difficulty adjusting. The severity 
and amplitude of the crisis provides convincing evidence that there is something fundamentally 
wrong with this prevailing theory and with the approach to market regulation that has gone with 
it. To understand what has happened, and what should be done to avoid such a catastrophic crisis 
in the future, will require a new way of thinking about how markets work.
153
 
 
Soros then goes on to recount the now familiar story of the development of the subprime housing 
crisis, of how the reckless and sometimes predatory lending of cheap money by profit-hungry 
financial and mortgage institutions to particularly vulnerable borrowers led to double digit rises 
in housing prices, resulting in a boom which eventually went bust when these borrowers began to 
default in record numbers.
154
  However, what seems to be of the most crucial importance to 
Soros is how the story of the subprime mortgage crisis’ spillover into the wider financial system 
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is a secondary or derivative phenomenon of the theoretically-based, fundamental causes of the 
crisis.
155
  To further evidence his expert knowledge, this already signified to some extent through 
his rejection of the popularly-held crisis narrative of ‘irresponsible’ lending and borrowing as 
root cause, Soros then goes on to explain how the origins of the dominant paradigm he speaks of, 
‘market fundamentalism’, are to be found in the deregulatory policies of the Reagan and 
Thatcher regimes which eventually led to the overextension of credit and leveraging
156
 – a 
phenomena that he (and others such as Jeff Madrick
157
) saw as sowing the seeds of the housing 
boom that resulted in the 2008 meltdown.  Like Cassidy, Soros also prescribes a specific course 
of action that should be taken, though his prescription of reviving regulatory levers of 
government which were formerly used in the 1950s and 1960s
158
 is a solution that seems 
designed more to prevent a future economic crisis than to deal with the immediate issues of the 
2008 crisis.  Nevertheless, the pattern of expert analysis based in theory – in other words, based 
in the treatment in an abstract manner of issues implicated in, yet significantly removed from, the 
phenomena in question in order to explain that phenomena – followed by specific prescriptive 
remedies is apparent here as well.  
Another article from The New York Review of Books published in 2008, “What To Do” by 
Paul Krugman, shares a good deal in common with the articles by Cassidy and Soros in terms of 
its heavy theoretical and historical emphasis and in respect to how its author prescribes a specific 
course of action to be taken to blunt the economic impact of the crisis and eventually turn the 
economic tide back towards growth.  In the article, a much wider causal context for the crisis 
than that most often conventionally attributed to it is established (namely, wider than the 
conventional explanation of the subprime housing bust as the primary causal origin of the 2008 
crisis: Krugman’s approach is quite close to Soros’ in this regard), and Krugman discusses three 
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past examples of particular policies pursued by governments in the face of immediate and acute 
economic crises to demonstrate the historical depth of his knowledge.
159
  Having established the 
theoretical basis of his appraisal of the character of the problem and having given an historically-
grounded account of the tools available to address it, Krugman goes on to deliver the verdict that 
the reform of the system out of which the crisis originated must at the present moment take a 
backseat to what he sees as the urgently necessary course of action which policy makers 
worldwide must immediately take, which is to “get credit flowing again and prop up 
spending.”160  After offering some criticisms of the piecemeal measures taken by the U.S. 
Treasury Department to deal with the crisis, Krugman answers the question of what should be 
done to reverse the global slump once the present critical stage of crisis has been blunted with 
the answer that what is needed “almost surely, is good old Keynesian fiscal stimulus.”161  While 
Krugman’s recommendation of deploying Keynesian strategies is not particularly unique 
amongst the experts featured in The New York Review of Books’ coverage of the crisis  (indeed, a 
quite similar position is taken over a year-and-half later by Soros in ‘The Crisis & The Euro’162), 
the impressively detailed explanation he gives immediately afterwards of how the safeguards that 
were created in the wake of the Great Depression were outstripped and eroded by developments 
such as greater international capital flows and the immense growth of the shadow banking 
system
163
 does strike one as a truly expert exposition: its historical scope and level of detail 
clearly goes well beyond that of any article on the 2008 crisis that appeared in The New Yorker 
during the period of this study.  This is particularly evident at the end of the article in Krugman’s 
powerful and eloquent concluding remarks on the connection between structural issues and the 
importance of ideas,
164
 as they serve to further reinforce an overall impression of Krugman as a 
preeminent expert of his field who indeed ‘knows more’, ‘knows better’, and has the authority to 
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expound views which are deserving of very close attention and consideration.  The very title of 
the article – ‘What To Do’ – conveys the power invested in the figure of the expert and 
communicates the nature of the coverage of the 2008 crisis apparent in The New York Review of 
Books: there are simply no parallels to such an authoritative projection in The New Yorker. 
The kind of expert analysis and opinion evident in the articles discussed above, grounded in 
a wide historical context, often commenting upon advanced theoretical matters, and sometimes 
even crossing disparate disciplinary boundaries,
165
 is a distinguishing feature of The New York 
Review of Books’ coverage of the 2008 economic crisis.  The articles on the crisis appearing in 
The New York Review of Books share a commonality in that they are all highly serious, wide-
ranging pieces written by expertly knowledgeable authors who are widely recognized as the 
preeminent authorities in their respective fields.  Indeed, it can be hypothesized that, in its 
coverage of the 2008 crisis, The New York Review of Books is following an elite model of 
discourse significantly borrowed from the long-standing elite tradition of expert literary criticism 
(particularly, through The New York Review of Books’ use of the central role of the esteemed 
expert critic in that tradition) and applying the model associated with this tradition to a current 
political-economic topic.  As such, the discourse on the 2008 crisis in The New York Review of 
Books can be said to constitute a kind of discourse ‘by elites’ (considering the expert status of the 
authors of the articles) ‘for elites’ (considering both the size of the magazine’s relatively limited 
readership and the high levels of intellectual and cultural capital necessary to fully digest what is 
admittedly challenging material).  It should also be mentioned that what The New York Review of 
Books does not feature in its coverage is also of significance.  Unlike the coverage of the crisis in 
The New Yorker, The New York Review of Books’ coverage does not include shorter articles, 
articles profiling the roles in the crisis of particular figures in government or finance, or articles 
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where the author principally speaks in the first person narrative style.  The impression left is that 
material of such a nature would detract from the exclusive focus on the highly serious, expert-
authored articles that the editorial board of The New York Review of Books seems to believe is 
expected and desired by this periodical’s readership.  An elite, “fit through few” approach is 
taken: only the best, and nothing else.  It is therefore the case that the coverage of the crisis in 
The New York Review of Books can be postulated as largely reflecting the perceived character of 
this publication’s imagined public.  Arguably, this quite narrow, even elite, imagined public is 
theoretically in possession of advanced levels of cultural and intellectual capital with an appetite 
for only the highest quality of hard news and insightful analysis drawn from what that imagined 
public would likely regard as the most qualified of sources.  The omnipresence of widely 
recognized experts as authors of The New York Review of Books’ coverage of the crisis, the often 
daunting complexity and overwhelming seriousness of the articles published on the subject of the 
crisis, and the complete absence of any material to the contrary all suggest that this is indeed the 
case.  The kind of world The New York Review of Books projects in its coverage of the 2008 
crisis is a highly technical, abstract one over which the figure of the expert towers in all their 
authority. 
In this chapter, I conducted an extensive analysis of articles on or related to the subject of the 
2008 crisis that were published in The New Yorker as well as a significantly less extensive 
analysis of the much smaller number of articles on or related to this subject that were published 
in The New York Review of Books.  The goal of having done this was to gain perspective on how 
the crisis – a crisis simultaneously economic and political – was depicted in the mediated form of 
a certain vein of fairly highbrow, relatively liberal-oriented print journalism in the United States.  
The investigation of this third and final of the three case studies featured in this dissertation has 
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provided insight into how the crisis, as an event that was constructed significantly through its 
mediation, was manifest in terms of particular emphases and particular lack of emphases, 
through the attention or lack of attention given in these periodicals to particular themes and 
subjects out of a very large field of possibilities of what might have been included or highlighted.  
The character of these periodicals’ coverage of the crisis says many important things about their 
definitions of what the crisis actually constituted, what kind of moral lenses it could or should be 
seen through, what its overall significance could be said to be both for the United States and the 
world beyond American borders, as well as what should be done about it, how it should be done, 
and why given courses of actions should be pursued or not pursued.  Notably, not taking any 
action whatsoever (whether in terms of the specific or of the general, and whether implied or 
explicitly stated) was not an option that was advocated by either of the two publications in their 
coverage of the crisis.  This fact, however seemingly routine, is in and of itself significant: a 
major implication of it is that no pure market-based solution is envisioned and that finding 
solutions to the systemic issues which produced the crisis as well as emanated from it, problems 
arising out a given political-economic system, is indeed the task and responsibility of certain 
bodies and actors such as government and economic experts.  This logic, or perhaps more 
accurately said, this belief, therefore can also be said to be undergirded by a moral framework: 
that, in a society such as that of the United States, a responsibility exists amongst the nation’s 
leadership and leading knowledge authorities to attempt to fix problems of the political-
economic system and to mitigate their impact(s) upon the population of the polity.  Having now 
discussed all three case studies individually and in detail, in the next chapter, after a brief 
retrospective overview of the crisis, I will proceed to summarize them through synthesizing 
major elements of commonality across them as well as discussing key differences, especially in 
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regards to differences stemming from their respective and distinctive mediated characters.  
Following this, future directions forward for other research of a similar kind will be considered 
before some concluding thoughts are offered.   
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Chapter 5 – Conclusion 
 
Will the modern man be able to fight his tendency to be inactive, to stay silent? Besides, 
Thucydides has already said that: it’s either freedom or tranquility. You need to choose. You will 
either be free or tranquile. You can’t have both. 
 
(Cornelius Castoriadis, 1990 Radio France Internationale interview; featured in the closing scene 
of the 2012 crisis film Catastroika) 
 
Looking back over six years removed in time from the chain of tumultuous events that first 
swung fully into motion in September of 2008 with the collapse of the almost one-hundred-and-
sixty-year-old, storied financial firm, Lehman Brothers, one is perhaps surprisingly struck at how 
dated the whole sequence feels.  For a short period, much the world stood on edge with baited 
breath and the revisiting of an old ghost seemed almost nigh – that of a generalized crisis of 
capitalism ending in an extended economic depression in several leading countries around the 
globe.  However, after the frenetic and at times even panicked actions of many world leaders and 
other influential figures, the anxious holding of many breaths, and the loss of many jobs, houses, 
and dreams, that ghost seemed to recede back into the shadows. 
This is not to say of course that what transpired happened quietly or uneventfully: it did not.  
The outrage at what had happened was intense in many quarters, and in some places the streets 
burned with black smoke, wafted with tear gas, and echoed with the sounds of protesters’ shouts 
and the rhythmic beating of truncheons on riot shields.  During the period that this dissertation’s 
research spanned, amongst a kaleidoscope of events that could be mentioned, the American 
financial system received a bailout in excess of seven hundred billion dollars that was greeted 
with protests in over one hundred American cities.  Affluent and socially stable Iceland 
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experienced the largest banking collapse of any country in history.  Two iconic American 
automobile manufacturers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection and were put on life 
support by the federal government to prevent them from failing altogether.  Workers in China 
protested in their factories despite their government’s well-known and amply-demonstrated 
intolerance for dissent. The city of Toronto – hardly known for its explosiveness – became the 
site of the largest mass arrests in Canadian history when it hosted the G-20 summit in June 2010, 
and the streets of several European capitals were convulsed by repeated, and frequently violent, 
clashes between protesters and police while the future of the continent’s common currency 
appeared to be on the shakiest of legs. 
All this and much more happened in the wake of the 2008 crisis, but much of the turbulence 
did subside eventually though not evenly.  In the aftermath of the crisis a post-2008 sort of ‘new 
economic normal (of precarity)’ gradually took hold in many places across the globe and this 
development did not go unnoticed amongst many leading commentators: indeed, a post-crisis 
rhetoric of precarity to the effect of ‘in these new uncertain times’ (and a good many variations 
of such) can be said to remain on the lips of many Western governments to this very day.  The 
sense of optimism and confidence in the West that had more-or-less continued unabated since the 
triumph over the Soviet Empire seemed to have been permanently wounded by the realization 
that Western hegemony, predicated more than anything else on economic might, did not stand on 
ground nearly as firm as had been imagined.  The Western sense of invulnerability had been 
severely damaged in a way that the September 2001 attacks had not achieved: the disaster of 
2008 had come from within the very temple of Western power, and there were no evil bogeymen 
in faraway lands that could be blamed or singled out for retribution on this occasion. 
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The world-spanning economic system had choked and sputtered but not collapsed, and in 
time many in the West just seemed to carry on, perhaps not carrying on as if nothing had 
happened, but carried on nonetheless.  An overarching narrative of shock and the proclaiming of 
crisis, followed by anxious waiting to see if emergency actions could avert the worst of possible 
outcomes, followed by a slow transition back to a degree of normalcy was largely reflected in the 
discourse of two of the three case studies examined in this dissertation.  In retrospect, it is indeed 
remarkable how relatively quickly dire warnings of another Great Depression were replaced by 
business as usual (but in less certain times), more or less.  Yes, there was the expected finger-
pointing and fault-finding, the lamenting of what had happened and the promises of what would 
be done to try to prevent it from happening again, a whole quasi post-mortem – economically, 
morally, and politically – of what had been a painful and harrowing experience.  But ultimately 
the situation was stabilized, and the rhetoric of the worst of the possible outcomes was soon 
enough mostly forgotten.  However, for a brief period, there was an opening for new ways of 
thinking about how the world could or should work, a window for the thinking out of alternatives 
to the ruling world economic order, and although this fleeting moment of possibilities seems to 
have mostly passed for the time being, that it had emerged in a time of crisis is an instructive 
lesson in what might be anticipated in future large-scale economic crises that are surely to come.  
The violent fissures opened up by the convulsions of a political and economic system, whose 
truth and efficacy is all too often assumed and taken for granted, are the places where ideas of 
how the world might otherwise be different often find their most fertile soil.  Despite this though, 
it remains undeniably the case that ultimately very little of substance changed in the wake of the 
2008 crisis, and that an overall lack of transformation is what is overwhelmingly found, and this 
difficult, unavoidable fact must be addressed given that a central aim of this dissertation was to 
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examine how widely dispersed textual formations can open up fields of possibility for the 
articulation and enactment of ways of being in the world divergent from the status quo ante.  
At risk of sounding simplistic and not doing adequate justice to the subject, one way of 
explaining the absence of transformation and the continuation of the status quo is that the inertial 
weight of the existing structure(s) of institutional reality, not to mention the reciprocal relations 
between this structure and the whole set of material relations both perpetuated by it and 
supportive of it, is heavy indeed and thus highly resistant to substantial or fundamental change.  
In this sense the rips and tears in its fabric stemming from the disruptive force of the 2008 crisis 
were ultimately not many enough nor severe enough to seriously challenge its legitimacy or 
jeopardize its ongoing reproduction: these wounds to the system, however dangerous they may 
have seemed initially, were not sufficiently grave and consequently the spaces of possibility 
opened up by them were sutured closed quickly enough.  Both symbolic and material factors and 
forces are of importance here as well as interconnected.  Symbolically, though the crisis was 
undoubtedly a reputational black eye to the existing political-economic structure at the centre of 
the institutional reality of the global system of power, its fundamental ideological coordinates 
remained essentially in place.  There were no truly dangerous challenges to private property, the 
regimes and mechanisms of capital accumulation, the existence of vast disparities of wealth 
within and across societies, or the liberal-individualist philosophic underpinnings of the system.  
While even as unabashed a right-winger as French President Nicholas Sarkozy could solemnly 
claim in the immediately aftermath of the crisis that the free market was finished,
1
 the 
constellation of primary ideas supporting its continuance would remain firmly in place.  Instead, 
predictably, the language of ‘reform’ ended up being dominant.  A lack of popularly-supported 
viable alternatives to the status quo waiting in the wings was undoubtedly also a factor in this.  
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Materially, despite millions of jobs and homes being lost and despite the standard of living of 
many being detrimentally impacted to one degree or another (at least temporarily), the overall 
system of production and exchange remained functioning: the vast majority of those in the most 
affected developed countries remained fed, clothed, and housed.  In other words, many remained 
altogether too comfortable or secure to be motivated to mount any real challenge to the status 
quo (and this doesn’t even take into account the logistical and organizational hurdles to mounting 
a serious challenge).  Appetite for change of substance was not lacking altogether, yet it was 
neither intense nor widespread enough to be sustained. 
And there was of course the sticky, unavoidable question of “change to what?”  What 
alternative to the status quo could be said to have seemed present anywhere on the horizon?  
Collectivism of any flavour?  A forsaking of a life whose essentials are provisioned through the 
usage of the medium of money in favour of some kind of pre-capitalist system of exchange based 
on barter?  For most, clearly not.  Accordingly, while texts such as some of those which were 
examined in this dissertation can indeed be said to potentially open the horizons of possibility for 
meaningful action and change in the world, such potentiality must be measured again the inertial 
weight of existing institutional reality; an exceedingly complex fabric whose tightly woven 
threads are both resistant to being pierced and in possession of resilient capabilities of 
rejuvenation once pierced.  The examination of the texts on the 2008 crisis conducted here must 
be seen in this light: the possibilities of transformation some of these texts contained were on the 
whole strongly curtailed by the density and tenacity of the status quo social reality, as the impact 
of the crisis was not sufficiently disruptive to seriously endanger this status quo.          
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Case Study Summary: Crisis in Media Res 
This dissertation’s primary aim was to examine the ways in which the 2008 economic crisis 
was textually depicted as an event within and across the media of radio, film, and periodicals in 
the United States.  In accordance with this aim, the analysis that was undertaken of presidential 
radio addresses, select films, and articles from The New Yorker and The New York Review of 
Books revealed a marked degree of richness in how this event was rendered in these important, 
culturally expressive, media forms.  In particular, the analysis outlined the contours of several 
key themes and narratives that were conjured in the various renderings of the crisis examined, 
with these themes and narratives themselves being in significant part connected to and dependent 
on wider important mytho-ideological formations that provided a basis for their expressive value 
as ways of making sense of the 2008 crisis as an event.  At the bottom of all this is, the socially 
constructed, linguistically-based, and quintessentially human nature of symbolically conveyed 
institutional reality is apparent, and the complex and dynamic strength of its operative flexibility 
is something truly to be marveled at.  It is in such a manner that the core question of ‘What 
happened?’ in reference to the crisis leads to an infinite regression of other questions. ‘What 
happened?’ ultimately is connected to the question of ‘What happened to whom?’, this connected 
to the question of ‘Who are the ‘we’ to which this has happened?’, these in turn lead to other 
crucial questions, such as ‘What is our nature?’, ‘Our nature as beings?’, ‘As communities of 
beings?’, ‘What is the nature of the world we live in?’, ‘What is right?’, ‘How do we know what 
is right?’ and, finally, ‘What is to be done?’  This last question points towards the interconnected 
nature of the constellations formed amongst human social phenomena, texts, and action.  The 
experiences of people in the world provide the basis for and shapes the creation of texts which 
make sense of such experiences using culturally recognized codes, and such texts make claims 
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about the world and serve as guidebooks for human action in it.  It is therefore the case that the 
meaning of a text is never purely centred on the question of ‘What happened?’, never merely 
descriptive in character, but rather that texts are always in one form or another oriented towards 
action in the world, even when such actions are not particularly transformational in character.  
Texts are artifacts of human intent that make various claims about the world and what to do in it. 
The action-oriented nature of the texts examined in this study makes apparent the complex 
sets of relations between textual expression and the elicitation of action in the world, of how 
these texts say something about the world and in doing so also say something about what kind of 
actions should be taken in it.  That there is a relation between ‘saying’ and ‘doing’ is something 
that is discernible in many of the texts that were analyzed.  Indeed, taken collectively, the texts 
on the subject of the crisis that were examined together constitute a large and complex discourse 
that says a great deal about what happened, why it happened, and what to do about it.  What a 
given text articulated and how it was connected to the domain of action was in large part shaped 
by the sets of expectations which framed the point and perspective of its enunciation, and the 
strong institutional influence upon many of the texts examined in this study was often clear in 
this regard.  A broadcasted speech directed to a national public in a time of crisis by a holder of a 
high political office, such as the president of a country, is shaped to a significant extent by 
expectations of what such a speech should be like.  A film about an event widely recognized as 
one of major historical import affecting the lives of many is heavily conditioned by past films of 
such a kind.  An article in a periodical on a ‘serious’ news story is written with thoughts in mind 
of what journalism covering such stories should be like.  This being said, what was especially 
interesting regarding the different sets of texts drawn from the three case studies was how each 
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had some particularly salient features, themes or conceptual approaches that they emphasized 
distinctively as well as some for which they shared a good deal in common with each other. 
The presidential radio addresses for example often sought to reassure a national public that 
the American nation – an imagined community depicted as coextensive across space and time – 
would make it through the difficulties they were and would be encountering.  History was drawn 
upon heavily to support this perspective, particularly the mytho-ideological history of an 
America that had faced difficult challenges before yet had consistently emerged triumphant.  
Another significant issue that the presidential addresses sought to provide reassurance to 
Americans on was that the fundamentals of their way of life would remain intact and in 
particular that federal government would take whatever actions were necessary to prevent full-
scale, systemic financial collapse and avoid a second Great Depression.  Reassurance of this was 
particularly crucial given the paramount importance of confidence in a system predicated on 
ongoing faith in the surety of the symbolic medium of money.  Another primary intention of the 
radio addresses was significantly invested in what could be called the establishment of a ‘moral’ 
or an ‘ethical’ dimension.  Insofar as the crisis was depicted as a social calamity primarily caused 
by certain specific parties or groups, but which had inflicted economic distress on a wide scale, 
given the highly interconnected and complex character of the American economy, assigning 
responsibility for what had happened and promising that something would be done to right what 
was wrong and to try to prevent what went wrong from happening again was clearly a major 
theme in the addresses.  In short, a main function of the addresses was to moralize the crisis as a 
means of explaining it, to depict it within a moral framework that positioned it as transpiring 
within a universe of right and wrong, and to bring reassurance that what was right would 
ultimately prevail in the face of injustices done.    
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Ethical or moral concerns were even more of a prominent theme in the films that were 
examined.  The principal narrative of Inside Job for example was transparently anchored in a 
specific moral context: that the crisis of 2008 was the latest and most severe in a series of 
economic crises caused by the self-interested greed of the U.S. financial industry and that this 
was a severe social injustice in need of rectification.  Also substantially morally-centred was the 
story of the Siegels in The Queen of Versailles, as this film was in many ways a highly stylized 
critique of the super-wealthy and the morally bankrupt practices that ostensibly led to the crisis.  
Many of the references and metaphors in the two other films that were analyzed – Arbitrage and 
Margin Call – also had moral or ethical issues at the heart of their matter (albeit in a different 
way than the two documentary films), in particular through their highlighting of issues 
surrounding the moral ambiguity of actions taken in self-interest or self-preservation under 
conditions of crisis.  Moral-ethical themes and concerns were also present in many of the 
periodical articles on the crisis that were examined, though in many cases less obviously and 
prominently.  That moral-ethical issues related to the crisis in these texts were rendered in a more 
emotionally detached and intellectualized manner seems to have been on account of an 
overarching attempt at providing relatively dispassionate, serious journalism in both of the 
periodicals in which the articles in question were published.  Issues of right and wrong still 
mattered, but they were mostly not as much in the foreground of the discourse of the periodical 
articles published in The New Yorker and The New York Review of Books.  Nevertheless, moral-
ethical concerns were often still a major subject of preoccupation amongst these sets of texts: the 
relative absence of affect amongst the articles most certainly did not imply the presence of a 
moral vacuum, but rather that the seriousness of the issues should be matched by a seriousness in 
kind of their treatment in the pages of both publications. 
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Related to this overall prevalence of moral and ethical concerns, on the subject of deep 
commonality what is most detectable across the texts from all three case studies examined in this 
dissertation is a sometimes implicitly made and sometimes explicitly made moral-ethical concern 
for the collective welfare of the imagined community of the American people under threat or  
perceived threat.  While not present in all the texts that were analyzed, and while not always 
manifest in a similar way when present or to the same extent, this particular concern does seem 
to be the most common feature apparent across all three case studies.  The particular character of 
an economic crisis as a phenomenon which endangers collective welfare has much to do with 
why this is the case.  While modern market-based economic systems tend to privilege some 
groups and individuals more than others, and even prosper through the disadvantaging of some 
relative to others, a degree of widespread belief that such systems are at least functioning to 
provide a relatively acceptable standard of living to a relatively big enough percentage of a 
population is what in the main keeps such systems operational and, in keeping operational, they 
act as instruments of social cohesion and as checks on forces which push towards social 
disintegration.  The particular character of economic crises in capitalist systems represent 
moments where faith in such systems wavers since they cease operating as they are expected to 
in the minds of many
2
 and the welfare of the social whole is threatened or perceived to be 
threatened.  This threat or perceived threat to the welfare of the community at large is seen as a 
grave problem to be combated (and in this sense, whatever is perceived to threaten the security 
and wholeness of the community – however divided that community may indeed actually be in 
terms of antagonisms amongst groups in it – is always already a priori morally-ethically coded 
as negative), and it is here that a great deal of convergence was evident across many texts of the 
different case studies.  Whether it was the voice of the President of the United States assuring the 
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American people that the nation would rise above the adversity of the crisis or a world famous 
economist’s words in a prestigious periodical explaining in highly abstract and technical 
language how to avoid a second Great Depression, the welfare of the whole as intrinsically 
worthy in and of itself was a de facto compass point of meaning for a large number of the texts 
that were analyzed.  Accordingly, the 2008 crisis was, first and foremost, depicted as the crisis of 
a particular imagined community, whatever the fallacies, contradictions, shortcomings and 
ideological distortions of such a notion.  The depiction of the crisis as a threat to the social whole 
thus served as a kind of master-framework around which so many different and fascinating 
discourses of it were woven. 
While the concept of the 2008 crisis as a threat to the collective welfare of the imagined 
community of America permeates the discourse of all the case studies that were examined in this 
dissertation to varying degrees, there were some important differences in how the crisis or the 
idea of crisis itself was rendered in each that need to be commented upon.  Of the three sets of 
texts examined, the presidential radio addresses were the set that most depicted the crisis as a 
sudden and unexpected disaster visited upon the collective on account of human failings of 
character (particularly the moral and ethical failings of those deemed most responsible), these 
being epitomized through the large-scale failure of macro-economic systems.  Throughout the 
crisis and particularly so during roughly the period from mid-September 2008 to about late 
spring 2009, the presidential radio addresses often acted as a kind of ‘voice of the father’ to the 
‘family’ of the imagined American community, reassuring it that circumstances would 
eventually get better and promising action to make that happen.  In executing this, the addresses 
often drew upon the collective cultural memory of past economic crises that had afflicted the 
United States – most notably the Great Depression – in an attempt to establish an optimistic 
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narrative of resilience and hope which was in large part built upon a constellation of mytho-
ideological concepts regarding the American nation’s history of perseverance and success in the 
face of the adversity.  With respect to the assigning of blame for the crisis, the presidential 
addresses walked a line between attributing particular blame to the moral failure of specific 
parties (notably but not exclusively Wall Street), acknowledging a level of systemic or 
institutional failure (such as the failure of regulatory safeguards meant to prevent what 
happened), and from the Obama presidency forward, articulating a more generalized and 
simultaneously highly political narrative of a nation that had been traveling down a morally 
deficient and economically misguided path during the years of Republican leadership under 
George W. Bush.  Above all, the presidential radio addresses were distinctive in their 
construction of a binary ideological opposition between that associated with the crisis and that 
associated with the mythic idea of what America was about.  The speculative frenzy that inflated 
the housing bubble, the decline of savings in the face of stagnant real wages, the irresponsible 
and ultimately damaging flows of cheap credit and a general desire for easy fortunes and living 
beyond one’s means were in this way contrasted against a mytho-ideological foil of a hard-
working, responsible America whose strength and success was built and would continue to be 
built on individual initiative and enterprise, an America built firmly upon the pillars of the 
sacredness of the individual and individual liberty. 
Another distinctive aspect of the discourse of the presidential radio addresses was that their 
manner, matter, and purpose seemed to be highly complementary.  The directness and tonal 
qualities of transmitted human speech as an orality-based medium of communication was 
particularly well-suited to the principal themes the addresses focused on and to their primary 
intended effects of providing reassurance, instilling hope, and channeling popular discontent.  In 
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these respects, the presidential radio addresses on the 2008 crisis can be considered part of a 
wider and considerably older tradition of formal and semi-formal oral communication by leaders 
to communities in times of crisis, adversity and mourning.  In such difficult circumstances, the 
verbal rhetoric of the leader performs a variety of functions such as legitimizing the situation of 
crisis, providing information on the circumstances of crisis, appealing to followers for support of 
their proposed solutions, and inspiring followers to intensify efforts to achieve group objectives.
3
  
These features of the rhetoric of charismatic leadership in times of crisis, along with those 
characteristic of a more general rhetoric of charismatic leadership, which appeals to followers by 
incorporating elements such as references to history and tradition, collective identity, collective 
efficacy and hope and faith,
4
 were all apparent in one form of another in the presidential radio 
addresses as a body of discourse on the 2008 crisis.  In short, the particularly aurally-oriented 
media of transmitted human speech was a particularly apt match for the situation of addressing a 
nation in crisis in the case of the presidential radio broadcasts that have been analyzed here. 
While the discourse of the presidential radio addresses were remarkable on account of the 
degree to which they depicted the 2008 crisis as a sudden and damaging event that threatened the 
collective welfare of the social body as well as on account of the extent to which they 
contextualized the crisis in highly nationalistic mytho-ideological terms, the discourse of the 
films that were examined exhibited some salient features that distinguished it as remarkable in its 
own right.  While it is difficult to say a great deal that is comprehensive about the cinematic 
discourse on the crisis given the substantial variety exhibited amongst the four films that were 
analyzed, some general tendencies can nonetheless be noted.  First, the cinematic discourse on 
the crisis tended to be significantly more character-driven and dramatically-oriented than either 
of the other two discourses.  In three of the four films examined (Margin Call, Arbitrage, and 
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The Queen of Versailles), the plots of the film were driven by characters caught up in dramatic 
situations, and even in the single film that was not character-driven in a comparable manner 
(Inside Job) an overtly dramatic structure was present in which a large cast of characters was 
deployed to assist in moving the plot forward.  That cinema is above all a medium predicated 
upon moving images biases it toward the utilization images of individuals in motion to achieve 
its articulation of the dramatic, of ‘events’, and this dependency upon the action of characters as 
the drivers of the plot was indeed largely borne out by the cinematic discourse of the crisis: the 
idea of crisis was primarily rendered through the dramatic movement of characters on the screen. 
While the cinematic discourse of the crisis was clearly in the main based around character-
driven dramatic plots, as is indeed is the case in most films, something peculiar that was apparent 
in many of the films was how agency was set up in a restricted manner to heighten tension 
through the creation of an asymmetrical power relationship between a character or set of 
characters and a relatively agent-less set of circumstances or conditions.  In the majority of the 
films examined, dramatic tension was generated by framing the actions of characters as heavily 
circumscribed by anonymous, impersonal forces much larger than themselves and this 
asymmetrical configuration of power served in turn as the basis for much of the moral ambiguity 
that was present.  In both Margin Call and Arbitrage for example, the morally ambiguous nature 
of the actions of the main characters are derived from them being caught up in crisis situations 
that are beyond the scope of their abilities of control and the question of how they will act in 
such conditions is what creates the dramatic movement in the films’ plots.  ‘Crisis’ is in this way 
individualized: characters, put in opposition to anonymous impersonal forces that restrict their 
agency, are forced to act in self-interested or self-preservational ways despite the potential and 
even likelihood that doing so will cause damage to others.  The ugliness and grimness of the 
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situation is the face of crisis in such scenarios, and the burden of navigating a set of limited 
choices, none particularly satisfying, is placed upon the back of the disempowered individual.  
Although substantially different in many respects, this broad thrust of the idea of the individual 
or set of individuals versus anonymous and impersonal forces is also apparent in The Queen of 
Versailles.  Though there is no real comparable context of moral ambiguity present in this film, 
the Siegels do find themselves in opposition to the juggernaut force of the crisis and this 
becomes the primary mover of the film’s plot.  Tellingly, in all three of these films tension is 
expressed through the vehicle of temporal compression.  The film Inside Job is the exception 
here in the wider cinematic discourse on the crisis.  Ferguson’s film frames the threat to the 
collective welfare of the imagined community of America directly front-and-centre, and its use 
of the dramatic activity of characters comes secondary to and in support of this.  This film’s plot 
is indeed not primarily predicated on the activity of individual characters or sets of characters.  
Rather, unlike in the other three films, the outcome of the plot of Inside Job is known at the 
beginning of the film and dramatic movement is instead achieved through the demonstration of 
its already foretold narrative.  In summary, the films that were examined on the whole exhibit a 
tendency towards individualizing crisis as that which is inflicted on the individual or on groups 
of individuals but not always in the same way and with the one major exception just noted.     
Finally, distinct in several ways from the discourse of both the presidential radio addresses 
and the critically acclaimed and culturally significant films is the discourse on the crisis as found 
in the pages of The New Yorker and The New York Review of Books.  The discourse in these two 
periodicals seems particularly shaped by the institutional forces that give it form, namely, those 
of a certain style of centre-left journalism in the United States aimed at implied audiences in 
possession of high levels of cultural and intellectual capital.  This is evidenced by the marked 
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degree of attention to and emphasis on matters related to political power and governance, 
institutional structures, historical precedents, and expert knowledge (particularly on the subjects 
of economics and political economy) present amongst the articles of both these periodicals.  
Politically, the discourse of these periodicals on the crisis could be considered somewhat 
moderate.  The articles in both publications by and large favoured Keynesian-style intervention 
by government to combat the crisis for example, but also tended to stop well short of calling for 
deep-seated fundamental reform of capitalism in the United States, never mind contemplating or 
advocating the adoption of any economic system other than capitalism.  Moreover, the highly 
intellectualized character of the texts drawn from this case study distinguished it from both the 
affect-heavy, strongly mytho-ideologically infused presidential addresses and the dramatic, 
action-oriented films.  The discourse of the periodical articles was neither geared towards 
reassuring the nation that government was taking action to prevent economic disaster nor 
towards dramatically portraying crisis via the depictions of actions forced upon characters in 
conditions of crisis.  Instead, what defined the 2008 crisis in the texts drawn from this particular 
case study was that it was an exceedingly complicated problem that emerged in significant part 
out of complex and overlapping sets of institutional practices and contexts – political, economic, 
historical, and even philosophical – and that as such the measures to be taken in reaction to it 
should and would be largely the purview of those in elite circles of power and influence.        
In accordance with this particular slant of the periodical articles’ discourse, that an 
exceedingly complex problem, which had originated from deep within an intricate systemic 
machinery, would inevitably have to be dealt with by those who had access to its levers and sway 
over those with access, what really seems to distinguish this discourse from the other two 
examined in this dissertation more than anything else, beyond the sheer variety of its wide 
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topical latitude, is its depth.  ‘Depth’ here is to be understood as designating something like 
‘level of detail’ or ‘depth or complexity of analysis’, and the level of depth apparent in the 
articles on the crisis from The New Yorker and The New York Review of Books seems 
inextricably related to their particular written character.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how 
such a level of discursive depth could be achieved in either oral or audio-visual form given the 
complexity involved in rendering it in an organized and intelligible manner.  It is also along the 
lines of such a logic that the particular depth of the discourse on the crisis gleaned from The New 
Yorker and The New York Review of Books also coincides with it being the least affectively-
oriented of the three discourses examined.  The intimate, almost interpersonal nature of the 
orally-delivered communication of the presidential radio addresses and the richly emotional 
audiovisual character of the films stand in considerable contrast to the often highly technical and 
intellectual quality of the discourse in these two periodicals, raising the question of whether there 
is a relationship between the abstract disposition of writing, the ability to convey analytic depth, 
and the relative circumscription of affect among certain kinds or styles of written expression.  
The existence of such a relationship, however tentative, would go some way in helping to 
explain what seems to be a wide gap between highly sophisticated technical and historical 
knowledge as expressed in written form (and possibly only expressible in written form) and the 
apparently more affective-oriented communicatory disposition of the aural and audiovisual 
media forms examined here. 
These specific observations concerning the character of the periodical articles’ discourse on 
the 2008 crisis, however, direct attention towards a much larger set of issues concerning media 
and meaning which revolve around the following question: if different media types can be said to 
capture qualitatively different data flows as well as organize such data flows in qualitatively 
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different ways, how are these differences manifest in how the discourses of different media types 
carry within them the potential for change and transformation of the kind that has been outlined 
in this dissertation’s highlighting of affinities between texts, discourse, and action in the world?  
While no easy answers avail themselves to this very difficult question, some tentative hypotheses 
can be postulated regarding it.  From either a Kittlerian or McLuhanite perspective, the question 
of sense data is of paramount significance.  All media enter into consciousness through the gates 
of the senses, and how they mean is caught up unavoidably in a complex matrix of how the 
senses register the data of different media types, how brains process such data, how societies 
utilize the mechanisms of culture to configure the social meaning of such data, and how this 
social meaning is integrated as part of systems of belief of what the world is like, what it could 
be like, and what it should be like.  In the context of the discussions that have been conducted in 
this dissertation, these are ultimately and exclusively human issues.  They are grounded 
anthropologically in the human condition.  They are not issues that find equivalence of a 
meaningful kind amongst bacteria, fish, dogs, nor even chimpanzees. 
So what then is to be said of the questions of sense data, data flows, media types, the human 
condition and the potential of discourses to change and transform ways of being-in-the-world?  
Once again, the work of Searle on the construction of social reality is of relevance here: 
institutional reality requires language or a system that operates on the same principles as 
language.
5
  Does this not however just push the question posed in relation to what has been 
examined in this dissertation concerning the potentialities of discourses based on different media 
types to enact change and transformation in the world back one step, for could it not be said that 
the orally-based radio broadcasts, the audiovisual films, and the written periodical articles all 
could be said to operate like language to one extent or another? 
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The answer is somewhat but not entirely.  Even though each of these three does operate 
according to principles broadly characteristic of those of language, they are different forms of 
sense data and have variability in their operational codes.  As such, they have differing 
potentialities for change and transformation of the world of institutional reality.  Yet even within 
such broad differing media types there is enormous variability certainly.  Furthermore, it can be 
asserted that the differences between media types may alternatively be construed as much as 
assets toward enacting change and transformation as much as they might be perceived as 
privileging one media type as having stronger transformational possibilities than another; that 
some media types might be predisposed toward being affectively more powerful while others 
might be predisposed toward being more logically inclined but no less valuable toward the 
potential of change and transformation.  Nevertheless, taking this argument to the extreme is 
revealing: it is highly unlikely that media types of a purely visual character, and even less so 
media types of an olfactory character if they in fact existed, would provide a promising platform 
for change and transformation of institutional reality.  Indeed, when looking at the crucial role 
that written records have played in enabling the development of more and more complex forms 
of civilization throughout history, a powerful argument can be made that challenges to existing 
systems of institutional reality probably carry more chance of success if they are configured on 
the same broad grounds as that which they seek to dislodge.  In other words, if an existing 
system of institutional reality is predicated heavily upon written artefacts, an argument can be 
mounted that the challenge to it must in large part eminate in written form.  With respect to the 
arguments contained in this dissertation then, written discourse assumes a privileged position as 
a media type of potential transformational power because the status quo of institutional reality is 
itself so deeply invested in structures predicated on the written, such as transactional records, 
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highly complex written forms of valuation, politico-legal concepts enshrined in writing (such as 
private property) and protected by a corpus of written documents (namely, the law).  This is not 
to say that other non-written or significantly less writing-based media types do not have 
transformational potentialities.  It is however saying that the potentialities of such media types 
would remain limited in their ability to pierce structures of institutional reality which are largely 
predicated upon the written: if given structures of institutional reality are historically contingent 
upon certain configurations of media types, then it follows that their transformation must be too.          
Putting aside such thorny yet fascinating questions concerning sense data, media types, and 
transformational possibilities, it can nonetheless be said that, taken collectively, the three case 
studies analyzed in this dissertation testify to the richness and complexity of how the 2008 crisis 
was depicted as an event in the United States.  Similar in many respects to how other significant 
and complex events of a traumatic nature to befall a group, people or country such as armed 
conflicts, genocides, or major political and social upheavals tend to be registered widely, that the 
2008 economic crisis was registered in a wide variety of cultural forms, spanning the gamut from 
the affective to the intellectual, the individual to the institutional, and the personal to the 
political, seems highly appropriate to the wide-ranging character and impact of this event.  While 
the crisis was predominantly depicted as an event in the singular, in practice it was an incredibly 
complex patchwork of events and stories, sometimes overlapping and at other times disjointed, 
often in flux with new additions to the overarching narrative of it casting new and different light 
on stories and chapters already written.  What was known in the United States until September 
2008 as the subprime housing crisis became considered by many as a generalized crisis of 
capitalism to be compared to the likes of the Great Depression; this generalized crisis became 
recognized as being of an international scale, as captured through the labels of ‘The Great 
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Recession’ or ‘The Global Financial Crisis’; as of the present, there is a lack of consensus on 
what name should be given to the economic turmoil that crystallized in 2008 and in some 
quarters whether it can in fact be said to be properly concluded at all is an article of debate rather 
than agreement.  As such, the 2008 crisis was many things to many different people and groups 
in different places at varying temporal points, and the complexity and ambiguousness of this 
phenomenon as an economic crisis has much to do with this amorphousness.  This high degree of 
heterogeneity in the discursive constructions of the 2008 crisis seems to be quite abundantly 
reflected in the discourses of it that were examined in this dissertation.  Indeed, for the crisis not 
to have been so reflected would have done injustice to its character as an extremely complex and 
dynamic phenomenon which impacted the lives of so many in such a myriad of ways. 
 
Future Directions Forward 
Inevitably, any research can also pursue other avenues of inquiry and be expanded.  Having 
briefly considered the findings and the implications of this project, some future directions 
forward will now be outlined with an eye towards identifying other potentially productive paths 
of scholarly investigation related to those which have been taken up here. 
In this spirit, I would like now to highlight in closing a small number of broad research 
trajectories which, based on the fruitfulness of the work that has been conducted in this 
dissertation, hold great promise for informing the further scholarly exploration of the mediation 
of economic crises.  Three general and metaphorical trajectories according to which such future 
research might be oriented in the wide sense most immediately suggest themselves as being 
especially promising paths of exploration: backwards (historically), outwards (disciplinarily), 
and inwards (theoretically).  These three trajectories of research emphasis – pursuing greater 
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historical grounding, increased interdisciplinary cross-dissemination, and deeper theoretical 
exploration – each contain the potential to bring significant progress and innovation to the future 
study of economic crises and of the mediated depictions of economic crises. 
First, the relative paucity of research explicitly on the mediated representation of economic 
crises is problematic and it would be a positive development if future research explored this 
subject on a more extensive basis.  In particular, research on the historical trajectory of media 
representations of economic crises and on the representations of proto-economic crises prior to 
the nineteenth century would appear to be extremely fertile areas of analysis that would serve to 
cast the media representations of crises such as that of 2008 in a historicized perspective by 
illuminating how and to what extent the media representations of recent crises can be seen as 
genealogically related to such representations of earlier economic crises and proto-economic 
crises.  At the present moment, it appears that no established body of literature on media 
representations of economic crises per se exists, never mind an established literature that 
explores how mediated representations of economic crises have developed or changed 
historically or can be seen as connected to depictions of economic calamities prior to the 
nineteenth century (such as ‘Tulip mania’ in Holland in the seventeenth century or the British 
South Sea Bubble in the eighteenth century: no doubt many other such examples exist as well).  
This seems to be a glaring hole in the study of the mediation of economic and proto-economic 
crises.  A more robust, historically-informed body of research exploring how market crises were 
depicted in mediated form prior to the nineteenth century and how depictions of economic crises 
have developed from the nineteenth century forward carries with it the promise of building a 
much more historically informed perspective from which to approach the study of the mediation 
of recent and future economic crises. 
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Second, the scope of the general study of crises of capitalism – traditionally based primarily 
in the disciplines of politics, history, and economics – can be more intensely cross-fertilized with 
disciplines that it has up until this point either been seldom extended to or not extended to its 
potential.  The fields of rhetorical criticism, literary theory, communication studies, and trauma 
studies for example each have rich interdisciplinary potential for being integrated into the study 
of capitalist economic crises that has not up until this point been adequately tapped into, and an 
effort should be made to more fully harness that potential.  The application of rhetorical criticism 
to the study of elites’ pronouncements on the subject of economic crises for example could 
provide new understandings of how hegemony is negotiated in societies operating under market 
systems at crucial moments when the popular acceptance of such systems wavers on account of 
their ceasing to operate as expected.  The increased integration of concepts from literary studies 
into the study of economic crises can provide valuable theoretical constructs that would aid in 
understanding how narrative structures are superimposed on phenomena such as economic 
crises, such as how myths are harnessed to make sense of such crises and how the creation of 
binary categories of identification through narratives can demarcate ideological territory in 
conditions of economic crisis.  A more forceful inclusion of the study of economic crises into the 
discipline of communication studies for its part undoubtedly would provide a basis for greater 
understanding of how different sets and kinds of communicatory practices are implicated in the 
depiction of economic crises.  Greater attention to economic crises as a particular type of 
disastrous phenomena often bearing elements of traumatic character in their manifestation and 
representation can be facilitated through the cross-fertilizing of the study of economic crises with 
trauma studies, as the latter has contributed to the development of a vast corpus of knowledge 
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regarding how collective, manmade disasters such as warfare and genocide traumatically affect 
individuals and groups and sometimes have the ability to do so in a transgenerational manner.   
Third and finally, the theoretical framework for studying economic crises can be enhanced 
through a deeper recognition and exploration of their particular character as phenomena that are 
simultaneously material and representational.  Specifically, while crises of capitalism are on the 
one hand deeply rooted in the material world, in the historical material conditions, modes, and 
relations of production and exchange that are the basis for the creation of commodities and the 
provision of many of the necessities of life in market-based societies, they on the other hand can 
also be considered representational or symbolic in character in that key systemic elements such 
as value, time and labour are mediated through a variety of highly abstract representational 
systems such as prices, wages, forms of currency, credit and debt, mathematical models of risk 
and returns, and the quantification of measures of value in and over time and space.  This dual 
character of economic crises as simultaneously both material crises and representational crises is 
in need of further theoretical exploration, and the task of achieving this should be taken up as a 
target of future research on the subjects of economic crises and their causes, the mediated 
representational nature of economic crises, and the representation of economic crises in and 
across different media.  Future research on the peculiar dual character of economic crises as both 
material and representational phenomena can provide new understandings of the relations 
between the material and representational aspects of economic crises and consequently can blaze 
a trail for other studies which would further contribute to the body of knowledge concerning the 
web of relations between material and symbolic practices, both in reference to how such 
relations are manifest in economic crises and in other phenomena of a similar or related 
character. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 The broadly-based, yet depth-oriented, hermeneutical approach that has informed this study 
has proved itself a productive avenue of inquiry that can be rewardingly pursued by 
interdisciplinary scholars conducting future research into how depictions of the complex and 
ambiguous phenomena of economic crises are mediated.  The three case studies at the heart of 
this project were designed to gain understanding into how the depictions of the 2008 economic 
crisis were manifested across multiple forms of cultural expression located in different media, 
and these lines of inquiry have indeed been fruitful in the pursuit of such knowledge.  The 
broadcasted speeches of American presidents, films, and articles on the crisis that were analyzed 
highlighted the important ways in which these different forms of discourse played a crucial 
communicative role through their creation of structures of meaning through which the 2008 
crisis could be understood in the consciousness of their respective implied publics, and the 
interpretive method of analysis applied also revealed some key narrative continuities amongst 
these discourses.  Further employment of this broad interpretive approach in future research on 
comparable subjects has the potential to advance the understanding of how discourses create 
structures of meaning through which complex institutional phenomena are rendered intelligible 
and meaningful.  Moreover, such an approach can provide valuable insight into how the 
particular qualities of such discourses are in part shaped by the media from which they originate 
and the given publics which they summon and are summoned by. 
The examination of discourses of the 2008 crisis that has been conducted here has 
demonstrated the complexity of the network of interrelationships formed between social 
phenomena, texts, and publics.  Together, they form part of a complex system of interpretive 
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grids and circuits through which meaning is generated and through which a basis for action in the 
world can be established on the one hand, and through which a perpetuation of existing states of 
affairs in the world can be continued through the reinforcement of the conditions of belief 
undergirding these states on the other.  Major crises such as the 2008 meltdown do afford space 
for new ways of thinking the world and imagining how it might be otherwise – they create 
breaches in status quo structures of beliefs and serve to shake the confidence, even truth-status, 
these enjoy under normal circumstances.  Media has and will remain contested grounds in such 
instances: they can leap into and try to expand such breaches or aid in suturing them shut.  Social 
reality in a world such as ours will always have to be mediated; indeed, it is in many ways 
always-already mediated.  The modern world simply would not be, nor would have become the 
modern world in the first place, without ream-upon-ream of printed paper, audio and visual 
media mechanically-produced on an industrial scale, and vast networks of wires and signal 
systems spanning neighbourhoods, nations, continents and the entire globe.  Together, across 
time and space, such an empire of media is part and parcel of the creation of what has been and 
what is, and it will undoubtedly be of paramount significance in what is to be.  It is therefore 
certain that our reality, and our ideas about our reality, insofar as it and they are mediated, will 
require us to think deeply about the role of media, in all its different forms.  Without such a deep 
understanding of the role of media in this broad sense, the danger will remain that its role will be 
misunderstood, misconstrued, or, possibly worst of all, missed altogether.  The symbolic world is 
not an epiphenomena of reality as we know it or to the development of reality as it has it come to 
be understood – it is at the very centre – and the massive yet intimate role played by media in its 
construction, perpetuation, and potentially in its transformation, is missed only at our peril. 
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In closing, this dissertation has examined the role played by sets of texts of three media types 
in registering the major global event of the 2008 crisis in the United States of America and has 
argued that such sets of texts played a crucially important role in creating frameworks through 
which this crisis became socially intelligible and meaningful.  It is hoped that the close 
examination that has been conducted here of the three sets of texts examined has shed some light 
on how the particular histories, properties, and dynamics of these sets of texts are implicated in 
how they registered the crisis, how they configured and unpacked the meaning of this event, and 
how their mediations can be considered a part of a much larger mediated sphere whose 
functioning, however complex and opaque, undoubtedly performs a critical organizing role in the 
construction of social reality.  The intent of the project that has been executed here was to see 
how different sets of media texts came to mean under circumstances extraordinary, specifically, 
how they came to mean at a moment when the ideological structures of the world-as-it-is 
quivered, and in that aim the project has been successful.  It is hoped that future research can 
take up the torch of this inquiry and find novel and productive ways of exploring how media, 
texts and discourses are implicated in the building, maintaining, and transforming of the 
structures upon which social reality is built.  Worlds of the human do not come out of voids – 
they are built upon particular configurations of meaning, signification, and understanding – and 
this must always be kept in mind, especially amongst those who imagine and wish that their 
worlds might be built differently. 
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1 – Bank run on the Fourth National Bank, No. 20 Nassau Street, New York City.  Frank 
Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper, October 4
th
, 1873.  Library of Congress Prints and Photographs 
Division. 
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Figure 2 – Run on the Union Trust Co., Broadway & Rector St, New York City.  Frank Leslie's 
Illustrated Newspaper, October 4
th
, 1873.  Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division. 
324 
 
 
Figure 3 – Run on the American Union Bank, 281 West 37th Street, New York City. 1929. 
Creative Commons. 
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Figure 4 – A crowd mills in front of The New York Stock Exchange on ‘Black Tuesday’, 
October 29
th
, 1929; Manhattan, New York City. Bettman/Corbis Stock Photo ID 
U120116ACME. 
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Figure 5 – William Hogarth’s Emblematic Print on the South Sea Scheme. Engraving; 1721.  
Creative Commons. 
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Figure 6 – Thomas Cole’s Desolation from The Course of Empire.  Painting; 1836.  Creative 
Commons. 
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Talks”]) and the unsightliness of a balcony outside his office due refuse left on it (“The flotilla of 
[cigarette] butts on the balcony, as it turned out, was not much more unsightly than the state of 
the economy left behind by the Bush Administration. Obama inherited a haywire banking 
system, plummeting employment, a pandemic of housing foreclosures, and a deficit of more than 
a trillion dollars--an amount that has risen steadily in the months since.” [Cassidy, “Money 
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and how they each received a ‘Profile in Courage’ award from the Kennedy Library Foundation 
on account of their noble though ultimately futile actions.  After identifying Bair as head of the 
FDIC and distinguishing her in a positive manner from others who have served advisory roles in 
both the George W. Bush and Obama administrations (“Advisers with ties to New York banks 
have dominated both the Bush Administration and the Obama Administration, and Bair has 
consistently stood out for her skepticism of Wall Street and for her eagerness to confront the big 
banks.”28 [Lizza, “The Contrarian”]), the article then goes on to background her origins in small 
town Kansas (which can be read ideologically as her being representative of an outsider now in 
elite territory who is representative of the ‘every-person’, or ‘the common person’ in opposition 
to an established and entrenched elite) and to further position that background in opposition to 
the crisis at hand through associating her with the image of simpler and more straightforward 
times in the world of finance (“She recalls with nostalgia the simplicity of banking in those 
years, when children learned about the magic of compound interest by using passbook savings 
accounts, and their parents knew the lenders by name.”28[Lizza, “The Contrarian”]).  The 
article’s emphasis on nuance then begins in earnest in what might be called an ‘individual-
understood-through-the-historic manner’ through its detailing of how Bair qualifies herself as a 
Republican (“Bair has always been a Republican, as, she told me, her parents were, but she was 
quick to add that they were Kansas Republicans, in the tradition of William Allen White.” 
[Lizza, “The Contrarian”]), and, after again emphasizing Bair’s individuality some more times 
(“It [her particular non-traditional] political background] made her an odd fit in the Washington 
of 1981”28; “Bair, the one commissioner who voted against the decision [the C.F.T.C. decision to 
deregulate some energy-industry transactions, which eventually became linked to the Enron 
fiasco], wrote an angry dissent.” [Lizza, “The Contrarian”]), the issue of origins of the present 
crisis is broached through some discussion of how Bair originally came to be concerned 
regarding, what would later be referred to as unethical or predatory, subprime home mortgage 
lending practices and of the many frustrations she incurred through trying to bring adequate 
attention and action to this issue.  This establishment of Blair’s persona and political position 
(one is tempted to say the article essentially makes her out to be a maverick of sorts) eventually 
serves as a basis in the story for distinguishing her approach in the face of the crisis from that of 
other high-ranking figures, such as Timothy Geithner (“But the split [between Geithner and Bair) 
quickly became a proxy for the philosophical divide over the nature of the economic crisis and 
the correct response to it [...]The pro-Bair camp generally argues that any company that is too 
big to fail has an implicit guarantee of government support, which leads to reckless behavior.” 
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[Lizza, “The Contrarian”]).  From this point forward, most of the article discusses the nuances in 
the policy approaches of Bair and Geithner (“The New York Post recently summarized the 
dispute with a picture of Bair and Geithner dressed as characters from "Batman." Geithner "is 
doing a pretty good Joker impression outfoxing FDIC 'Batgirl' cop Sheila Bair, who's pushing for 
the busting up of ailing Citigroup," the caption read.” [Lizza, “The Contrarian”]).  However, it 
concludes with a reference to the larger frame of history, quoting Bair as saying that her ideas in 
response to the crisis is more “akin to Teddy Roosevelt's trust-busting age.” (Lizza, “The 
Contrarian”) in comparison to the policy approach taken by figures such as Geithner. 
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 2009 article, “Inside the Crisis”, by Ryan Lizza, focused on former Secretary 
Treasurer Larry Summers, does not seem to have an equivalent air of urgency as compared to 
‘Anatomy of a Meltdown’, ‘Enter, Pursued by a Bear’, and “Money Talks”.  While still 
dramatically-oriented in its rhetoric, its overall emphasis on the temporal texture of the crisis is 
one of graveness and urgency now passed (such as when it reads “On Tuesday, December 16, 
2008, as five inches of snow fell on Chicago, Obama's top advisers gathered in his transition 
headquarters to discuss the memo.” [Lizza, “Inside the Crisis”]).  The overall air of the piece is 
of one that is looking backwards upon a crisis of which the worst has now been weathered.  Such 
a retrospective tone is further and even more forcefully evident in John Cassidy’s article “No 
Credit” published on March 15, 2010.  This article is essentially a retrospective piece on the 
impact of the actions of Geithner during the height of the crisis and makes the case that Geithner 
performed well in his duties but doesn’t get the credit he deserves for this on account of the poor 
public image of the Obama’s administration’s overall stabilization plan.  The temporal frame 
established at the beginning of the article is slightly over one year prior to its date of publication, 
as a speech Geithner gave on February 10
th
 2009 is referenced.  This kind of flashback-oriented 
narrative approach is used often in the article, as is evidenced in statements such as “Economists 
are still debating what it was that ended the financial crisis and turned the economy around.” 
(Cassidy, “No Credit”) and “Once the banking panic had ended, the economy, like a patient 
recovering from a coronary arrest, began to take some hesitant steps forward.” (Cassidy, “No 
Credit”).  Somewhat similarly, the last two articles focused on particular individuals, in or 
associated with government or government-related agencies, to appear chronologically in the 
pages of The New Yorker within two years of September 2008 can also be seen as firmly 
retrospectively oriented.  The July 26
th
 2010 article, “The Volcker Rule” (also by John Cassidy), 
is Janus-faced in the sense that it is partly a retrospective on the influential career of former 
Federal Reserve Chair Paul Volcker and partly a forward-looking discussion of Volcker’s 
involvement in the proposed Frank-Dodd legislation to tighten regulation on Wall Street in the 
aftermath of the 2008 crisis.   However, it should be emphasized here that even the forward-
looking aspect of this article is coming from a perspective of the crisis now having become a past 
event.  For example, Volcker’s interest in enacting reforms for Wall Street is explained as a 
reaction on his part to a crisis that the article already effectively locates in the past (“Ultimately, 
it was Wall Street's recidivist tendencies that put new life into Volcker's reform campaign. By 
the end of 2009, firms that had been bailed out a year earlier were making hefty profits and 
setting aside big bonuses.” [Cassidy, “The Volcker Rule”]).  The last article centred on a 
particular figure of government, Jeffrey Toobin’s “The Senator and the Street” (published on 
August 10
th
 2010) focuses on Democratic Senator Chuck Schumer and seems to mostly side-
swipe the crisis.  The article touches upon the history of Schumer’s friendly ties with Wall Street 
(most of this discussion occurring in approximately the first third of the article) and also includes 
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some discussion of a bipartisan job creation bill Schumer cosponsored to spur employment in the 
aftermath of the crisis. 
30
 “Bailing Out” was published on September 29th, 2008.  “Money Talks” was published on 
October 6
th
 2008.  “Car Talk” was published on December 8th 2008.  “The Road Ahead” was 
published on April 27
th
 2009. 
31
 Holtzman states that “over the course of the day [of September 15th] the dominant media 
narrative that emerged was characterized by crisis, complexity, uncertainty, and panic” 
(Holtzman, “What’s The Problem”).  He then goes on to make an argument that it was at this 
point that a qualitative change in the general portrayal of what was happening in the U.S. 
economy took place. 
32
 Brassett and Clarke, “Performing the Sub-Prime Crisis”, 10. 
33
 Cassidy writes “If Barack Obama is victorious on November 4th, someone on his transition 
team should send inauguration tickets to Richard Fuld, the chairman and chief executive of 
Lehman Brothers.” (Cassidy, “Bailing Out”) 
34
 Stephen Labaton and Edward Andrews, “U.S. Takes Over Mortgage Finance Giants,” New 
York Times, September 7, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/08/business/08fannie.html 
35
 John Cassidy, “Bailing Out,” New Yorker, September 29th, 2008, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/09/29/bailing-out 
36
 Cassidy leaves no doubt that he considers government intervention as the sole course of 
action: 
 
Marketing such an enormous bailout to the American voters will not be easy, but history 
demonstrates that often the only way to resolve a collapse in the banking system is for the 
government to step in and socialize the losses. That is what happened during the savings-and-
loan crisis of the late nineteen-eighties, when the government set up the Resolution Trust 
Corporation to dispose of the assets of insolvent thrifts. The total cleanup cost to the taxpayers, 
in today's dollars, was nearly two hundred billion. (Cassidy, “Bailing Out”) 
 
37
 Cassidy less than obliquely references Roosevelt’s policies to support his argument for the 
need of large scale government intervention: 
 
As Obama noted last week, it is no accident that the country is confronting its worst financial 
crisis since the Depression. Gullibility and greed caused this latest calamity, but what allowed 
those basic human traits to combine to such catastrophic effect was a legal and institutional 
framework that resulted from deliberate policy actions. Something new, from a new 
Administration, is needed. A new deal, you might say. (Cassidy, “Bailing Out”) 
 
38
 “Dow Jones Industrial Average All-Time Largest One Day Gains and Losses,” Wall Street 
Journal, n.d., http://online.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/2_3024-djia_alltime.html.   
39
 Cassidy begins the article’s narrative by capturing the immediate moment, highlighting the 
roles of leading Democrats and Republicans (as well as their collusion of both parties with the 
financial firms responsible for the crisis) in a semi-mocking or sardonic manner:  
 
In the latest episode of the financial drama "Credit Crunch," the President, the Presidential 
candidates, and congressional leaders from both parties gather in the White House to agree on a 
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seven-hundred-billion-dollar bailout for the very financial firms whose greed and recklessness 
created the crisis. George W. Bush, perched between Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid and 
House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, is wearing a grim expression. Barack Obama also looks grave, but 
John McCain, who pretended to "suspend" his campaign before rushing back to Washington to 
help "solve" the crisis, is grinning broadly. Off camera, House Republican Leader John Boehner 
is threatening to sink the deal. (Cassidy, “Money Talks”) 
 
40
 “Money Talks” ends much in the manner it starts, with a jab at a Republican approach to the 
crisis which it sees as tantamount to depression-baiting.  The last sentence of the article reads “If 
this is any indication of how a potential McCain Administration would handle a banking crisis, 
now may be the time to start buying gold and stashing cash under the mattress.” (Cassidy, 
“Money Talks”). 
41
 The article “Car Talk” (December 8th, 2008) shares in common some elements present in both 
“Bailing Out” and “Money Talks” but also differs from these two articles in some important 
respects.  “Car Talk” begins by exploring the crisis of the big three American automakers found 
themselves in late 2008 by looking at the historical trajectory that is believed to have led them 
toward insolvency and in particular cites their resistance to change as the primary cause of their 
misfortunes.  This attempt to provide a historical context for a current state of crisis somewhat 
parallels how “Bailing Out” looks at the history of deregulation as the context and origin of the 
financial industry’s crisis in terms of how both articles look to history for insight into the present 
situation of crisis, however what the two find when they conduct that operation differs 
considerably.  Both “Car Talk” and “Money Talks” exhibit a degree of moral outrage at parties 
which are portrayed as most responsible for the crises at hand, but both also advocate 
government intervention even if it benefits such parties in order to avoid disastrous collapse.  
This support for the shoring up of the interests of unpopular parties for the sake of the great good 
is particularly evident in “Car Talk” when the catastrophic consequences of a failure of the 
automobile industry are sketched out.  The other article on the automobile industry bailouts, 
“The Road Ahead”, is a somewhat distinct article amongst the others in the bailout subcategory 
based on the fact that it was published on April 27
th
, 2009, over four full months after the initial 
extension of emergency funds in the waning days of the George W. Bush administration on 
December 19
th
, 2008.  On account of its date of publication being some distance removed from 
the initiation of the automobile industry bailouts instead of around the time a bailout was being 
considered (which was the case in the other three bailout articles) the “Road Ahead” has a 
retrospective dimension to it that is largely absent amongst the other three articles. 
42
 Steve Coll begins his article by writing “In 1934, President Franklin Roosevelt asked Frances 
Perkins, his Secretary of Labor, to draft a plan that might help Americans escape poverty in old 
age.” Coll goes on to immediately link this to Roosevelt’s wider attempt to create a new social 
structure that would serve as a bulwark against the impact of future major economic downturns.  
George Packer leads off his article with “In September, 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the 
Democratic nominee for President, was asked by a reporter for his view of the job that he was 
seeking.”  Packer then goes on to elaborate how this line of inquiry led to Roosevelt’s 
articulation of a particular vision of a United States that would define his presidency: that of an 
America in which the general interest would come before that of special interests, as well as one 
based on a liberalism that would not seek to resist the historical changes of the modern world yet 
which would seek to mediate the violence of their impact.   
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43
 Coll writes that “the next Presidency has within its reach at least two generation-spanning 
causes: the need to jump-start a new energy economy, and, in so doing, help to contain climate 
change; and the need to enact a plan to provide quality health care to all Americans, and, in so 
doing, complete the project of social insurance that Roosevelt described in 1935.” 
44
 George Packer, “The New Liberalism,” New Yorker, November 17, 2008, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/11/17/the-new-liberalism. 
45
 Packer depicts Obama’s victory as being one of truly historical proportions: 
 
 But November 4, 2008, is one of those infrequent dates when one historical age and one 
generation, with a distinct political and economic and cultural character, gave way to another 
age, another generation. The new era that is about to begin under President Obama will be more 
about public good than about private goods. The meal will be smaller, and have less interesting 
flavors, but it will be shared more fairly. The great American improvisation called democracy 
still bends along the curve of history. It has not yet finished astounding the world. (Packer, “The 
New Liberalism”) 
 
46
 Coll associates the crisis with the potential of lasting ideological change in America, writing 
that “embedded in this festival of emergency measures [taken in response to the economic 
crisis], however, is an important and possibly durable ideological shift.” (Coll, “The Test”) 
Packer takes a similar perspective in his emphasis that the crisis represents a moment of 
opportunity for change of a historic manner, writing that “for the first time since the Johnson 
Administration, the idea that government should take bold action to create equal opportunity for 
all citizens doesn't have to explain itself in a defensive mumble. That idea is ascendant in 2008 
because it answers the times.” 
47
 Packer’s portrayal of the Obama’s administration’s early performance is overwhelmingly 
favourable, as is evidenced by how the article’s opening paragraph lauds the administration’s 
performance under pressure in a plethora of areas: 
 
Another week, another earthquake. Having already signed a nearly eight-hundred-billion-dollar 
stimulus bill, restored the rule of law to America's treatment of detainees in its custody, 
developed plans to shore up the banking and housing sectors, demanded new regulation of 
private equity and hedge funds, proposed sweeping reforms in health care, energy, and 
education, and deepened the country's involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan, President 
Obama, in his tenth week in office, effectively put the government in charge of a large part of the 
automobile industry. And that was just Monday. By midweek, at the G-20 meeting in London, he 
had also committed the United States in principle to a new global regulatory framework for 
financial markets and, by some accounts, had resurrected the art of Presidential diplomacy. Then, 
on Thursday night, he won passage of a $3.5-trillion budget, whose tax and spending provisions 
mark the end of a long-term trend toward greater inequality. (Packer, “Obamaism”) 
 
48
 Packer puts the Obama administration’s intervention to save the U.S. automobile industry on a 
similar level to President Truman’s forced nationalization of the U.S. steel industry in 1952.  He 
pointedly says Truman’s action was undertaken “to avert a strike during wartime.” (Packer, 
“Obamaism”) and the implication is that the Obama administration has similarly acted in a 
decisive manner borne out of critical necessity. 
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49
 At the end of an opening anecdote concerning the devastating impact of the economic crisis in 
the town of Martinsville, Virginia, the strong sense of disappointment at the non-materialization 
of what seemed at first to be the dawning of a qualitatively new era in history for America is 
veritably palpable in “Obama’s Lost Year”.  Packer for example writes that “President Obama 
signed the Recovery Act on February 17, 2009. It was his first and, to date, only major 
legislative achievement.” (Packer, “Obama’s Lost Year”).  He then goes on to describe how the 
Rooseveltian visions of some liberal economists went unrealized (“They imagined something 
along the lines of the Works Progress Administration, which, within a year of its founding, in 
1935, had put three and a half million people to work.” [Packer, “Obama’s Lost Year”]).  A 
sense that the Obama administration has crucially missed an opportunity is established through 
the inviduals that Packer quotes in his article, and despite the clearly anti-Republican thrust 
present throughout the article. Packer even criticizes Obama’s communication and messaging 
capacities in comparison to Ronald Reagan: “His [Reagan’s] talent for phrasemaking and 
anecdote derived from having a strong world view: unlike Obama, he began with a set of ideas 
and found the evidence to match them and the words to dramatize them.” (Packer, “Obama’s 
Lost Year”) 
50
 For example, ‘Balancing Banks’ (April 6th 2009) examines the Obama administration’s dual 
attempt to stabilize the economy while simultaneously laying the groundwork to prevent future 
crises.  “Caveat Mortgagor” (July 6th 2009) discusses the pros and cons of the administration’s 
proposal for a Consumer Financial Protection Agency.  “Not Home Yet” (August 10th 2009) is 
on the subject of government policies enacted to slow the foreclosure epidemic.  “Masters of 
Main Street” (July 12th 2010) is a fairly tangential piece on the successful attempt of automobile 
dealers to avoid being included in the financial-reform bill that was about to go before Congress 
at that time.   
51
 Early on in the article “Harder Times” (March 16th 2009), John Cassidy takes a swipe at 
Republican attempts to spin the proposed 2010 budget negatively, saying “Republican jibes that 
the budget was "socialist" should be treated with the respect they deserve, which is to say none” 
(Cassidy, “Harder Times).  In a somewhat similar manner, the article “Second Helpings” 
(September 20
th
 2010) begins with an opening barb directed at Republicans, as author James 
Surowiecki sarcastically writes “Republicans, meanwhile, energetically set about decrying the 
plan as more of the same failed 'stimulus'  and as simply a ‘second stimulus’--as if the word itself 
were a damning indictment.” (Surowiecki, “Second Helpings”) 
52
 See for example the article “Soak The Very, Very Rich” (August 16, 2010).  While principally 
on the subjects on how disparities of wealth in America have been increasing at alarming rate 
and how the United States’ tax system could be reformed to be more fair through heavier 
taxation of the highest percentiles of wealth earners, the piece also takes a shot at ‘conservatives’ 
and Republican-friendly news media’s opposition to the Obama administration’s designs to raise 
taxes on the wealthy: 
 
Conservatives suggest that this threshold [of the Obama administration’s proposal to raise taxes 
on individuals earning more than 200,000$ a year and households earning more than a quarter of 
a million dollars annually] is far too low, and argue that Obama would be taxing mostly small-
business owners, or the people a Fox News host has referred to as "the so-called rich," rather 
than fat plutocrats.” (James Surowiecki, “Soak The Very, Very Rich”) 
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However, it should be kept in mind that some other articles that also focus on taxation and tax 
reform do not include such partisan-oriented references though they do sometimes make 
reference to socioeconomic unfairness in the tax code or to how certain tax policy can have an 
economically destabilizing effect on the economic system at large.  For example, the article 
“Special Interest” (March 15, 2010) by James Surowiecki takes issue with a tax code loophole 
that allows “money managers at privately held partnerships--like hedge and private-equity funds-
-to treat most of the money they make as capital gains rather than as ordinary income.” 
(Surowiecki, “Special Interest”).  Surowiecki’s point is that such a policy further financially 
benefits those in such lines of business (and whom are already usually amongst the top ranks of 
earners) at the expense of ordinary people.  Another article, “The Debt Economy”, makes the 
claim that the ability of companies to write off interest on debt and the ability of individuals to 
write off interest on their mortgages “gives the system what economists call a ‘debt bias.’” 
(Surowiecki, “The Debt Economy”) and also mentions that it has been estimated that “tax breaks 
make corporate debt as much as forty-two per cent cheaper than corporate equity” (Surowiecki, 
“The Debt Economy”), a policy which encourages corporations to leverage themselves to 
dangerous levels, as was the widespread case in the U.S. financial industry immediately prior to 
the crash in the fall of 2008.  While this article doesn’t specifically make a case that a tax policy 
which is generally tilted towards the taking on of debt benefits some parties (corporations or the 
wealthy) at the expense of others (the average person and those of lower socioeconomic class), 
this seems implied given the well-known fact that the federal government’s 2008 bailout of 
major financial institutions while leaving many individuals to face financial ruin stands as 
powerful testimony to who tends to bear the brunt of the suffering when the economic system at 
large starts to become destabilized. 
53
 This scene-establishing aspect is particularly apparent at the outset of both pieces.  
“Partisanship, by the Bye” starts off locating the scene of the action on Capitol Hill and uses a 
metaphor of heart failure to drive home the gravity of the situation concerning the partisan 
debating over just-passed economic stimulus bill (“the Capitol Hill confrontation that culminates 
this week in a signing ceremony for a historically unprecedented piece of legislation that will 
inject more than three-quarters of a trillion dollars' worth of adrenaline into America's fluttering 
economic heart”53 [Hertzberg, “Partisanship, by the Bye”]).  “The Empty Chamber” for its part 
locates the scene of activity on Capitol Hill in dramatic fashion through the highlighting of 
specifics of place and time to foster a sense of drama (“The Senators were in the Capitol, sunk 
into armchairs before the marble fireplace in the press lounge, which is directly behind the 
Senate chamber. It was four-thirty on a Wednesday afternoon.” [Packer, “The Empty 
Chamber”]) 
54
 Author Hendrik Hertzberg specifically associates the lack of bipartisanship with the actions of 
Republicans and the Republican Party.  For example, he writes that “In 1981, President Reagan's 
tax cuts passed with the help of forty-eight cross-party votes in the House and thirty-seven in the 
Senate. Obama's stimulus got zero and three, respectively.” (Hertzberg, “Partisanship, by the 
Bye”)  Hertzberg also portrays the Republican intransigence as being of a radical nature, as he 
mentions that the Republican party pressure that resulted in Republican Senator Judd Gregg 
withdrawing from the Secretary of Commerce the Obama administration had tapped him for as 
“another signal that Hill Republicans have opted for total war.” (Hertzberg, “Partisanship, by the 
Bye”)  To further drive his point home, Hertzberg cites that even a number of Republican 
governors supported Obama’s stimulus bill while their house colleagues opposed it en masse, 
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which leads to him stingingly write “A Republican governor, you might say, is sort of like a 
Republican congressman--except with actual responsibilities.” (Hertzberg, “Partisanship, by the 
Bye”) 
55
 For example, Hertzberg writes that, despite the urgency of the crisis and in contrast to 
Republicans’ lack of collegiality, Obama “found time for cordiality, inviting Republicans from 
both Houses of Congress to join him for cocktails, a Super Bowl party, and more cocktails.” 
(Hertzberg, “Partisanship, by the Bye”)  Hertzberg also considers Obama’s pursuit of 
bipartisanship a well-thought out strategy even in the face of Republican hyper-partisanship: 
 
Fifty years ago, the civil-rights movement understood that nonviolence can be an effective 
weapon even if--or especially if--the other side refuses to follow suit. Obama has a similarly 
tough-minded understanding of the political uses of bipartisanship, which, even if it fails as a 
tactic for compromise, can succeed as a tonal strategy: once the other side makes itself appear 
intransigently, destructively partisan, the game is half won. (Hertzberg, “Partisanship, by the 
Bye”) 
 
56
 A somewhat bemused and sarcastic tone sometimes seems present in Hertzberg’s ridiculing of 
the Republicans.  For example, with an element of dry wit he writes near the beginning of the 
article that during the debate on the stimulus bill that “On the Senate floor, the remarks of 
[Republican] Lindsey Graham, of South Carolina, provided evidence that an age of perpetual 
political peace had not yet dawned. ‘This bill stinks!’ Senator Graham exclaimed” (Hertzberg, 
“Partisanship, by the Bye”).  Hertzberg’s tone is mocking when he attacks both right-wing media 
and House Republicans, as is evident when he writes “After the Senate passed the stimulus, 
which Sean Hannity, on Fox News, denounced as ‘the European Socialist Act of 2009,’ Mitch 
McConnell, the Senate Republican leader, pronounced it ‘a dramatic move in the direction of 
indeed turning America into Western Europe.’” (Hertzberg, “Partisanship, by the Bye”) 
57
 After an introduction which lays out a detailed scene of a dysfunctional, non-functioning 
Senate whose operations have been hijacked by the obstructionist tactics of the Republican Party, 
Packer attacks the Republicans repeatedly and with vigor.   He goes so far as to equate their 
behaviour and motivations with the Wall Street financial firms widely held to have brought the 
United States’ economy to the brink of collapse, writing of the Republican exploitation of an 
antiquated nineteenth-century Senate regulation that “like investment bankers on Wall Street, 
[Republican] senators these days direct much of their creative energy toward the manipulation of 
arcane rules and loopholes, scoring short-term successes while magnifying their institution's 
broader dysfunction. (Packer, “The Empty Chamber”)  Packer’s scathing criticism of the 
Republicans is continued throughout the course of the article.  Amongst a bevy of charges he 
levels at the Republicans, he rails against how they have “have consistently consumed as much 
of the Senate's calendar as possible with legislative manoeuvring” (Packer, “The Empty 
Chamber”), and he also accuses them of deliberately opposing financial reform legislation for 
partisan purposes when he elaborates on how “[Republican Senate leader] McConnell presented 
a letter, signed by all forty-one Republicans, suggesting that they would filibuster the financial-
reform bill.” (Packer, “The Empty Chamber”) 
58
 Nick Paumgarten, “Freeze!,” New Yorker, October 20, 2008, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/10/20/freeze-2. 
59
 Ibid. 
353 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
60
 James Surowiecki, “Oil Check,” New Yorker, June 22, 2009, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/22/oil-check. 
61
 James Surowiecki, “Inflated Fears,” New Yorker, September 14, 2009, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/14/inflated-fears 
62
 James Surowiecki, “Blame Games,” New Yorker, August 2, 2010, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/08/02/blame-games 
63
 Heilbroner, The Making of Economic Society. 
64
 Koselleck, The Practice of Conceptual History, 237. 
65
 Nick Paumgarten, “In For It,” New Yorker, November 17, 2008, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/11/17/in-for-it 
 
66
 The article's opening passage, “If you came up with a list of obstacles to economic recovery in 
this country, it would include all the usual suspects--our still weak banking system, falling house 
prices, overindebted consumers, cautious companies”, (Surowiecki, “Fifty Ways To Kill 
Recovery”) comes off as rather dry and detached and is fairly representative of the article on the 
whole (the mention of a ‘list of obstacles’ in particular seems quite diagnostic).  Surowiecki 
avoids affective appeals and instead concentrates on pointing rather neutrally to the need for a 
policy approach that is best tailored towards the quickest reasonable restoration of economic 
growth through his focus on the nuts-and-bolts of the stimulus package, particularly the divisions 
of power and authority between the State and Federal levels of government. 
67
 For example, Surowiecki writes “we've now had three straight quarters of growth, and last 
month saw the creation of more than a hundred and fifty thousand jobs. That prompted the 
Harvard economist Jeff Frankel, a member of the committee that officially declares when 
recessions begin and end, to declare the downturn over.” (Surowiecki, “Timing the Recovery”) 
68
 James Surowiecki, “Timing the Recovery,” New Yorker, April 19, 2010, 36.  
69
 See the September 14
th
 2009 article “Inflated Fears”.  In it, Surowiecki write that “The Fed 
does have to make sure that the economy doesn't go careering off the road. But let's wait until the 
car is actually moving forward before we worry about applying the brakes.” (Surowiecki, 
“Inflated Fears”)  Also, see the January 11th 2010 article “After the Blowup” in which economist 
Charles Posner is quoted as saying “We are learning from it [the crisis] that we need a more 
active and intelligent government to keep our model of a capitalist economy from running off the 
rails” (Cassidy, “After the Blowup”). 
70
 The article “Blame Games” (August 2, 2010) is a good example of this.  The article discusses 
the tepid state of the U.S. economy close to two years after the events of the fall of 2008, citing 
low rates of business investment and job growth, and after commenting on a variety of economic 
indicators ultimately cites an uncertain economic climate on the whole as the reason why 
businesses are withholding cash and holding off on hiring.  It also makes the case that such a 
state of affairs will hold for the short term, that “there are few signs that this is going to change 
any time soon: consumer demand remains weak, economic indicators--inflation rates, consumer 
confidence, the stock market, bond rates--aren't forecasting a quick return to boom times” (James 
Surowiecki, “Blame Games”).  In a somewhat related manner, the article “Inconspicuous 
Consumption” (October 12, 2009) also provides a perspective of the moment on the state of the 
American economy but does so through discussing how, despite the occurrence of recession and 
a rhetoric of a new age of austerity in America amongst pundits, consumer spending has actually 
not dropped as much as expected and that the lion’s share of the drop in consumer spending that 
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is actually evident is overwhelmingly concentrated in two areas: new car purchases and rates of 
gasoline consumption.  A key difference between “Inconspicuous Consumption” and “Blame 
Games”, however, is that the former article frames the crisis of 2008 in a historical context, 
offering commentary on its impact on consumer spending and attitudes in reference to that of the 
Great Depression, the 1990-1991 recession, and the dotcom bust, arguing that the beliefs of some 
pundits and commentators that Americans had or would become more frugal, due to the 
economic impact of these events, were in retrospect either plainly inaccurate (in reference to the 
1990-1991 recession and the dotcom bust) or mostly invented and mythologized (for example 
the article asserts that “the notion that the Depression turned Americans into tightwads is largely 
a myth.” [Surowiecki, “Inconspicuous Consumption”])    
71
 For further evidence of a pro-Keynesian approach in The New Yorker, two articles are of 
particular relevance.  First, refer to the article “After the Blowup” (January 11, 2009) by John 
Cassidy.  Focused on the history of the Chicago School and how the merits of the ideas chiefly 
associated with it (such as the ‘efficient-markets hypothesis’ and ‘rational-expectations theory’) 
have suffered a loss of credibility and influence in the wake of the crisis, the article on several 
occasions mentions the revival of interest in the writing of Keynes due to the crisis, to the point 
where some formerly fairly orthodox adherents of the Chicago School’s tenets who are 
interviewed in the article, such as economist Richard Posner, are spoken of as apostates who are 
converted to Keynes.  Indeed, several points offered in this article can be seen as either implicit 
or explicit endorsements of Keynesianism or its constituent elements.  Second, refer to “The 
Deflationist” (March 1, 2010) by Larissa MacFarquhar.  This lengthy article centers on the figure 
of economist Paul Krugman and briefly details the influence on Keynesian ideas on Krugman’s 
early development as an economist.  Krugman’s use of Keynes in lambasting those in his 
profession for having failed to see the crisis of 2008 coming is highlighted in particular, as is 
evidenced through the pointing out of how Krugman outlined in his September 2009 article, 
“How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?”, that the failure of certain schools of economic thought 
to anticipate the crisis was because they “had forgotten the Depression, forgotten what Keynes 
had said about the resemblance of financial markets to casinos.” (MacFarquhar, “The 
Deflationist”) 
72
 Nick Paumgarten, “Wiz Bucks,” New Yorker, September 29, 2008, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/09/29/wiz-bucks. 
73
 Paumgarten writes that Wall Street’s techno-fetishism was not the science it believed it to be, 
that “it was more like what anthropologists and psychologists call magical thinking--the 
tendency to believe that wishing it so makes it so.” (Paumgarten, “Wiz Bucks”)  He goes on to 
associate this with what he sees as a further and further detachment from grounded reality on 
Wall Street due to misguided faith in the power and reliability of increasingly complex, 
computer-mediated abstract models, stating that “over the past thirty years, Wall Street has 
honed the art of creating and selling financial products with an increasingly tenuous connection 
to reality.” (Paumgarten, “Wiz Bucks”) 
74
 Paumgarten writes of credit default swaps that “The question of their worth has mystified even 
the druids who created them, especially because, it turns out, the swaps haven't really insured 
against anything. They are like Wiz bucks, in a world without the Wiz” (Paumgarten, “Wiz 
Bucks”).  
75
 In the last paragraph of the article, Paumgarten rips into the financial industry and what he sees 
as the enormous social damage done by their sorcery: 
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Magical thinking enables you to see good where there may be only bad, and it is tempting to try 
out a little magic on this mess. For example: let's postulate that the collapse of the financial-
services industry spells catastrophe for New York City, a return to the nineteen-seventies. Lost 
tax revenues, budgetary shortfalls, unemployment (not only of those in finance but of the hordes 
who rely on them), plunging property values, vanished retirement accounts. Let's cut this up, like 
a pile of bad debt, into various strips, and, as the rating agencies did to various slices of 
subprime-mortgage debt, take the top layer and, abracadabra, rate it triple A. Throw out the other 
strips, the grim probabilities--the crime, the decaying infrastructure, the hardship all around, the 
heroin and the syphilis. What do we have left? The bright side: maybe Manhattan will become 
affordable again, and cool, and dangerous. Dangerous in theory, but not to you or your family 
and friends. Dirty, but in a good way. Night clubs where anything goes. Art, music, Billy Martin. 
(Paumgarten, “Wiz Bucks”) 
 
76
 “Too Clever by Half?” was published on May 17th, 2010, almost exactly twenty months after 
Lehman Brothers filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on September 15
th
 2008.  After 
unfavourably comparing the ‘innovations’ of Wall Street to the much-lauded innovations of 
Silicon Valley, Surowiecki ends the opening section of the article in a sarcastic manner by 
referring to Congress’ looming attempt at Wall Street reform legislation, writing “Not 
surprisingly, then, the whole notion of ‘financial innovation’ is being looked at with a gimlet eye, 
and Congress is now considering various ways to rein in the banking industry's excesses.  Given 
the tumult of the past few years, the barter system is starting to look good.” (Surowiecki, “Too 
Clever by Half?”) 
77
 Surowiecki essentially establishes a narrative of how various financial innovations ended up 
either backfiring or were misused, and thus contributed to the crisis: 
 
Unfortunately, the benefits of good financial innovations have, of late, been swamped by the 
costs of the ones that went bad. Things like "structured investment vehicles," for instance, were 
designed to evade regulations and make bank balance sheets look safer than they were. Subprime 
loans, which offered lower-income Americans a rare chance to accumulate wealth, ended up 
inflating the housing bubble and leaving these same people with debts they couldn't pay. Credit-
default swaps, which are a useful way for investors to protect themselves against unavoidable 
risks, became a way for institutions like A.I.G. to make easy money in the short term while 
piling up billions of dollars in potential obligations that taxpayers ended up paying for. And 
securitization--the packaging of many loans into a single complex financial product--led 
investors to neglect the quality of the actual loans that were being made. (Surowiecki, “Too 
Clever by Half?”) 
 
78
 Surowiecki highlights the role of innovation in concealing risk, arguing that “if investors had 
known the risks they were taking in the pursuit of greater returns, they would have been more 
prepared for failure--and would presumably have put less money into the housing market. 
Instead, they thought that financial wizardry had engineered all the danger out of the system.” 
(Surowiecki, “Too Clever by Half”) 
79
 James Surowiecki, “Too Clever by Half?,” New Yorker, May 17, 2010, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/05/17/too-clever-by-half. 
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80
 Taking a long historical view of the development of the financial industry in the United States 
in “Monsters Inc.”, Surowiecki cites three successive transformative revolutions, each which 
required increased banking involvement, as the explanation for how the U.S. financial industry 
came to occupy such a position of prominence in the American economy and by extension how it 
was able to wield such a disproportionate weight in the run-up to the crisis of 2008.  The article 
makes the case that the three modern booms in banking in the United States were in response to 
wide, historic changes in business and society but that the banking boom which fuelled the 
housing bubble “was unique, and uniquely awful.” (Surowiecki, “Monsters Inc.”)  Surowiecki 
doesn’t fail to acknowledge that other booms also led to busts, but he differentiates them from 
the housing bubble boom because “along the way they made the economy more productive and 
more innovative in a lasting way.” (Surowiecki, “Monsters Inc.”)  By contrast, of the housing 
boom he asserts “Banking grew bigger and more profitable. But all we got in exchange was acres 
of empty houses in Phoenix.” (Surowiecki, “Monsters Inc.”) 
81
 Nicola Clarke, “Ex-Trader’s Pilgrimage Culminates in Jail Cell,” New York Times, May 18, 
2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/19/business/international/convicted-trader-resumes-his-
trek-toward-prison.html 
82
 Author James B. Stewart makes the Kerviel case is symptomatic of the problems which caused 
the crisis, arguing that in retrospect “Kerviel looks even less like an isolated rogue trader, and 
more like a harbinger of systemic failure: the intricate investing vehicles that few understood; the 
impotence of internal risk controls; the moral blindness in the face of mounting profits; and, 
above all, greed.” (Stewart, “The Omen”) 
83
 This overall inclination towards laying blame at the systemic level in the article seems 
evidenced by its considerable weighting of the testimony of a court-appointed psychologist’s 
opinion that Kerviel was not psychologically abnormal in any way and that there was nothing in 
particular in his character that would explain his alleged criminal activities: “In short, there was 
nothing aberrational about Kerviel that might account for his behavior.” (Stewart, “The Omen”) 
84
 The article’s last paragraph is very revealing in this regard: 
 
 "I accept my share of responsibil-ity, which I don't deny," Kerviel told the psychologist. "But it 
must be acknowledged that I was not alone in this thing, that my superiors were indulgent toward 
my activities, and that the responsibility is not mine alone." He also noted, "When you're used to 
making five hundred thousand euros every day, at some point it becomes normal. The results, the 
numbers, become banal. You're happy, but it makes less of an effect on you. It's not an ego thing. 
There are people in the company who are far more brilliant than I am. I was one of the most 
discreet about results. Truly, my goal was just to increase activity." (Stewart, “The Omen”) 
 
85
 The framing of Mozilo early in the article as having come from humble origins – that “Angelo 
Mozilo started working in his father's butcher shop, in the Bronx, when he was ten years old.” 
(Bruck, “Angelo’s Ashes) – is a clear sign of a narrative of the rise to and descent from greatness 
and esteem being deployed, and there are many other instances of such in the article to support 
this contention. 
86
 Bruck explains that Bank of America announced that it would buy Countrywide on January 
11, 2008, and that the amount of money offered for the ailing firm was four billion dollars in 
stock, which was only a sixth of Countrywide’s value before the subprime crisis. 
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87
 Bruck argues that the dramatic cutting of interest rates by the Federal Reserve in 2001 
unleashed such a boom in the mortgage-lending market that “Mozilo and some of his executives 
believed they were in a new era, in which limits had become obsolete.” (Bruck, “Angelo’s 
Ashes”) 
88
 See for example the articles “Been There” by Jeffrey Toobin (October 27th, 2008), “The Pay 
Problem” by David Owen (October 12th, 2009).  The former article highlights systemic problems 
in its discussion of how A.I.G. came to be in need of a federal government bailout, with Toobin 
arguing that “A.I.G., basically, had to go begging for cash because of the collapse of its London-
based financial-products division, whose large credit-default-swap business prompted losses far 
in excess of the unit's relatively small part of the over-all company.” (Toobin, “Been There”).  
The latter article discusses the problems of executive pay being linked to performance criteria as 
a contributing cause of large scale systemic failure, such as was the case in the subprime 
mortgage crisis.  On the subject of conditions related to executive pay contributing to systemic 
instability, Owen writes that “as recent experience has shown, payment strategies have the power 
to upend national economies. The subprime-mortgage crisis was driven in part by a 
compensation structure that rewarded the quantity of loan transactions rather than the quality.” 
(Owen, “The Pay Problem”) 
89
 Nick Paumgarten, “Goldman Trust,” New Yorker, October 6, 2008, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/10/06/goldman-trust. 
90
 Paumgarten writes that the humiliating status change of Goldman Sachs represented a fall of 
of epic proportions for the firm: 
 
On Sunday, Goldman, along with Morgan Stanley, had announced that it was changing its status 
from an investment bank to a more traditional bank holding company [...] It had done so, as well, 
in desperation. Its stock had been hammered; the market was in a panic. [...] It would no longer 
be your father's Goldman, the one your mother dreamed that you'd work for, even if she said she 
didn't. Instead, it would be a Goldman that might give your mother a free toaster in exchange for 
her opening a checking account. (Paumgarten, “Goldman Trust”) 
 
91
 Paumgarten specifcally and sarcastically highlights the incestuous character of the relationship 
between Goldman Sachs (as representative of the financial industry at large) and governments 
and institutions of government: 
 
[Goldman Sachs C.E.O.] Blankfein noted the ubiquity of ex-Goldmanites in Washington--at the 
Treasury, in the White House--and in foreign governments and various other august institutions. 
(He neglected to mention Charlie Haas, the Goldman broker turned professional wrestler.) This 
well-placed array, which outsiders might mistake for evidence of conspiracy or conflicted 
interest, was, in Blankfein's rendering, a reassurance that a familiar kind of character and 
competence would have a hand in whatever was to come. (Paumgarten, “Goldman Trust”) 
 
92
 Kate Julian, “Makeover,” New Yorker, April 13, 2009, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/04/13/makeover. 
93
 Julian wryly comments on the greatly reduced fortunes of the hedge fund industry: “this 
having been almost as bad a year for hedge funds as for charity galas, things had been scaled 
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back a bit. 2008: black tie optional, filet-mignon sit-down dinner. 2009: business attire, mini-hot 
dogs on trays, hot buffet, free-for-all seating.” (Julian, “Makeover”) 
94
 At the beginning of the article it is pointed out that Davis originally conceived of founding 
such as charity/P.R. dinner in the late 1990s after the widespread negative press the financial 
industry received following collapse of the hedge fund Long Term Capital in 1998.  Julian 
describes how “Davis felt that his volunteer P. R. effort was more urgent than ever.  ‘This’, he 
said, referring to the current financial crisis, ‘is like multiples of that'--the collapse of Long Term 
Capital—‘in terms of the damage it's done to the businesses, to the perception of them.’” (Julian, 
“Makeover”) 
95
 McGrath associates the two directly and unambiguously: “Last month, during the Senate 
Finance Committee hearings in Washington, a group of would-be reformers assembled at B Bar 
& Grill, in the East Village, to celebrate business ethics.” (McGrath, “The Oath”) 
96
 Of the conspicuous absence of the book’s two authors from the book launch gathering, 
McGrath’s sarcasm is less than subtle: 
 
One of the book's co-authors, an investment analyst named Peter Escher, couldn't make it to the 
party. He had just got engaged, and was on his way to Alabama to spend time with his future in-
laws. His was the disembodied voice, speaking through the cell phone of his co-author, Max 
Anderson. Anderson was struggling with competing claims on his behavior, too. He had signed 
the book contract for “The Oath” before taking a job at an asset-management fund that asked 
him, in essence, to refrain from speaking publicly about business. "I want to honor the spirit of 
the contract I have with them," he said, referring to his fund, not to his publisher, in the course of 
asking that he not be quoted talking about the book he'd just written. (From "The Oath": "I will 
understand and uphold, both in letter and spirit, the laws and contracts governing my own 
conduct and that of my enterprise.") (Ben McGrath, “The Oath”) 
 
97
 McGrath clearly exploits the attendee’s partial defence of Tourre to mock his intelligence: 
 
Another supporter of the movement was reluctant to condemn Fabrice Tourre, the thirty-one-
year-old Goldman V.P. who had referred to himself, in an infamous e-mail, as Fabulous Fab, 
while admitting to creating "highly leveraged, exotic trades," or "monstruosities," without 
considering their full implications. "Fabulous Fab didn't think, I'm going to be Fabulous Fab," 
the supporter said. "It happened because of the situation." Surely "The Oath" could accommodate 
a stricture against the doing of "shitty deals," no? "I think 'shitty deals' is, like, passing judgment 
already," he said. "Why not preach things that are positive? This is a very glass-half-full type of 
mentality." He compared the movement to D.A.R.E.--"like what we used to sign when we were 
in middle school." 
 
98
 McGrath’s criticism is particularly sardonic here: 
 
Dan Moon, a recent medical-school graduate who got his Harvard M.B.A. last year, said. "If you 
go back a hundred and fifty years, and you look at how medicine used to be practiced, it was not 
up to the professional standards that the Hippocratic oath espouses." He then conceded that the 
Hippocratic oath is more than two thousand years old, which would suggest that it will be a long 
time yet before business does no harm. (Ben McGrath, “The Oath”) 
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99
 For example, “Scandals” (May 3rd, 2010) is an article that again takes aim at wrongdoings and 
alleged wrongdoings of the financial industry.  Goldman Sachs is again the primary target, with 
the author focusing on the conflict-of-interest scandal regarding Goldman Vice-President Fabrice 
Tourre, the author of the notorious ‘shitty deal’ email mentioned in “The Oath”.  “Scandals” 
does however ultimately make the argument that faulty federal regulation of the banking sector, 
essentially providing tacit federal backing to financial companies that were engaging in highly 
questionable practices was, above and beyond particular scandals such as that involving Touree’s 
role in Goldman Sachs betting against the very same products it sold its investors, the 
fundamental problematic issue.  It is according to this argument that author John Cassidy writes 
“What we have had, in effect, is a government-guaranteed and taxpayer-subsidized casino 
industry piggybacked onto the legitimate banking sector. That is the real scandal.” (Cassidy, 
“Scandals”) 
100
 Six articles were published in The New Yorker on the subject of the Madoff scandal over the 
period of analysis.  Despite this number of articles being present, the news pieces on the Madoff 
scandal were ultimately not classified as either an article category or subcategory in this study.  
There were two primary reasons for this decision.  First, the rather specific and restricted topical 
focus of the Madoff scandal put it at odds with the more broad-based spirit of the other 
categories and subcategories in the study.  Second and related, five of the six articles on the 
Madoff scandal were published in the rather short period between January 12
th
 2009 and March 
23
rd
 2009 (a period which roughly corresponds to the scandal’s emergence and Madoff’s first 
court appearances), indicating a rather a fairly fleeting focus on it in the pages of The New 
Yorker.  This quite limited temporal focus also made the articles on the Madoff scandal, as a 
grouping, qualitatively different from the other categories and subcategories of the study.  
Overall, the impression left is that the particular nature of the coverage of the Madoff scandal 
was shaped by a combination of its sensational nature and the fact that it was based so 
specifically in the context of New York and Wall Street, making it a kind “scandal at ground 
zero (of the financial crisis)”.  While some of the articles on this story in The New Yorker are 
fairly substantial, many appear somewhat tangential (in the sense that several of them use the 
Madoff scandal as their overarching context while the actual content of the article doesn’t really 
focus strongly on the scandal itself) and it seems to be the case that these tangential pieces most 
strongly bear the mark of locality in their referencing of New York and the New York area.  For 
example, the majority of “Family Jewels” (January 12th, 2009), an article about suckered Madoff 
investors selling off their jewelry (the scandal itself is quite in the background of the article’s 
narrative), is firmly situated in mid-town New York (one description in the article outlines how 
“Back in midtown [New York City], business was brisk at the Madison Avenue headquarters of 
CIRCA, a jewelry-buying firm, where Madoff-related jewels had been incoming all month, like 
expensive shrapnel.” [Widdicombe, “Family Jewels”]).  Likewise, a gathering “at the YIVO 
Institute for Jewish Research, on West Sixteenth Street” (Widdicombe, “Thief or Crook?”) is the 
setting of the short article “Thief or Crook?”, another piece in which the actual Madoff scandal is 
definitively in the background of the narrative while a debate amongst a group of Jewish 
intellectuals over the particular nature of Bernie Madoff’s alleged crimes over the course of a 
panel entitled ‘Madoff: A Jewish Reckoning.’ is at the forefront.   Two other articles, “Paper 
Chase” (March 2nd, 2009) and “Cleaned Out” (November 9th, 2009), follow a quite similar 
pattern.  The story of “Paper Chase” is focused on how a bunch of discarded Madoff-related 
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documents are traced back to the person to which they were originally issued and is also clearly 
situated in the New York City area (the boxes are found in Long Island City, and the person to 
which they were issued to was a Manhattan resident, Juliet Nierenberg).  In “Cleaned Out”, the 
New York City area location in which the narrative is set at a launch party for a poetry book 
penned by a bilked Madoff investor which is taking place at an “apartment in the Flatiron 
district” (Mead, “Cleaned Out”).  “Cleaned Out”, like the other Madoff scandal-related articles 
already mentioned, essentially uses the scandal as a backdrop to the scene of the gathering at the 
apartment as well as to contextualize the spiritual transformation of fraud victim/author Kim 
Rosen.  The two other articles on the Madoff scandal that have yet to be detailed  here – “Madoff  
and his Models” (March 23rd, 2009) and “The Dolor of Money” (March 23rd, 2009) – are 
distinguishable from the other four Madoff scandal-related articles on account of the fact that 
their narratives focus a great deal more on Madoff himself and the swindle he presided over.  
“Madoff and his Models” is an article that discusses the historical precedents of figures engaged 
in frauds paralleling those committed by Madoff (such as Charles Ponzi and Ivar Kreuger: the 
latter in particular is discussed at length), and the piece ends in a cautionary morality tale which 
effectively links the Madoff scandal to scandals past (“And so the saga of Ivar Kreuger presents 
a credible explanation of how giant Ponzi enterprises come about that huge Ponzi schemes arise 
“not as sudden inspirations of criminal masterminds but as the gradual culmination of small 
moral compromises made by financiers who aren't quite as ingenious as they think.” [Chernow, 
“Madoff and his Models”]) “The Dolor Of Money” for its part details Madoff’s March 12th 2009 
appearance at a federal courthouse in lower Manhattan at which he pleaded guilty to the eleven 
charges read against him, with author Nancy Franklin lambasting Madoff’s supposed 
contriteness during his appearance as insincere and self-serving (“Yet in this very statement, 
designed to clear the air, was language that betrayed even more lies, deceit, and pathological 
self-righteousness.” [Franklin, “The Dolor of Money]). 
101
 Ohio was amongst the top ten U.S. States with the highest foreclosure rates in 2008 
(RISMedia, “Foreclosure Activity Increase 81% in 2008,” January 15, 2009, 
http://rismedia.com/2009-01-15/foreclosure-activity-increases-81-in-2008/.) and Akron itself had 
ranked 12
th
 on a list of the metropolitan areas hit hardest by the foreclosure crisis in 2007, having 
a foreclosure rate of 2.326% (Ben Rooney, “Rust and Sun Belt Cities Lead ’07 Foreclosures,” 
CNN, February 13, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/02/12/real_estate/realtytrac/.) 
102
 Peter Boyer, “Eviction,” New Yorker, November 24, 2008, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/11/24/eviction-2.  
103
 Ibid. 
104
 Ibid. 
105
 One of the loans against her home Polk had been goaded into taking was schedule to be paid 
off in 2034 – Polk was 86 though at the time of signing, meaning whoever issued the loan knew 
that she had no prospect of paying it off in her lifetime. 
106
 Adair had been recruited by Akron city council president, Marco Sommerville, to be the head 
of a task force looking into predatory lending.  Adair’s long history in the real estate business is 
used in the article to discuss the major changes in the home mortgage lending market in the 
United States over the past three decades, particularly the extension of programs to help those 
formerly denied home loans and how these ended up being exploited by the predatory practices 
of the mortgage industry in the period leading up to the crisis. 
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107
 Peter Boyer, “Eviction,” New Yorker, November 24, 2008, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/11/24/eviction-2. 
108
 Packer opens the article by referencing the large scale construction of homes in Florida during 
the boom years: “All along State Road 54 in Pasco County, Florida--forty-five minutes northeast 
of Tampa--the pine trees and palmettos and orange groves have been cleared to make way for 
new developments.” (Packer, “The Ponzi State”) 
109
 George Packer, “The Ponzi State,” New Yorker, February 9, 2009, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/02/09/the-ponzi-state.  
110
 Ibid. 
111
 Tad Friend, “Cash for Keys,” New Yorker, April 6, 2009, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/04/06/cash-for-keys. 
112
 One particularly example of this is a darkly humorous listing of the ‘complications’ Nordine 
has come across in the course of his work: 
 
There is often a complication: the second house on a property in Lawndale that somehow 
vanished; the duplex in Compton where a neighbor donned a black mask to frighten off buyers; 
the doctor in Burbank who broke into his town house, brandished a knife at one of Nordine's 
field representatives, filed legal motions, and warned the bank's lawyer, "There will be blood." 
(Tad Friend, “Cash for Keys”) 
 
 This listing of the clearly dysfunctional as almost normal-like occurrences and calling them 
‘complications’ has the effect of making them seem like routine parts of Nordine’s job.   
113
 Tad Friend, “Cash for Keys,” New Yorker, April 6, 2009, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/04/06/cash-for-keys. 
114
 A particularly memorable passage in the article describes how “A makeshift memorial stood 
inside the front gate [of one house]: dead flowers, a plush toy dog, a baby rattle. ‘This is one 
where someone was murdered, which never helps it sell,’ he added. Squatters had been here for a 
time; the toilet was caked with dried feces and the kitchen had been plundered.” (Tad Friend, 
“Cash For Keys”) 
115
 Surowiecki writes in the article that “It's harder and harder to find and keep a job, but if 
you've got one you may well be making more than you did twelve months ago.” (Surowiecki, 
“Nice Work If You Can Get It”) 
116
 James Surowiecki, “Nice Work If You Can Get It,” New Yorker, March 2, 2009, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/03/02/nice-work-if-you-can-get-it. 
117
 Ibid. 
118
 Lizzie Widdicombe, “Take Two,” New Yorker, May 4, 2009, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/05/04/take-two-2. 
119
 This seems to take on various manifestations, sometimes more-or-less detectably sarcastic, 
and other times fairly allusive.  On the sarcastic side, there is the description of some the former 
Wall Street workers less than brilliant statements concerning themselves in the applications they 
had submitted to try to get accepted into the school (one applicant is quoted as having written on 
his application that “My strengths lie in customer service/support. My other big strength is in 
being a ‘right hand man’” [Lizzie Widdiecombe, “Take Two”]) and on the allusive side there is 
their failure in the simulation business game that is part of the program’s training.  Another 
allusion that evidences the article’s hostility to Wall Street and the now unemployed Wall Street 
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workers is a passage near the end of the article where one participant tells another who has just 
explained his failed attempt to start up a T-shirt business after losing his job “You have to have a 
gimmick.” (Lizzie Widdicombe, “Take Two).  Reading between the lines and taking into account 
the overall tone of the article, the suggestion here may be that Wall Street practices in the lead up 
to the crisis in general were ‘gimmicks’ insofar as they were based on trickery and without 
substance. 
120
 “Cracks in the Crust,” Economist, December 11, 2008, 
http://www.economist.com/node/12762027. 
121
 For example, Parker writes on one occasion “By the start of 2008, it had become clear that 
international investors were rattled, that they would not be renewing their lending, and that a 
great deal of money would be flowing out of the country” (Parker, “Lost”).   On another 
occasion in the article, he writes somewhat similarly “Lehman Brothers failed in mid-September, 
and banks around the world stopped lending to one another. Glitnir, the smallest of the main 
Icelandic banks, saw a liquidity crisis looming.” (Parker, “Lost”) 
122
 For example, early in the article, Prime Minister Geir Haarde’s ‘God bless Iceland’ speech of 
October 6
th
 2008 is mentioned as having “formally brought to an end its giddy years of growth--
an era now remembered for Range Rover traffic jams, and private parties featuring Elton John.” 
(Parker, “Lost”), and there are other references of such a kind scattered throughout the article as 
well such as one interviewee referring to the Reykjavik road running outside the building 
housing the headquarters of Kaupthing – one of Iceland’s three major banks (which all 
collapsed) – as “The Boulevard of Broken Dreams” (Parker, “Lost”), while another interviewee 
(who had been convicted of embezzlement after being exposed for using his company’s credit 
card for lavish personal spending sprees) is described by the article as drawing “a hesitant line 
between his experience and his country's: delusion, denial, followed by an upheaval that brought 
clarity” (Parker, “Lost”). 
123
 Surowiecki writes extensively on how differing past experiences of severe economic crises 
have deeply affected American and European attitudes regarding how to deal them: 
 
Furthermore, there seems to be an underlying difference in psychology. Americans talk a good 
game about the need for balanced budgets and fiscal responsibility, but we've proved ourselves 
happy to borrow trillions in order to maintain our life styles. And, while Americans hate 
inflation, they love economic growth more: the Federal Reserve's mission is not just to fight 
inflation but also to maximize employment. Europe runs a much tighter ship: if an E.U. member 
has a deficit of greater than three per cent of G.D.P., it's subject to disciplinary action. And the 
European Central Bank has only one mandate: keep inflation low. (Surowiecki, “Continental 
Drift”) 
 
124
 Surowiecki writes that “If European and American policymakers seem, in their public 
statements, to be dealing with two very different financial crises, it's because, in some sense, they 
are.” (Surowiecki, “Continental Drift”) 
125
 Surowiecki’s use of the word ‘our’ in the following passage and his appeal to fairness 
evidences a pro-American bias: “a good chunk of our [American] stimulus package will buy 
other countries' goods. So Europeans can avoid getting too deeply into debt and still reap some 
of the benefits of our borrowing. This is unfair: in effect, Europe is refusing to carry its share of 
the global economic burden and is piggybacking on us.” (Surowiecki, “Continental Drift”)  He 
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does however qualify this position somewhat in his very next sentence, stating that “In some 
sense, we [the United States] need economic growth more than Europe does. It's not surprising 
that we're going to be the ones who end up paying for it.” (Surowiecki, “Continental Drift”) 
126
 James Surowiecki, “Debtor States,” New Yorker, April 12, 2010, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/04/12/debtor-states. 
127
 On this subject, Surowiecki writes “For all this, though, the comparison has been overblown. 
Our states' debt burden, while sizable, is far more manageable than that of the PIIGS, which owe 
three times as much relative to G.D.P. as American state and local governments.” (Surowiecki, 
“Debtor States”) 
128
 James Surowiecki, “Debtor States,” New Yorker, April 12, 2010, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2010/04/12/debtor-states. 
129
 Ibid. 
130
 ‘Hanging Tough’ (April 20th, 2009) discusses how companies tend to take a conservative 
approach to obtaining more market share in recessionary times by generally avoiding 
acquisitions and reducing their research and development budgets (despite some notable 
examples to the contrary, such as Chrysler’s aggressive market share move of introducing the 
Plymouth brand early in the Great Depression).  The article concludes by postulating that the 
continuance of this kind of corporate approach during the latest economic crisis is because “most 
companies are far more worried about sinking the boat than about missing it.” (Surowiecki, 
“Hanging Tough”) 
131
 ‘Greater Fools’ discusses the topic of ‘financial illiteracy’ in the United States and calls for 
the implementation of various measures to combat what it sees as a growing problem.  
Surowiecki argues that “Financial illiteracy isn't new, but the consequences have become more 
severe, because people now have to take so much responsibility for their financial lives.” 
(Surowiecki, “Greater Fools”) 
132
 Paumgarten writes of the tendency of looking back in history to the Great Depression in the 
American popular imagination of economic crises but says this is ultimately a misguided fantasy, 
writing that “In the mind's eye, we tend to populate our recessionary streets with squad cars 
painted green, cat's-eyed ambulances, and other anachronisms--"Fort Apache, the Bronx: The 
Remake." But, really, the city will probably just look the way it does now.” (Paumgarten, “The 
Pits”) 
133
 Nick Paumgarten, “The Pits,” New Yorker, December 8th, 2008, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2008/12/08/the-pits. 
134
 Ibid. 
135
 McGrath writes that the scene of the Vermont Independence Convention was one of “an 
assemblage of nearly two hundred neo-Luddites and anarchists and socialists and freegans and 
steampunks and homeschoolers and folksingers and knitters and yak farmers”. (McGrath, “The 
Dystopians”) 
136
 Lizzie Widdicombe, “Ayn Crowd,” New Yorker, April 13, 2009, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/04/13/ayn-crowd.  
137
 For example, near the end of the article Widdicombe appears to mock the group’s assertion 
that when civilization collapses they would “just have to organize an Objectivist gang [...]We'll 
call ourselves the Galts.” (Wizziecombe, “Ayn Crowd”).  ‘John Galt’ is the name of the 
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